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1 Self Sells. On Augustine’s Putting Personified 
Voices into Writing 
et voluptate ad fidem ducitur[.] 
Quintilian (Inst. Orat. 3–5. 278, 4.2.119) 
In Book VIII of his Confessions, at the crux of the entire endeavor—as regards 
the literary composition, the life and self it is to reflect—Augustine introduces 
“Chastity [‘continentiae’]” personified as having “appeared [‘aperiebatur’]” to 
him (Conf. 1–8. 404–405, VIII.11.27).1 Twice the orator ventriloquizes in writing 
what she might say (“quasi diceret”, iterated)—and is then careful to clarify (in 
forensic terms): “ista controversia in corde meo non nisi de me ipso adversus 
me ipsum” (“[t]his debate took place within my heart; it was myself arguing 
against myself”, Conf. 1–8. 406–407, VIII.11.27; cf. 406n.).2 Said envisioned 
|| 
1 In a context declaring a (previously) prodigal use of his God-given “intellectual ability” (“de 
ingenio meo, munere tuo”, Conf. 1–8. 48–49, I.17.27), Augustine mentions performing a 
prosopopoiía with allocutio during his student years, detailing the resp. oratorico-theatrical 
process as follows: “A task [‘negotium’] was assigned to me […]. It was to perform the speech of 
Juno when she was angry and hurt […], words that I had never heard Juno utter. Instead we 
were obliged to go astray by following the footsteps of poetical inventions [‘figmentorum 
poeticorum’], and to declaim in prose something similar to what the poet [sc. Vergil] had 
written in verse. The one who was displaying a more realistic [‘similior’] impression of anger 
and hurt in defending the honor of the character being delineated [‘adumbratae personae’] 
(using appropriate words to clothe the ideas [‘verbis sententias congruenter vestientibus’]) was 
the one whose speech won the most praise” (Conf. 1–8. 48–49, I.17.27; cf. Lanham “Instruction” 
85: “Augustine […] describes being made to impersonate an angry goddess Juno in an exercise 
of ethopoeia”; see “Composition” 121). The young Augustine outperformed everyone—a 
triumph for which the mature writer has only contempt, albeit rather ostensively so (cf. Conf. 1–
8. 49, I.17.27). Seeing that the basic procedure outlined for the Greek goddess is repeated in the 
personification of an abstract entity equally ‘inexistent’ (from the Church Father’s angle), it is 
not the technique itself that is at issue, but the (intended) use to which it is put—with 
Continentia personified serving a moral, and (more importantly) Christian purpose, here; as to 
motive, Augustine’s craving for personal glory is reallocated to disseminating the Deity’s. 
2 Iulius Rufinianus’ taxonomy would term this ‘dialogismós’ (“secum disputat et velutat”, 43–
44, §20); see also Priscian (“ipse per se loquens”, “praeexercitamina” 558, §9). Cf. an obsolete 
use in English (the second s.v.): ‘sermocination’, “a form of prosopopoeia in which the speaker 
answers his own question or remark immediately” (Merriam-Webster “sermocination”); this 
seems to stress the aspect of anticipation qua (foremost) function of the device; see subchs. 3.1 
and 5.1, herein. Generally, cf. Bonner (Declamation 21; 53; 150); and Kennedy: “In deliberative 
declamation a speaker composed a suasoria, a speech dealing with a dilemma confronting 
some mythological figure or some famous historical person in the past. […] The speech could 
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prosopopoeia with interior sermocinatio causes emotional upheaval (a form of 
auto-movere, to be experienced vicariously by the reader), the tension of which 
the speaker feels he must “let […] all pour out, in words as well [‘cum vocibus’]” 
(Conf. 1–8. 406–407, VIII.12.28)—wherefore he leaves his silent (“tacitus”) 
interlocutor Alypius, sensing “that the business [‘negotium’] of weeping was 
better suited [‘aptior’] to solitude” (Conf. 1–8. 406–409, VIII.12.28).3 
 In an even “remotius” place—somewhere (albeit inevitably “sub quadam 
fici arbore”) and “somehow” (the speaker stresses his ignorance, “nescio 
|| 
be a prosōpopoeia, for which grammatical exercises had provided some training and in which 
the speaker impersonated a specific individual giving advice to another or debating with 
himself what action to take in a given situation, or it could be addressed to someone in the 
second person” (New History 168). “The more difficult, but much more popular, judicial 
declamation was the controversia in which one or more laws, Greek, Roman, or often 
imaginary, was stated. […] The orator may speak in the person of any of the individuals 
involved or as an advocate for any of them” (New History 169). Concerning Augustine’s 
relationship to rhetoric (including as to passages under consideration here), see Olmsted 
(passim; spec. 79–80), who stresses: “Rhetoric operates in books VI–VIII not so much through 
the structure and effects of particular formal speeches as through the interaction between 
readers and texts or verbal expressions” (80). Generally, cf. Niehues-Pröbsting: “Augustinus 
stellt den bekanntesten und prominentesten Fall der Verbindung von Rhetorik und Theologie 
dar, kein Sonderfall, sondern eher die Regel” (“Glauben” 34). See Momigliano (referring also to 
Augustine): “this effort of explaining oneself and one’s own purposes to a personal audience, if 
not to one’s own direct accusers, may well have been a decisive contribution to the recognition 
of the self as a person with a definite character, purpose and achievement. After all, in so far as 
they express a relation to gods or God, confessions have an element of self-defence which links 
them to judicial speeches” (90; cf. 91). Despite this statement with a view to forensic practice 
and its (literary) aftermath, Momigliano all but relegates rhetoric (save a brief mention at 89); 
in Mauss’ essay (passim; but cf. references to Roman law, 14, 16; and grammar, 24n.), as well as 
throughout the resp. volume it occasioned (see Carrithers et al. passim), rhetoric is treated to 
all but consummate silence. Even so, the following is to the point: “It is Christians who have 
made a metaphysical entity of the ‘moral person’ (personne morale), after they became aware of 
its religious power. Our own notion of the human person is still basically a Christian one” 
(Mauss 19). The rhetorico-dramatic view of the persona is at variance therewith (as to the 
Christian refunctionalization, see spec. Fuhrmann “Persona” 102–104; cf. Oesterreich “Person” 
865; Boriaud/Schouler 799; Gill “Particulars” 129; also De Temmerman/Emde Boas “Intro.” 7–
8); generally, see Mayfield (“Interplay” 21n.); and subch. 3.3, herein. 
3 The terms employed katà tò parón in this introduction will be dealt with in detail, and with 
the resp. source-related references, in part 3 (cf. spec. the synopsis in subch. 3.4). At this point, 
see Fuhrmann’s précis: “Die Ethopoiie (sermocinatio) besteht darin, daß der Redner eine 
andere Person einführt, ihr ein Stück Rede in den Mund legt und dabei auch deren 
charakteristische Redeweise nachahmt […]. Die Prosopopoiie (personificatio) unterscheidet 
sich von der Ethopoiie dadurch, daß nicht reale, sondern fiktive Personen und zumal 
personifizierte Gegenstände auftreten, redend oder handelnd” (Die antike Rhetorik 138). 
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quomodo”)—he addresses himself to the Deity twice, thus paralleling the 
structure of the utterances put in Chastity’s mouth moments ago.4 In this case, 
however, the qualification differs: given his spatial isolation, the speaker writes 
that he actually voiced himself “non quidem his verbis, sed in hac sententia” 
(“not in these actual words, but along these lines”, Conf. 1–8. 408–409, 
VIII.12.28).5 After having imagined a personified Continentia addressing him in 
|| 
4 As to ‘fig trees’ qua familiar settings, vivid mental (nominal) anchors in various parables or 
related encounters within the New Testament (partly highly significative), see e.g. the narrative 
of Jesus ‘cursing a fig tree’ (Mt 21:18–22; Mk 11:12–14, 20–24; the analogous parable in Lk 13:6–
9), with its (figurative) foci both on ‘bearing fruit’ and on ‘faith alone’; the tree’s leaves are also 
referred to as a seasonal indicator, and functionalized as an anticipative sign of coming things 
(Mt 24:32; Mk 13:28; Lk 21:29–31); finally—and arguably most importantly for Augustine’s case 
(from his point of view)—see the fig tree’s (apparently incidental) nexus with men (and sinners) 
being called into the Lord’s service (Lk 19:4–5, plus context; especially also Jn 1:48–50). 
5 Petrarch—emulating Augustine in many matters literary—also uses the tool of putting words 
into his own mouth (an auto-allocutio): “and [I] addressed myself in words like these” (“Mont 
Ventoux” 39), “talibus me ipsum compellabam verbis” (Epistole 122, 9*[IV, i]); the ensuing 
features an embedded sermocinatio (“they say”, “ut aiunt”, “come dicono”), with the added 
piquancy that he is here citing Scripture, while treating beatitude Nominalistically: “The life we 
call blessed” (“Mont Ventoux” 40), “vita, quam beatam dicimus”, “La vita che noi chiamiamo 
beata” (Epistole 122–123, 9*[IV, i]). The process of auto-sermocinatio (metapoetically speaking) 
is repeated further down: “and I said to myself” (“Mont Ventoux” 42), “Dicebam […] ad me 
ipsum” (Epistole 126, 9*[IV, i])—with the ensuing remarks featuring an embedded citation from 
Augustine (cf. “Mont Ventoux” 42; Epistole 126, 9*[IV, i]); again: “and asked myself” (“Mont 
Ventoux” 43), “et querebam ex me ipse” (Epistole 128, 9*[IV, i]). Then, of course, he reenacts 
the Augustinian ‘tolle lege’ scene in a sort of intertextual mise en abyme (explicitly so: “The 
same had happened before”, “Mont Ventoux” 45; “Quod iam ante […] acciderat”, Epistole 130; 
9*[IV, i])—and from on high, Petrarch being on a mountain at this (at least physical, temporal) 
turning point; the imposing setting might be part of the aemulatio, given the trouble taken to 
describe it in vividmost detail, while Augustine is just ‘out there in the nowhere under some fig 
tree’. Cf. Blumenberg: “Die Darstellung der Besteigung des Mont Ventoux exemplifiziert 
anschaulich, was ‘Realität’ der Geschichte als Umbesetzung formaler Stellengefüge bedeutet” 
(Legitimität 399); in an affine context, the philosopher adds: “Bekehrungserlebnisse dieser Art 
setzen fast allemal formale Identitäten voraus, erweisen sich also als Umbesetzungen” (Quellen 
160). “Durchsetzung und Bestätigung der Umbesetzung sind rhetorische Akte” (“Annäherung” 
426). Petrarch logs: “I thought it fit to look into the volume of Augustine’s Confessions […]. I 
opened it with the intention of reading whatever might occur to me first” (“Mont Ventoux” 44; 
cf. 45; with Epistole 128–130, 9*[IV, i]). “Aperio, lecturus quicquid occurreret” (Epistole 130; 
9*[IV, i]). Before the passage is read out, Petrarch’s brother is said to stand “beside” him, 
“intently expecting to hear something from Augustine on” the speaker’s “mouth”—the 
Humanist envisions himself as, writes himself into the role of, the Father’s mouthpiece (“Mont 
Ventoux” 44): “per os meum ab Augustino aliquid audire” (Epistole 130; 9*[IV, i]). As to the 
persistence of said reading praxis, see Blumenberg: “Goethe war, vom elterlichen Hausumgang 
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the interiority of his mind with words he attributes to her, Augustine here 
confesses to be ‘writing words into his own mouth’ (so to speak).6 The 
envisioned interlocutor is silent.7 
 Then—accentuated by the crucial indicator “ecce” (see Jn 19:5; Vulgate), by 
a change to the present tense (“audio”) for purposes of vivid immediacy 
(evidentia), and couched in ignorance (“nescio”) once again—the decisive 
sermocinatio occurs, which everyone knows: 
et ecce audio vocem de vicina domo cum cantu dicentis et crebro repetentis, quasi pueri 
an puellae, nescio: ‘tolle lege, tolle lege’. statimque mutato vultu[.] 
And look!—from the house next door I hear a voice—I don’t know whether it is a boy or a 
girl—singing some words over and over: ‘Pick it up and read it, pick it up and read it!’ 
Immediately my expression transformed. (Augustine Conf. 1–8. 408–409, VIII.12.29)8 
|| 
mit der Bibel her, ein Glücksaufschlager. Er öffnete Bücher aufs Geratewohl und fand, was er 
suchte. Es bestätigte ihm, daß das Leben in exemplarischer Selbstdarbietung auf ihn zulief” 
(Arbeit 587–588). “Zu Adele Schopenhauer sagt Goethe 1819, er habe immer das Glück […] in 
Büchern die bedeutendsten Stellen aufzuschlagen … (Werke XXIII 44)” (Arbeit 587n.). 
6 This being possible or plausible due to the temporal (and notional) distance between the 
narrating (refining) persona—the auctor called ‘Augustine’ (including his projected ethos)—and 
the work’s protagonist (by the same name), whose previous experiences are said to be rendered 
in narrative form (an ‘ethopoietic’ act). As to chronology, Hammond suggests “354–386” CE in 
terms of the events referred to in the Confessions overall; “397” as “the time when Augustine 
composed this account”; while it was not until “426 or 427” that “he looked back […] at what he 
had written and evaluated it” (“Intro.” xv). Contrast Enterline’s unrhetorical take (Body 93–94). 
7 See Küpper: “Der Augustinische Mono-Theos ist erfahrbar, konzeptualisierbar einzig in den 
Kategorien der Differenz. Dementsprechend ist die Augustinische Theologie über ihren Basis-
Satz hinaus weitgehend (nur) Rhetorik” (“Ordnung” 216). There may seem to be a certain 
caution with respect to hearing God speak (lest one be putting words into His mouth); after the 
prophets and Christ, and especially by the time of Late Antiquity, God has always already 
spoken (in the past and canonized Scripture), wherefore talking to the Deity may regularly 
amount to a soliloquy—perchance especially so if done ‘by the book’. In this regard, cf. e.g. 
“vides haec, domine, et taces […] numquid semper tacebis” (Conf. 1–8. 50, I.18.28)—see Ps 82:2 
(Vulgate; i.e. Ps 83:1, NIV); “habitans in excelsis in silentio, deus” (Conf. 1–8. 52, I.18.29); cf. the 
gloss: “A[ugustine] repeatedly associates silence with God” (Conf. 1–8. 52n.). Regarding 
Petrarch’s Secretum, and the ‘silence of Truth personified’, see Küpper: “die Allegorie der 
Veritas, hinter der sich niemand anderes als der christliche Gott selbst verbirgt, jener Gott, der 
zu Zeiten des fiktiven Interlokutors [sc. Petrarch’s ‘Augustinus’] noch gesprochen hatte (‘tolle, 
lege’), schweigt in diesem von Anfang bis Ende kontroversen Gespräch” (Schweigen 52). 
8 Cf. Küpper (Diskurs-Renovatio 184; 295; Discursive Renovatio 174; 285; Schweigen 32; 52). 
Given the context—it being a passage from Paul’s Letter to the Romans (“codicem apostoli”) 
that effects Augustine’s ‘conversion’ (Conf. 1–8. 410–411, VIII.12.29)—a comparison with the 
words that bring about Saul’s volte-face is meet (and a scholarly consensus, of course): “Saule, 
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The face turns first—owing to the outward sign—quasi ‘prefiguring’ the inner 
conversion resulting from the perusal of the message within the book 
subsequently opened.9 Standing in for the tacit Deity, a child—see “parvulos” 
(Mt 19:14, Mk 10:14), “pueros” (Lk 18:16), and “pueri” (in the plural at Conf. 1–8. 
408, VIII.12.29, hence no matter which gender)—is heard to utter the above, 
with the writer (decidedly) putting them into the mouth of those with respect to 
|| 
Saule quid me persequeris”—the situation having been specified as “audivit vocem dicentem” 
(Acts 9:4, Vulgate; resp. “audivi vocem dicentem” in Acts 22:7, “loquentem” in 26:14). For the 
expediency (hence durability) of this (quasi ‘ethopoietic’) pattern in the Christian tradition, see 
Küpper on Constantine’s ‘conversion’ as per Eusebius and Lactantius (Diskurs-Renovatio 181–
186, spec. 183–184; Discursive Renovatio 171–176, spec. 173–174). Augustine not only 
accommodates his own version to the intentional structure and significance of the situation 
that is to prefigure his own, but also ‘ties in with’ (sc. hypólepsis) the precise wording (“audio 
vocem”), and even with the ‘tonality’ of the prefiguring statement—the iterated vocative 
“Saule, Saule” being comparable to the twofold imperative repeated (“tolle, lege”). As a 
bilingual sýnkrisis will render patent, the trans. here is likely to seem infelicitous. While 
naturally conceding Hammond’s commonsensical comments concerning the dissimilar 
linguistic configurations of (synthetic) Latin and (analytic) English (cf. “Intro.” xxxvi), 
defending the choice of converting the crucially concise (hence memorable, highly ‘portable’), 
partly paronomastic formula ‘tolle, lege’ into such prolixity might prove problematic; there 
seems to be no (linguistic, grammatical) reason for not rendering the dictum (trochaically) as 
‘take it, read it’—or even (less gently and euphoniously, while entirely in line with the 
imperative) ‘take! read!’. The formula is repeated and varied (as per the resp. rhetorical 
precept) in the following paragraphs: “ut aperirem codicem et legerem quod primum caput 
invenissem” (Conf. 1–8. 408, VIII.12.29); “arripui, aperui, et legi in silentio capitulum quo 
primum coniecti sunt oculi mei” (Conf. 1–8. 410, VIII.12.29)—here a paronomastic tricolon, 
featuring a (continued) density of ‹i›. As to the above semiotic marker, see Hammond: “The 
terms ecce […] and vide […] are fundamental to how emphatically Augustine draws the reader’s 
attention to key points in his argument; they also remind the reader repeatedly that 
Conf[essions] is [sc. to be] a dialogue with God and the reader, not a soliloquy” (“Intro.” 
xxxvii)—implying that, as to crafting his ethos, a sermocinatio would be misplaced, here. 
Regarding the density of references to ‘not knowing’, cf. that the writer takes care to intimate 
his being unable to recall exactly what his earlier ‘self’ had been doing at said point in time: 
“Then I put my finger [‘aut digito’], or some other marker [‘aut nescio quo alio signo’], into the 
book and closed it” (Conf. 1–8. 410–411, VIII.12.30); in the next sentence, Augustine describes 
his not having known at the time (“quod ego nesciebam”) what had been going on in Alypius 
while the aforesaid was taking place with(in) himself (Conf. 1–8. 410, VIII.12.30). As regards the 
significance of an “absence of facial expression” in a Tacitean context (“‘immoto…vultu’”, 
“‘neque…vultu mutato’”), cf. Gill (“Question” 486; 486n.). On the concept of ‘hypólepsis’ 
(‘taking up and tying in with’), see Mayfield (“Variants of hypólepsis” passim; spec. 239–266). 
9 Cf. (paralleling the above): “Immediately [‘statim quippe’], the end of the sentence was like a 
light of sanctuary poured into my heart; every shadow of doubt [‘dubitationis’] melted away” 
(Conf. 1–8. 410–411, VIII.12.29). The trans. does not render the emphatic “quippe”. 
6 | DS Mayfield 
  
whom it is written that “talium est enim regnum Dei” (Mk 10:14, Lk 18:16; 
Vulgate).10 It seems unlikely that the ‘momentaneous evidence’ effectuated by 
this Augustinian sermocinatio could have escaped anyone living in a 
prevalently Christian community pertaining to Late Antiquity, Medieval times, 
or the Early Modern period.11 
 By making various personified voices speak in his place, the Church Father 
is acting on the rhetorico-‘ethopoietic’ assumption par excellence: ‘self sells’.12 
|| 
10 Cf. Mt 19:14, which has “caelorum” in lieu of “Dei”. It will be ethopoetically significant that 
Augustine, consistent with his gestures signaling doubt and uncertainty as to knowledge prior 
to the ‘conversion’—“nescio”, “nescio” (Conf. 1–8. 408, VIII.12.28–29), “nescio”, “nesciebam” 
(Conf. 1–8. 410, VIII.12.30)—instantly tries (hence fails) to apply reason to the situation: “I 
started to ask myself eagerly whether it was common for children [‘pueri’] to chant such words 
when they were playing a game of some kind. I could not recall ever having heard anything 
quite like it. […] I understood it as nothing short of divine providence that I was being ordered 
to open the book and read the first passage I came across” (Conf. 1–8. 408–409, VIII.12.29). This 
course is induced by recalling an occurrence heard about (or read) that seems to quasi 
‘prefigure’ (sc. with repeatable ‘fulfillments’, here; generally, cf. Küpper Diskurs-Renovatio 100 
with 184; Discursive Renovatio 89–90 with 174) Augustine’s own case at hand: “I had heard 
[‘audieram’] of Antony, how he had been challenged by a reading from the gospel which he 
happened to [‘forte’, sc. by chance] encounter, as if what he was reading was being spoken for 
himself [‘tamquam sibi diceretur quod legebatur’]” (Conf. 1–8. 408–411, VIII.12.29)—Scripture 
itself acts as a ‘speaker’, the word kat’ exochén (for a Christian) is quasi personified. The (basic 
structure of the) passage that follows seems similarly formulaic (being likewise paronomastic, 
memorable): “‘vade, vende […] et veni, sequere me’”—the result of which is an ‘instantaneous 
conversion’: “et tali oraculo confestim ad te esse conversum” (Conf. 1–8. 410–411, VIII.12.29). 
11 On the concept of ‘momentane Evidenz’, here employed mutatis mutandis, see Blumenberg 
(e.g. “Möglichkeit” passim; spec. 10–12; 15; 26; for further references and applications, cf. 
Mayfield Artful 48n.; 92; spec. 92n.; 256n.); and the n. in 4.1, herein. 
12 What Kopperschmidt states in an Augustinian context may seem to apply to the Bishop of 
Hippo himself: his “Werk ist bis in die Rhetorik hinein ‘Selbstdarstellung’” (103); with the 
former not only conducing to, but factually crafting, the latter. Similarly, one might read the 
phrase the critic uses to qualify the “‘Confessiones’”: “eine vor Gott bekenntnishaft abgelegte 
und ihn zugleich rühmende Lebensbeichte” (107; without 122n.)—taking “ihn” to refer to the 
writer, rather than his Deity (against Kopperschmidt’s grain). 
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2 Provisional Heuristics 
a study of how exactly a technique like ēthopoiia, for example,  
is used in different genres and throughout different eras could 
considerably enhance our understanding of narrative practice  
and rhetorical texture in literary history. 
—De Temmerman/Emde Boas (“Epilogue” 652)13 
From a metapoetical perspective, ventriloquistic tendencies—words being put 
into someone’s mouth—seem to be present in works of history, mythology, 
‘(auto)biography’ (for instance), and prevalent in declamation, drama, and 
dialog (inter alia).14 Having commenced with a well-known example from Late 
|| 
13 See this pertinent assessment on the part of De Temmerman/Emde Boas: “The notion that 
speech indicates character is […] central to the ancient concept of ēthopoiia. In its broadest 
sense, this […] refers to the construction (poiia) of ēthos in general, i.e. both direct and indirect 
characterization in all its forms. […] in practice, the notion of characterization through speech 
is usually central: the term can refer, among other things, to an orator’s ability to depict 
himself in his speech as good and trustworthy and, perhaps most famously, to a rhetorical 
exercise (progymnasma) that trained students to speak ‘in character’ of a (possibly fictitious) 
person” (“Intro.” 22). The ensuing nuances seem called for: one is dealing with the crafting of 
an impression; De Temmerman’s/Emde Boas’ (pertinent) focus on the process of reception (see 
“Intro.” 2–3; 12; 18; “Epilogue” 650) may incidentally deprioritize the (peistikó-purposive) 
poetics (of effect) involved—for which a functional analysis is requisite. The eds. concede this 
in their conclusion: “As the underpinning in ancient rhetoric of techniques of characterization 
central to this book suggests, and as many chapters […] show, the way in which character is 
constructed is not neutral; it is a rhetorical phenomenon involving strategies of (c)overtness, 
im[…]/explicitness, […] (inter[-][…], intratextual or ‘internarrative’) a[…]/dissociation” 
(“Epilogue” 650); “notions evoked by the concept of character (performance/observability, 
permanence, shapeability/external influence, habituation)” are “not simply a given, but rather 
constructs […] consciously designed and used […] in larger rhetorical agendas” (“Epilogue” 
651). Even so, a decisive uptake, assessment of diachronically pluralistic taxonomies, technical 
variants, including a correspondingly detailed discussion of functional applications, may not 
appear to be taking place in a comprehensive (or structural) manner. This would apply even to 
a (somewhat limited) narratological take, since Ancient discourses will require express 
recourse to rhetoric also in the diagnostic instrumentarium utilized. It seems significative that 
said volume features but two subchs. on ‘Oratory’ (cf. Characterization VII; in part 5: 407–442). 
The eds. explicitly exclude “Isocrates and, of course, Theophrastus” (“Epilogue” 651)—which 
must seem somewhat curious, given the title (and despite the narrow, narratological focus). 
14 In line with Lanham, epistolography might be added to this list: “as part of the centuries-
long shift from an oral culture to one dependent on writing, the written letter replaced the 
spoken declamation as the primary vehicle for practice in prose composition” (“Composition” 
127); “the letter form would provide an excellent framework for […] prosopopoeia or ethopoeia” 
(“Composition” 126). In this respect, see spec. subch. 5.1, herein. 
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Antiquity in chapter 1, the submission of selected Ancient and Early Modern 
examples from the dialogic genre (sensu lato) in this heuristic sýnkrisis is to 
prepare the detailed taxonomic description of various forms of rhetorical 
ventriloquism and the affine concept of oratorico-dramatic ‘personae’ in section 
3 (concerned with the Rhetorica ad Herennium, Cicero, Quintilian, inter alia).15 
With an increasing focus on the plane of application, section 4 addresses 
variants of rhetorical ‘selfcraft’ (dealing with Dionysius on ethopoiía, and a 
rhetorico-theatrical approach to authorship by recourse to Shakespeare and 
Cervantes).16 Part 5 features assorted transgeneric and diachronic applications 
of oratorico-ventriloquistic devices from a comparatiste perspective. The 
conclusion is of synoptic character (percursively recapitulating parts 1 through 
5), and includes a concise coda on ‘entechnic’ artlessness. 
|| 
15 The term ‘heuristic’ is used in an (etymologico-)rhetorical sense qua relating to provisional 
‘findings’, initial ‘encounters’, tentative ‘discoveries’ (the orator’s first office: heúresis, 
inventio). In the first and this ch., assorted examples and passages featuring various forms of 
ventriloquism are presented side by side to facilitate a preliminary comparison at the level of 
specific instances, prior to moving on to the more general, taxonomic descriptions in part 3. In 
so doing, this essay proceeds inductively—from particular instances (chs. 1, 2) to the more 
universal plane (part 3, with subchs.), and back to (increasingly) specific cases (chs. 4, 5). This 
method is characteristic of rhetoric, which begins with the finite (facts, situation), proceeds to 
the nonfinite (generalizations, more universal, ‘infinite’ questions)—applying, in a concluding 
step, the latter back to the case resp. at hand. See Moos (188–190, §50; spec. 190). 
16 With respect to a morphological pattern for the term ‘selfcraft’, see Lever’s comparable 
Early Modern word formations in his Arte of Reason, as qualified by the ensuing subtitle: rightly 
termed, Witcraft, teaching a perfect way to argue and dispute (*.i.; with 1, I.1.1, A.; spelling 
accommodated here and below); see Lever’s meta-morphological preface (*.iiij.r–**.i.r); plus 
the explanatory ‘table’ qua word index (no pag., equivalent to 238–239, Q.ii.v–r; with the n. in 
the facsimile’s fm, no pag.). Lever demonstrates that ‹-craft› is morphologically productive, 
giving his own, as well as other examples thereto: “witcrafte, speachcraft, starrecraft, etc.” (6–
7, I.1.35, A.iiij.v–r); likewise in the tabular appendix: “crafte is the aunciente English worde, 
whereby wee haue used to expresse an Arte: whiche two wordes knit together in Witcrafte, doe 
signifie the Arte that teacheth witte and reason. And why shoulde handcrafte and witchecraft 
bee good englishe names: and Starcraft and Witcrafte bee none: the simples beeing knowne, 
and the composition lyke” (no pag., equivalent to 238–239, Q.ii.v–r); in employing the term 
“composition”, Lever pragmatically performs the linguistically bilateral, cross-referential 
function of this index, having previously written the equivalent phrase “two wordes knit 
together”. As to another term at issue, Lever takes a strictly logical and material (rather than 
rhetorical) view, Englishing “indiuiduum” as “a Selfe thing, or a sole thing” (no pag., 
equivalent to 238, Q.ii.v; cf. 5, I.1.24, A.iij.; 77, II.6.2–4, E.vij.r). On Early Modern neologistic 
practice, cf. Puttenham’s meta-statements (242, III.9; with Wigham/Rebhorn 58–60). 
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2.1 On Dialog and Ventriloquism 
Mihi videtur omnis oratio eſſe διαλογισμός[.] 
Scaliger (126, III.xlviii)17 
Whereas the title of the Erasmian “Ciceronianus” will inevitably be received as a 
nominal gesture also—hence prompt diverse, historically accrued connotations 
associated with the Roman rhétor’s name in the respective reader’s mind—its 
“Personae” are “Bulephorus, Hypologus et Nosoponus” (“Ciceronianus” 2). Not 
only will the appellations of said protagonists hardly be familiar; they are also 
speaking names (and Humanist coinages).18 Accordingly, words put into the 
|| 
17 John of Sardis emphasizes the pervasiveness of the devices at issue: “Ethopoeia […] is 
suitable in all parts of a speech and especially in the proofs; for it makes the language alive and 
moves the hearer to share the emotion of the speaker by presenting his character”; it “occurs in 
almost all […] exercises and is a part of each, starting with fables”; “to compress” or “extend 
them, we” employ “ethopoeia” (213, §11.194). “Practice in ethopoeia is most useful everywhere; 
for it does not contribute to only one species of rhetoric, but to all. Everywhere […] we form 
characters and attribute speech to persons” (217, §11.200). See Kustas: “The influence that 
ἠθοποιΐα exercised upon other forms of literature and the high esteem in which it was held in 
Byzantine circles are […] illustrated […] in an anonymous scholium on Aphthonius that 
ἠθοποιΐα is the perfect kind of progymnasma and in this capacity contributes to the 
ἐπιστολιμαῖος χαρακτήρ” (59–60; cf. 60n.). Lanham sees it as a transgeneric craft: “Establishing 
an authorial voice, an ethos, is a central task for any speaker or writer” (“Instruction” 111). 
18 With ‘Bulephorus’ qua ‘bearing counsel’; ‘Hypologus’ as ‘(additional) partner in dialog’ (de 
re), or ‘all but reasonable’; ‘Nosoponus’ may mean ‘plagued by pain’ (approx.; cf. Payr’s gloss 
at “Ciceronianus” 3n.; with 345n.; Payr XLIII; Cave Cornucopian 149); paronomastically, the 
text draws attention to the naming process: “ex Hypologo fiam Hyponosus” (“Ciceronianus” 
344)—hence “‘halfway ill’ as opposed to ‘halfway reasonable’” (“Ciceronianus” 345n.; trans. 
dsm). Cf. Payr on the typical make of one of the personae: “Tatsächlich hat Nosoponus außer 
seiner Vorliebe für Cicero so gut wie keine individuellen Züge” (XLIV)—rendering this a sort of 
‘effictionalizing’ notatio (see subch. 3.1). She stresses the need for differentiating which words 
are being put in whose mouth, logs that this was apparently not done in the contemporaneous 
reception (IL). The set of issues resulting from an equalization of (intratextual) personae with 
(verifiably) factual beings (resp. the auctor) is another matter (cf. XLIII–XLIV; IL). It is linked to 
ethopoetic considerations in that (usually intertextual, rather than ‘historical’) consistencies 
are taken as evidence by a given audience: an ethos crafted and projected during what is 
perceived as speech in propria persona is found to align with the ‘character’ of what is deemed 
a ‘mouthpiece’. Cf. Henderson’s formulation: “the attack on Ciceronian letter-writers that […] 
Erasmus […] deliver[ed] through his character Bulephorus” (348). Eden sees “Bulephorus” as 
Erasmus’ “porte-parole” (“Acclaim” 46). Generally, a rhetorico-poetic act of ventriloquism (de 
re, per se) signifies that a resp. position may be taken (heuristically, potentially, conceivably): 
one is dealing with prosopopoiíai of, and for, particular perspectives (overall stances or specific 
viewpoints personified, so to speak; cf. subch. 5.2, herein). Referring also to “the Ciceronianus”, 
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mouths of these prósopa with the insinuative identifiers of Erasmian craft will 
likely differ—in their (immediate) effect on the recipient—from encountering 
utterances by ‘Socrates’ or ‘Gorgias’ in the respective dialog on Plato’s part.19 
 While the latter’s list of ‘dramatis personae’ (“ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ 
ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ”) also includes ‘Callicles, Chaerephon, Polus’ (see “Gorgias” 258–
259, 447A), it may seem all but indisputable that the text would have a different 
ring (and reception, probably), if entitled ‘ΠΩΛΟΣ’—rather than “Gorgias”.20 
|| 
Cave states: “the colloquial relationship of writer and reader is enacted and almost […] pre-
empted by the sermocinatio of the characters in the dialogue. Rabelais and Montaigne likewise 
dramatize their would-be oral communication with the reader, caricaturing him, tricking him, 
simultaneously inviting and excluding him” (Cornucopian 146). 
19 Generally, Kennedy logs that, among “[t]he wandering teachers known as ‘sophists’, […] 
Gorgias and Protagoras are probably the most famous because of their roles in dialogues of 
Plato” (“Intro. [2003]” xi). Any history of reception ‘follows the names’ incidentally or 
expressly (in the scholar’s investigative tracing). As a matter of course—and all but irrespective 
of philosophical wishful thinking, (apparently capable of) believing in readings for reasons of 
content—texts are received and reread all but exclusively on account of their (nominal) 
attribution to a particular auctor, and the expectations said name generates; or in view of the 
apparent or recognized authority of the intratextual personae, whose (extraliterary) positions 
are conceived of as being faithfully represented (mainly due to a rhetorically effected and -ive, 
hence ultimately ‘entechnic’, impression of consistency; see subch. 3.3, herein). 
20 The case differs in that other “dialogue” whose “chief theme […] is rhetoric” (Fowler 407; 
cf. 408)—which is precisely not called ‘Lysias’; the ed. logs: “Some of the persons mentioned in 
the dialogue are so well known that no further account of them is necessary” (410); but “[o]f 
Phaedrus […] little or nothing is known except what we learn from Plato” (410). For a rhetorical 
analysis of said work, see Dionysius (“Demosthenes” 258–265, §7; spec. 263; with “Pompeius” 
358–359, §1; 369–371, §2; vs. Plato, 352–371, §1–2). Cf. “Für die Würdigung der rednerischen 
Verdienste des Lysias sind Kunsturtheile aus dem Alterthum in bedeutend[…]er Fülle 
überliefert […]: von Platon bis zu Photius reiht sich ein mehr oder minder berühmter Name an 
den andern an” (Blass Beredsamkeit I. 383; on Plato’s view or version of ‘Lysias’, cf. 383–386). 
The scholar logs that the former, “den Phaidros ausgenommen, […] Lysias nicht erwähnt” 
(Beredsamkeit I. 386). As per D. Laertius, it was said or supposed that the logographer had writ 
a speech for Socrates, whereby he might defend himself in court—which the latter refused as 
‘unsuitable to himself’ (see Lives I. 171, II.40–41; with Montaigne Essais III. 387–388, III.xii; cf. 
571n.). Meeting Socrates, Plato’s titular persona claims to be coming from Lysias (“Phaedrus” 
413, 227A, §1). After some to and fro, it turns out that Phaedrus will not have to “tell from 
memory, in a way that is worthy of Lysias” a certain “love-speech” delivered by “the cleverest 
[‘δεινότατος’] writer of our day” (“Phaedrus” 414–415, 228C–D, §1); nor “repeat the general 
sense of the whole” (“Phaedrus” 417, 228D, §3)—having brought “the actual discourse [‘τὸν 
λόγον αὐτόν’]” (“Phaedrus” 418–419, 228D, §3); he delivers the speech in the orator’s name 
(“Phaedrus” 424–435, 230E–234C, §6–10). In forensic terms, the Lysian ‘client’ Phaedrus reads 
out a discourse before the ‘judge’ Socrates—with the difference that the ‘enargico-ethopoietic’ 
effect expressly relates to the absent logographer, for whom (and on whose behalf) the speech 
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Writings and detached statements by the latter (qua historico-virtual presence) 
were highly familiar, floating in the cultural networks during the dialog’s initial 
reception (variously mediated, potentially enduring to this day).21 In line 
|| 
is given, rather than to his (current) spokesperson: “when Lysias is here [‘παρόντος δὲ Λυσίου 
ἐμαυτόν’] I have not the slightest intention of lending you my ears” (“Phaedrus” 418–419?, 
228E, §3; cf. 526–527, 263E, §46)—hence ‘Lysias himself is present’ (‘evidently’, ethopoetically) 
in the speech assigned to him. “The first of the three discourses on love is ascribed to […] Lysias 
[…] it approaches the style of his extant speeches as nearly as a discourse on such a subject can 
be expected to approach the style of a speech intended for delivery in […] court […] Plato was a 
consummate literary artist” (Fowler 409; contrast: Süss 10–12, spec. 11). At the metalevel, Plato 
is ascribing words to Phaedrus, into whose mouth (written) lógoi are said to have been put by 
Lysias. In other words: the philosophizing rhétor has writ a (discursively, ethopoetically 
functionalized) discourse for the (extra-dialogic) logographer—delivered vicariously by an 
intratextual persona. When Phaedrus (still feigning not to have the speech in writing) states: “I 
have not at all learned the words by heart; but I will repeat the general sense of the whole” 
(“Phaedrus” 417, 228D, §3; cf. 415, 228A, §1)—he implies his putting other (while verisimilar, de 
re adequate) words into Lysias’ mouth. The ethopoiíai of the speakers are performed explicitly 
and intra-dialogically, by the resp. other (“If I don’t know Phaedrus, I have forgotten myself”, 
“Phaedrus” 417, 228A, §2, with 228A–C; and 441–443, 236C–E, §12–13; ‘auto-hypoleptically’ 
pointing back to: 417, 228B–C, §2; 425, 230D–E, §5). Socrates is “quite overcome by” Phaedrus’ 
‘syn-homoio-pathetic’ actio (“Phaedrus” 435, 234D, §10) of Lysian elocutio (“Phaedrus” 437, 
234E–235A, §10). With characteristic conceit, he then goes so far as to put a verdict (hence a 
prohaíresis) on (what is said to be) the logographer’s own discourse into the latter’s mouth in 
absentia (since he is not present in, or vicariously represented by, speech at that point): “even 
Lysias himself would not think that [sc. ‘the rhetorical manner’] satisfactory” (“Phaedrus” 437, 
235A, §10). Into some minds the notion may be put that Plato has placed a discourse into the 
mouth of the orator’s vicarius that is as criticizable as possible. Lysias’ ‘image’ continues to be 
present, e.g. when Socrates logs that his lógos will be hypoleptic of necessity (“Phaedrus” 438–
439, 235E, §11; cf. 522–525, 262C–E, §45; 526–529, 263D–264A, §46–47); or when giving himself 
as Phaedrus’ mouthpiece: “do you not believe that Love […] is a god? / […] So it is said / […] 
Yes, but not by Lysias, nor by your speech which was spoken by you through my mouth that 
you bewitched” (“Phaedrus” 461, 242D–E, §20)—which ironico-humorously, but still effectively 
‘accuses’ Phaedrus of ventriloquism (cf. “Phaedrus” 465, 244A, §22, for the attribution of the 
ensuing). With (typically Platonic) hauteur, Socrates “advise[s] Lysias also to write” another 
speech in utramque partem (“Phaedrus” 463–465, 243D–E, §21; cf. 505, 257B–C, §38–39); and 
addresses him in an apostrophe: “Do we want to question Lysias about this” (“Phaedrus” 511, 
258D, §40). The dialog concludes with Socrates’ delegating Phaedrus to “Go and tell Lysias” all 
about his ‘philosophical rhetoric’ as the only legitimate (hence mono-)lógos (“Phaedrus” 575, 
278B, §64; cf. 574–577, 278C–279B, §64; 570–571, 277B–C, §62)—another (intra-, extratextual) 
sermocinatio. On the whole and in (always) other words: ventriloquistic devices are present at 
various discursive levels throughout a dialog that, inter alia, is precisely concerned with such a 
(particularly rhetorical) enactment of vicariousness (a formal or structural mise en scène et 
abyme; see this subch., as well as 3.1, 5.2). On Lysias, cf. segments 4.1 and 5.2, herein. 
21 On “culture as a (virtual) network”, see Küpper (“Hypotheses” 1; 4; passim, spec. 6–9; cf. 
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therewith, words put into the mouth of the protagonist named ‘Gorgias’ in 
Plato’s work also had (and have) a (conceivable) extratextual measure 
determining their expediency.22 Consequently, his intra-dialogic reply to the 
Socratic inquiry regarding ‘rhetoric’s particular concern’ as “With speech [‘Perì 
lógous’]” (“Gorgias” 268–269, 449D) is likely to seem plausibly ‘Gorgianic’.23 
 What is a sermocinatio metapoetically speaking—an (implied) extratextual 
author attributing probable words to protagonists, here named like otherwise 
historical (and apparently familiar) human beings—also occurs intratextually, 
in a quasi ‘mise en abyme of the device itself’.24 For the Platonic ‘Socrates’ waxes 
|| 
Cultural Net passim; “Rhetoric” passim; Küpper/Pawlita V; Küpper et al. 2); Mayfield 
(“Proceedings” 220–222; “Interplay” 3–5; 28; 36). See Bloemendal’s affine approach (“Polish 
Pindar” 115–117; 122–123; 130; “Transfer” passim). Provisionally, hypólepsis may be described 
as the ‘poetics’ of the (virtual) cultural network (see Mayfield “Variants of hypólepsis” passim). 
22 As Blumenberg notes, the fact that words are being put into the mouth of someone whose 
name is associated with extratextual temporality and events may modify the process of 
reception (and endow the device of sermocinatio with an anticipatory function, for instance): 
“Der Philosoph vertritt die Wahrheit, aber sie vertritt ihn nicht: es wäre gar nicht so 
verwunderlich, wenn er ihretwegen sterben müßte (521D). Man darf nicht vergessen: für Autor 
und Leser des ‘Gorgias’ ist diese Aporie bereits im Tod des Sokrates realisiert!” (Paradigmen 
112–113). Cf. Schwartz (with a grain of salt): “So scharf auch Platons Angriffe gegen die 
Redekunst des Gorgias sind, so ist er selbst bei Platon doch ein gemütlicher alter Herr, der sich 
dagegen verwahrt, daß von seiner Kunst eine schlechte Anwendung gemacht werde” (79). A 
rhetorico-technical approach to various forms of ventriloquism must render untenable any 
value judgmentalism of the ensuing cast: “There is no other first-class thinker whom Plato ever 
represents as speaking in his own person except Socrates” (Robinson 226). 
23 Cf. K. Morgan’s expedient observations concerning the ‘ethopoietic’ technique in relation to 
both the sender and the receiver: “Socrates […] crafts an argumentative strategy that is tailored 
for the character of a particular interlocutor, and the character of the interlocutor emerges 
through the answers he gives […]. His philosophical quest thus proceeds in an ad hominem 
manner” (445–446). See Niehues-Pröbsting: “Die für den sokratischen Dialog wesentliche 
Verbindung von logos und ethos verlangt eine bestimmte Art von Themen. […] mit den Sachen, 
die in Frage und Antwort erörtert werden, [‘stehen’] die Personen, die die Sachen vertreten, auf 
dem Prüfstand. […] In der ‘Apologie’ erklärt Sokrates die Menschenprüfung als sein 
Hauptgeschäft” (Die antike Phil. 59). The above, ‘brachylogic’ reply (complying with the 
‘Socratic’ desire for brevity, to which he himself does not adhere, “Gorgias” 266–267, 449C) is 
restated as follows: “rhetoric[’s] […] whole activity [‘praxis’] and efficacy [‘kýrosis’] is by means 
of speech. For this reason I claim for the rhetorical art that it is concerned with speech [‘perì 
lógous’]” (“Gorgias” 270–271, 450B–C); this will probably not be (all that) far from Aristotle’s 
accent and focus on ‘entechnicity’ (cf. subch. 3.3). Generally speaking, Niehues-Pröbsting logs: 
“Die rhetorische Form schlechthin ist die Rede” (Die antike Phil. 54). Cf. “The root rhê/rha refers 
to speech and is found also in Greek erô and Latin orator” (Kennedy’s gloss, Nicolaus 132n.). 
24 As to the latter, see Küpper’s formulations in a (structurally) comparable context (Diskurs-
Renovatio 342; 370; 372; 381; Discursive Renovatio 333; 362; 364; 373). 
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‘makrologic’ by contrast, decidedly performing the effectuality of speech in 
several, cumulated ventriloquisms.25 First, he has recourse to an unspecified 
someone (cf. “Gorgias” 272–275, 451A–C); then puts words into the mouths of 
generic representatives pertaining to particular professions (“doctor”, “trainer”, 
“money-getter”, “Gorgias” 274–277, 452A–D); finally—lest the rhétor speak too 
much—‘Socrates’ even anticipates a reply his interlocutor is likely to make: 
And your opinion is right, as you can prove in this way: if some one asked you—Is there, 
Gorgias, a false and a true belief?—you would say, Yes, I imagine [‘phaíes án, hos egò 
oimai’]. (“Gorgias” 284–285, 454D)26 
|| 
25 Prior to treating affine terms in III.iii, III.xxxiiii–xxxv, III.xlviii, Scaliger signals the layering 
of prosopopoeiae (and sermocinationes) at the onset of the first book; this may be performed in 
propria persona, or by putting words into someone’s mouth, who might be ascribing speech to 
yet others: “Diſceptat orator in foro,de vita,vitiis,virtutibus:atque ea examinat in ſtatu 
qualitatis:& in eo, quo quæritur,Quid ſit.Item in conciliis quid ſit eligendum.Quae omnia eodẽ 
animo traƈtat Philoſophus & Poeta:vterque vel ex ſua vel alterius perſona:quemadmodum 
Socrates introducit vel Diotimã vel Aſpaſiam:& ipſum Socratem Plato.ſic etiam orator interponit 
proſopopœias” (3, I.i.). Referring to the “Gorgias” as a “lively drama” (“Intro. Gorgias” 249), 
Lamb sees language and certain concepts as (quasi) personified: “Plato’s dramatic art is at its 
height: not only are the disputants intensely alive, but the very statements […] seem for the 
moment to become active participators in the contest; and ‘the truth’, ‘the good’, and ‘the just’ 
are similarly invested with a certain august personality. The characters of the three men who in 
turn oppose Socrates are ingeniously chosen” (“Intro. Gorgias” 254)—sc. crafted and projected 
(ethopoetically speaking). With its focus on dispositio, the latter stresses one aspect of what is 
herein termed the ‘economy of rhetorical ventriloquism’ (see ch. 5). As to a metapoetical view 
focusing on the (implied, extratextual) author, cf. Lamb’s formulation: “Plato is speaking 
through the mouth of Socrates to the world at large” (“Intro. Gorgias” 255). As to “makrologia 
and brachylogia” in this context, see Eden (“Refutation” 61). Blumenberg refers to the 
“vielleicht einzig authentischen Ausspruch, der uns von dem Nicht-Schriftsteller Sokrates 
überliefert ist: Ich weiß, daß ich nichts weiß” (Beschreibung 479)—which would entail that 
every other ‘Socratic’ utterance amounts to a Platonic ventriloquism. 
26 Cf. “suppose some one asked […] I should tell him […] And suppose he went on to ask […] I 
should say […] And if he asked again […] I should say […] And if he proceeded to ask […] I 
should say […] And suppose, on my saying […] he were to ask me […] I should say” (Plato 
“Gorgias” 273–275, 451A–C). This basic pattern of layered (conjectural) allocutiones is repeated 
with the generic representatives (cf. “Gorgias” 274–277, 452A–D); said segment ends on an 
exhortation to virtual vicariousness: “Now come, Gorgias; imagine yourself being questioned 
by those persons and by me” (“Gorgias” 277, 452D). When not receiving the (termino)logical 
setup he wants, ‘Socrates’ puts the coveted words into the interlocutor’s mouth (quasi auto-
hypoleptically via delegation, tying in with himself by way of an alter qua dialogic pawn): “Ask 
me now what art I take cookery to be”; hence ‘Polus’: “Then I ask you, what art is cookery?” 
(“Gorgias” 311, 462D). In other words: ‘Socrates’ employs the device of sermocinatio to mitigate 
the (otherwise ‘momentaneously evident’) impression that he is in fact holding a monolog. 
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Having initially infinitized (“Some have said”) that Platonic sermocinatio, 
Quintilian takes up the brief reply on the part of the protagonist ‘Gorgias’ by 
way of a partial citation, while qualifying this hypólepsis with a comment 
indicating its character as ventriloquistic: 
Some have said [‘quidam dixerunt’] that the subject matter or material of rhetoric 
[‘Materiam rhetorices’] is ‘speech’ [‘orationem’]: Gorgias is given this opinion in Plato 
[‘qua in sententia ponitur apud Platonem Gorgias’]. (Inst. Orat. 1–2. 406–407, 2.21.1)27 
Three paragraphs down, Quintilian ties in with his initial quotation: 
Socrates in Plato seems to say [‘dicere (…) videtur’] to Gorgias that the subject matter [sc. 
‘of rhetoric’] consists of things, not words, and in the Phaedrus he openly proves that 
rhetoric is concerned not only with law-courts and assemblies, but also with private and 
domestic affairs. This shows that this was Plato’s own opinion [‘quo manifestum est hanc 
opinionem ipsius Platonis fuisse’]. (Inst. Orat. 1–2. 408–409, 2.21.4) 
Using a metapoetico-comparative approach, the Roman rhétor reattributes said 
words to the extratextual auctor—rendering patent the ventriloquistic process. 
 Differing both from the Erasmian neologisms personified and from Plato’s 
choice of notorieties, Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations—explicitly staging 
argument in utramque partem—feature interlocutors that, rather than being 
entirely generic, seem somewhat particularized (also situated with regard to 
time and place), while still remaining unspecified ultimately, seeing that they 
are simply labeled “A.” and “M.” (Tusc. Disp. 10–11, I.v.9).28 
|| 
27 Then follows a list of alternative views, launched with a triply paralleled “Quidam”, ended 
by an “Alii” (Inst. Orat. 1–2. 406, 2.21.2–3); the fourth paragraph opens with Quintilian’s take: 
“Ego (neque id sine auctoribus) materiam esse rhetorices iudico omnes res quaecumque ei ad 
dicendum subiectae erunt” (Inst. Orat. 1–2. 408, 2.21.4). Generally, see Cicero’s etymological 
reflections on the term ‘rhétor’: “the all-inclusive word [‘haec complexus est omnia’] is not 
‘discoverer’ [‘inventor’], or ‘arranger’ [‘compositor’], or ‘actor’ [‘actor’], but in Greek he is called 
ῥήτωρ from the word ‘to speak’ [‘ab eloquendo’], and in Latin he is said to be ‘eloquent’ 
[‘eloquens’]. […] Theophrastus received his name from his divinely beautiful language 
[‘divinitate loquendi nomen invenit’]” (“Orator” 350–351, xix.61–62); the glosses add the 
(etymologically) implied terms “eloquor, ‘speak’”, “ἐρῶ, ‘speak’”, and (as to the cognomen 
“Theophrastus”) “φράζω, ‘speak’” (“Orator” 350n.–351n.); on the latter, cf. Rusten (8). 
28 Opening his work, Cicero states that he will adopt “the old Socratic method [‘vetus et 
Socratica ratio’] of arguing against your adversary’s position [‘contra alterius opinionem 
disserendi’]” as the basic structure; he explains that he will (virtually) stage this procedure of 
‘in utramque partem’ by “put[ting] them [sc. the ‘disputationes’] before you” (Tusc. Disp. 10–11, 
I.iv.8)—i.e. ‘Brutus’ (cf. Tusc. Disp. 2, I.i.1; 546, V.xli.121), a generic recipient being implied (see 
King xxvi, xxviii)—“in the form of a debate [‘quasi agatur res’, stressing actio] and not in 
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 With particular regard to the experience on the part of the recipient, 
another nuance concerning the selection of personae for the respective 
(extratextual) author’s ventriloquistic praxis may be indicated by reference to 
those posited in the Tacitean “Dialogus”: when contrasted with encountering 
statements ascribed to ‘Socrates’, reading their (historical) names (“Curiatius 
Maternus”, “Marcus Aper”, “Julius Secundus”, at “Dialogus” 233, §2.1), and 
ventriloquized positions (throughout), would likely have (significantly) differed 
already for the contemporaneous audience—and even more so in the present 
(being known only to specialists). The Tacitean text itself draws attention to this 
fact, by expressly taking its initial stimulus from Maternus’ having enacted 
‘ethopoietic’ sermocinationes for ‘Cato’ the previous day—which Aper castigates 
on the grounds that “it looks as if of set purpose you had selected a notorious 
personality [‘elegisse personam notabilem’], whose words would have great 
weight [‘et cum auctoritate dicturam’]” (“Dialogus” 256–257, §10.6).29 
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narrative form [‘non quasi narretur’]” (Tusc. Disp. 10–11, I.iv.8). Featuring two speakers labeled 
“A.” and “M.”, a dialog then begins in medias res (Tusc. Disp. 10–11, I.v.9)—without the latter 
being clarified further. King glosses: “It is uncertain whom the initials A. and M. stand for. A. 
may stand for Adolescens or Auditor. It is not likely to stand for Cicero’s friend Atticus, then 
sixty-five. M. may stand for Marcus, Cicero’s own name, or for Magister” (Tusc. Disp. 10n.–11n.; 
cf. King xxvii). The aforesaid structural (or procedural) reference is repeated in Book II: the 
writer first mentions the “Peripateticorum Academiaeque consuetudo de omnibus rebus in 
contrarias partes disserendi”—wherein is “maxima dicendi exercitatio”—and then signals that 
he will “not present” what follows “in narrative form [‘non quasi narrantes’], but as nearly as I 
can in the exact words of our actual discussion [‘ut actum disputatumque est’]” (Tusc. Disp. 
154–155, II.iii.9; cf. Trimpi Muses 57n.). Depending on the precise meaning of the speaker’s 
(inclusive) reference here, this may also comprise auto-allocutiones. See Cicero’s later mention 
of Socrates’ “multiplex ratio disputandi rerumque et ingenii magnitudo” (Tusc. Disp. 434, 
V.iv.11); for the device of arguing in utramque partem, cf. also the n. below. 
29 With a (partly) ethopoetic function, another protagonist is made to fulminate (“Aper acrius, 
ut solebat, et intento ore”, “Dialogus” 258, §11.1) against Maternus—who had the day before 
“given a reading of his ‘Cato’ [sc. the younger]”, with “court circles” allegedly having “taken 
umbrage at the way in which he had thrown himself in the play heart and soul into the role of 
Cato, with never a thought of himself” (“Dialogus” 233, §2.1)—using (inter alia) the following 
words: “it is not in defence of a friend that you make yourself objectionable, but, what is more 
dangerous, in defence of Cato” (“Dialogus” 256–257, §10.6). With regard to what follows (and is 
cited above), employing the ‘(re-)personifying’ device of an ethopoietic sermocinatio is here 
seen as, or taken to be, a political statement (on stage, in a declamation, or a similar activity). 
By hypoleptically selecting ‘Cato’ as the ‘character’ to be ventriloquized, Maternus is tapping 
into the received, familiar view of said persona’s ethos (which ‘everyone knows’). From an 
Aristotelian perspective, such preestablished ethos (quasi extra-oratorical, vicariously 
adopted) would be ‘átechnon’ (cf. Rhetoric 14–17, 1355b–1356a, I.ii.2–6)—although one might 
argue (in this specific, declamatory case) that the very choice (prohaíresis) of said name, and 
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 Another aspect concerning the choice of personae and their implications 
may be clarified with regard to (more) diegetic variants of the dialogic genre. In 
Shakespeare’s (epic) poem “Lucrece”, featuring considerable amounts of direct 
speech and some (immediate) exchanges, the familiar historical protagonists 
appear and speak within a narrative framework explicitly present. After a 
respective stanza (“Lucrece” 281, v.505–511), the ensuing commences with 
words put into Tarquin’s mouth (by the implied author, from a metapoetical 
perspective)—a process signaled intratextually by the diegetic intercalation in 
the second iamb: “‘LUCRECE’, quoth he, ‘this night I must enjoy thee. / If thou 
deny, then force must work my way” (“Lucrece” 281, v.512–513). At the climax—
moments before Tarquin has his will indeed (which falls into a praeteritio)—he 
intrudes upon Lucrece’s speech, violating her utterance: “‘So let thy thoughts, 
low vassals to thy state –’ / ‘No more’, quoth he. ‘By heaven, I will not hear thee! 
/ Yield to my love” (“Lucrece” 294, v.666–668).30 At once, the sermocinatio’s 
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the authority (known to be) associated therewith (hence conveyed), pertains to the art. On 
“auctoritas” in an affine respect, see Quintilian (Inst. Orat. 3–5. 280–281, 4.2.125; this seems to 
include ‘atechnic’ aspects; Russell’s trans. also renders said term as “power to convince”, Inst. 
Orat. 9–10. 76–77, 9.2.72). Wisse gives “auctoritas” as “‘authority, prestige’” (53). 
30 Cf. Duncan-Jones/Woudhuysen (34). When the poem’s focus has shifted to the female 
protagonist, Lucrece commences a long speech (Shakespeare “Lucrece” 300–324, v.747–1078, 
at times briefly interrupted by narrative comments); in its course (and inter alia), she curses 
Night personified (see “Lucrece” 301–305, v.747–812), blames the prosopopoiíai of Opportunity 
(“Lucrece” 310–313, v.874–924; cf. Duncan-Jones/Woudhuysen 45) and Time (“Lucrece” 313–
316, v.925–966). See Enterline (Schoolroom 124–125). Summarizing her tirade—“In vain I rail at 
Opportunity, / At Time, at TARQUIN, and uncheerful Night” (“Lucrece” 320, v.1023–1025)—she 
curses her own eloquence: “Out, idle words, servants to shallow fools” (“Lucrece” 320, v.1016); 
“This helpless smoke of words doth me no right” (“Lucrece” 320, v.1027; cf. Duncan-
Jones/Woudhuysen 46). Later (to pass the time until her husband’s arrival), she studies a 
“skilful painting” (“Lucrece” 345, v.1367) relating matters pertaining to the Trojan War, as 
instigated by “HELEN’s rape” (“Lucrece” 345, v.1369); its ekphrasis, and Lucrece’s (hermeneutic 
and haptic) engagement with the work of art—as well as the afflictions it depicts, which she 
suffers vicariously, granting her a certain amount of relief—continues for more than 200 lines 
(“Lucrece” 345–363, v.1366–1582). As part of her (virtual) reception, she expressly states that 
she will put words into the mouth of (the depicted) ‘Hecuba’ (cf. the overall segment, “Lucrece” 
352–356, v.1447–1498; contrast Enterline Body 183; her construal is problematic throughout: 
152–197; see the detailed discussion below; also Schoolroom 126–133, spec. 128). Lucrece indicts 
“[t]he painter” for “giv[ing] her so much grief and not a tongue” (Shakespeare “Lucrece” 353, 
v.1461–1463). She herself will remedy the situation by proxy (literally speaking for, as well as 
on behalf of, Hecuba): “‘Poor instrument’ quoth she, ‘without a sound, / I’ll tune thy woes with 
my lamenting tongue” (“Lucrece” 353, v.1464–1465; cf. Duncan-Jones 78). Said ventriloquist 
segment ends with the narrator’s explaining: “So LUCRECE, set a-work, sad tales doth tell / To 
penciled pensiveness and coloured sorrow; / She lends them words, and she their looks doth 
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narrative indicator (“quoth he”, necessary for generic and formal reasons) 
infringes Tarquin’s own speech act.31 
Technically speaking, the aforesaid again differs from a “colloquy” by 
Cervantes, featuring interlocutors called ‘Cipión’ and ‘Berganza’. While both are 
also historical names (the former being of particular fame) the words put into 
the mouths of these protagonists are unlikely to be checked against (or even 
associated with) the historical Scipio and a descendant of the House of 
Braganza—seeing that the respective Cervantine speakers are, from the outset, 
presented as canine.32 Moreover, the ventriloquistic technique is intratextually 
embedded—and expressly reflected upon—in the narrative framework of the 
“coloquio de los perros”, the novela ejemplar “El casamiento engañoso”.33 
 To review these exploratory samples metapoetically suggesting an affinity 
between sermocinatio and various dialogic genres: an implied (seldom explicit) 
author—sometimes stylized as a sort of scribe, observing and noting (or, more 
likely, restoring from memory) a conversation apparently partaken in (or 
witnessed silently)—is taken to be putting words into the mouths of the 
respective interlocutors in all of the above cases (which, in terms of degree, will 
|| 
borrow” (“Lucrece” 356, v.1496–1498). One is thus dealing with a layered (meta-)sermocinatio 
(considering the various extra- and intratextual planes, as well as the reader’s participation). 
For another instance of the device in “Lucrece”, see Skinner (Forensic 206). 
31 Generally, cf. that Lucrece (using a distinctive antanáklasis) later also personifies her heart, 
suggesting words it should say (with respect to her intended suicide): “Faint not, faint heart, 
but stoutly say ‘So be it’” (Shakespeare “Lucrece” 334, 1209). On distinctio and antanáklasis, 
see Lausberg (Elemente 93–95, §289–292; Handbuch 333–336, §660–663). 
32 Cf. “cada uno [‘de los dos perros’] tenía el suyo [sc. ‘nombre’] propio y significativo: Scipión 
o Cipión el uno, en recuerdo del gran patricio romano, y Braganza o Berganza, a la castellana, 
por alusión a este gran linaje portugués, el del barcino color” (Amezúa y Mayo 412); cf. 
“Berganza puede ser una derivación de Braganza” (Castro García 198); “Cervantes manipula 
sus referentes” (200). Generally, see Mayfield (“Talking Canines” passim). 
33 The narrator Campuzano claims: “yo oí y casi vi con mis ojos a estos dos perros, que el uno 
se llama Cipión y el otro Berganza”; he adds: “a poco rato vine a conocer, por lo que hablaban, 
los que hablaban, y eran los dos perros Cipión y Berganza” (Cervantes “casamiento engañoso” 
293). Initiating the colloquy, the talking dogs also call each other by said names: “CIPIÓN.—
Berganza amigo […] retirémonos a esta soledad […] donde podremos gozar sin ser sentidos 
desta no vista merced que el cielo en el mismo punto a los dos nos ha hecho. / BERGANZA.—
Cipión hermano, óyote hablar y sé que te hablo” (“coloquio” 299). As to this twofold novela (“El 
casamiento engañoso” and “El coloquio de los perros”), the processes of sermocinatio are 
patently layered (in a quasi mise en abyme manner), spec. since the framing narrative provides 
an intratextual author and recipient, who (in the implied service of the extratextual author) 
conjointly craft the resp. reader’s experience of ‘the dialog of the dogs’. For a detailed analysis 
of these processes and techniques, see Mayfield (“Talking Canines” passim; spec. 13–18). 
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be especially patent in such as must seem entirely fabricated).34 At once, this 
very act of (what one might call) ‘rhetorical ventriloquism’ is differently 
accentuated and variously effectuated for (and received by) the reader—who is 
also free to take it at face value (of course). 
 While the genre is relatively stable in the above paradigms (mutatis 
mutandis, all are dialogic), the particular textual circumstances of the oratorical 
devices employed differ (considerably). In the Erasmian “Ciceronianus”, the 
concept describing the dominant aspect most pertinently will be prosopopoiía 
(de re), seeing that the reader is facing (purposively) crafted (and more or less 
generic) personae (prósopa) articulating themselves. As regards Plato’s 
“Gorgias”, the most suitable terms may seem to be sermocinatio and ethopoiía, 
since the focus is both on the speech acts as such (sermones), and on the 
‘characteristic’ (distinctive, accustomed, recognizable) ethos of the protagonists 
thereby expressed.35 These terms also apply to the above dialogs on the part of 
|| 
34 Cf. Trimpi (Muses 389). Prefacing the Stoic’s diatribes, Arrian asserts: “I have not composed 
[‘Oúte synégrapsa egò’] these Words of Epictetus as one might be said to ‘compose’ books of 
this kind, nor have I of my own act published them […] I have not ‘composed’ them at all. But 
whatever I heard him say I used to write down [‘grapsámenos’], word for word, as best I could, 
endeavouring to preserve it as a memorial [‘hypomnémata’], for my own future use, of his way 
of thinking and the frankness of his speech. They are, accordingly, as you might expect, such 
remarks as one man might make off-hand to another, not such as he would compose for men to 
read in after time. This being their character, they have fallen, I know not how, without my will 
or knowledge, into the hands of men” (Disc. I–II. 4–7, I). Even so, their virtual rendering is to 
“produce that same effect” of Epictetus’ actual words: “to incite the minds of his hearers” (Disc. 
I–II. 7, I). While König plausibly logs that “[t]he imagined dialogue, and the second-person 
address to an imagined interlocutor, […] are entirely typical of Epictetus’ style” (60), the critic’s 
value judgments also testify to the effectuality of Arrian’s (professed) agenda: “it is tempting to 
feel”, “one might feel” (König 59), “wonderfully passionate”, “we as readers can hardly fail to 
feel” (60). A scholarly stance will likely be characterized by distance and sobriety; the same 
applies to the projected persona and ethos of a ‘reporter’ (literally speaking). Cf. Tacitus: “So it 
is not intellectual ability that I require, but only power of memory [‘Ita non ingenio, sed 
memoria et recordatione opus est’], in order to recount the sagacious thoughts and the weighty 
language which I heard from the lips of those eminent men” (“Dialogus” 230–233, §1.3–4). For 
a discussion of an affine formulation in the Cervantine “coloquio”, see Mayfield (“Talking 
Canines” 16–18; 22). The (factual) allocutiones are quasi said to be without the prefix (‘ad-’), 
which also conduces to (sc. serves to craft and project) the writer’s (envisioned, desired) ethos. 
35 See Trimpi: “in the Socratic dialogues, ‘accompanying peculiarities of each individual 
character’ become ‘ethical indications’. Hence, characterization will particularize the narrative 
in quality” (Muses 271n.). Expediently, K. Morgan accentuates the meta-level: “Plato not only 
employs techniques of characterization as author, but pervasively makes character an object of 
analysis” (445). “Mimesis prosōpōn was regarded by ancient literary critics as a distinctive 
feature of Platonic dialogue”; the latter “offer more than ample scope for the examination of 
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Cicero and Tacitus—although one might tentatively nuance the former as 
emphasizing sermocinatio more (given the all but anonymous speakers); 
whereas the latter rather noticeably aims at ‘characterizing’ (qua ‘crafting and 
representing the éthe of’) the (named, but hardly transhistorically paragonal) 
personae. In Shakespeare’s “Lucrece”, the notorious (mythologico-)historical 
protagonists (familiar from several Ancient sources, and myriad later variations) 
are principally portrayed with respect to their ethos (‘hexical’ dispositions, as 
set in relief by extraordinary circumstances); and while the latter is an effect to 
which the (recurrent) narrative elements also conduce, it is primarily the (mono- 
and dialogic) speech acts placed into their mouths, which perform this 
‘ethopoietic’ function (metatextually speaking).36 With respect to the Cervantine 
“coloquio”, the reader might seem to be dealing with a sermocinatio (qua ad-
locutio) from the viewpoint of the narrative framework (the intratextual author 
claiming to be recording quasi verbatim the actual words of dogs); and with a 
prosopopoiía from a metapoetical perspective (the auctor ‘Cervantes’ endowing 
canines with human speech).37 
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characterization” in general—and spec. of “dramatized ēthopoiia”, “characterization through 
setting or speech patterns”, as well as “the assessment of Socrates’ character” (446). 
36 Certain taxonomies refer to deliberative soliloquies as dialogismoí (cf. Iulius Rufinianus 43–
44, §20); Priscian speaks of ‘simple (sc. auto-)allocutions’ (“praeexercitamina” 558, §9). 
37 Cf. Vives: “Porro non hominibus tantum damus sermonem, sed rebus mutis, rebus etiam 
prorsum confictis, ut patriæ, paupertati, et ejusmodi, quæ fictio personæ prosopopœja verbo 
Græco nominatur, prior illa proprie est ethopœja” (186, Aa.v, II.xvi). Rico Verdú gives Bravo’s 
definitions as follows: “es una imitación de las costumbres ajenas. Puede ser etopeya si finge 
las palabras de una persona real y existente; idolopeya, si las de un difunto; prosopopeya, si 
además finge la persona. La pasiva expresa los afectos y mociones del ánimo; la moral, las 
costumbres, y la mixta, ambas” (102); the latter may refer to Nicolaus (cf. 165, §10.64). Rico 
Verdú gives de Céspedes’ definition of “Etopeya” as “Oración que referimos de alguna persona 
de la misma manera que la hizo y con sus palabras formales. Puede ser: etopeya, idolopeya, 
prosopopeya” (107). He also cites those by Núñez: “Etopeya.—Imitación del habla acomodada a 
las costumbres, personas y cosas que se tratan. Pueden ser: etopeya, si finge el habla de 
personas vivas ([ad] Her., IV: Sermocinatio); idolopeya, si finge el habla de difuntos ([ad] Her., 
Conformatio); prosopopeya, finge el habla de otros seres” (164). Like both of the above, this is 
given in a progymnasmatic context; “etopeya” is defined again, now as “cuando se relatan en 
primera persona los hechos ajenos” (166). Rico Verdú adds a conceptual overview, plus textual 
locations in Spanish rhétores of the Siglo de Oro. These will be of spec. import: “Dialogismo 
διαλογισμός. […] ‘Cuando el orador introduce dos o más hombres hablando’ (Barberá). […] 
Otras denom.: diálogo, sermocinación, conformación” (296). “Etopeya ἠθοποιία. […] ‘retrato 
fiel de alguna persona, considerada y examinada en sus acciones, carácter y costumbres’ 
(Capmany). […] Otras denom.: effictio, caracterismo, notación” (308–309). “Idolopeya 
εἰδωλοποίησις. Prosopopeya en la que los personajes introducidos están ya muertos” (318). 
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2.2 Notes on Method 
πεπαιδευμένου γάρ ἐστιν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον τἀκριβὲς ἐπιζητεῖν  
καθ’ ἕκαστον γένος ἐφ’ ὅσον ἡ τοῦ πράγματος φύσις ἐπιδέχεται.  
—Aristotle (Nicomach. Ethics 8, 1094b, I.iii.4)38 
we are not the only ones doing it or the first[.] 
Aelius Theon (“Exercises” 48, §8.116)39 
nur eine Nachlese zu dem auf diesem unabsehbaren Felde bereits von Andern Geleisteten. 
Schopenhauer (402, V) 
the history of rhetoric […] continues to move forward by looking back. 
—Eden (“Rhetoric” 826) 
In the above subchapter and its summary, the terms ‘ethopoiía’, ‘sermocinatio’, 
‘allocutio’, ‘dialogismós’, and ‘prosopopoiía’ were employed (entirely) de re—
taking their etymologico-conceptual implications as a tentative guideline. By 
recourse to central and prevalent rhetorico-theoretical texts, part 3 overall, as 
well as subchapter 4.1, describe the above (with further and affine) concepts in 
greater detail—including their variant utilizations in different theoreticians. 
Being more ‘argumentative’ than said taxonomic subchapters, segment 3.3, part 
4 (especially its opening, as well as 4.2), and the comparatiste section 5 are 
concerned with assorted applications in a diachronic perspective. Part 6 tenders 
a concluding summa. A balance between the largely descriptive and the 
somewhat more ‘thetical’ chapters constitutes the general rationale. 
|| 
“Prosopopeya προσωποποιία. ‘Es propiamente ficcion de alguna cosa como dando habla o 
alguno de los sentidos a cosas que dellos carecen, o dando personalidad o entidad real 
corporea a entes de razon ymaginados por phantasias o espiritus solos’ (Patón). […] Puede ser 
perpetua, si no habla ella sola, o sermocinación, si existe diálogo. […] Otras denom.: 
personarum inductio, sermocinación, conformación, ficción de persona, etopeya” (339–340). 
For a synopsis of Spanish treatises on rhetoric published in the sixteenth century, cf. Rico 
Verdú (75–76). He offers abstracts of such works as pertain to the Siglo de Oro (76–245), e.g. for 
de Céspedes (104–108), Fox Morcillo (117–119), Gracián (134–135), Núñez (160–172), Sánchez de 
las Brozas (200–204), Suárez (212–216), Vives (220–243). Rico Verdú also includes an edited 
version of de Céspedes’ treatise ‘Del Vso Y Exercicio De La Rhetorica’ in an appendix (355–364). 
Cf. incidental uses of the terms ‘etopeya’, ‘prosopopeya’ (11; 123; 131; 153). 
38 See Trimpi’s authoritative reading (Muses 125). 
39 “μὴ μόνοι πράττομεν μηδὲ πρῶτοι” (Aelius Theon “ΠΡΟΓΥΜΝΑΣΜΑΤΑ” 116, [237], §10). Cf. 
Bakhtin: “‘one’s own word’ cannot be the ultimate word” (Speech 152); “and these words are 
the words of other people” (Speech 163; “Methodology” 67). 
 Variants of Rhetorical Ventriloquism | 21 
  
 In the (predominantly) taxonomic segments and notes, the guiding 
directive is to signal and offer diachronic, transgeneric, pragmatic interrelations 
and affinities between various conceptual phenomena and strands of tradition. 
Etymologico-philological references and considerations are tendered with a 
heuristic purpose. A functional approach is aimed at throughout, especially in 
the more applicative sections.40 An emphatically contextualized, diachronic, 
pluralistic (meaning, Humanistic) method—“a thoroughly comparative 
perspective” (Küpper “Hypotheses” 4)—is to counter monolithic tendencies 
(which are considered to be generally and academically inexpedient).41 
 The overall approach employed is meta-rhetorical (inductive): starting in 
medias res, from ‘finite’ facts in chapters 1 and 2 (specific samples featuring 
oratorico-ventriloquistic techniques), part 3 moves to a more universal, 
taxonomico-conceptual plane (designed to cover and describe diverse instances 
under relatively general headers); while retaining a predominantly theoretical 
tendency, the opening of part 4 and subchapter 4.1 already signal the plane of 
application, to which section 4.2 and part 5 return by analyzing particular 
(textual) instances relating to the conglomerate of issues here treated (oratorico-
theatrical concepts, specific cases, ventriloquistic phenomena and devices). 
|| 
40 See Blumenberg: “Funktionale Interpretation verlangt […] die Zuordnung der uns 
vorliegenden Aussagen zu den je akuten Problemen und zwar inhaltlich und formal” 
(“Epochenschwelle” 102). The substratum and (inductive) starting point of such an approach is 
the diversity of given particulars—in Küpper’s accentuation: one is to begin with “observable 
surface phenomena”, since “Culture […] is characterised by rapid and erratic change in 
phenomena; if there is stability at all, it is to be found neither in the pheno- nor in the 
genotype, but rather in function” (“Hypotheses” 5n.; 5; with “National Lit.?” 29). In this way, 
the (literal) ‘theorization’ of variants will likely conduce to a “theory of constants” (Blumenberg 
Beschreibung 487; trans. dsm; with 484–485; also Phänomenologische 13): “Ströme ohne Ufer, 
Dynamik ohne Statik, gibt es als Erfahrbares jedenfalls nicht” (Quellen 160). On this process, cf. 
Mayfield (“Variants of hypólepsis” 238–239). Generally, see Kibédi Varga’s linking ‘functional’, 
‘poly-perspectival’, and ‘contextual’ interpretation to rhetoric (84–85; passim). Cf. Ptassek: 
“Das rhetorische Praxiskonzept kann einander ausschließende Perspektiven als Standpunkte 
nebeneinander bestehen lassen. Rhetorische Rationalität ist nicht zuletzt darin begründet, daß 
anstehende Fragen des richtigen Handelns von mehreren Seiten beleuchtet werden” (65). 
41 See Küpper’s formulation of the “main” methodical “desiderata of the DramaNet project”—
here mutatis mutandis for the pan-European, transgeneric, polyfunctional phenomenon that is 
the art of rhetoric (including its affinities to, and impact on, various genres): adopting “a 
thoroughly comparative perspective”; going “beyond the confines of literary discourse” in a 
limited sense, spec. as articulated by the so-called ‘national’ disciplines; taking into 
consideration “the societal function of early modern” rhetoric at the kathólou level (as well as 
its particular nexus to “drama”); and “integrat[ing] the data available in the cultural field into” 
a “general” description of the “dynamic[s]” resp. obtaining (“Hypotheses” 4). 
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 Decidedly taking up and tying in with previous scholarship (also ex 
negativo), the purpose of this heuristic study—which aims at being as 
descriptive as possible—is to conduce to further research. In so doing and to 
said effect, the balance of agón and accommodatio characteristic of all 
rhetorico-Humanistic approaches will obtain throughout—on both the 
‘horizontal’ plane (the continuous text) and the ‘vertical’ levels (the specialist, 
expressly polyglot glosses ad locum).42 Rather than merely giving bare (author–
page) references only, the present method aims at visibly providing—and 
engaging with—the respectively pertinent passages from various diachronic 
sources, equitably setting them side by side wherever expedient; and 
specifically with a view to indicating the numerous nuances the concepts and 
devices under consideration have received. In that the terms themselves also 
reflect sedimented takes and viewpoints, their pluralism is held to be scholarly 
valuable—above and beyond the decided solidarity with the past that will ever 
be requisite in the Humanities.43 Perhaps comparable to the ratio obtaining in 
an iceberg, the main body of (continuous) text represents the more thetical or 
argumentative plane; and the (vertical) footnotes the underlying (literally 
‘hypo-thetical’) groundwork consisting of various previous perspectives on the 
phenomena at hand (with both attempting to be as descriptive as possible); this 
approach aims at counteracting the latter’s typical latency. 
|| 
42 Ever have the studia humanitatis thrived on the catalyzing mélange of agonal debates 
(disputes, discussions) and accommodative consensus (see Mayfield “Proceedings” 203–204; 
206; 212; 224–225; “Interplay” 10n.; 20, 20n.; 22n.; 34); the latter tends to be mapped by the very 
diversity of the former—hence precisely by (vicariously) arguing in utramque partem (cf. 
“Interplay” 14–15; 15n.–16n.; “Otherwise” passim); by expressly quoting conflicting views and 
tendencies. In academic microcosms (the same as societies at large), the relegation or 
banishment (to say nothing of a downright lack or neglect) of productive contrarianism—
typical of ideologically ‘streamlined’, herd-coerced jargon, and comparably mono-lateralized, 
overly harmonistic language regimes—will be overcome by decided recourse to the 
contextualized, pragmatic, polyfunctional, transgeneric and -temporal, supra-disciplinary, 
universalist téchne kat’ exochén. Applied to the case at hand: it will not do to be spiriting away 
(let alone demonize) the taxonomic pluralism as factually obtains. See Sloane, noting 
“rhetoric[’s] […] life-giving linkage to fractiousness” (“Education” 165). With respect to John of 
Salisbury (here infinitized), Moos notes that one will “mit den Zitatwaffen antiker und 
moderner ‘Freunde’ fechten […]. Kampf scheint schlechthin die Form des Denkens und der 
literarischen Äußerung zu sein” (289, §70; cf. “das effektvolle Zitieren”, 251, §63; with 251–253, 
252n.). On Machiavelli’s quotationally agonal poetics, cf. subch. 5.2, herein. 
43 See Trimpi (Muses xiii–xiv; 25; 258); and Blumenberg’s scholarly ethics—as expressed in 
this statement of purpose: “whatever men have ever thought is noteworthy; to read it, where it 
may be rendered readable, [is] an act of diachronic ‘solidarity’” (Lesbarkeit 409; trans. dsm). 
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 The effect of a supra-disciplinary, comparatist, neo-Humanistic method—
making pragmatic use of, and conducing to, the technical possibilities and 
research-related potentials afforded by a ‘digital’ age—is fourfold (at least).44 
First, it has literal recourse to (Ancient, Medieval, Early Modern) texts, lets the 
‘sources’ speak for themselves (ad fontes, as far as possible)—with ‘Theory’ 
being but a ‘contrast agent’.45 Secondly, this approach provides a diachronic, 
discernibly comparative synopsis of scholarly consensus obtaining in a given 
area—with complementary, variously nuanced, (partly) divergent positions 
being actually cited (hence present on the page). Thirdly, said method expressly 
calls to mind latent ken, foregoing scholarship (of Antiquity, Early Modernity, 
but also of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries) in need of being actively 
kept in (and, at times, decidedly reentered into) circulation—considering the 
dynamics of uptake (hypólepsis) and floatation obtaining in virtual cultural 
|| 
44 This is no endorsement of the (largely) quantifying, (hence) supposedly ‘scientific’ slants 
classed as the ‘Digital Humanities’ (soi-disant). The (mathematical) logic of identity, statistics 
for the sake thereof, virtually interminable series of ones and zeros (etc.), are fundamentally at 
variance with the qualitative approach distinctive of the studia humanitatis. See Bakhtin: “The 
interpretation of contextual meanings cannot be scientific” (Speech 160; “Methodology” 64). 
“The exact sciences constitute a monologic form of knowledge” (Speech 161; “Methodology” 
65). “Is there anything in the natural sciences that corresponds to ‘context’? Context is always 
personalized (infinite dialogue in which there is neither a first nor a last word)—natural 
sciences have an object system” (Speech 167–168; “Methodology” 71). “Question and answer are 
not logical relations (categories); […] any response gives rise to a new question. […] If an 
answer does not give rise to a new question from itself, it falls out of the dialogue and enters 
systemic cognition, which is […] impersonal. […] From the standpoint of a third consciousness 
and its ‘neutral’ world, where everything is replaceable, question and answer are inevitably 
depersonified” (Speech 168; “Methodology” 71). “The limit of precision in the natural sciences 
is identity (a = a). In the human sciences precision is surmounting the otherness of the other 
without transforming him into purely one’s own (any kind of substitution, modernization, 
nonrecognition of the other, and so forth)” (Speech 169; “Methodology” 72). 
45 Cf. Blumenberg (Beschreibung 153); Mayfield (“Talking Canines” 11n.). Bakhtin takes 
“Understanding as correlation with other texts and reinterpretation, in a new context […]: the 
point of departure, the given text” (Speech 161; “Methodology” 65). On the Renaissance, see 
Schanze: “[w]herever the classical tradition [re]occurs, it is changed as a whole by the new 
conditions the media have brought about and by the change in the concept of tradition itself 
[…] precisely that time[,] which advocated a return to the […] sources[,] basically altered the 
latter in practice and, consequently, also in theory. Adhering to the idea [of] ad fontes, the 
humanist comes out in support […] of a new rhetoric”—the critic’s value judgments have been 
bracketed (e.g. “problem”, “paradox”, “this problematic situation”, 109). Such indicate a 
misconception of the transtemporal ‘hypoleptic’ process ever in effect (which might therefore 
be described as the ‘poetics’ of the cultural net): any uptake entails variation (cf. Küpper et al. 
18; with Mayfield “Variants of hypólepsis” 243–246; 249n.; 252n.; 254; 269; 273; passim). 
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networks: “Auffinden und Weiterdenken” (in Moos’ felicitous formulation, 295, 
§71).46 This approach tenders a (literal) copia of references likely to be expedient 
in terms of conducing to future research—a depot digitally available in a 
thematically focused, arranged, entirely searchable format.47 Such a fund may 
conduce to what Trimpi describes as the function “of the studia humanitatis”: a 
“selection of those opinions which have the greatest probability” (Muses 391).48 
|| 
46 Meaning, ‘rhetorical inventio with notional elaboration’ (emphatic of the toil involved). See 
Blumenberg: “Geschaffen wird durch ‘Rezeption’ weitere Rezeptionsfähigkeit” 
(Phänomenologische 228). Cf. Gordon: “the precedents were always there. What is important is 
that they are suddenly invoked again and developed” (380). See Bakhtin’s approach—
rhetorical in stressing settings (with personae), arguing against decontextualization: “I hear 
voices in everything and dialogic relations among them. […] Contextual meaning is 
personalistic; it always includes a question, an address, and the anticipation of a response, it 
always includes two (as a dialogic minimum). This personalism is not psychological, but 
semantic. There is neither a first nor a last word and there are no limits to the dialogic context 
[…]. Even past meanings, […] born in the dialogue of past centuries, can never be stable 
(finalized, ended once and for all)—they will always change (be renewed) in the process of […] 
the dialogue. At any moment in the development of the dialogue there are immense, boundless 
masses of forgotten contextual meanings, but at certain moments […] they are recalled and 
invigorated in a renewed form (in a new context). Nothing is absolutely dead” (“Methodology” 
72–73; Speech 169–170). The past is present. 
47 Spies sees “Scaliger’s poetics” as “a means by which to come to terms with a huge mass of 
empirical data, augmenting and changing in the course of time […]. It[…] is based on the 
conviction that an empirical analysis of earlier achievements could help to direct one’s 
endeavours in any field” (260–261); his “less rigid combinatory system makes it possible to 
account for a […] more differentiated field of poetical phenomena” (262); “the structure of most 
poetical genres is defined by Scaliger in rhetorical terms” (265). “Poetry, as far as references to 
the norms of the audience are concerned, is to be equated with rhetoric” (269). In general, 
Kibédi Varga notes that “[w]e need an exhaustive inventory of possible relations” (87; with 90), 
and stresses: “Lausberg’s […] rhetoric is a complicated network of cross-references” (85n.). 
There may well be an added value and yield in being able to compare various descriptions of a 
phenomenon within a single gloss, rather than meeting a string of author-page references only, 
sans citations. Rhetorically, the research-related expediency of a copious approach is taken to 
be beyond doubt (in a ‘digital’ age); the same holds true for its scholarly advantageousness as 
regards elucidating a specified phenomenon—any such being effectually constituted by the 
assorted viewpoints diachronically adopted in describing it. Cf. Fuhrmann: “Dionysios rechnet 
wohl […] mit einer rationalen Tätigkeit des Beobachtens und Sammelns, die zur Übernahme 
von mancherlei einzelnen Wendungen und Motiven führen kann” (Dichtungstheorie 193); in 
other words (adapted to the present approach): submitting a focused, nuanced, pluralistically 
diverse variety of views conduces to the Humanistic sine quibus non of libertas and aequitas. 
48 Trimpi’s method—particularly the scholarly ethos evinced in his opus magnum (Muses 
passim)—may be taken as being authoritative and foundational for the present endeavor. 
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3 Theoretico-Conceptual Groundwork (By 
Recourse to the Rhetorica ad Herennium, 
Cicero, Quintilian, and Further Theorists) 
multa renascentur quae iam cecidere, cadentque  
quae nunc sunt in honore vocabula, si volet usus, 
quem penes arbitrium est et ius et norma loquendi. 
Horace (“Ars Poetica” 456, v.70–72)49 
Diese Vielfalt gilt es zu berücksichtigen, um einen engen Blickwinkel zu vermeiden. 
Asmuth (“Angemessenheit” 580)50 
et adhunc augeri potest. 
Quintilian (Inst. Orat. 1–2. 376, 2.19) 
In dealing with scholarly concepts and taxonomies, the present, transtemporal, 
comparatist approach adopts Aristotle’s method—as elucidated by Ritter, 
performatively terming this process itself ‘hypólepsis’: “The load-bearing 
philosophical concepts […] are not posited by Aristotle. Philosophy takes them 
up ‘hypoleptically’ from preexisting linguistic usage” (53; trans. dsm; cf. 54n., 
58, 65n.).51 Such ‘tying in with’ (‘Anknüpfung’) ‘accepts’ as given a conceptual 
state of play, describing its potential uses by application—here, the ‘underlying 
conception(s) and assumptions (including taxonomies)’ advanced, specified, 
|| 
49 Cf. Blumenberg (Phänomenologische 234). Bakhtin logs: “assimilated words” are “renewed 
in new contexts; and others’ inert, dead words, ‘word-mummies’” (Speech 168; see 165, 169; 
“Methodology” 68; 71–72). He stresses the latencies: “The semantic treasures Shakespeare 
embedded in his works were created and collected through the centuries […] millennia: they 
lay hidden in the language […] [‘in’] diverse genres […] forms of speech […] plots whose roots go 
back to […] antiquity, […] in forms of thinking. Shakespeare, like any artist, constructed his 
works […] out of forms that were already heavily laden with meaning” (Speech 5). 
50 Cf. Sloane on “Erasmus’s lesson about words […] that they are wrapped in their own 
historicity and circumstance, that their meaning arises functionally from person, situation, and 
motive, and inheres not so much in the things they represent as in the often multiplex points of 
view from which they are spoken” (“Education” 175–176; cf. 166). The present study aims at 
describing the polyphony of views on the ventriloquistic techniques and affine phenomena 
under scrutiny—permitting them to stand side by side, and ‘speak for themselves’ (so to say). 
51 Ritter is here referring to Aristotle (Meta. 1–9. 8–11, 982a, I.ii.1–4; 18–21, 983b, I.iii.4–6). As 
to ‘hypólepsis’ (including the term’s use in rhetorical contexts), see Mayfield (“Variants of 
hypólepsis” passim; here spec. 239–251). Insofar as (the abstractum) ‘philosophy’ is conceived 
of as an agent in Ritter’s above observation, one will be dealing with a prosopopoiía. 
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and organized by various theories, systems, or traditions of rhetoric. 
 When there are many words for a phenomenon in a given language—and 
(correlatively) in translations—such may serve as a heuristic trace of its import 
in a certain field.52 The conglomerate of affine techniques one might figuratively 
describe as ‘rhetorical ventriloquism’—or rephrase as selectively ‘putting words 
(including conspicuous silences) into someone’s mouth’—have been referred to 
by a variety of terms, given numerous nuances of meaning, and employed in a 
considerable range of ways and genres over the course of the overall téchne’s 
two and a half millennia of alternating prevalence and latency.53 The same as 
the universal art of discourse itself—“rhetoric” being “a trans-generic system of 
diction” (Küpper Discursive Renovatio 289; see Diskurs-Renovatio 300)—these 
particular devices are likely to have had their initial uses in a forensic context.54 
 Depending on the theoretician, the relevant terms (where present) will tend 
to be differently accentuated, or considered substitutable (on occasion)—while 
further coinages are conceivable; and do occur, as well.55 In certain cases, a 
|| 
52 Cf. Bakhtin on “the […] heuristic significance of rhetorical forms” (Dialogic 269; cf. 268). 
53 As to the art’s latency, see Mayfield (“Interplay” 6; 6n.–7n.). The affine techniques (to be) 
indicated need not necessarily involve (explicitly) attributed speech; cf. the n. below, spec. on 
charakterismós, effictio, descriptio, as well as certain (variant) conceptualizations of ethopoeia; 
in such cases, an (implied) author’s or narrator’s presence will be more in the forefront. 
54 Bakhtin logs “[t]he importance of another’s speech as a subject in rhetoric” (Dialogic 353): 
“The speaker and his discourse is […] one of the most important subjects of rhetorical speech 
[…]. In the rhetoric of the courts […], rhetorical discourse accuses or defends the subject of a 
trial, who is […] a speaker, and in so doing relies on his words, interprets them, polemicizes 
with them, […] erecting potential discourses for the accused or for the defense (just such free 
creation of likely, but never actually uttered, words, sometimes whole speeches—‘as he must 
have said’ or ‘as he might have said’—was a device very widespread in ancient rhetoric)” 
(Dialogic 353). That is, sermocinatio (allocutio), with an (implied) reference to ethos; from a 
more universal perspective: the practice of (anticipatory, probable) virtual vicariousness. 
55 Quintilian includes ‘sermocinatio’ in ‘prosopopoeia’, as differentiated from ethopoeia. See 
Lausberg (Handbuch 141, §257; 408–409, §821–822; 548, §1147, 548n.), stating—in one of his 
recurrent, characteristic phrases: “Delimitations are fluid” (Handbuch 409, §823; trans. dsm); 
the (scholarly) point (ever) being “verfließende Grenzen scharf genug zu ziehen” (Blumenberg 
Phänomenologische 69). Nicolaus reflects on the conceptual state of affairs: “Different writers 
regard what is called ‘prosopopoeia’, being almost the same as ethopoeia, as differing from it 
in differing ways. […] Some call prosopopoeia that which specifies both the persons and the 
supposed circumstances, and ethopoeia what is in all respects freely made up, which they also 
called a rhêsis, giving this name to the same thing. Those who have the best opinion think that 
in ethopoeia real persons are specified, while prosopopoeia is that in which we invent persons 
and attribute words to them. This they attribute especially to the poets, who have the privilege 
of changing lifeless things into persons and giving them things to say” (165, §10.64–65). See 
Plett: “Ethopoeia depicts mild affections, pathopoeia vehement ones. […] Ethopoeia […] creates 
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(Modern) uptake might retain only the name, while altering the function and 
signifieds of a given device (completely).56 
 As provisionally indicated above, the term ‘prosopopoiía’ tends to signify 
the ‘personifying’ of an (other-than-human) animal, mute object, or immaterial 
|| 
the semblance of natural persons, and prosopopoeia that of non-natural ones […] it clothes that 
which is inanimate (e.g., abstractions, objects, deceased persons) in human form, language, 
and action. Distinctions like these […] have only limited validity in the Renaissance, since 
prosopopoeia is in some cases expanded to all fictional impersonations, and certain other 
categories are added […] – eidolopoeia, […] and anthropopatheia for the depiction of God” 
(Culture 284; cf. 284n.). Herrick believes that “in the rhetorical discussions of mimesis, 
prosopopoeia, proso[po]graphia, ethopoeia, and dialogismus […] [a]ll these terms were used 
more or less synonymously. […] Although all the terms for imitation mentioned were 
interchangeable, some rhetoricians tried to discriminate” (21). Despite its vacillating 
formulation—and while Herrick is referring to “Terentian commentators”, “Donatus, Latomus, 
and Willichius” (21; 21n.)—such seems hardly tenable (taking various rhetorical traditions into 
account). Herrick himself notes that, halfway through the sixteenth century, “Richard Sherry 
[…] designated six kinds of prosopopoeia: Characterismus, Proso[po]graphia, Ethopoeia, 
Pathopoeia, Sermocination, Mimesis” (134). The present study aims at clarifying the sedimented 
perspectives, the factual uses, as well as the (latent, descriptive) potentials of such and further 
devices, which may indeed be differentiated on an etymological and functional basis. 
56 For a highly problematic twentieth century construal, contrast de Man (in a Wordsworthian 
context): “Voice assumes mouth, eye, and finally face, a chain that is manifest in the 
etymology of the trope’s name, prosopon poien [sic], to confer a mask or a face (prósopon). 
Prosopopeia [sic] is the trope of autobiography, by which one’s name […] is made as intelligible 
and memorable as a face. […] The dominant figure of the epitaphic or autobiographical 
discourse is […] the prosopopeia [sic], the fiction of the voice-from-beyond-the-grave” (76–77); 
“the rhetorical function of prosopopeia [sic] [i]s positing voice or face by means of language” 
(81); he ultimately extends the trope to reception in general: “to read is to understand, to 
question, to know, to forget, to erase, to deface, to repeat—that is to say, the endless 
prosopopoeia by which the dead are made to have a face and a voice” (122). Chase employs that 
terminology (see 82–89; passim): “De Man’s translation or definition of prosopopoeia is 
already a reading, and is in fact a giving of face. Translating prosopon as ‘face’ or ‘mask’, and 
not as ‘person’, is to imply that a face is the condition—not the equivalent—of the existence of a 
person” (83). “De Man not merely reads prosopopoeia as the giving of face; he reads face as 
that which is given by prosopopoeia. Face is not the natural given of the human person. It is 
given in a mode of discourse, given by an act of language” (84). She also notes that de Man 
connects “prosopopoeia” to “apostrophe” (88; cf. 68–69, 80, 105). For the latter on 
“prosopopoeia” as “‘the master trope of poetic discourse’”, see also Brogan et al. (1121); with 
Vickers’ incisive discussion of the approach and critic in question (Defence 453–454). Menke 
stresses: “‘Eine-Stimme-Geben’ ist die rhetorische Figur, die ein Subjekt der Rede (erst) voraus-
setzt und einsetzt, das nachträglich, als sprechendes, immer schon gegeben zu sein scheint. 
Insofern verstellt diese Figur in ihrem Effekt ‘lebendigen Sprechens’ auch schon ihr 
Funktionieren als rhetorische Figur und ihre Voraussetzung von Stummheit und Tod” (7). As to 
examples from German literature (Brentano, Hoffmann, Kleist, Kafka), see Menke (passim). 
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abstract entity.57 Often (though not always or necessarily), this will comprise an 
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57 Cf. Isidore: “Personification […] endows inanimate objects with personal character and […] 
the power of speech [‘Prosopopoeia est, cum inanimalium et persona et sermo fingitur’]. […] we 
endow mountains, rivers or trees with the power of speech [‘loquentes inducimus’], awarding a 
personal character to objects [‘personam inponentes rei’] which have not the ability to speak 
[‘quae non habet naturam loquendi’]. This method, so popular among dramatists [‘tragoediis’], 
is often found in orations” (“Concerning Rhet.” 94, XIII.1–2; “de arte rhet.” 514, XIII; the 
definition is reiterated at 522, XXI.45, instancing Cicero); cf. Bonner (Declamation 53, 53n.); 
Baldwin (Medieval Rhet. 97); on Isidore’s rhetoric, Kendall (147–149; spec. 148). See Alberic: 
“prosopopoeia […] is a method of applying foreign characteristics to objects; […] it ascribes to 
things qualities which nature does not bestow. […] often […] a phrase about an inanimate 
object attributes one of the senses to it. […] it […] attribut[es] senses to things which lack them” 
(155, VII.6). Volkmann gives “P r o s o p o p o e i e” as “erdichtete Rede einer abwesenden 
Person, oder eines als Person behandelten leblosen Gegenstandes” (280, I.i.28; cf. 563, III.54). 
“die Prosopopoeie [‘lässt sich’] auch an anderen Stellen der Rede als blos im Epilog anbringen” 
(281, I.i.28; plus a Lysian sample); “wir [‘tragen’] Unterredungen zwischen uns und anderen, 
oder anderen unter sich mittelst der Prosopopoeie auf glaubwürdige Weise vor. Auch Götter 
und Unterwelt lassen sich […] in Scene setzen, Städte […] Völker können personificirt werden 
und reden” (489, III.49). While “der Sprachgebrauch sehr schwankend [‘war’]”, Volkmann’s 
claim that “[d]ie Ausdrücke προσωποποιία und ἠθοποιία […] ursprünglich völlig synonym 
[‘waren’]” (490n., III.49) seems untenable. Blass gives “P r o s o p o p o e i e” as obtaining 
“wenn man Lebeloses oder Verstorbene redend und empfindend vorführt” (Beredsamkeit III.1. 
177); he logs Andocides’ using a “Prosopopoeie, indem er den Richtern seine verstorbenen 
Ahnen als gegenwärtig vor Augen stellt […] ähnlich[…] Lysias[,] am Schluss der Eratosthenika” 
(Beredsamkeit I. 308). Aeschines employs a “Heraufcitiren Verstorbener” (Beredsamkeit III.2. 
214n.), “eine vortreffliche Prosopopoeie der früheren grossen Männer Athens, welche der 
Redner einzeln […] als seine Fürsprecher vor Augen führt, […] so den Solon und Aristeides […] 
reden l[ässt]” (Beredsamkeit III.2. 214). “Nicht nur die Reden sind […] ethisch gefärbt, sondern 
auch die Art des Auftretens charakteristisch angegeben” (Beredsamkeit III.2. 215). Blass logs 
Demosthenes’ being “sehr behutsam und nüchtern. Er muthet seinen Zuhörern nicht zu, Todte 
als anwesend, oder Land […] Bäume […] Tempel als […] flehend sich vorzustellen […] seine 
Personificationen [‘sind’] äusserst einfach […] auf die Gefühle Verstorbener bezieht er sich nur 
in hypothetischer Form. […] innerhalb dieser Grenzen […] entwickelt Demosthenes in den 
Formen der Ethopoeie und Prosopopoeie einen ausserordentlichen Reichthum” (Beredsamkeit 
III.1. 178). Generally, cf. Lausberg (Elemente 140, §425; Handbuch 406, §817; 409, §822; 411–413, 
§826–829): “Die fictio personae ist die Einführung nichtpersonhafter Dinge als sprechender 
sowie zu sonstigem personhaftem Verhalten befähigter Personen […]. Die Unterscheidung 
zwischen fictio personae (prosopopoeia) und sermocinatio (ethopoeia […]) wird von den meisten 
Theoretikern scharf aufrechterhalten, indem die Prosopopoiie auf die nicht personhaften Dinge 
(und die Toten […]) beschränkt wird, während die Ethopoiie die natürlichen Personen betrifft” 
(Handbuch 411, §826); “Die fictio personae durch Reden verleiht besonders gern Kollektiven 
([…] Städte usw.) Stimme” (Handbuch 412, §828). Cf. Hartmann (passim); Boriaud/Schouler: 
“Die Prosopopoiie, durch die der Redner einem sonst stummen Geschöpf oder einem 
Verstorbenen Leben und Ausdrucksfähigkeit verleiht bzw. wiedergibt […], verdeutlicht die 
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endowment with human language.58 An entire genre—the fable—is largely 
constructed on said process.59 Functionally as well as taxonomically, it is 
|| 
Nähe zwischen P[ersona] als rhetorischer Schöpfung und P[ersona] als dramatischer Rolle. Als 
sprechende P[ersona] kann der Redner auch seinen Gegner selbst einführen. […] Dies geschieht 
in der ὑποφορά […] genannten Figur. […] Sie ist die vorweggenommene[…] Formulierung eines 
gegnerischen Einwandes (ἀντίθεσις […]) samt dessen Widerlegung” (798). Vickers gives 
“prosopopoeia” as “an impersonation speech put into the mouth of” a “client” (Defence 78); as 
“representing an imaginary or absent person as speaking or acting; attributing life, speech or 
human qualities to dumb or inanimate objects” (Defence 498; cf. 174). Mack sees it as “[a] 
speech written for an animal, object or abstraction, or the progymnasmata exercise of writing a 
speech for a character or object” (History 336). 
58 While vividly described and explicated in terms of purpose, the two Dionysian ‘rhetorics’—
personified as lady (“the old philosophic rhetoric [‘archaía kaì philósophos rhetorikè’]”) and 
harlot (seen as “intolerably shameless and histrionic [‘theatrike’]”)—do not actually talk 
(“Ancient Orators” 4–7, §1; here: 4–5); the term ‘sermocinatio’ would not seem suitable, here. 
The very fact that it is precisely (this twofold) ‘Rhetoric personified’, who does not speak (for) 
herself, will be deemed significative (discursively). Referring to Dionysius, Usher remarks that 
“two rival Rhetorics form the subjects of a prosopopoeia which recalls the visual arts. The sober 
and chaste Attic Muse […] and the wanton Asiatic harlot, form an unharmonious maison-à-trois 
with their master (the literary world?), who is unable to decide between their claims until Rome 
has restored his sanity. This colourful allegory enables Dionysius to disguise or conceal two 
embarrassing realities. The first was a delicate matter of politics. The real reason for the initial 
decline of literature, and particularly of oratory, was the demise of freedom; and this was not a 
subject which a privileged visitor could raise in Augustan Rome without appearing to abuse the 
emperor’s hospitality. The second concerns the literary debate personified by the two ladies 
above—the recent wrangle between the Atticists and the Asianists. […] for by Dionysius’s time 
[…] it was utterly impossible to say […] what constituted Attic and what Asiatic style” (“Orators. 
Intro.” 1–2; cf. Fuhrmann Dichtungstheorie 191–192). 
59 Animals seem natural choices for allocating human speech; cf. Mayfield (“Talking Canines” 
16n.; 19–20; passim). On a speaking goose in Montaigne (Essays 397, II.12), see Blumenberg 
(Höhlenausgänge 280n., III.vii). As to a fable significative in terms of the status qualitatis, cf. “A 
lioness, on being criticized by a fox, because she bore only one cub at a time, replied, ‘True, 
only one, but it’s a lion’” (Babrius and Phaedrus 473, §257); Blumenberg comments: “Daß 
Löwen nicht nur Löwen zeugen müssen, sondern es auch sollen, ist eine polemische Variante. 
In der Fabel des Äsop verwahrt sich die Löwin, verhöhnt von der vielwürfigen Füchsin ob ihres 
einzigen Jungen, mit dem geballten Hochmut des Satzes: hena alla leonta – Eines nur, dafür 
ein Löwe! Das allerdings, anders ausgedrückt, sollte dann auch einer sein” (Löwen 77). In such 
contexts, prosopopoiíai have an ‘ethopoietic’ function also. Not only animate beings are 
endowed with human language; as Blumenberg logs, there is a speaking “trumpet” (“Fabeln” 
341; trans. dsm), a sword: “Unter den Fabeln des Phaedrus, der sich rühmte, auch Bäume 
sprechen zu lassen, findet sich eine, in der ein Schwert spricht” (“Fabeln” 340). “Der Wanderer 
findet auf seinem Weg ein weggeworfenes Schwert und befragt es: quis te perdidit? Das 
Schwert antwortet: me quidem unus, at multos ego! Das ist schlagfertig”; in Blumenberg’s 
ingenious rendering: “Wer ließ dich fallen? – / Mich einer, ich viele” (“Fabeln” 341). 
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associated with evidentia.60 Moreover, the overall device is typically related to 
allegory sensu stricto (hence also to drama, historically).61 The personifications 
having accrued diachronically are legion.62 
|| 
60 In terms resembling what is otherwise called prosopopoiía in the ensuing first subtype, the 
anon. “Schemata Dianoeas” give “Ἐνάργεια” as “imaginatio, quae actum incorporeis oculis 
subicit”; “fit modis tribus: persona, loco, tempore. Persona, cum absentem alloquimur quasi 
praesentem” (“schemata dianoeas” 71, §1; with samples from Vergil on the three subcategories; 
said terms also follow each other in Iulius Rufinianus 62, §14–15). Göttert links “Evidenz und 
Personifikation” as to a “besonders kunstvolle[…] Darstellung einer ‘Sache’”, defining “fictio 
personae” qua “das Auftreten und entsprechende Reden sei es bereits toter, sei es fiktionaler 
Personen wie etwa von Tugenden” (61; also referring to Boethius); he signals the “confusion” 
caused by speaking of “personification” as “allegory” (62; trans. dsm). Cf. Plett (Systematische 
Rhet. 189), who calls “Prosopopoiie” a “kommunikative[…] Rollenfigur”, seeing its function in 
enhancing a ‘statement’s immediacy’ (“Direktheit”, Systematische Rhet. 161). 
61 A prosopopoeia voicing itself (in dialog, drama) might be distinguished from the making of 
notionalities only said to be speaking (‘personification allegories’ of States, Vices, being mute). 
See Plett: “Prosopopoeia gained such popularity in […] the sixteenth century that the Italian […] 
Bonciani […] composed a Lezione della Prosopopea” (Culture 284; cf. Bonciani passim); as to 
the latter, Weinberg speaks of “creare personaggi” (502), stressing the craft involved. An all but 
non-figurative use may be said to occur when someone is called “‘common sense’ personified” 
(Blumenberg Literatur 83; trans. dsm); as to generic conventions (restrictions) with a view to 
verisimilitude (cf. “Wirklichkeitsbezug und Glaubhaftigkeit im Roman”), the philosopher notes 
“daß Ideen nur im Medium der Gestalten Akteure der Handlung werden können” (Literatur 98). 
See Plett’s performative definition (personifying the art itself): “If the action of figures is not 
merely described but presented in persona, as it were, rhetoric speaks of προσωποποιία or fictio 
personae […] Prosopopoeia is therefore a theatrical impersonation” (Culture 283); cf. subch. 5.2 
(on Shaw). As to prosopopoeiae generally, see Curtius (112–115, §5.9; 141–144, §7.2; 212, §11.1; 
417, Exkurs.III), who notes: “Das Wort prosopopeya […] hat im Spanischen einen […] 
Bedeutungswechsel erfahren: es bedeutet auch afectación de gravedad y pompa […]. In diesem 
Sinne braucht es Cervantes” (417–418, Exkurs.III; with Quijote II. 339, II.xxxvi). 
62 For a précis of Ancient samples, see Webster (38–43; 100–106; 137–138; passim). On “kharis 
personified” (217n.) in Pindar, cf. Nagy (53). For Rhetoric and Dialog per se facing the writer’s 
persona, see Lucian (“Double” passim; spec. 135–151; with Branham: “comic personifications”, 
36; cf. 4–5, 28–37). In the former, “Odysseus is characterized in his own words in a letter to 
Calypso (2.35), a familiar literary variant of the rhetorical exercise of propsopopoiia in the 
epistolary form” (Hodkinson 553)—sc. of a nymph. On “Boethius’ famous description of Lady 
Philosophy”, see Trimpi (Muses 233n.); Moos (574–575, §118); cf. the onset of Book I, where she 
is given (effictio) in terms of her exterior (Boethius 10–13, I; with Grasmück iv; xiv); the first 
speech (sermocinatio) defies the “Musas”, defamed as “has scaenicas meretriculas”, “Sirenes” 
(12, I); ‘Boethius’ (qua persona) renders Plato the mouthpiece of Philosophy personified: “Atqui 
tu hanc sententiam Platonis ore sanxisti […] Tu eiusdem viri ore hanc sapientibus capessendae 
rei publicae necessariam causam esse monuisti” (24, I)—hence (tacitly) himself likewise. As to 
the reception of Martianus Capella’s prosopopoiíai (“Philologia”, “Phronesis”), see Curtius (47–
49, §3.1; with 266, §14.4); Plett, on Puttenham’s ‘uptake’ (“Style” 367–368). For Medieval kinds, 
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Sometimes seen as a subcategory of prosopopoiía, ‘eidolopoiía’ (always) 
refers to putting words into the mouth of the departed—specifically when 
imagined as speaking while in the state of being dead.63 
|| 
cf. Leach on “Lady Nature” (being “most commonly personified as God’s sub-vicar”, 73), “Lady 
Musica” (“turning” the latter “into a harlot”, 75). Petrarch: “persuaded by one whom it is hard 
to disbelieve: I mean Love” (“Self-Portrait” 34). On Death in Johannes Teplensis’ “Ackermann 
aus Böhmen” (“1401”), see Burger (Renaissance 48–53; here 48). As to “Sige, das hypostasierte 
Schweigen”, cf. Blumenberg (Legitimität 334); likewise on “Thalassa, in Gestalt eines Weibes” 
(“Fabeln” 340). Above all, see Erasmus’ Morías Enkómion, opening “Stultitia loquitur” (“Laus 
Stultitiae” 8): “Praises you shall hear […] my own […] of myself” (Praise of Folly 8; cf. “Laus 
Stultitiae” 10–11); see (Greek) abstractions qua Folly’s “companions”: “Philautia”, “Kolakia”, 
“Hedone” (Praise of Folly 11; with “Laus Stultitiae” 18–19). Cf. Altman: Erasmus “fuses two 
Aphthonian forms—the prosopopoeia and […] laus—to create a […] speech of self-praise” (54); 
see his analysis (53–63)—spec. of “prosopopoeiae inserted with prosopopoeiae” (59); “sophistic 
notationes, […] character sketches” (56). Cf. Harvey: “Erasmus’s ventriloquization of Folly” 
(Voices 7). Noting that “[d]ie personifizierte stultitia […] ungefähr die gleiche Rolle [‘spielt’] wie 
bei Cusanus der idiota” (Renaissance 384), Burger logs a layered sermocinatio: “Affectibus 
movere bzw. […] moveri lautet […] die Maxime der Neuen Rhetorik: Indem sie […] der Torheit 
und von dieser dem stoischen Weisen in den Mund gelegt wird, also doppelt abgewertet zu 
sein scheint, läßt Erasmus den Leser selbst ihren Wert entdecken” (Renaissance 383; cf. “Laus 
Stultitiae” 36–37, §16). See Bakhtin on Rabelais’ “King Lent” qua “grotesque personification of 
the Catholic fast and askesis […] of the bias against natural processes” (Dialogic 175). In the 
sixteenth century, “Morel edited […] Palamas’s Prosopo[p]eia, […] a judicial debate between […] 
mind and […] body” (Monfasani 182–183). Fraunce’s Arcadian Rhetorike has diachronic, pan-
European samples from Homer, Virgil, Sidney, Tasso, Saluste du Bartas, Boscán (G2r–G7v, 
I.31). Schade’s Tabulae de schematibus et tropis (cf. Knape 274–275) give “Prosopopoeia” as “a 
feigning of persons [‘Personarum fictio’], […] when speech is given to many things [‘cum multis 
sermo tribuitur’]. The poets allowed themselves much in this […] the Orators took it over 
[‘usurpant’] from them” (qtd. in: Mack History 215; 215n.; 216n.). On (seasonal) prosopopoiíai in 
Nashe, cf. Trimpi (“Interpretation” 502); for “Time” personified—anticipating what it might say 
(“thou shalt not boast”), Shakespeare (Sonnets 357, §123, v.1). On a “portrait of Envy” as “kite” 
in Chapman, see McDonald: “a prosopopoeia, the Aphthonian personification and description 
of an abstract quality” (190; cf. 193–194). For Milton’s “Personifying Truth as a dismembered 
virgin”, see Dobranski (44; as to “Areopagitica” 364–365). Mack refers to “personification” in 
“Geoffrey de Vinsauf’s Poetria nova” (History 28–29), Erasmus (History 80), Luis de Granada 
(History 271). For a diachronic synopsis of the device, see Nash (63–70; 125–127). 
63 In the Renaissance, the term “anthropopatheia” was used “for the depiction of God” (Plett 
Culture 284; cf. 284n.); for notorious Early Modern words put into the Deity’s mouth, see Pico’s 
sermocinatio, legitimizing man’s plus ultra in the beginning of his “Oratio”: “the best of 
artisans […] took man as a creature of indeterminate nature and […] addressed him thus: 
‘Neither a fixed abode nor a form that is thine alone nor any function peculiar to thyself have 
we given thee […]. Thou, constrained by no limits […] [art] the maker and molder of thyself” 
(224–225, §3; cf. Oesterreich “Subjektivität” 1290). On ‘eidolopoiía’, cf. Lausberg (Handbuch 
411–412, §826; 543, §1132). Vallozza logs Priscian’s using “‘simulacri factio’” in said respect 
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The terms ‘allocutio’ and ‘sermocinatio’ (at times used to denote particular 
and dialogic instances, respectively) foreground the ventriloquistic procedure 
as such.64 Implicitly, the latter also holds good for (the affine technique of) 
‘ethopoiía’, performed with a view to semiotically crafting (or redescribing) and 
conveying distinctively habitual (common, socio-moral) traits—typically in, and 
|| 
(414; “quando mortuis verba dantur”, Priscian “praeexercitamina” 558, §9). See Kennedy: “The 
status of the speaker at the time the speech is imagined as being given is what determines 
whether it is ethopoeia or eidolopoeia” (Aphthonius “Exercises” 115n.; with Hermogenes 85n.). 
Aspects of temporality are rhetorically decisive: “What is said is […] affected by […] when it is 
said” (Aelius Theon “Exercises” 48, §8.116). One of the most characteristic refunctionalizations 
will be Montaigne’s preemptive refutation of future eidolopoiíai: “I would willingly come back 
from the other world to give the lie to any man who portrayed me [‘me formerait’] other than I 
was, even if it were to honor me” (Essays 751, III.9; Essais III. 288, III.ix; cf. Friedrich 216, 216n.; 
Rendall 330n.–331n.)—i.e. ‘to form (poiein) me other than as per the essayistically projected, 
diachronically diverse, personae’. Montaigne is taking the (rhetorico-forensic) practice literally; 
in the same segment: “Je ne veux pas, après tout, comme je vois souvent agiter la mémoire des 
trépassés, qu’on aille débattant. Il jugeait, il vivait ainsi: il voulait ceci: S’il eût parlé sur sa fin, 
il eût dit, il eût donné, Je le connaissais mieux que tout autre” (Essais III. 288, III.ix)—the 
(ethopoetically functionalized) sermocinationes being particularly pertinent, in said respect. 
64 Vallozza gives allocutio as “Rede, die einer historischen oder fiktiven Person zugeschrieben 
wird, damit ihre Charakterzüge […] herausgestellt werden”; ‘equating’ it with ethopoiía, ‘allied 
to sermocinatio’ (413), she finds “‘ethopoiia’, ‘sermocinatio’ […] ‘prosopopoiia’” ‘difficult to 
distinguish’—“aufgrund der beweglichen Grenzen zwischen den einzelnen Begriffen” (413); see 
the n. below. With Iulius Victor, Vallozza stresses “die emotionale Wirkung der A[llocutio]” 
(414; cf. 422, XV); “die ausdrückliche Gleichsetzung” of ‘allocutio’ and ‘ethopoiía’ is taken from 
Emporius (414; with “de ethopoeia” 561–563; here 561; Naschert 1515; Lanham “Instruction” 
111). Cf. phrases describing the process: “sermonem attribuunt […] damus sermonem […] sermo 
est dandus” (Vives 186, Aa.v, II.xvi); “loquentem facimus […] personas loquentes introducunt” 
(185, Aa.r, II.xvi). “Lysias […] makes Euphiletus consistently refer to himself as” (Bakker 
“Lysias” 421). “Cicero […] makes Appius Caecus and Clodius […] address [‘adloquitur’] Clodia” 
(Quintilian Inst. Orat. 3–5. 142–143, 3.8.54). “Cicero has Antonius suggest” (Christiansen 307). 
“Cicero […] engages in debate […] with imagined spokesmen” (Gill “Personhood” 198). He 
“makes him [sc. ‘Antonius’] the mouthpiece”; “makes Crassus […] the spokesman for style” 
(Baldwin Ancient Rhet. 46). See Machiavelli: “E Vergilio nella bocca di Didone dice” (Il Principe 
109, XVII). Blumenberg offers the following (inter alia): “Bruno läßt seinen Teofilo sagen” 
(“Universum” 42); “Galilei [‘läßt’] den Salviati sagen” (Legitimität 465). Nor is the former’s 
(literary) persona ‘safe’ from the device: “Der Ausspruch, den Brecht Galilei hier in den Mund 
legt” (Legitimität 463). In an epistolary context, cf. “Lambert läßt seinen Korrespondenzpartner 
schreiben” (GKW III. 647); plus a ventriloquized reaction: “Das ist nun wieder ein Punkt, an 
dem Lambert seinen Korrespondenzpartner empört und verwirrt reagieren lassen kann” (GKW 
III. 650; cf. 652). “J[ünger] läßt […] den Bruder Otho […] sagen” (Literatur 28; cf. Jünger 12); “läßt 
Stefan Andres den Maler El Greco sagen” (Phänomenologische 104)—such metapoetical 
formulations presuppose an (extratextual) author. On dialogismós, cf. subchs. 3.1, 3.4, 5.1, 5.2. 
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by way of, language.65 De Temmerman and Emde Boas pertinently accentuate 
the foundational assumption in this respect: “The notion that speech indicates 
character is […] central to the ancient concept of ēthopoiia” (“Intro.” 22).66 
|| 
65 At times, ‘ethopoeia’ is called ‘mímesis’, ‘imitatio’—with potentials for confusion, while also 
signaling a (plausible) affinity to drama; see Lausberg (Elemente 142–143, §432–433; Handbuch 
408, §820–821; 543, §1131). Cf. “μίμησις, Latin imitatio, figuratio, expressio, is another word […] 
used as synonymous with ἠθοποιία, but it is a more comprehensive term” (Devries 9). Naschert 
gives ethopoiía as “die Darstellung von Charakterzügen durch Rede”: “des Redners selbst”, or 
“den fiktiver oder historischer Personen in Form einer nachahmenden Rede” (1512). Like 
Vallozza (413), Naschert logs: “Schwierigkeit bereitet […] die Abgrenzung des Begriffs” (1512); 
his description is functional: “In ihrem nachahmenden und beschreibenden Moment kommt 
die E[thopoeia] in die Nähe der μίμησις […] und ἐνάργεια […], in ihrer Darstellung von Reden 
oder Gesprächen abwesender Personen gleicht sie der allocutio und sermocinatio” (1512; cf. 
Cave “Mimesis” 161). “AQUILA beschreibt sie [sc. ethopoeia] als ‘moralis confictio’ im Gegensatz 
zur prosopopoeia, […] ‘personae confictio’ […] Die ‘Schemata Dianoeas’ bezeichnen E[thopoeia] 
als ‘data locutio certae personae’” (1514). Cf. Aquila: “Προσωποποιία est p e r s o n a e  
c o n f i c t i o. […] rem publicam ipsam loquentem inducimus, aut defunctos aliquos quasi 
excitamus ab inferis” (23, §3; instancing Cicero); “Ἠθοποιία, m o r a l i s  c o n f i c t i o. 
Haec figura differt a superiore [sc. prosopopoiía] eo, quod ibi et personas fingimus, quae 
nusquam sunt, hic certis quibusdam [vel] personis verba accommodate adfingimus” (23–24, 
§4; “vel” bracketed in Halm; with a Ciceronian sample; cf. Volkmann 490, III.49). The anon. 
“Schemata Dianoeas” give “Ἠθοποιία” as “data locutio certae personae”; and “Προσωποποιία” 
as “alicui rei inanimatae vel defuncto adcommodata locutio. Haec figura a superiori [sc. 
ethopoiía] hoc differt, quod in illa vox tantum viventibus datur, in hac vero eis, quae naturam 
vivendi non habent” (“schemata dianoeas” 72, §5–6; with examples from Cicero). Vives has: 
“Unicuique sermo est dandus naturæ ac ingenio suo conformis, tum habitui, quem illi 
affingimus” (186, Aa.v, II.xvi). The nexus of héxis (habitus) and ethos will be particularly patent 
here—and will be implied, whenever the latter term is used; see subch. 3.3, below. 
66 Cf. Kennedy: “What the speaker says […] show[s] what he is like” (Persuasion 136). As to 
perceiving ethos from lógos, see Plutarch: “It is possible […] to get a glimpse of the character 
[‘ἤθους’] of each in his style of speaking [‘λόγοις’]” (“Demosthenes and Cicero” 210–211, §886, 
I.3). Cf. Menander: “ἀνδρὸς χ α ρ α κ τ ὴ ρ  ἐκ λόγου γνωρίζεται” (qtd. in: Körte 79); Terence: 
“nam mihi quale ingenium haberes fuit indicio oratio” (218, II.iv.384; cf. Körte 79). Iulius 
Victor: “Fere sermo cuiusque mores probat” (446, XXVI); Alcuin: “fere cuiusque mores sermo 
probat” (547, §43). Noting that “Mores in infinitum abeunt, ut est eorum indicibilis diversitas”, 
Vives gives an “universalis” (only ostensively “obscura”) “formula” implying the effectuality of 
(a) speech qua diagnostic: “capi quenque oratione suis moribus conformi” (179, Z2.r, II.xvi). Cf. 
Scaliger: “Orationes enim quodam modo piƈturæ ſunt animorum.& qualis quiſque eſt, ita 
loquitur.& in obliquo” (123, III.xxxv). “Mihi videtur omnis oratio eſſe διαλογισμός:Perſonæ verò 
habitum nequaquam pingi debere,ſed orationem per ſe ſatis poſſe ad perſonam illam 
declarandam” (126, III.xlviii). See Puttenham: “because this continual course and manner of 
writing or speech showeth the matter and disposition of the writer’s mind […] there be that [sc. 
such as] have called style the image of man (mentis character), for man is but his mind, and as 
his mind is tempered and qualified, so are his speeches and language at large” (233, III.5); 
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 Variants of rhetorical ventriloquism dependably formed part of the common 
curriculum from Antiquity to the Early Modern Age—wherefore every student 
(including such as would later be referred to as ‘Seneca’, ‘Ovid’, and 
‘Augustine’, or ‘Montaigne’, ‘Shakespeare’, and ‘Cervantes’) had ample practice 
in these (and related) techniques.67 Given their observable prevalence over the 
|| 
“men do choose their subjects according to the mettle of their minds” (234, III.5). Cf. Hellwig: 
“was er sagt, legt zugleich seine […] Einstellung frei” (270). In drama, action—being decisive 
(Aristotle “Poetics” 46–53, 1449b–1450b, VI)—is similarly performed (chiefly) in, by speech; as 
ethos in oratory; hence Pearson’s remarks apply to both: “actions […] establish […] character”; 
the “Greek language represents a man as ‘becoming an ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός’ when he fights bravely to 
the end […]; his ἀρετή is not established until then. […] Only when the action is completed have 
they ‘acquired the character’ which the dramatist wants us to recognize in them” (“Character.” 
81); “the actions of a dramatic personage imply or involve character-development […] he picks 
up and acquires character in the course of a play” (“Character.” 82); “‘characterization’ is one 
of the consequences […] of their actions” (“Character.” 82); a “‘revelation of ἦθος’ is included” 
in “representing actions” (“Character.” 82). Cf. “just as the orator selects arguments which 
reveal his character, so a character in a drama, through the way he argues (dianoia), shows his 
ethos” (Sattler 59; his overall take cum grano salis). With Aristotle (“Poetics” 52–53, 1450b, VI; 
cf. 78–81, 1454a, XV), Pearson logs: “‘it is by representing people’s actions that one shows what 
kind […] they are’. Apart from the relative importance of πρᾶξις and ἦθος, Aristotle seems to be 
insisting on the temporal priority of πρᾶξις in drama. […] [‘in’] orator[y] […] representation of 
ἦθος often precedes the narrative […] to make the representation of πρᾶξις more effective” 
(“Character.” 79–80); “character in tragedy is created as speech or action reveals motivation” 
(“Character.” 80n.; cf. “Poetics” 78–79, 1454a, XV). Drama is (incidentally) ethopoetic through 
action—taking place in, by way of, language; ‘ethopoiía’ (not only forensically) effects a (quasi) 
‘personalizing’ transference from a case-related ‘quale’ to a speaker-focused ‘qualis sit’, which 
redirects the attention: away from the res, toward the (supposed) ‘make’ of the given persona, 
its ethos (see subch. 4.1, herein). Said shift is produced ‘entechnically’—in, through language: 
“the narrative [‘diégesin’] should be […][‘Ἠθικὴν’], and in fact it will be so, if we know what 
effects this [‘τί ἦθος ποιεῖ’]. One thing is to make clear our […][‘προαίρεσιν’]; for as the 
[latter][…], so is the character [‘ποιὸν δὲ τὸ ἦθος τῷ ποιὰν ταύτην’], and as is the end [‘τέλει’], 
so is the […][‘προαίρεσις’]. For this reason mathematical treatises have no […][‘ἤθη’], because 
neither have they […][‘προαίρεσιν’]; for they have no […][such] end” (Aristotle Rhetoric 446–
447, 1417a, III.xvi.8; cf. 288–289, 1395b, II.xxi.16; “Poetics” 52–53, 1450b, VI; 78–81, 1454a, XV; 
with Trimpi Muses 271n.; Niehues-Pröbsting “Ethos” 344; Die antike Phil. 59; Bruss 42; 42n.; 
contrast: Süss 219). Freese’s trans. of ‘ethos’, ‘prohaíresis’ seem misleading (hence are 
bracketed). See Baumlin’s sober take: “rhetoric” is “an art that emphasize[s] the role a 
speaker’s character plays in persuasion” (xii); the “Aristotelian tradition asserts the sufficiency 
of seeming good. […] discourse becomes an active construction of character […] Aristotelian 
theory […] outline[s] the means whereby such image-making is achieved. […] appearance will 
suffice” (xv); as per “Aristotle’s model of ethos, the rhetorical situation renders the speaker an 
element of the discourse” (xvi); “ethos is […] a linguistic phenomenon” (xxiii). 
67 See Kennedy: “Latin literature, beginning in the Augustan age, shows the influence of 
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course of (at least) two millennia, as well as their instrumentality de re, the 
general impact and distinct import of the various ventriloquistic devices must 
seem considerable. By describing their acceptations and functions, as well as 
potential latencies with a view to additional forms of application, the ensuing 
subchapters detail the treatment of the above and affine concepts in the 
Rhetorica ad Herennium, Cicero, Quintilian, and other Greek or Latin rhétores—
especially also as handed down to the pan-European tradition in the set of texts 
usually referred to as the Progymnasmata.68 Among the latter, those by 
|| 
exercises in composition, which even became literary genres. The Heroides of Ovid are versified 
prosōpopoeiae, […] common […] in schools. Often literary versions of exercises are combined as 
structural units in larger works: Ovid’s Metamorphoses uses myth, personification, narrative, 
comparison […] ekphrasis (vivid description of a place or work of art). The comparisons of 
Greeks and Romans that Plutarch included in his Lives are literary versions of synkrisis, another 
[‘common’] exercise” (New History 202). Cf. Bonner: “the Heroides would be […] accurately 
described as prosopopoeiae, or ethopoeiae or ‘imaginary monologues’” (Declamation 150); with 
Seneca the Elder: “Ovid rarely declaimed controversiae, and only ones involving portrayal of 
character [‘ethicas’]. He preferred suasoriae, finding all argumentation tiresome” (Controv. 1–6. 
264–265, 136M, 2.2.12). Lanham logs: “Ovid’s Heroides” were “created in accordance with the 
rhetorical rules for ethopoeia”; he adds: “The fourth-century invented correspondence between 
Seneca and […] Paul is best explained as a classroom exercise in style and characterization” 
(“Composition” 121). Generally, cf. Bloemendal (“Polish Pindar” 115–117, spec. 116; Mayfield 
“Interplay” 29, 29n.). Vickers logs: “a Renaissance schoolboy would achieve a mastery of 
rhetoric that would never leave him”; the context is problematic, reducing the art to elocutio 
(cf. “figures”, Artistry 30; also passim). See Christiansen, as to Early Modernity: “in England […] 
the word ‘rhetoric’ was on every schoolboy’s lips” (297); for Renaissance praxis (stressing 
actio), she logs: “This personification of the figures [sc. of rhetoric, per se] along with the 
experience of writing the prosopopoeia, the ‘character’ or impersonation exercise from the 
progymnasmata, […] [which] most […] schoolboys would have practiced, makes obvious that 
style is behavior. […] to write a speech that a particular character would make to a particular 
audience in a particular situation, the pupil must be able to identify specific speech habits that 
would create the character. Style inevitably connects mental operations with speech patterns 
and outward actions” (326; for applications, 327–329; also on Shaw; cf. subch. 5.2, herein). 
Preparing them for a public career (and continued later in life), prosopopoiíai are likely to have 
been a preferred exercise (with leisure qua pleasure ever conducing to industry)—being highly 
competitive, calling for aemulatio, affording the possibility for declamatorily demonstrating 
(‘showing off’) various talents, thereby linking elocutio (the spec. linguistic performance) with 
a comprehensive actio (simultaneously gestural, histrionic, dramatic), and providing ample 
space for the students to aim at (or appear to be) ‘outshining’ one another. Generally, see 
Fothergill-Payne on the Jesuits (passim; spec. 376–377); Mareel on the Rederijkers (1151); cf. 
Mayfield (“Interplay” 29n.); also the n. on Augustine in ch. 1, above; see subch. 4.2, part 5. 
68 Cf. Kennedy (New History 202–208; “‘progymnastic’, that is, […] ‘preparatory’”, 202); Conley 
(30–31); Lanham (“Instruction” 105); Trimpi (“Quality” 75–81; Muses 305; 321–327); Eden 
(“Rhetoric” 827–828; also on “speeches in character”, 828). Cf. Quintilian’s ‘rhetorical’ versions 
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Aphthonius proved particularly influential.69 The decidedly rhetorical poetics of 
Early Modern literature cannot be described without recourse to said exercises.70 
|| 
(Inst. Orat. 1–2. 280–301, 2.4.1–42)—seen to tie in with those “learned with the grammatici” 
(Inst. Orat. 1–2. 281, 2.4.1; with 208–213, 1.9.1–6); cf. Trimpi (“Quality” 75–76; Muses 321–322); 
Lanham (“Composition” 120). Kennedy describes the Progymnasmata as “the system of 
teaching prose composition and elementary rhetoric[,] practiced in European schools from the 
Hellenistic period until early modern times”; and stresses that “[t]hese texts were the common 
basis for teaching composition in western Europe for several centuries”, that all “writings” 
were “molded by the habits of thinking and writing learned in schools” (“Intro. [2003]” ix); he 
stresses argument in utramque partem: “the exercises […] tended to encourage the idea that 
there was an equal amount to be said on two sides of any issue” (“Intro. [2003]” x). 
69 Kennedy logs that “Aphthonius[’]” was “the most commonly used work on progymnasmata 
in late antiquity” (intro. to Aelius Theon “Exercises” 2; italics removed): “His Progymnasmata 
became the first text in the standard Hermogenic corpus, […] because it included examples of 
all exercises as well as brief and clear descriptions of each” (intro. to Aphthonius “Exercises” 
89; italics inverted). “The clarity of his discussion and division and his inclusion of examples 
won for Aphthonius’ work an authoritative place in Byzantine education. An extensive body of 
commentary was built up over the next millennium, […] the treatise was translated into Latin 
by […] Agricola in the late fifteenth century, making it available for use in the schools of 
western Europe” (New History 203; cf. Classical Rhetoric 164). For the Byzantine context, Kustas 
logs “the ever present and […] used outlines of Hermogenes and his commentator Aphthonius” 
(56); on the latter, “through whom the Christian world was to learn so much of its rhetoric”, he 
notes: “The special success of Aphthonius lies in the simplicity of his exposition as well as in 
his inclusion of examples for each of the types under discussion” (57). See also part 5, herein. 
70 On the prevalence of the Progymnasmata, cf. W. Crane’s ch. ‘Rhetoric in the Schools of the 
Sixteenth Century’ (57–79; on “‘Ethopoeia’”, affine devices, 66, 75–76; see 160, passim). Cf. 
Rainolde’s “discussion of ethopoeia […] combined Aphthonius, Priscian ([…] Hermogenes), […] 
Quintilian” (Herrick 135; cf. 136; Clark 262); for “Ethopœia” (see Fol.xlix.r–Fol.lj.r, N.j.r–N.iij.r; 
here: xlix.r), Rainolde refers to Priscian thrice (Fol.xlix.r–Fol.l.r, N.j.r–N.ij.r; to Quintilian at 
xlix.r), dividing it into three subgroups: “Eidolopœia”, “Proſopopœia”, “Ethopœia”—the latter 
also qua hypernym (similarly: Volkmann 490n., III.49). It is defined as “that, whiche hath the 
perſone knowne: but onely it doeth faigne the maners of the ſame, and imitate in a Oracion the 
ſame”; subdivided into an “imitacion paſſiue”, “a morall imitaciõ”, and one “mixt” (Fol.xlix.r , 
N.j.r). “Eidolopœia is that part of this Oracion, whiche maketh a perſone knowne though 
dedde, and not able to ſpeake” (Fol.l.v, N.ij.v)—emphatic of the craft. “Proſopopœia is 
properlie, when all thinges are faigned bothe the maners, [and] the perſone” (Fol.l.r, N.ij.r). 
Rainolde adduces an ethopoetic speech, written for “Hecuba Quene of Troie” (Fol.lj.v–r, 
N.iij.v–r). Cf. Desmet (60, 134); she employs the term “ventriloquist” (94); her use of the 
technical concepts may seem vague (cf. 68–69, 109, 143; spec. 167; passim; at times, she 
misconstrues: 46–47). Fraunce (cf. G2r–G7v, I.31; with F8v, I.30) defines “Proſopopoia” as “a 
fayning of any perſon, when in our ſpeach we repreſent the perſon of anie,and make it ſpeake 
as though he were there preſent : an excellent figure,much vſed of Poets, wherein wee muſt 
diligentlie take heede, that the perſon thus repreſented haue a ſpeach fit and conuenient for his 
eſtate and nature”; he offers two subclasses: it is “imperfeƈt,when the ſpeach of ſome other 
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3.1 The Rhetorica ad Herennium on ‘sermocinatio’ and 
‘notatio’ 
even if theory cannot have the last word,  
a good many words before the last rightly belong to it[.] 
—Grube (214) 
rhetorical discourse […] with all its living diversity[.]  
—Bakhtin (Dialogic 268–269)71 
Long ascribed to Cicero, the Rhetorica ad Herennium sees sermocinatio as an 
aspect of “Refining [‘Expolitio’]”, which “consists in dwelling on the same topic 
and yet seeming to say something ever new [‘et aliud atque aliud dicere 
videmur’]” (Rhet. ad Her. 364–365, IV.xlii.54).72 One is “not [to] repeat the same 
thing precisely […] but with changes”; such may take place “in the words 
[‘verbis’], in the delivery [‘pronuntiando’], and in the treatment [‘tractando’]” 
(Rhet. ad Her. 364–365, IV.xlii.54)—comprising ‘sermocinatio’, ‘exsuscitatio’ 
|| 
perſon is but brought in by the way and lightlie and ſleightlie repreſented” (G2r, I.31). For the 
other variant, he stresses its being set apart: “The perfeƈt Proſopopœia is, when the whole 
ſpeach of anie perſon is fully and liuely repreſented;wherin we muſt make both a fit and orderly 
acceſſe too, and regreſſe from the ſame Proſopopœia” (G3v, I.31; cf. “preparation”, “left off”, 
G3v–r). Moreover: “By this figure wee ſometimes make dumme and ſenceles things ſpeake”, 
e.g. “Xanthus Achilles horſe” (G5r, I.31). In Homer, the hero first addresses both of his steeds, is 
then answered by one—which segment opens with the ensuing: “from beneath the yoke spoke 
to him the horse […] Hera […] gave him speech”; and concludes: “[w]hen he had thus spoken, 
the Erinyes checked his voice” (Iliad 13–24. 362–365, XIX, v.404, 407, 418; cf. 364n.). 
71 Cf. Fuhrmann on Dionysius of Halicarnassus: “Außerdem aber war er […] bestrebt, eine 
große Vielfalt von Formen und Ausdrucksmitteln anzuerkennen” (Dichtungstheorie 196). 
72 Cf. “res simplex multiplici ratione tractetur” (Rhet. ad Her. 370, IV.xliv.56); the Greek being 
‘exergasía’ (Rhet. ad Her. 370n.). “Refining [‘expolitio’] […] gives force and distinction to the 
speech [‘adiuvat et exornat orationem’]” (Rhet. ad Her. 374–375, IV.xliv.58). For a précis of said 
work’s “Devices for Achieving dignitas in Style”, cf. Murphy (Middle Ages 21); those relevant 
herein are given as follows: “13. effictio (portrayal) / 14. notatio (character delineation) / 15. 
sermocinatio (dialogue) / 16. conformatio (personification” (Middle Ages 21); an appendix has: 
“effictio […] consists in representing and depicting in words clearly enough for recognition the 
bodily form of some person. / 14. […] notatio […] describ[es] a person’s character by the definite 
signs which, like distinctive marks, are attributes of that character. […] / 15. […] sermocinatio 
[…] assign[s] to some person language which […] conforms with his character. […] Quintilian 
[…] joins this figure and Personification […] / 16. […] conformatio […] represent[s] an absent 
person as present, […] mak[es] a mute thing or one lacking form articulate, […] attribut[es] to it 
a definite form […] language or […] behavior appropriate to its character” (Middle Ages 373). 
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(qua “Dialogue”, “Arousal”, Rhet. ad Her. 366–367, IV.xliii.55).73 
 The former is defined as follows: “Sermocinatio est […] in qua constituetur 
alicuius personae oratio adcommodata ad dignitatem”, “putting in the mouth of 
some person language in keeping with his” status (Rhet. ad Her. 366–367, 
IV.xliii.55).74 Before giving an explication of said device, a section on “Portrayal 
[‘Effictio’]” ensues—which “consists in representing [‘exprimitur’] and depicting 
[‘effingitur’] in words clearly enough for recognition [‘ad intellegendum’] the 
bodily form of some person [‘corporis cuiuspiam forma’]” (Rhet. ad Her. 386–
387, IV.xlix.63). A longer disquisition on “Character Delineation [‘Notatio’]” 
follows—which describes (“describitur”) someone’s habitual bearing (“alicuius 
natura”) by way of ‘certain distinctive signs or marks’ (“certis […] signis […] 
sicuti notae”, Rhet. ad Her. 386–395, IV.l.63–li.65; here: 386–387, IV.l.63).75 
|| 
73 “Arousal” means a direct appeal to the audience—aiming at movere by “seem[ing] to speak 
under emotion [‘nos commoti dicere videamur’]”—induced quasi ‘syn-homoio-pathetically’ in 
the captivated (“auditoris animum commovemus”, Rhet. ad Her. 368–369, IV.xliii.55). 
74 As Caplan notes, auto-deliberation is entailed: “‘διαλογισμός occurs when someone 
discusses with himself and ponders what he is doing or what he thinks ought to be done’” 
(Rhet. ad Her. 366n.; cf. “secum disputat et velutat”, Iulius Rufinianus 43–44, §20). This aspect 
is embedded within a sermocinatio in the Rhetorica’s example: “‘The wise man will think […] 
Often he will say to himself: ‘Not for self alone was I born[’]’” (Rhet. ad Her. 367, IV.xliii.55). 
75 Cicero gives “χαρακτὴρ” as ‘forma’ (“formam […] exponere”); Hubbell has “pattern”, “type” 
(“Orator” 330–331, xi.36; “‘character’”, 406–407, xxxix.134): “‘distinctive mark’ or ‘character’, 
‘stamp on a coin’” (“Orator” 331n.). It is also equated with “descriptio” (“hallmark”, “Topica” 
446–447, xxi.83); Körte glosses: “Da bedeutet χαρακτήρ […] in Anlehnung an Theophrast […] 
Kennzeichnung, Beschreibung” (81n.). See W. Crane: “English writers of the early seventeenth 
century used […] ‘character’ at times as a synonym for ‘description’” (155; cf. 160n., with Cicero, 
as cited). Cf. Rusten: “The meanings of […] χαρακτήρ are derived from […] inscribing (χαράσσειν) 
onto a surface: the imprint on a coin, […] form of a letter, […] style of an author for rhetorical 
analysis. ‘Character’ in the modern sense is not one of its meanings—the Greek word for 
‘character’ is usually ἦθος—[…] Theophrastus’ title might better be rendered ‘traits’” (12–13). Cf. 
“‘character’ derives from […] kharassō (‘to engrave’). It etymologically privileges a connotation 
of distinctive, visible mark that already in Aeschylus and Herodotus is semantically transferred 
to the realm of moral depiction” (De Temmerman/Emde Boas “Intro.” 6; with 6n.); “Herodotus 
uses kharaktēr to indicate traits of distinction in appearance […] or in language” (Bakker 
“Herodotus” 137n.). Noting that “‘character is a notoriously slippery concept” (“Intro.” 1; cf. 
“Epilogue” 650), De Temmerman/Emde Boas define it as “(the representation of) a human(-
like) individual in a […] text”; and as “the sum of relatively stable moral, mental and social 
traits and dispositions pertaining to an individual” (“Glossary” XII; cf. “Intro.” 2, whose list 
includes “personal”). Using the word “individual” is inadvisable: the authors see the issue, but 
still speak of “the self” (“Intro.” 7; cf. “individual”, 2). As to Antiquity, spec. Theophrastus, 
Körte logs: “Niemals wird die Darstellung eines Individuums erstrebt, sondern stets die eines 
Charaktertypus […] dem Individuum ist auf diesem Wege nicht beizukommen” (78). Noting 
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 Typically, ‘effictio’ (qua ‘charakterismós’) does not feature words being put 
|| 
“welche Sinneswandlungen es schon im Altertum durchgemacht hat”, “wie wenig sich seine 
antike Verwendung mit der modernen deckt”, he stresses: “Das Wort Charakter ist ein […] 
fester Besitz aller abendländischen Kultursprachen geworden” (69). For the conceptual path, 
see Körte’s descriptive synopsis: “χαρακτήρ ist seiner formalen Bildung nach ein nomen 
agentis, bezeichnet […] den Ausüber der durch das in ihm steckende Verbum angegebenen 
Tätigkeit” (69). “Zunächst ist […] χαρακτήρ ‘einer der χαράσσει’. Das bei Homer fehlende 
Verbum χαράσσειν kommt zuerst bei Hesiod in den Erga vor und heißt hier schärfen, schleifen 
[…]. Diese auch […] später[…] gelegentlich vorkommende Bedeutung ist […] abgeleitet aus der 
Grundbedeutung aufreißen, ritzen, verwunden” (70). “Metaphorisch wird χαράσσειν […] für 
kränken, erzürnen, aufreizen gebraucht” (70n.); “häufig […] wird das Verbum später in zwei 
technischen Bedeutungen angewendet”: it signifies “das Schreiben auf Stein, Holz […] Erz” 
(70); another “häufige Verwendung ist die für das Prägen der Münze” (71). “Eine schon bei 
Homer […] einsetzende Bewegung degradiert […] die nomina agentis auf -τήρ zu den 
Werkzeugen, mit denen der Mensch eine Tätigkeit ausübt” (72). “So ist auch χαρακτήρ 
zunächst das Instrument […] de[r] […] Münzprägung […], der Prägestempel” (72). “Theoretisch 
[…] könnte […] χαρακτήρ in Hesiods Zeit der Schleifer, später der Schreiber, […] Präger 
bedeuten” (71). “Bis hierher ist die Entwicklung des Wortes […] normal, aber nun tritt etwas 
Überraschendes ein, aus dem Prägestock wird das durch ihn Hergestellte, das Gepräge” (73); 
“diese Verwendung, χαρακτῆρες = Schriftzüge, Buchstaben, hat sich […] in den modernen 
Sprachen zäh behauptet” (84). By the first century BCE: “es kann […] der Plural χαρακτῆρες […] 
für Geld gesetzt werden” (75). Körte stresses: “Das Bild vom Stempel […] wird ziemlich früh auf 
den Menschen angewendet, aber n i c h t  zur Bezeichnung seines seelischen Gepräges, der 
[…] individuellen Eigenart, wie wir heute das Wort Charakter überwiegend gebrauchen. Es geht 
mitunter auf die körperliche Erscheinung” (75). From being applied to physical externals, it 
moves to a human animal’s decisive ‘characteristic’—first as to regional differences: “Ist in 
diesen Fällen der Sprachcharakter noch mehr physiologisch genommen, der […] Stempel der 
Mundart […], so wird nun […] χαρακτήρ das Gepräge der geformten Rede, die Art sich 
auszudrücken, der Stil” (76); cf. “χαρακτὴρ λέξεως” (80). Qua “Verwendung […], die in der 
späteren griechischen Literatur weitaus die häufigste ist”, Körte gives “χαρακτήρ = Stilart” (76). 
“Niemals […] dient das Wort in der klassischen Zeit […] zur Bezeichnung der seelischen 
Eigenart eines Menschen. Aristoteles, der χαρακτήρ für […] Gepräge mehrfach verwendet […] 
hat es ebensowenig in seinen ethischen Schriften wie in seiner Poetik. Erst […] Theophrast hat 
in seinen […] Ἠθικοὶ χαρακτῆρες die Übertragung auf das ethische Gebiet vollzogen und […] die 
Bedeutung des Wortes angebahnt, die in allen modernen Kultursprachen die vorherrschende 
ist. Freilich verwendet er das Wort nur im Titel, in der Schrift selbst kommt es, […] in der uns 
erhaltenen […] Fassung, niemals vor” (77; cf. 77n.; for the title, cf. D. Laertius Lives I. 496, V.47; 
Hicks has: “Character Sketches”, 497). Plausibly, Körte locates the shift in a Stoic(izing) 
context: “Das ständige Hereinziehen des Münzgepräges zeigt […], daß Epiktets Hörern die 
Verwendung von χαρακτήρ im Sinne der angeborenen […] Eigenart nicht unbedingt geläufig 
war […]. Vom Individuum wird hier ganz abgesehen, der Mensch als Gattungsbegriff hat seinen 
χαρακτήρ, sein bestimmtes […] Gepräge” (85; cf. Epictetus “Disc. III–IV.” 336–339, IV.v.15–18). 
The Greeks used it “ganz überwiegend für etwas Formales, […] das feste Gepräge des Stils […]. 
Wenn sie es auf die menschliche Seele anwenden, so denken sie meist an Typen” (Körte 86). 
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into the mouth of the person sketched—seeing that it focuses primarily on the 
outward shape and physical frame (‘effingitur forma’: ‘figura’, de re).76 
Conversely, ‘notatio’ (‘ethopoiía’) will usually (if not necessarily) contain 
language attributed to the ‘characters’ respectively (re)described (Rhet. ad Her. 
388–393, IV.l.63–li.64); and plausibly so, since said device deals with their 
ethos (an acquired disposition being a somewhat ‘more inward’ shape), their 
general (habitual, customary) comportment under typical, non-extraordinary 
circumstances.77 In a précis as to such “notationes”, the Rhetorica ad Herennium 
|| 
76 A versified treatise defines “Χαρακτηρισμός” thus: “Fit d e p i c t i o , cum verbis ut 
imagine pingo” (“Carmen de figuris” 69, v.148; with two subsequent v. as a sample); another 
tract gives said term as “quod latine i n f o r m a t i o  vel d i s c r i p t i o  appellatur” 
(“schemata dianoeas”). Cf. Tryphon (201, §751, ϛʹ). “C h a r a c t e r i s m u s  est descriptio 
figurae alicuius expressa” (Isidore “de arte rhet.” 521, XXI.40; with a sample from Vergil). Cf. 
Hodkinson: “An anonymous sophist/‘philosopher’ type is very briefly sketched in Peregrinus 
(40) on the basis of his appearance […]—grey hair, long beard, a dignified bearing […] fitting 
the short-hand imagery for characterizing a philosopher” (553). Said ‘charakterismós’ is 
functionalized with a view to a speaker’s ethos (cf. “ἀξιοπίστῳ τὸ πρόσωπον”)—while the 
“confidence” he is said to ‘inspire’ is (evidently) deceptive (Lucian “Peregrinus” 44–45, §40). 
On “the Reeve’s self-portrait in the Canterbury tales” as a Chaucerian “notatio”, cf. Gallo (83–
84). Scaliger sees ‘effictio’ as pertaining to ‘prosopopoeia’: “Effiƈtio enim eſt pars fiƈtionis in 
Proſopopœia” (122–123, III.xxxiii). In his “Treatise of Schemes and Tropes, 1550”, “Richard 
Sherry” defined “Charactirismus” as “the efficion or pycture of the bodye or mynde” (qtd. in: 
W. Crane 158; cf. 160–161, 160n.–161n.). The latter does not square with the tradition; cf. and 
contrast Desmet (46–47). With a narratological agenda, De Temmerman/Emde Boas (re)use the 
term “kharaktērismos” as “[d]irect characterization” (“Intro.” 23). Caplan links ‘charakterismós’ 
to “comedy” (Rhet. ad Her. 386n.); re notatio, he logs the Greek term (‘ethopoiía’, with Cicero’s 
equivalent “Morum ac vitae imitatio”), refers to “Theophrastus’ Characters”, and observes that 
“Lysias employs Ethopoeia with special skill” (Rhet. ad Her. 387n.); cf. subch. 4.1. See Baldwin, 
giving “ἠθοποιίαι” as “character sketches”, “the rhetorical method of characterization by 
typical traits” (Ancient Rhet. 187). Bruns stresses that the “Kunstübung, welche die Alten 
Ethopoiie nannten, […] typenbildend und verallgemeinernd [‘ist’], nicht individualisirend und 
das Besondere hervorhebend’” (433; cf. Naschert 1513; Hellwig 259n.; 270n.). This qualification 
links ‘ethos’ to an affine term (treated in subch. 3.3), with respect to which Fuhrmann notes 
that “persona always points to something typical”: it “always means the bearer of a social role, 
not the absolute person, [not] the individual” (“Persona” 91; trans. dsm). 
77 Cf. De Temmerman/Emde Boas: “The notion that speech indicates character is […] central 
to the ancient concept of ēthopoiia” (“Intro.” 22)—as cited at the onset of ch. 3 (with n. ad 
locum). Montaigne—for (a meta-)instance—describes his habitual ethos thus: “Il m’est souvent 
advenu, que sur le simple crédit de ma présence et de mon air, des personnes qui n’avaient 
aucune connaissance de moi, s’y sont grandement fiées: soit pour leurs propres affaires, soit 
pour les miennes” (Essais III. 396, III.xii; cf. Cave Cornucopian 312). In the ensuing, tò prépon is 
linked to ethos: “Composer nos mœurs est notre office […], et gagner […] l’ordre et tranquillité à 
notre conduite. Notre grand et glorieux chef-d’œuvre, c’est vivre à propos” (Montaigne Essais 
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stresses the ever needful nexus with the aptum (“quod consentaneum sit unius 
cuiusque naturae”), gives its function as delighting (“magnam delectationem”) 
by way of evidentia (“naturam cuiuspiam ponunt ante oculos”, Rhet. ad Her. 
392, IV.li.65)—both continue to be accentuated throughout the tradition.78 
 Then follows the second section on “Sermocinatio” qua “assigning to some 
person language [‘cum alicui personae sermo adtribuitur’] which […] conforms 
with his character [‘cum ratione dignitatis’, sc. status, rank]” (Rhet. ad Her. 394–
395, IV.lii.65).79 The examples elucidating said device include uses of (otherwise 
infinite) sententiae—specifically as an (acute) highlight and (expressive) climax 
in a longer speech being attributed (here put into the mouth of a protagonist’s 
wife): “[‘]nosce te esse hominem’” (“[‘]Remember that you are human’”, Rhet. 
ad Her. 394–395, IV.lii.65).80 In the same sequence of tragicizing dialog serving 
as a sample, the antagonist (after yet another dictum, now on the part of the 
husband) draws attention to the process meta-performatively: “‘Ut in extremo 
vitae tempore etiam sententias eloqueris![’]” (“‘Sententious even at the point of 
death![’]”, Rhet. ad Her. 396–397, IV.lii.65)—again expediently rendered in an 
apophthegmatic manner.81 Moreover, this same sermocinatio also features what 
might amount to a mise en abyme of the very device treated: within the dialog 
featuring attributed speech, the wife—with the aim of moving the antagonist 
(“commovere”)—explicitly claims to be speaking for her husband, putting ‘pleas 
and supplications’ (“rogat et supplicat”) in his mouth that, from his perspective, 
|| 
III. 470); all significative terms are oratorical, here (“Composer”, “mœurs”, “office”, “ordre”, 
“chef-d’œuvre”, “à propos”—and, by contextual implication, “conduite”, in terms of a 
rhetorical héxis). With reference to Early Modernity (spec. Montaigne), Beaujour logs 
“rhetoric’s traditional emphasis on ethos, the orator’s projection of a persuasive persona” (196; 
the context is problematic). For a detailed treatment of ethos, see subch. 3.3 (with n.), herein. 
78 Baldwin notes “[t]he pervasive classical inculcation of appropriateness” (Ancient Rhet. 71). 
79 Caplan trans. the device as “Dialogue” (Rhet. ad Her. 395, IV.lii.65), as per the Greek term 
“διάλογοι” (Rhet. ad Her. 394n.). Generally thereto, see Hartmann (811). 
80 The glosses refer to Isocrates, Hippothoön (via Stobaeus), Sophocles for previous usages of 
comparable variants (Rhet. ad Her. 394n.–395n.). While the device seems dramatic per se, 
many of the sermocinationes (here and elsewhere) refer (or allude) to utterances in plays; see 
Caplan’s glosses (Rhet. ad Her. 394n.). For the Isocratean version of the above sententia, cf. 
“You will attain […] self-control [‘enkráteian’] […] if, when you are in trouble, you contemplate 
the misfortunes of others and remind yourself that you are human [‘ánthropos’]” (“Demonicus” 
16–17, §21). For the nexus of “drama and oratory” in the above, see Altman (49n.). 
81 Caplan glosses “Sententious” as “γνωμολογεῖς” (Rhet. ad Her. 396n.). See Lausberg 
(Elemente 130–131, §398–399). Cf. Kennedy: “Sententiae are what Aristotle ([Rhetoric] 2.21) had 
called gnomai. These are maxims or epigrammatic generalizations about life and human 
beings, couched in a novel form to give them ‘point’” (New History 169; with Aristotle Rhetoric 
278–289, 1394a–1395b, II.xxi.1–16; also 454–455, 1418a, III.xvii.8–9). 
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are not apposite to his status (“loqui quae me digna non sint”, Rhet. ad Her. 396, 
IV.lii.65).82 The text’s (anonymous) auctor reaccentuates this focus on the aptum 
by a comment concluding the aforesaid segment of extended sermocinationes: 
“the language assigned to each person [‘datos esse uni cuique sermones’] was 
appropriate to his character [‘ad dignitatem adcommodatos’]”—it being 
particularly “necessary to maintain” decorum in this device (“id quod oportet in 
hoc genere conservare”, Rhet. ad Her. 398–399, IV.lii.65).83 In a rhetorical (as 
well as metapoetical) perspective, a consideration of circumstances will always 
be critical and decisive: it matters in whose mouth words are being put, as well 
as when, in which way, what setting, whose presence—and (above all) in the 
interest of whom or what (including vicariously).84 
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82 Cf. Horace: “si dicentis erunt fortunis absona dicta, / Romani tollent equites peditesque 
cachinnum” (“Ars Poetica” 458, v.112–113; with context, 458–461, v.112–127; also: 462–465, 
v.153–178). On the proliferation of sermocinationes in terms of an intratextual multiplication of 
rhetorico-ventriloquistic layers, see subchs. 2.1 and 5.2, herein. 
83 Cicero stresses: “In an oration, as in life [‘ut enim in vita sic in oratione’], nothing is harder 
than to determine what is appropriate [‘quid deceat’]. The Greeks call it πρέπον; let us call it 
decorum” (“Orator” 356–357, xxi.70); “semperque in omni parte orationis ut vitae quid deceat 
est considerandum; quod et in re de qua agitur positum est et in personis et eorum qui dicunt 
et eorum qui audiunt” (“Orator” 358, xxi.71; cf. Cope 111n.). See Trimpi: “decorum […] can 
never be expressed by (formal) axioms, (philosophical) propositions, or (rhetorical) sanctions 
to be codified and transmitted by manuals” (“Reason” 109; with 105n.). Cf. Eden: “Decorum 
requires that the orator accommodate the circumstances of the case, among other things, 
subject matter, speaker, time, place, and especially audience” (“Rhetoric” 827); it “is that rule 
that trumps all others in giving the orator the flexibility to accommodate the particularities of 
his case, including the demands of a particular audience” (“Rhetoric” 826; with Mayfield 
“Proceedings” 206; 224–226; “Interplay” 18–20; 18n.–20n.). As to the various terms used 
(diachronically), cf. Asmuth: “prépon […] ‘ansehnlich’ […] harmótton […] decorum […] decere 
[…] quid deceat […] aptum […] ‘apte dicere’ […] ‘adaptieren’ […] accom[m]odatum, conveniens 
[…] decens […] ‘angemessen’ […] gemäß” (“Angemessenheit” 581); “Bis zur Goethezeit bedeutet 
auch bequem angemessen” (“Angemessenheit” 582; plus affine German terms). 
84 Thereto, see spec. subchs. 5.1 and 5.2, herein. Isidore tenders the following list: “Who is 
speaking? In whose presence? About what? Where? When? [‘quis loquatur et aput quem et de 
quo et ubi et quo tempore’]” (“Concerning Rhet.” 95, XIV.1–2; “de arte rhet.” 514–515, XIV). In 
stressing the aptum—“Et hominum et locorum et temporum ratio servanda est”— Iulius Victor 
also gives the ex negativo: “Hi sunt enim, quos Cicero ineptos vocat, qui neque ubi nec quando 
nec cum quibus fabulentur existimant nec quam diu nec quo modo” (447, XXVI). See the 
Medieval hexameter (as qtd. by Lausberg): “quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, 
quando” (Elemente 25, §41; cf. Moos 258, §64; Rico Verdú 102, referring to Bravo). As to 
Castiglione, see Altman (73–74). Said formula’s utility extends beyond the forensic (hence 
primarily past-related) context. Given the present focus on (a potential) vicariousness, the 
queries ‘on whose behalf’ or “for whom [‘pro quo’]” (Quintilian Inst. Orat. 11–12. 30–31, 11.1.43, 
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 Before transitioning to a brief section on ‘conformatio’ (see Rhet. ad Her. 
398–401, IV.liii.66), the text adduces that there are also “sermocinationes 
consequentes” (translated by Caplan de re, as “Hypothetical Dialogues”), which 
draw attention to the device itself while employing it: “‘Indeed what do we 
think those people will say [‘Nam quid putamus illos dicturos’] […] Will not 
every one say [‘utentur oratione’] […]’ And then one must add what they will say 
[‘deinde subicere sermonem’]” (Rhet. ad Her. 398–399, IV.lii.65).85 
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including contextualization: “apud quem”) might be added—with this being implicit in “quibus 
auxiliis” to some extent; a variant wording has “quibus adminiculis” (Lausberg Handbuch 183, 
§328; cf. 203, §374). W. Crane gives this list: “Under circumstances of special concern in oratory 
fall such considerations as who, what, where, when, to whom, how, and why” (58). Sloane logs 
“rhetoric[’s] […] insistence upon circumstance” (“Education” 169n.), “that all arguments 
should be attached to sources and purposes, to speakers and occasions” (“Education” 171). Cf. 
Christiansen on “balanc[ing] the demands of the multiplex context, demands which change as 
circumstances change” (305): “Texts are always connected to speakers, purposes, audiences, 
occasions, and effects” (315); in line with Quintilian, she uses the formulation: “varied to suit” 
(305). See Niehues-Pröbsting: “Rhetorik hat es wesentlich mit Einzelnem und Speziellem zu 
tun. Ihre Unvermeidlichkeit beruht auf der Unbestimmtheit des Einzelfalles” (“Ethos” 346). 
“Rhetorik […] ist zeitgebunden und situativ” (“Rhet. und Ästhetik” 51). Circumstances are ever 
decisive, rhetorically—hence the accent on kairós and tò prépon (cf. Trimpi Muses 273; 276)—all 
is “with a difference” (Shakespeare Hamlet 359, IV.v.181); accordingly, adjustment, flexibility 
are paramount: “He […] will be eloquent [‘eloquens’] who can adapt his speech [‘accommodare 
orationem’] to fit all conceivable circumstances [‘ad id quodcumque decebit’]” (Cicero “Orator” 
398–399, xxxvi.123). Cf. Aristotle’s description of rhetoric: “Rhetoric [‘ῥητορικὴ’] […] may be 
defined as the faculty [‘δύναμις’] of discovering [‘θεωρῆσαι’] the possible means of persuasion 
[‘τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν’] in reference to any subject whatever. This is the function of no other 
of the arts [‘τέχνης’]” (Rhetoric 14–15, I.ii.1, 1355b; cf. 12–13, I.i.14; with Trimpi Muses 18–19). 
85 According to Lausberg (Elemente 143, §433), as well as de re, the ensuing seems to be an 
affine device (cf. “subicere”): “Hypophora [‘Subiectio’, also ‘ἀνθυποφορά’] occurs when we 
enquire of our adversaries, or ask ourselves, what the adversaries can say in their favour, or 
what can be said against us [‘quid contra nos dici possit’]; then we subjoin [‘subicimus’] what 
ought or ought not to be said [‘id quod oportet dici aut non oportet’]” (Rhet. ad Her. 310–311, 
IV.xxiii.33; 310n.). “There is much vigour and impressiveness [‘acrimoniae et gravitatis’] in this 
figure because, after having posed the question, ‘What ought to have been done?’, we subjoin 
[‘subicitur’] that that was not done. […] In another form of the same figure we refer the 
hypophora [‘subiectionem’] to our own person [‘ad nostram (…) personam’]” (Rhet. ad Her. 
312–313, IV.xxiv.34); moreover, one may ‘accumulate’ “subiectiones” (Rhet. ad Her. 314, 
IV.xxiv.34). As to hypophorá generally, see Quintilian, who mentions it in passing (Inst. Orat. 
9–10. 158–159, 9.3.98); but see the examples pertaining to the former, given by Lausberg in the 
resp. sections (Handbuch 381–383, §771–775); cf. also Boriaud/Schouler (798); Murphy (Middle 
Ages 367). On “Hypophora mit Ethopoeie, insofern der Gegner redend eingeführt wird” (here in 
Hyperides), see Blass (Beredsamkeit III.2. 40; also: “Selbstfrage”, “mehrfache[…] Hypophora”). 
Volkmann stresses: “Sehr häufig ist die Hypophora bei Lysias” (493, III.49). “[A]ls eine bei 
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 Rather than following the Greek taxonomy (which fronts the ‘prósopon’), 
the Latin concept employed in the present text’s concise description of (what is 
else termed) ‘prosopopoiía’ accentuates said compound’s suffix—meaning, the 
device’s ‘figurative’ potential and ‘poetico-formative’ capacity (de re): 
Personification [‘Conformatio’] consists in representing an absent person as present 
[‘aliqua quae non adest persona confingitur quasi adsit’], or in making a mute thing [‘res 
muta’] or one lacking form [‘aut informis’] articulate [‘eloquens’], and attributing 
[‘adtribuitur’] to it a definite form [‘forma’] and a language [‘oratio’] or a certain behaviour 
[‘aut actio quaedam’] appropriate to its character [‘ad dignitatem adcommodata’][.] (Rhet. 
ad Her. 398–399, IV.lii.66; 398n.)86 
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Lysias übliche Figur”, Blass notes “die Hypophora, subjectio, wo der Redner gegen sich selbst 
Einwendungen erhebt oder einen andern erheben lässt, um dieselben sodann zu widerlegen, 
wodurch […] ein lebhaftes dialogisches Element hineingebracht wird. Auch diese Figur hat 
viele Formen […]; in öffentlichen [‘Reden’] gebraucht er nicht ganz selten länger fortgesetzte 
ὑποφοραί mit rasch folgenden Fragen und Entgegnungen, namentlich zum Abschluss des 
Beweises, um alle noch übrigen Einwendungen zusammen abzufertigen” (Beredsamkeit I. 415). 
Cf. (cum grano salis): “Künstlicher ist schon die Selbstfrage: ‘weshalb sage ich dies?’ sowie die 
dialogisch an den Gegner gerichtete; weshalb denn auch diese, dem Demosthenes so 
geläufigen Formen bei Lysias recht selten sind” (Beredsamkeit I. 415). In general, Bakhtin logs: 
“In secondary speech genres, especially rhetorical ones, […] frequently within the boundaries 
of his own utterance[,] the speaker (or writer) raises questions, answers them himself, raises 
objections to his own ideas, responds to his own objections, and so on” (Speech 72; 
“secondary”, i.e. “complex”, 61–62). See also subch. 5.1, herein. The technique of hypophorá 
serves an anticipatory, preparatory, deliberative function; it is related to “Ratiocinatio” de re 
(cf. Rhet. ad Her. 284–289, IV.xvi.23–24; here 284; cf. Lausberg Handbuch 197–201, §367–372; 
also Volkmann 492, III.49); Murphy gives the latter as “Reasoning by Question and Answer” 
(Middle Ages 366). When rendered in direct speech and dialogically, it may seem similar to a 
sequence of sermocinationes for the other party. A further, apparently affine ‘figure of thought’ 
is referred to as the “Distribution [‘Distributio’]” of “certain specified rôles [‘negotia’] […] 
among a number of things or persons [‘in plures res aut personas’]”, using formulae such as 
“‘Whoever of you [‘Quibus vestrum’] […] loves the good name of […]. Whoever [‘Qui’] of you 
wishes […]. You who [‘Qui’] have parents […]. You who [‘Quibus’] have children” etc. (Rhet. ad 
Her. 346–347, IV.xxxv.47; 346n.). This refers back to the ‘narratio’—(here) as part of the 
“progymnasmata (praeexercitamenta)”—in which respect the Rhet. ad Her. states that “one [is] 
based on the facts [‘in negotiis’], the other on the persons [‘in personis’]”; Caplan’s glosses add 
the Greek qua “[a]ccording to τὰ πράγματα or τὰ πρόσωπα” (Rhet. ad Her. 22–23, I.viii.13; 23n.). 
As to the above, see also subchs. 5.1 and 5.2, herein. 
86 The gloss refers to “προσωποποιία”, to Cicero’s formula (“personarum ficta inductio”), to the 
device of “[m]aking the dead speak” as “sometimes called εἰδωλοποιία”, while suggesting that 
“[r]epresenting an absent person as present would not today be regarded as strictly within the 
meaning of Personification” (Rhet. ad Her. 398n.). As indicated in what follows above, this 
might depend on the quality of that (supposed) absence. Generally, cf. also Iulius Rufinianus’ 
definition: “Προσωποποιία est figura sententiae, qua oratio ad alterius personae orationem 
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Endowing the crafted ‘entity’ with speech is thus seen as but one aspect of the 
process described, which chiefly comprises its ‘formation’ (and action). The 
examples include a city personified, as well as a conceivable speech by the 
|| 
imitandam retorquetur. Latine dicitur d e f o r m a t i o  vel e f f i g u r a t i o” (62, §14). 
The use of the aforesaid and the above taxonomic variants may also have been (largely) 
discontinued due to the term’s evidently conducing to errata—as in Vickers, glossing 
“Prosopopoeia” as “(or confirmatio)” (Defence 498). For pertinent Medieval examples of the 
device, see Campbell, who (with “Schlauch”) notes that “one of the finest poems in Old 
English, The Dream of the Rood, was constructed on the principle of prosopopoeia” (195). 
Curtius mentions the “Schwalbengedicht des Bischofs Radbod von Utrecht (917)”, in which 
“[d]ie Schwalbe […] in eigener Person [‘spricht’] und […] den Leser […] an[‘redet’]” (168, §8.4)—
glossing: “Das Stück ist also eine conformatio (quando rei alicui contra naturam datur persona 
loquendi […])” (168n.; cf. the definition on the part of Priscian, “praeexercitamina” 557–558, 
§9). Concerning a comparable technique in a sermon on Luther’s part (“eine fiktive Rede der 
Vögel und wilden Tiere”, here with the function of ‘amplifying’), see Stolt (41–42; 42n., 
referring to Curtius); with Quintilian, she speaks of a “Fictio personae (prosopopoeia)”, adding: 
“es handelt sich um eine hochpathetische Figur” (42n.; cf. 68). In a rhetorical analysis of the 
resp. passages—where “[f]ictio personae” is defined as “fingierte Rede, die in den Mund 
nichtsprechender Wesen oder Dinge gelegt wird” (67)—Stolt demonstrates Luther’s couching of 
this prosopopoiía in various forms of “[f]ictional dialog (subiectio)” (its function being 
“Belebung der Gedankenfolge”, 66, 66n.; her gloss refers to Rhet. ad Her. 284–289, IV.xvi.23–
24, on “Ratiocinatio”, 284; cf. spec. “et animum auditoris retinet adtentum”, 288, IV.xvi.24; as 
well as to “Subiectio”, resp. “Hypophora”, 310–315, IV.xxiii.33–xxiv.34, here 310–311). Luther’s 
sermon features “fabricated objections”, ‘words put into the auditor’s or reader’s mouth’ (Stolt 
66; trans. dsm; cf. 69); “fabricated statements and objections by unspecified persons […] put 
into the mouth of an anonymous person” (68; trans. dsm; referring to Quintilian’s “‘dicat 
aliquis’”, cited in Lausberg Handbuch 410, §824; Stolt does not concur with the latter’s 
taxonomy, here); “the sun” (68n.; trans. dsm), even “God” Himself are “introduced as 
speaking”, and “the reply is put into the mouth of the addressed” (67; trans. dsm); while 
Luther takes up and ties in with Scripture (“Mt. 25, 42 ff.”) in the latter case, the following 
prosopopoeia is ‘freely fabricated’ (67). He also uses a “[f]ingiertes Gegenargument”, which is 
‘put into an opponent’s mouth and refuted’ (“in den Mund gelegt und widerlegt”, 45)—here 
spec. “in the mouth of a ‘geitz wanst [sc. ‘miser’, more literally, a ‘stingy paunch’]’” (69; trans. 
dsm). In one place, Luther attributes a “(fabricated) dictum” to “a ‘fine noble man’”, while later 
repeating the same saying “as his own opinion” (70; 70n.; trans. dsm); said scholar gives the 
function of this move as ‘cautionary’ (70n.). She summarizes: “Alle diese fingierten 
Aussprüche, […] teils in direkter, teils in indirekter Rede […], dienen der Belebung der 
Argumentation sowie der Stärkung bzw. Schwächung der causa. Dadurch, daß Gründe und 
Gegengründe verschiedenen Menschen, […] Tieren und unbelebten Gegenständen in den Mund 
gelegt werden können, ergeben sich unerschöpfbare Möglichkeiten der Variation. Die varietas 
wirkt der Langeweile entgegen und bildet den gedanklichen ornatus”—the effects being a 
“gespannte Aufmerksamkeit”, and “eine größere Bereitschaft, den Inhalt zu glauben und sich 
von der Rede fortreißen zu lassen” (70–71). Listing “verschiedene Mittel, die Langeweile zu 
bannen”, Stolt similarly refers to “sermocinatio” as “Aufmerksamkeitserreger” (56). 
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absent (being dead) Roman exemplar par excellence: “‘But if that great Lucius 
Brutus should now come to life again [‘revivescat’, his ‘reconfiguration’, so to 
speak] and appear here before you [‘et hic ante pedes vestros adsit’], would he 
not use this language [‘hac utatur oratione’]’”—then follow words put into this 
persona’s mouth (Rhet. ad Her. 398–399, IV.liii.66).87 The Rhetorica ad 
Herennium also logs the polyvalence of “conformatio” (utile “in plures res, in 
mutas atque inanimas”), its being especially expedient (“Proficit plurimum”) in 
“Amplification”, and (with a view to movere) when ‘appealing to pity’ 
(“commiseratione”, Rhet. ad Her. 400–401, IV.liii.66). 
 The quasi personifying of a text or work—all but inevitable in the present 
case, its “auctor” being “incertus” (Caplan “Intro.” xiv; Eloquence 7)—might also 
be taken to pertain to this category (de re).88 
|| 
87 Cf. Rainolde’s variation (Fol.l.v–r, N.ij.v–r). Emporius has: “a fourth kind of impersonation 
[‘adlocutionis’] […] involves giving words to the dumb [‘cum mutis damus verba’] and creating 
a person who does not really exist [‘et fingitur persona quae non est’], as when M. Tullius 
[Cicero] attributes words to the province of Sicily or represents the republic as speaking [‘rei 
publicae loquentis inducit’]; this is called prosopopoeia” (“Ethopoeia” 35; “de ethopoeia” 562). 
88 For the (also historically) effectual personification of a book, see Moos: “Wichtig ist […], 
daß Policraticus sprachlich ein Mensch und keine Sache ist. […] (Gerade die Personhaftigkeit 
des Titels führte übrigens im Spätmittelalter zu kuriosen Verwechslungen von Titel und Autor 
bis zu jener Anführung eines unter dem Namen Policraticus bekannten Kirchenvaters). Die 
Personifikation gilt primär dem Buch, nicht einer darin enthaltenen Idee. In dem 
Widmungsgedicht […] schickt Johann [of Salisbury] sein Buch […] auf eine gefährliche 
Wanderschaft (wie einst Ovid und Horaz[)]” (573, §118). “Der […] Policraticus ist […] ein Buch in 
einer fictio personae oder Prosopopoeie” (574, §118). Chase (in a de Manian context) refers to 
“the persuasion that a text has a voice” as “prosopopoeia” (80). Cf. Prins’ phrasing: “The pages 
speak in place of Sappho” (36); “the text is made to speak in place of the author […] Sappho 
comes to be read as the personification of her own texts” (48); with reference to Lardinois, she 
mentions “recent speculation that Sappho was a stock persona in archaic poetry” (42; 42n.). 
Generally, see Eco’s semiotico-linguistic references to prosopopoiía: “in Italian it is customary 
to say that an inanimate object (a clue, an imprint) ‘accuses’ someone […] there is a sort of 
anthropomorphization of the object which is considered to ‘speak’. In fact this […] use of 
/accusare/ has to be viewed as a rhetorical figure (a prosopopoeia) even if it has been definitely 
catachresized by usage” (109). Cf. “All English it-names are he-names or she-names in Italian 
and this naturally has its consequences in fairy tales. But these connotations are due to a 
rhetorical process of personification relying on the semantic markers” (146n.). 
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3.2 Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria on ‘prosopopoeia’ 
(With Remarks by Cicero) 
Utimur enim fictione personarum et velut ore alieno loquimur[.] 
—Quintilian (Inst. Orat. 11–12. 28, 11.1.39) 
considerandum est quid cuique personae conveniat[.] 
—Quintilian (Inst. Orat. 3–5. 140, 3.8.51) 
In certain respects, Quintilian’s later position differs significantly from the 
previous Latin treatise. He specifically deals with the matter at hand in books 3 
and 9 of the Institutio Oratoria; to begin with the former: 
I regard prosopopoeia [‘prosopopoeiae’] as far the most difficult [‘longe (…) difficillimae’] 
exercise, because the difficulty of maintaining a character [‘personae difficultas’] is added 
to the other problems of the suasoria [‘suasoriae laborem’]. Caesar, Cicero, and Cato will 
all have to be assigned different ways of giving the same advice. However, it is a very 
useful [‘Utilissima’] exercise, whether because it does involve this double effort [‘duplicis 
est operis’], or because it is particularly valuable [‘plurimum confert’] also to future poets 
and historians [‘poetis quoque aut historiarum futuris scriptoribus’]. But it is essential for 
orators [‘oratoribus’] too. (Inst. Orat. 3–5. 138–139, 3.8.49)89 
|| 
89 The trans. of “personam” as “personality” seems problematic (generally). Russell gives said 
form of prosopopoeia as “an elementary exercise, in which the speaker plays the part of a 
specific historical character” (Inst. Orat. 3–5. 138n.). See Volkmann (312–313, I.ii.32), also as to 
the context in Quintilian; cf. Bonner (Declamation 53, 53n.). Above, the choice of names is not 
only alliterative in effect, but also attributable to their particular familiarity as (commonplace) 
personae, spec. in terms of a customary, recognizable ethos—hence their prevalence in said 
exercises. On the preparations for rhetoric, Quintilian remarks that “[t]he grammatici […] make 
inroads as far as prosopopoeiae [‘ad prosopopoeias’] and suasoriae, in which the burden of 
speaking is very great [‘in quibus onus dicendi vel maximum est’]” (Inst. Orat. 1–2. 262–263, 
2.1.2; cf. 262n.; problematically, 210, 1.9.3, 210n.; cf. Murphy “Habit” 62; Percival 306; 324). As 
to the “Order of Treatment of Progymnasmata in Extant Treatises” (reflecting an increasing 
level of difficulty, given the educational context), Kennedy’s table shows “Ethopoeia” (resp. 
“prosôpopoeia, Characterization, Personification”) as ranked 6th (of 10) in the Progymnasmata 
by Theon, 9th (of 12) in ‘Hermogenes’, 11th (of 14) in Aphthonius, 9th (of 12) in Nicolaus (“Intro. 
[2003]” xiii); the latter (while not adhering) also indicates that “[s]ome […] put […] ethopoeia 
after thesis”, making it the second to last, since (they say) “there is a path leading from thesis, 
through ethopoeia, to complete hypotheses” (164, §10.63; cf. John of Sardis/Sopatros 214, 
§11.195,4; 216, §11.198–199). See Clark, who speaks of “a graded series”: “all textbooks of 
progymnasmata […] build each exercise on what the boys have learned from previous” ones, 
while “each […] adds something new” (260). He defines ‘impersonation or prosopopoeia’ as 
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The reason for the latter being that speeches were often ‘ghostwritten’ (so to 
say)—a form of vicarious labor requiring accommodative and anticipative 
capacities on the part of the proxy in the background: 
there are many speeches composed by Greeks and Romans for others to deliver [‘quibus 
alii uterentur’], in which the words had to be adapted to the position and character [‘ad 
quorum condicionem vitamque aptanda’] of the speaker. Did Cicero think in the same way 
[‘eodem modo cogitavit’] or assume the same personality [‘eandem personam induit’] 
when he wrote for Gnaeus Pompeius […] and the others? (Inst. Orat. 3–5. 138–141, 3.8.50)90 
Rhetoric ever reckons with contingency and context, hence with various forms 
and degrees of particularity.91 Quintilian accentuates that the orator (Cicero 
|| 
“requir[ing] the pupil to compose an imaginary monolog which might appropriately be spoken 
or written by an historical, legendary, or fictitious person under given circumstances” (260). 
90 For a formulation similar to the above in a rhetorico-dramatic context, see Quintilian 
(“induere personas”, Inst. Orat. 6–8. 62, 6.2.36; with Plett Culture 283n.). On the nexus of 
personae and mores in this regard, cf. Quintilian: “Tragic and comic poets pay greater attention 
to characters [‘Maior in personis observatio’], because they use many different ones [‘variis’]. 
The same was true of those who wrote speeches for others [‘qui orationes aliis scribebant’], and 
is true of declaimers today, since in declamation we do not always speak as advocates, but very 
commonly as litigants. However, even in Causes in which we do appear as advocates, the same 
differentiation must be carefully observed. This is because we use imaginary persons [‘Utimur 
enim fictione personarum’] and speak as it were with other men’s lips [‘et velut ore alieno 
loquimur’], and so have to provide the appropriate personalities [‘accommodamus sui mores’] 
for those to whom we lend our voice [‘dandi (…) vocem’]” (Inst. Orat. 11–12. 28–29, 11.1.38–39). 
Quintilian reaccentuates the pragmatic pluralism of the device: “it is not only that there are 
just as many varieties [‘varietates’] of Prosopopoeia [‘prosopopoeia’] as there are Causes: there 
are more [‘plures’], because in Prosopopoeia we simulate [‘adsimulamus’] the emotions 
[‘adfectus’] of children, women, nations, and even things which cannot speak [‘mutarum etiam 
rerum’], and they are all entitled to their appropriate character [‘quibus omnibus debetur suus 
decor’]” (Inst. Orat. 11–12. 30–31, 11.1.41); “we often have to speak differently on behalf of 
different people [‘aliter enim pro alio saepe dicendum est’]” (Inst. Orat. 11–12. 30–31, 11.1.42); 
“aliud alios decere” (Inst. Orat. 11–12. 178, 11.3.177); “alios aliud decet” (Inst. Orat. 11–12. 24, 
11.1.31; cf. 30, 11.1.42). Quintilian notes the (conventional) renown of Lysias in this respect, 
having written plausible (cf. “veritatis fidem”) orations “for uneducated clients” (Inst. Orat. 3–
5. 140–141, 3.8.51). Similarly, “Declaimers [‘declamatoribus’] […] rarely deliver their speeches 
as advocates [‘advocati’], but generally as sons, parents, rich men, old men” etc. (Inst. Orat. 3–
5. 140–141, 3.8.51). Cf. subch. 4.1 (regarding the art of Lysian ventriloquism); as well as 5.2 (with 
respect to vicariousness generally, and logography in particular). 
91 See Eden: “That rhetoric and historiography should be complementary arts in antiquity is 
not surprising given their common stake in contingency and particularity” (Rhet. Tradition 
27n.; with “Augustinian Hermeneutics” 57n.). Cf. “Rhetoric is, above all, an art based on 
contingency” (Enterline Body 21; the context is highly problematic). 
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being the nominal exemplar) “consider[s] the fortune [‘fortunam’], position 
[‘dignitatem’], and career [‘res gestas’] of each” when crafting a (hypoleptic, 
socio-morally acceptable and plausible) likeness (“imaginem”) of those to 
whom he (vicariously) ‘gives’ or ‘lends his voice’ (“vocem dabat”)—achieving or 
conducing to the impression (“viderentur”) of their effectually “speak[ing] 
better than themselves [‘melius (…) dicere’]”, while remaining recognizable 
(Inst. Orat. 3–5. 140–141, 3.8.50). Probable adaptation (“accommodari”) to the 
“speaker [‘ab homine”]” and “subject [‘a re’]” (meaning, the given context) are 
ever paramount (thereby to conceal the artfulness involved)—with Quintilian 
explicitly lauding “Lysias”, in said respect (Inst. Orat. 3–5. 140–141, 3.8.51).92 
 From a generic perspective, the device of prosopopoeia links rhetoric and 
drama with a view to audience assumptions and expectations (the oratorical 
being comparable to such as obtain in the theater). “Declaimers of course must 
especially consider what best suits each character [‘considerandum est quid 
cuique personae conveniat’]”—seeing that “they rarely deliver their speeches as 
advocates” (meaning, quasi in propria persona, while vicarious in function); 
rather, they actually have to play a wide variety of parts, so that 
comic actors [‘comoediarum actoribus’] hardly have more roles [‘plures habitus’] to 
sustain [‘concipiendi’] in their performances [‘in pronuntiando’] than these men do in 
their speeches [‘in dicendo’]. (Inst. Orat. 3–5. 140–141, 3.8.51)93 
|| 
92 See subch. 4.1 on Dionysius for a detailed discussion of the issues involved in (Lysian) 
ethopoiía; for samples, cf. also section 5.2; on celare artem, see subch. 4.2 and part 6, herein. 
93 Cf. Quintilian (Inst. Orat. 1–2. 240–241, 1.11.12–13; generally, 236–241, 1.11.1–14; with 241n.; 
Inst. Orat. 9–10. 284–289, 10.1.65–72; 316–317, 10.1.119; with Inst. Orat. 11–12. 248–249, 12.5.5 ; 
also: 28–31, 11.1.38–42; 178–183, 11.3.177–184, spec. “non enim comoedum esse, sed oratorem 
volo”, 180, 11.3.181). Cf. Bonner (Declamation 21, 21n.); with Winterbottom’s gloss (in Seneca 
the Elder Controv. 1–6. 379n.); Curtius (435, Exkurs.V.1); Herrick (15); Mayfield (“Interplay” 
10n.–11n.; 30n.–31n.). Referring also to the above, Bonner logs: “the Roman student of rhetoric, 
who frequently had […] to impersonate historical or mythological personages in his exercises, 
and to simulate their emotions, needed to be something of an actor” (Declamation 21); in a 
gloss (Declamation 21n.), he points to Seneca the Elder’s assessment of Cassius Severus, whose 
“delivery [‘pronuntiatio’] would have made any actor’s [‘histrionem’] reputation, without being 
at all reminiscent of an actor’s [‘histrionis’]” (Controv. 1–6. 378–379, 205M, 3.Preface.3; cf. 
379n.). Bonner suggests that “the early use of the term declamatio at Rome […] may have had a 
close connection with the stage” (Declamation 21). Winterbottom defines it as “a model speech 
[…] put in the mouth either of one of the parties in the case or of an advocate”: “Declaimers […] 
preferred to take the role of one of the parties, and prided themselves on their ability to speak 
in character (ἠθικῶς […])” (xi, with n.); cf. “to represent […] [a] character as faithfully as 
possible […] was to speak ethicos” (Bonner Declamation 53). Winterbottom refers to the second 
book, where Seneca describes one declaimer’s speaking “in character” (“a parte patris ethicos 
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As per alternative conceptual conventions focusing on the aspect of ethos in the 
same procedure, said device would characteristically be termed ethopoiía; 
Quintilian uses this term otherwise (see Inst. Orat. 9–10. 68, 9.2.58).94 
 The Roman rhétor also logs an overarching nexus between poetics, 
historiography, and (declamatory) oratory via (his comprehensive 
understanding of) prosopopoeia, since “both poetical and historical themes 
[‘poeticas et historicas’] are often set as [rhetorical] exercises [‘exercitationis’]”—
such as “Priam’s words to Achilles, or Sulla resigning the dictatorship in the 
public assembly” (Inst. Orat. 3–5. 140–141, 3.8.53).95 Quintilian accentuates the 
technique’s versatility and polyfunctionality—both in various segments of a 
speech, and in the different genera (“in materia iudiciali deliberativa 
demonstrativa”): “Indeed we very often employ [‘frequentissime (…) utimur’] 
fictitious speeches of persons [‘ficta personarum’] whom we set up ourselves 
[‘substituimus’]” (Inst. Orat. 3–5. 140–143, 3.8.53–54).96 
|| 
dixit”, Controv. 1–6. 296–297, 150M; 2.3.23; “Suasoriae” 502–503, 529M, 1.13). The reception is 
central: one declaimer’s “remark was in character [‘ethicos’], as many think (at least it was 
praised when he uttered it)” (Controv. 1–6. 306–307, 155M, 2.4.8). Whether or not something 
was (meant to be) prosopo-ethopoetic, or spoken in propria persona, would affect the 
assessment on the part of the audience (whose role will always have to be taken into account in 
any rhetorico-dramatic context). As to the term, cf. Sulpicius Victor: “E t h i c a  igitur erit 
causa, id est moralis, cum erit suscipienda persona vel rustici vel dyscoli, aut patris indulgentis 
aut contra severi. In eiusmodi causis, si † eas intellexerimus, poterimus id facere, quod fieri 
oportebit, ut omnis oratio personarum apta sit moribus” (316, §6). On the nexus of oratory and 
the theater generally (and with spec. regard to Early Modern times), see subch. 3.3, below. 
94 Cf. “It is quite right also to use the word ēthos [‘ἤθη’] of the sort of school exercises [‘in 
scholis’] in which we often represent [‘effingimus’] countrymen, superstitious men, misers, and 
cowards according to the terms of our theme. For if ēthos [‘ἤθη’] means mores, then when we 
imitate mores we base our speech on ēthos” (Quintilian Inst. Orat. 6–8. 52–55, 6.2.17). Russell’s 
n. refers to “this type of declamation” as “often humorous, largely inspired by comedy” (Inst. 
Orat. 6–8. 54n.). Quintilian’s use of said term seems akin to what is else called charakterismós 
(effictio). Cf. Bruss (43, 43n.), cum grano salis. See the n. below (on Inst. Orat. 9–10. 68, 9.2.58). 
95 For further examples and comparable applications, see subch. 5.2, herein. 
96 Cf. Cicero, who uses the same collocation, while giving its function as pertaining to ornatus: 
“impersonation of people [‘personarum ficta inductio’], an extremely brilliant [‘gravissimum 
lumen’] method of amplification [‘augendi’]” (“De Orat. III” 162–163, III.liii.205; see López 
Grigera 175n.). Cf. Consultus Fortunatianus, who (inter alia) gives ‘allocutio’ (“adlocutionibus”) 
in the context of “[o]rnata elocutio” (125, III.8). Followed by “descriptio” (“De Orat. III” 162, 
III.liii.205), this ‘fictional personifying’ or ‘crafting of personae’ is preceded by the device of 
“imitatio” in Cicero: “imitation of manners and behaviour [‘morum ac vitae imitatio’], either 
given in character [‘in personis’] or not, is a considerable ornament of style [‘ornamentum 
orationis’], and extremely effective in calming down an audience [‘aptum ad animos 
conciliandos vel maxime’] and often also in exciting it [‘ad commovendos’]” (“De Orat. III” 162–
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 In this section (de re on variants of rhetorical ventriloquism), Quintilian is 
likely to have chosen the term ‘prosopopoeia’ for etymological reasons, seeing 
that he reliably employs and emphasizes the term “persona” (Inst. Orat. 3–5. 
140, 3.8.52; cf. 138, 3.8.49, “personae”; 138, 3.8.50, “personam”; 140, 3.8.51, 
“personae”; 143, 3.8.54, “personarum”)—specifically qua signifying “named 
|| 
163, III.liii.204). For a longer mention of this maneuver, cf. “in mimicry [‘imitationis’], all 
likeness to buffoons [‘ethologorum similitudo’] in pantomime [‘mimorum’] is to be avoided” 
(De Orat. I–II. 378–379, II.lx.244); “the orator” is to ‘surreptitiously’ (cf. “surripiat”) insinuate 
“merely a suspicion of mimicry [‘imitationem’], so that his hearer may imagine more than 
meets his eye [‘cogitet plura, quam videat’]” (De Orat. I–II. 378–379, II.lix.242)—a suggestive, 
interactive strategy, rendering the (and any) audience the orator’s notional accomplice, while 
unable to pin their (quasi) homespun images and (inevitable) upshots on him (cf. Quintilian on 
‘emphasis’, Inst. Orat. 9–10. 72–91, 9.2.64–99; spec. 72, 9.2.65; “et ei quod a se inventum 
existimat credat”, 76, 9.2.71; 78, 9.2.75; with Trimpi Muses 73n.). In the above, the trans. gives 
‘imitatio’ as “mimicry”, “representation” (regarding the actor ‘Roscius’), “caricature” (De Orat. 
I–II. 377–379, II.lix.242); the context refers to comic effects. A qualification in Iulius Rufinianus’ 
(differing) definition of ‘ethopoiía’ may imply an affinity to comico-critical use: “Ἠθοποιία est 
alienorum affectuum qualiumlibet dictorumque imitatio non sine reprehensione. Latine dicitur 
f i g u r a t i o  vel e x p r e s s i o” (62, §13). In Early Modernity, Wilson ties in with 
Cicero’s above passage thus: “The matter is told pleasantly, when some man’s nature (whereof 
the tale is told) is so set forth, his countenance so counterfeited, and all his gesture so 
resembled, that the hearers might judge the thing to be then lively done, even as though he 
were there whereof the tale was told. Some can so lively set forth another man’s nature, and 
with such grace report a tale, that few shall be able to forbear laughter which know both 
parties, though they would the contrary never so fain. Now in counterfeiting after this sort, if 
such moderation be not used that the hearer may judge more by himself than the pleasant-
disposed man is willing fully to set forth, it will not be well liked” (167, II; 276n.). Wilson sees 
prosopopoiía as a subclass of descriptio, resp. evidentia, in the section entitled ‘An Evident, or 
Plain, Setting-Forth of a Thing as Though It Were Presently Done’: “This figure is called a 
description or an evident declaration of a thing, as though we saw it even now done” (203, III); 
“not only are matters set out by description, but men are painted out in their colors […]. In 
describing of persons there ought always a comeliness to be used, so that nothing be spoken 
which may be thought is not in them. […] By this figure also we imagine a talk for someone to 
speak, and according to his person we frame the oration” (204, III; cf. 287n.). “‘What if Henry 
the Eighth were alive and saw such rebellion in this realm, would not he say thus and thus? 
Yea, methinks I hear him speak even now’. And so set forth such words as we would have him 
to say. Sometimes it is good to make God, the country, or some one town to speak, and look 
what we would say in our own person to frame the whole tale to them” (205, III). Its function is 
“variety”, to “avoid tediousness” and “satiety”, but “cause delight”, “refresh with pleasure and 
quicken with grace the dullness of man’s brain. […] Certes as the mouth is dainty, so the wit is 
tickle and will soon loathe an unsavory thing” (205, III). Cf. Medine: “Wilson self-consciously 
undertakes to produce a full Ciceronian rhetoric in English garb. […] Historically The Art of 
Rhetoric is known as the first complete exposition of Ciceronian rhetoric in English” (23; cf. 8). 
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characters as speakers [‘certis agentium nominibus’]”, and as (typically) “based 
on history [‘ex historiis’]” sensu lato (Inst. Orat. 3–5. 140–141, 3.8.52).97 
 These hypotheses regarding an underlying etymological rationale as far as 
taxonomy is concerned may be verified by recourse to the ninth book. Having 
chiefly focused on generic applications and affinities in the third, Quintilian 
here treats the technique as a ‘figure of thought’, giving “προσωποποιίαι” as 
“fictiones personarum” (“Impersonations”, Inst. Orat. 9–10. 50–51, 9.2.29).98 In 
this sense, their general function is to “vary and animate a speech [‘cum variant 
orationem tum excitant’]” (Inst. Orat. 9–10. 50–51, 9.2.29).99 Specifically, the 
|| 
97 The rhétor introduces these qualifications when considering the appearance of 
‘prosopopoeiae’ not only in ‘suasoriae’, but also “in controversiae” (Inst. Orat. 3–5. 141, 3.8.52); 
the trans. uses various English terms for Quintilian’s forms of ‘persona’: “character” (Inst. Orat. 
3–5. 139, 3.8.49; 141, 3.8.51; 141, 3.8.52), “personality” (Inst. Orat. 3–5. 139, 3.8.50), “persons” 
(Inst. Orat. 3–5. 143, 3.8.54)—all of which are (potentially) problematic, on account of their 
(often) misleading connotations in other (especially Idealist) discourses (cf. subch. 3.3, herein). 
98 For the context (Inst. Orat. 9–10. 46–59, 9.2.26–44; 68–71, 9.2.58–63), see Russell’s précis: 
“More emotional are exclamations and outbursts of frankness […]; bolder still, Prosopopoeia 
[…], Apostrophe […], and various kinds of ‘vividness’, which aim to make the events come 
alive, as if seen happening at the present moment […] whereas ēthopoeia […], the vivid 
description of persons and characteristic traits, belongs rather to the less emotive range of 
Figures [sc. of Thought]” (“Intro. 9” 5). In Quintilian, the resp. section commences: “The 
Figures adapted to intensifying emotions [‘augendis adfectibus accommodatae’] consist chiefly 
in pretence [‘simulatione’]” (Inst. Orat. 9–10. 46–47, 9.2.26); after mentioning “Free Speech 
[‘oratione libera’]” (also called “Licence [‘licentiam’]”), being “parrhesia” in Greek (Inst. Orat. 
9–10. 48–49, 9.2.27; cf. Rhet. ad Her. 348–355, IV.xxxvi.48–xxxvii.50; 348n.), a longer segment 
deals with ‘prosopopoeia’ (Quintilian Inst. Orat. 9–10. 50–55, 9.2.29–37). After a brief 
intercalation on ‘apostrophe’ (Inst. Orat. 9–10. 54–57, 9.2.38–39) follows “evidentia”, termed 
“hypotyposis” in Greek (Inst. Orat. 9–10. 56–59, 9.2.40–44). Before ‘ethopoiía’ (here deviatingly 
qua “imitatio morum alienorum”, i.e. otherwise charakterismós, effictio) is treated (Inst. Orat. 
9–10. 68–71, 9.2.58–63; here: 68, 9.2.58; with Inst. Orat. 6–8. 52–55, 6.2.17; cf. Volkmann 490, 
III.49; Bruss 43; 43n.), Quintilian refers to irony qua figure (Inst. Orat. 9–10. 58–65, 9.2.44–65), 
as well as to ‘aposiopesis’ (Inst. Orat. 9–10. 64–67, 9.2.54–57). After his (otherwise) 
unconventional construal of ‘ethopoeia’ ensues an extended segment on ‘emphasis’ (Inst. Orat. 
9–10. 72–91, 9.2.64–99). As per W. Crane, “The Arte of English Poesie, 1589” used “hypotyposis” 
(“which Puttenham Englished as ‘the counterfeit representation’”) qua hypernym that also 
included “prosopopoeia” as a subcategory (alongside “proso[po]graphia”, “topographia, 
topothesia, chronographia”, “pragmatographia”); while other “rhetorics of the Renaissance 
omitted […] both hypotyposis and proso[po]graphia and treated the remaining figures as 
varieties of prosopopoeia”—which caused “confusion in terminology” (159; as an “example of 
complete confusion”, W. Crane cites ‘John Sturm’s 1576 discussion of character’, 160); for 
instance, “[s]ome authorities included pathopoeia and ethopoeia, as varieties of hypotyposis” 
(160). Cf. Puttenham (323–324, III.19; as also cited in subch. 4.2, herein). 
99 Cf. Cicero, stating that in a “plain style of oratory”, the rhétor “will not represent the State 
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device serves to “display the inner thoughts of our opponents as though they 
were talking to themselves”; “to introduce conversations [‘sermones’]” with, or 
among others (“nostros cum aliis […] et aliorum inter se”); and “to provide 
appropriate characters [‘personas idoneas’] for words of advice, reproach, 
complaint, praise, or pity” (Inst. Orat. 9–10. 50–51, 9.2.30).100 
 At the kathólou level (with Aristotle’s qualification as philosophóteron), said 
technique (most feckful in politico-deliberative contexts) seems to exploit an 
elemental capacity for vicarious experiences and actions on the part of human 
beings qua apparently primed for taking other perspectives: “Der Mensch ist ein 
extremer Standpunktwechsler” (Blumenberg Beschreibung 879).101 
|| 
as speaking [‘rem publicam loquentem’] or call the dead from the lower world”—as “[t]his 
requires stronger lungs” (“Orator” 368–369, xxv.85; Quintilian cites the latter qualification at 
Inst. Orat. 9–10. 50–51, 9.2.29; 50n.). Cicero adds that this ‘extenuated’ (cf. “tenuitati”) style 
will not feature the “delivery [‘actio’] […] of tragedy [‘non tragica’] nor of the stage [‘nec 
scaenae’]” (“Orator” 368–369, xxv.86). The first instance above is usually called a prosopopoiía 
proper, the latter eidolopoiía. See also Volkmann (280, I.i.28; 489, III.49). 
100 Cf. López Grigera (134–135; 134n.). See Quintilian: “prosopopoeiae, id est fictae alienarum 
personarum orationes” (Inst. Orat. 6–8. 30, 6.1.25; cf. Baldwin Ancient Rhet. 71). In this context, 
the rhétor stresses the quasi-synaesthetic, instant evidence induced by proxy via said device—
with decisive affinities to drama in all three respects (vividness, vicariousness, artfulness): 
“When an advocate speaks for a client, the bare facts produce the effect; but when we pretend 
[‘fingimus’] that the victims themselves are speaking [‘loqui’], the emotional effect is drawn 
also from the persons [‘ex personis’]. The judge no longer thinks [‘videtur’, sc. ‘it does not seem 
to him’] that he is listening [‘audire’] to a lament for somebody else’s troubles, but that he is 
hearing the feelings and the voice of the afflicted, whose silent appearance [‘mutus aspectus’] 
alone moves [‘movet’] him to tears […]. The pleas become more effective [‘ad adficiendum 
potentiora’] by being as it were put into their mouths [‘cum velut ipsorum ore dicuntur’], just as 
the same voice [‘vox’] and delivery [‘pronuntiatio’] of the stage actor [‘scaenicis actoribus’] 
produces a greater emotional impact [‘plus ad movendos adfectus’] because he speaks behind 
a mask [‘sub persona’]” (Inst. Orat. 6–8. 30–31, 6.1.25–26); cf. Volkmann (281–282, I.i.28); 
Altman (glossing: “Quintilian devotes much space to impersonation”, 49n.); Vickers (Defence 
78); Skinner (Forensic 168); de re, see Cicero (De Orat. I–II. 336–337, II.xlvi.193). 
101 Approx. ‘man is an (sc. human beings are) extreme shifter(s) of standpoints (qua views, 
positions, perspectives)’. Aristotle logs that poíesis is “more philosophical [‘philosophóteron’]” 
than historía (“Poetics” 58–59, 1451b, IX; cf. Trimpi “Ancient Hypothesis” 49–50). Following 
Quintilian, Baldwin defines “prosopopœiæ” (qua exercises) as “an imaginative entering into 
the character, the emotional as well as the intellectual habit, of the person for whom one was 
speaking”—while (problematically) taking “ethopœiæ” to mean a “more elementary form” 
thereof (Ancient Rhet. 71; cf. 245). Referring to Seneca the Elder’s “Controversiæ”, Baldwin 
notes: “That such dramatization is obviously an extension of […] school prosopopœiæ shows 
how pervasive was the preoccupation with imaginative development” (Ancient Rhet. 99). 
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 As Quintilian’s ‘idoneus’ signals, considerations pertaining to the aptum are 
(dependably) involved in all of the above—chiefly with a view to (ethopoetic) 
probability (“a fide non abhorrent”, “credibiliter”, Inst. Orat. 9–10. 50, 9.2.30), 
hence effectuality (ultimately). The latter will also be decisive with respect to 
the fact that, in this rhétor’s acceptation, the scope of said technique includes 
“to bring down the gods […] or raise the dead”, while even “cities and nations 
[…] acquire a voice [‘vocem accipiunt’]” (Inst. Orat. 9–10. 50–51, 9.2.31).102 
 What ensues is utile for comparing Quintilian’s conceptual preferences with 
the Rhetorica ad Herennium.103 In a historico-taxonomic remark, he notes: 
Some confine the term Prosopopoeia [‘προσωποποιίαις’] to cases where we invent both the 
person and the words [‘et corpora et verba fingimus’]; they prefer imaginary conversations 
between historical characters [‘sermones hominum adsimulatos’] to be called Dialogues 
[‘διαλόγους’], which some Latin writers have translated sermocinatio [‘sermocinationem’, 
qua ‘conversation’]. (Inst. Orat. 9–10. 50–51, 9.2.31)104 
|| 
102 As to projection being implied, see Cicero’s quarrel with Homer: “Fingebat haec Homerus 
et humana ad deos transferebat: divina mallem ad nos” (Tusc. Disp. 76, I.xxvi.65). 
103 Caplan logs that “there is no evidence that Quintilian knew or made use of” the Rhet. ad 
Her. (“Intro.” xiv; Eloquence 7), but gives “ἠθοποιία and χαρακτηρισμός” with respect to 
Rutilius (“Intro.” xiv n.; Eloquence 7n.; cf. Inst. Orat. 9–10. 160, 9.3.99; 160n.), which “appear 
in” the Rhet. ad Her. “as notatio […] and effictio” (Caplan “Intro.” xiv n.; Eloquence 7n.). Russell 
trans. the Rutilian terms as “Description of Thought and Feelings”, “Characterization” (Inst. 
Orat. 9–10. 160n.). Cf. Rutilius on ethopoiía (12, I.21; with samples from Demosthenes, Lysias, 
but sans definition, 12n.; Halm states that the 1521 Basel ed. had “Ethologia” instead, 12n.); on 
prosopopoiía: “Hoc fit, cum personas in rebus constituimus, quae sine personae sunt, aut 
eorum hominum, qui fuerunt, tamquam vivorum et praesentium actionem sermonemve 
deformamus. […] Hoc genere usi sunt poetae […]. Nam humana figura produxerunt personas, 
quae in veritate artis et voluntatis sunt, non personae” (15, II.6; with samples from Hyperides, 
Charisius; cf. Blass Beredsamkeit III.2. 41; 41n.); on charakterismós: “Quem ad modum pictor 
coloribus figuras describit, sic orator hoc schemate aut vitia aut virtutes eorum, de quibus 
loquitur, deformat” (Rutilius 16, II.7; with a long sample from Lyco of Troas). 
104 As to ‘sermocinatio’, Russell’s gloss ad locum refers to “Ad Herennium 4.55, 46.5”, adding 
that “this is commonly called ēthopoiia […], a term used by Q[uintilian] in a different sense” 
(Inst. Orat. 9–10. 50n.)—i.e. qua “Imitatio morum alienum, quae ἠθοποιία vel, ut alii malunt, 
μίμησις dicitur”; it takes place “in factis et in dictis”, is expressly ‘associated with hypotýposis’ 
(“quod est ὑποτυπώσει vicinum”), spec. as to ‘facts’ (Inst. Orat. 9–10. 68, 9.2.58; cf. Volkmann 
490, III.49). Above, Russell trans. “hominum” as “historical characters” (Inst. Orat. 9–10. 50–
51, 9.2.31), which may seem debatable: the adjective is at best implied in the Latin, the noun 
may be misleading (in this collocation); in a rhetorical context, the trans. of “fingimus” as “we 
invent” is similarly problematic (due to the latter’s ‘modern’ implications, at variance with the 
rhetorical). Iulius Victor (446–447, XXVI; cf. Lanham “Composition” 119–120) and Alcuin of 
York (547, §43) use the last term in the above quote in its literal sense. The former tenders a 
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Quintilian decides against previous practice, 
follow[ing] the now established usage [‘recepto more’] in calling them both by the same 
name, for we cannot of course imagine a speech except as the speech of a person [‘nam 
certe sermo fingi non potest ut non personae sermo fingatur’]. (Inst. Orat. 9–10. 50–51, 
9.2.32)105 
|| 
segment ‘de sermocinatione’ (446–447, XXVI; cf. a reference forward at 441, XXIV, on delivery; 
one backward, at 448, XXVII, on letter writing). Since he otherwise refers to the attribution of 
speech as “allocutio” (426–427, XVI, ‘de narratione’, here 426; cf. 422, XV, ‘de principiis’), this 
subch. takes the term in its root meaning (from ‘sermo’, resp. ‘sermocinari’), and consequently 
speaks about (informal) conversation sensu lato (generally see Lanham “Composition” 119; 126; 
127n.), as opposed to (formal) orations: “Sermocinandi ratio non in postremis habenda est; et 
quidem sermonis usus multo frequentior quam orationis est. Igitur sermonis est virtus 
elegantia sine ostentatione […] sine figuris insignibus, […] sine periodo, sine enthymemate […] 
sit simplex et aequalis et ante omnia carens obscuritate. […] Ubique brevitas bonum est, sed in 
sermone praecipuum” (Iulius Victor 446, XXVI). Nevertheless, he also states the ensuing, 
which facilitates a nexus with ethopoiía: “Fere sermo cuiusque mores probat” (446, XXVI). Cf. 
Alcuin’s comparable treatment of ‘conversation’, where the same line is put into (the textual) 
Charlemagne’s mouth: “in omni parte vitae honestas pernecessaria est, maxime in sermonibus, 
quia fere cuiusque mores sermo probat, nisi tibi, magister, aliud videatur”—(to which Alcuin’s 
persona replies)—“Mihi vero de hac re nil aliud videri potest, ac ideo consuetudinaria 
sermocinatione verba sint lecta, honesta, lucida, simplicia”, etc. (547, §43; cf. “sermocinandi 
ratio”, at the onset of said segment). Extratextually speaking, one will be dealing with a 
sermocinatio—while the overall disputation’s opening verses naturally assert that the reader is 
facing “Unum opus amborum”, since: “hic dedit, ille probat” (525, v.4–5). The first verse (and 
line in the book) explicitly gives the purpose of what follows as “civiles […] cognoscere mores” 
(525, v.1)—to which end the (implicitly) ethopoetic presentation of the two deliberating 
personae (King Charles the Great and his advisor Alcuin) will also conduce, seeing that what 
they are performing is precisely a (dialogic) conversation (in writing). With regard to the above 
quote from Quintilian, López Grigera notes: “Sobre la denominación de esta figura, que 
consiste en dar voz ficticia a los personajes […], hay cierta confusión que ya señalaba 
Quintiliano”; she quotes the definition by “el Brocense”, which combines the terminology on 
the part of Cicero, Quintilian, and the Rhet. ad Her.: “‘Prosopopeya sive sermocinatio est ficta 
personarum inductio, per quam res, cuiuscumque generis sint, vocem et sermonem possunt 
accipere’ (Organum Dialecticum et Rhetoricum[)]” (175n.). 
105 For Quintilian’s own modification thereof, see below (the second to last sample cited in 
the present subch.). Concerning an expansive use of the term in question, cf. Hartmann: “Die 
rhetorische Tradition setzt noch nicht den erst seit dem Idealismus gebräuchlichen 
philosophischen Begriff ‘Person’ voraus, sondern nur das Verständnis der ‘Persona’ ([…] 
πρόσωπον […]) als ursprünglich theatralische ‘Maske’ oder ‘Rolle’. […] Die Auffassung der 
prosopopoeia als dramatische Fiktion hat zur Folge, daß es zwar gebräuchlich ist, sie als 
P[ersonifikation] von erfundenen Reden natürlicher Personen (sermocinatio, ethopoeia; […] 
ἠθοποιία […]) abzugrenzen. Da aber prosopopoeia primär die Zuschreibung der Fähigkeit zu 
56 | DS Mayfield 
  
It is thus an etymological reflection—giving primacy to the term ‘prósopon’—
that suggests and supports said conceptual decision.106 This specific emphasis 
will be developed in the following subchapter (3.3), and taken up in 4.2 with 
regard to the contextual crafting and conveying of rhetorical ‘selves’. 
 In his ensuing examples, Quintilian stresses the nexus of prosopopoiía with 
evidentia (here specifically as a ruse), while mentioning that words (“dicta”) 
and written statements (“scripta”, such as the formulation of a “testamentum”, 
or ‘last words’) may be ‘feigned’ or ‘counterfeited’ (“fingi”, Inst. Orat. 9–10. 52, 
9.2.34–35; see also subchapter 5.2, herein); and that abstract concepts—he 
|| 
reden oder deren Produkt bezeichnet, kann der Begriff auch mehr einschließen als die bloße 
P[ersonifikation] und alle Arten fiktiver Reden abdecken” (811; cf. 812). Cf. Murphy (with regard 
to the Progymnasmata): “Despite the[…] theoretical divisions of the textbooks, the term 
Prosopopoeia (as in Quintilian) is often used to denote the whole range of impersonative 
exercises” (“Habit” 68). Quintilian signals that it is indeed possible for the persona to remain 
unspecified, or implied only (“sine persona sermo”, Inst. Orat. 9–10. 52–55, 9.2.37; here 52). 
Generally, see the distinction drawn between the infinite and finite in Aelius Theon: “Thesis 
differs from prosopopoeia, because thesis does not reveal a personality but prosopopoeia does, 
because the latter is most often involved with the invention of words appropriate to the persons 
who are introduced” (“Exercises” 55–56, §11.120). Cf. Moos, with respect to the “immer wieder 
neu gestellten philosophisch-rhetorischen Frage nach den Beziehungen des Partikulären zum 
Universalen, der quaestio finita (Hypothesis) zur quaestio infinita (Thesis, des geschichtlich 
Kontingenten zum Möglichen und Immergültigen (im aristotelischen Sinne)” (163, §44; with 
162n.–163n.; cf. 258, §64, with 258n.–259n.). 
106 Russell glosses: “Persona represents prosōpon (‘face, mask, person’) as in prosopopoeia” 
(Inst. Orat. 9–10. 50n.). Giving “personae” as “masks, roles, (dramatic) parts, or characters”, 
Gill states: “the term is explicitly dramatic” (“Personhood” 173; 173n.). Cf. Perelman/Olbrechts-
Tyteca: “The concept of ‘person’ introduces an element of stability” (New Rhetoric 294, §68); 
“whenever one wishes to make a group or an essence stable, concrete, and present, 
personification will be used” (New Rhetoric 331, §74). “The personification of the republic […] 
reinforces its importance as a group that is more stable than the individuals who are […] its 
manifestation and that is […] opposed to the accidents and vicissitudes occasioned by events” 
(New Rhetoric 331, §74). Perelman’s taxonomic distinction seems problematic: “An essence may 
be linked to a person through the use of such rhetorical figures as personification, apostrophe, 
and prosopopoeia” (Realm 101). “Personification will often be stressed by the use of other 
figures. By the use of apostrophe, a speaker will address that which is personified and has 
therefore become capable of being made a hearer. By means of prosopopoeia, the thing 
personified is turned into a speaking and acting subject” (New Rhetoric 331, §74). Such does not 
seem to be in line with rhetorical praxis and theory, nor to be etymologically sound, since both 
terms signify the same device (with ‘personification’ Latinizing the Greek ‘prosopopoeia’). Even 
so, the quote highlights that the feat of personifying an animal, object, notion, and that of 
putting words into a (personified) entity’s mouth, may be distinguished diagnostically. 
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offers ‘Fama’, ‘Voluptas’, ‘Virtus’, ‘Mors’, ‘Vita’ (see Inst. Orat. 9–10. 52, 9.2.36)—
are often ‘personified’ (“formas […] fingimus”, Inst. Orat. 9–10. 52, 9.2.36).107 
 Moreover, the Roman rhétor remarks that “[o]ne can also have an imaginary 
speech [‘ficta oratio’] with an undefined speaker [‘incerta persona’]: ‘At this 
point someone says’ or ‘Someone may say’” (Inst. Orat. 9–10. 52–53, 9.2.36–37); 
de re, this variant of rhetorical ventriloquism would also include appeals to 
such apparent phenomena as the ‘vox populi’—or (comparable) claims as 
regards one’s speaking for the norm or majority (‘it is said’, ‘they say’, ‘everyone 
|| 
107 As to a density of references to forms of ‘fingere’, see Quintilian: “fictiones personarum” 
(Inst. Orat. 9–10. 50, 9.2.29), “locutos finxerimus” (Inst. Orat. 9–10. 50, 9.2.30), “corpora et 
verba fingimus” (Inst. Orat. 9–10. 50, 9.2.31), “sermo fingi […] sermo fingatur” (Inst. Orat. 9–10. 
50, 9.2.32), “rerum personarum vocum imagines fingimus” (Inst. Orat. 9–10. 52, 9.2.33), “dicta 
[…] scripta […] fingi solent” (Inst. Orat. 9–10. 52, 9.2.34), “formas […] fingimus” (Inst. Orat. 9–
10. 52, 9.2.36), “ficta oratio” (Inst. Orat. 9–10. 52, 9.2.36). With Auerbach’s opening sentence—
“Etymologically, figura comes from the same root as fingere, figulus, factor [the German ed. has 
‘fictor’], and effigies” (“Figura [1938]” 65; cf. “Figura. Neuedition” 121)—and his citation from 
Varro, “fictor cum dicit fingo[,] figuram imponit” (“Figura [1938]” 66; cf. “Figura. Neuedition” 
122), one might add Quintilian’s uses of ‘figura’ in the resp. passages (qua etymological 
density): “fit figura [sc. prosopopoeia, here]” (Inst. Orat. 9–10. 50, 9.2.32), “per se figura est” 
(Inst. Orat. 9–10. 52, 9.2.34), “mixtura figurarum” (Inst. Orat. 9–10. 54, 9.2.37). Auerbach refers 
to Quintilian’s resp. subchs. as follows: “Under the figurae sententiarum he lists” (inter alia) 
“prosopopoeia, in which one has others [the German has ‘andere Personen’]—the enemy or a 
personification of the motherland [the German has ‘Vaterland’] […]—speak in their own words” 
(“Figura [1938]” 77; cf. “Figura. Neuedition” 137). As regards simulated ‘evidence’ (for purposes 
of inducing vicarious effects), see Quintilian: “It may be convenient also to pretend [‘fingimus’] 
to have before our own eyes [‘ante oculos esse’] images of things, persons, or utterances 
[‘rerum personarum vocum imagines’], or to express surprise that this is not happening to our 
opponents or to the judges”—with Quintilian stressing the particular difficulty of this tactic 
(Inst. Orat. 9–10. 52–53, 9.2.33). The notional presence of such a device in the curriculum (spec. 
as linked to prosopopoiía) is likely to have given rise to (metapoetically) affine renderings, e.g. 
in drama (cf. “A dagger of the mind”, in Shakespeare’s Macbeth 174–175, 2.1.33–49; here: 175, 
2.1.38). “Ante oculos ponendi” may be achieved by way of “similitudo”, spec. “in the form of a 
detailed parallel [‘per conlationem’]” (Rhet. ad Her. 380–381, IV.xlvii.60); likewise, the 
“Exemplum”—“παράδειγμα” (Rhet. ad Her. 382, IV.xlix.62; 382n.)—“renders a thought […] more 
vivid [‘ante oculos ponit’], when expressing everything so lucidly [‘perspicue’] that the matter 
can, I may almost say [‘ut (…) prope dicam’], be touched by the hand [‘manu temptari’]” (Rhet. 
ad Her. 384–385, IV.xlix.62). The auctor stresses that “frequenter ponere ante oculos” also 
serves the orator’s own processes of “inventio” qua “hunt[ing] out some likeness [‘venari 
similitudinem’] which is capable of embellishing [‘ornare’] or proving [‘docere’] or clarifying 
[‘apertiorem rem facere’] or vivifying [‘ponere ante oculos’]” (Rhet. ad Her. 382–383, 
IV.xlviii.61). As in all matters rhetorical, (what is resp. deemed to be) the aptum is the effectual 
measure: “In similibus observare oportet diligenter ut […] verba ad similitudinem habeamus 
adcommodata” (Rhet. ad Her. 382, IV.xlviii.61). 
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knows’ or ‘agrees’, etc.).108 Likewise, “[o]ne can even have speech without any 
|| 
108 See Aristotle (Rhetoric 378–381, 1408a, III.vii.7); Machiavelli (Il Principe 115, XVIII; 
Discourses 55, I.21; 58, I.23; 65, I.29; 293, III.36; with Strauss 86; 101; 210; 312n.–314n.; 320n.; cf. 
Mansfield with respect to “such favorite phrases as ‘everyone knows’”, Modes 10); Mayfield 
(“Variants of hypólepsis” 246n.; 251n.; 253n.; 256n.; passim; Artful 80n.–81n.; 115; 187; 192n.; 
passim). Cf. “Chacun l’entend” (Montaigne Essais III. 363, III.xii). Blumenberg—whose second 
sentence in the Legitimacy of the Modern Age begins with “Jedermann kennt” (Legitimität 11; cf. 
“Jeder weiß”, Sorge 176; “Bekannt ist”, 179; “das weiß jeder”, “den jeder verstehen zu können 
glaubt”, Beschreibung 250)—gives the ““consensus als Ideal der Rhetorik”, spec. “weil 
Überredung Gemeinsamkeit eines Horizontes voraussetzt, […] Anspielung auf Prototypisches, 
[…] Orientierung an der Metapher, am Gleichnis” (“Annäherung” 412; see Quellen 212). Cf. 
“Gemeinsamkeit von Wahrheiten ist Bedingung jenes minimalen”—and (one might add) 
‘jedes’—“Konsensus, den man wohl selbst noch mit dem Teufel haben muß, um von ihm in 
Versuchung geführt werden zu können” (Beschreibung 488). Generally: “Rhetorik arbeitet mit 
Vertrautheiten. Sie will nicht beweisen, sondern Widerspruch erschweren” (Quellen 212); he 
gives “Rhetorik als […] Einstimmung bei nicht erreichter oder nicht erreichbarer Eindeutigkeit” 
(Schiffbruch 81). Moos logs: “Blumenberg setzt, auf die antike Verschmelzung von Philosophie 
und Rhetorik Bezug nehmend, Konsens und Realität so gut wie gleich” (16, §6). Cf. Niehues-
Pröbsting: “Rhetorisch ist jede Argumentation mit vermeintlichen Selbstverständlichkeiten, 
das heißt mit Ansichten, die auf einem allgemeinen Konsensus beruhen und die daher ohne 
weiteres akzeptiert werden” (Überredung 30)—in a context on the “rhetoric” and potential 
‘éthe’ of “philosophy” (Überredung 30; trans. dsm). As to the téchne’s being constitutively 
hypoleptic (de re), see Ptassek: “Tatsächlich […] artikuliert sich das Ethos im Austausch der 
handlungsleitenden Meinungen, die von der Rhetorik fallweise und kunstmäßig zur Sprache 
gebracht werden. […] Damit Standpunkte durchgesetzt oder Ansichten plausibel gemacht 
werden können, müssen diese mit vorgefundenen Standpunkten in Beziehung gebracht 
werden […]. Die Rhetorik […] erzielt Zustimmung oder Überredung dadurch, daß sie sich der 
gemeinsamen Handlungsgrundlage versichert, […] daß sie ausdrücklich macht, was sonst im 
Handeln fraglos gilt. Glauben erwecken kann nur das, was zu den allgemeinen Überzeugungen 
gehört, die im Handeln bereits wirksam sind: Rhetorik generiert somit keine 
Handlungsmotivationen, sondern knüpft an diese an” (64); “die Fähigkeit, jeden Gegenstand 
mit dem Auslegungshorizont in Beziehung zu setzten, ist das Charakteristikum der Rhetorik” 
(66). “Dieser elementare Bezug auf Gemeinsamkeit findet seinen Niederschlag in den beiden 
Bedeutungen der rhetorisch vermittelten πίστις als dem ‘Glaubenerweckenden’ einerseits und 
dem vorausgesetzten ‘Glauben’ oder ‘Vertrauen’ andererseits” (66n.). “Wesentlich ist […], daß 
es ihm [sc. dem Redner, durch seine ‘Selbstdarstellung’] gelingt, seine Überzeugungsabsicht in 
eine gemeinsame Handlungsperspektive zu stellen” (68). “‘Voreingenommenheit’ wird der 
Rhetorik nicht zum Problem, sie ist vielmehr ihr Element” (69). With regard to application, 
Harding observes that Lysias’ client in Oration 24 “defends himself not by fact, but by resorting 
to an argument from popular prejudice. Everyone knows, he says” (205). The presence and 
effectuality of such (textualized) praxis will lead to related counsels in theoretical respects (at 
the progymnasmatic level): “A style without contrivance fits ethopoeias; for the speaker will 
say what is acknowledged universally in a scattered fashion, in short phrases and without 
connectives. And it ought to be wholly consistent with the character and the subject. Concise 
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person [‘sine persona sermo’]” (Inst. Orat. 9–10. 52–53, 9.2.37)—that is, letting 
the (somatic or virtual) ‘carrier’ fall into a praeteritio, and be present by 
implication (“detractum est enim quis diceret”, Inst. Orat. 9–10. 54, 9.2.37). 
 Lastly, Quintilian logs the tool’s presence in diegetic contexts: “Sometimes 
Prosopopoeia takes the form of Narrative [‘Vertitur (…) in speciem narrandi’]. 
Thus we find indirect speeches [‘obliquae adlocutiones’] in the historians [‘apud 
historicos’]”—such as in “Livy”, where a city (hence a collective) is personified 
(qua unified whole) by an implied speaker (Inst. Orat. 9–10. 54–55, 9.2.37).109 
3.3 The Rhetorico-Dramatic Terms ‘prósopon’ and ‘persona’ 
in Ancient and Early Modern Times (With Correlative 
Remarks on ‘ethos’) 
nam certe sermo fingi non potest ut non personae sermo fingatur.  
—Quintilian (Inst. Orat. 9–10. 50, 9.2.32) 
The p[ersona] appears as [a] constitutive element in literary genres  
such as comedy, tragedy, the Socratic Symposium or in dialog. 
—Boriaud/Schouler (798; trans. dsm) 
Societal life consists of a network of the most various roles[.] 
—Moos (511, §106; trans. dsm) 
As an expedient starting point for this emphatically diachronic, comparatist, as 
well as more argumentative subchapter—taking up a concept (latently) present 
in the foregoing—one might tender Nietzsche’s pertinent dictum: “Aller 
Charakter ist erst R o l l e. Die ‘Persönlichkeit’ der Philosophen — im Grunde 
|| 
(syntomos): Vigorous, forceful; for that is the style of commonly accepted ideas and what each 
person knows” (John of Sardis/Sopatros 217, §11.208,4; bold emph. removed from ‘concise’). In 
a deliberative context, Quintilian uses the formulations “nemo ignorat”, and “nemo est qui 
neget” (Inst. Orat. 3–5. 122, 3.8.10, resp. 3.8.13); such might also be taken at the meta-level (i.e. 
with respect to the orator’s own line of argument). 
109 As Russell specifies, the sample cited from Livy refers to a section of “indirect speech” that 
“states arguments supposed to be advanced by envoys” (Inst. Orat. 9–10. 54n.). One is dealing 
with a form of double (verbal) delegation, both intra- and metatextually. Generally, and for 
further instances (e.g. from Thucydides), cf. subch. 5.2, herein. In the above, the Roman rhétor 
uses a variant of the term ‘allocutio’—which, in other theorists, is (turned into) a (quasi) 
technical term (typically in place of, and signifying what would else be called, ‘sermocinatio’ or 
‘ethopoeia’); cf. e.g. Consultus Fortunatianus (125, III.8); Emporius (“de ethopoeia” 561–562); 
Iulius Victor (422, XV; 426–427, XVI); Priscian (“praeexercitamina” 557–558, §9). 
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persona” (KSA 11. 438, 34[57]); ‘a philosopher’s character, personality basically 
comes down to a role, a part played, a persona’.110 On the stage, the latter 
signifies ‘mask’—like its (equally polysemous) Greek equivalent (‘πρόσωπον’).111 
|| 
110 Literally: “any [or: every(one’s)] character is [a] r o l e [,] first [of all]. The ‘personality’ of 
the philosophers — persona at bottom” (KSA 11. 438, 34[57]; trans. dsm; see Mayfield Artful 341; 
341n.–342n.). Cf. “Von der ‘Einheit’, von der ‘Seele’, von der ‘Person’ zu fabeln, haben wir uns 
heute untersagt: mit solchen Hypothesen e r s c h w e r t  man sich das Problem” (KSA 11. 
577, 37[4]; cf. Mayfield Artful 345). As regards a use of the initial term in Nietzsche’s above 
remark, see the etymological note in subch. 3.1, herein; as well as the ensuing synopsis (related 
de re): “Crucially, no ancient term offers a straightforward equivalent of our modern notion of 
‘character’ or of related terms such as ‘individuality’, ‘personality’, ‘self’, or ‘identity’, which 
are all […] heavily burdened with modern connotations of idiosyncrasy, singularity, 
uniqueness, complexity and originality. The nearest Greek equivalent, ēthos, in fact seems to 
convey none of these […]. In its ancient use the term regularly privileges notions of outward 
performance and display. As one of Aristotle’s three rhetorical techniques of persuasion, it 
designates the morally and intellectually positive self-portrayal that an orator constructs in 
speech in order to enhance his credibility. In later rhetorical treatises, ēthos can designate a 
specific stylistic category […] which again implies an appreciation of speech as a performative 
tool used to display character. […] character is something to be displayed […], particularly 
through speech, and observed by others” (De Temmerman/Emde Boas “Intro.” 7). Its being a 
product of craft must be underscored; this includes the reception: “Character was assessed […] 
by actions that result from conscious […] choice (prohairesis)[;] it was taken to […] conform to 
or diverge from moral standards” (“Intro.” 7–8). Cf. Sattler (his context cum grano salis): 
“Fundamental to the Aristotelian conception of ethos is […] voluntary choice” (64). 
111 The Ancient polyvalence of ‘prósopon’ is evinced in Bion’s ‘autobiographical’ synopsis 
(refunctionalized by Montaigne, Essais III. 284, III.ix), where the philosopher–sophist refers to 
his father as someone “with no face [‘πρόσωπον’] to show, but only the writing [‘συγγραφὴν’] 
on his face [‘πρόσωπον’], a token [‘σύμβολον’] of his master’s severity” (D. Laertius Lives I. 424–
425, IV.46; cf. IV.47); the pun turns on a polysemy that, mutatis mutandis, tends to remain 
active in the Latin equivalent. With regard to drama, see Aristotle’s mentioning “τὸ γελοῖον 
προσώπον” (“Poetics” 44, 1449a, V; cf. Nédoncelle 281). The latter gives the etymology of 
“πρόσωπον” as “πρό et ὤψ. […] Le sens est donc: la face ou le visage […] l’‘avant’ d’un objet” 
(278). He asserts: “Il était fatal que du masque on glissât au personnage, puis au rôle qu’il joue 
et à l’acteur qui joue ce rôle. Il était fatal que πρόσωπον, après avoir désigné la fonction 
accomplie sur la scène, désignât celle qu’on exerce dans la vie” (281); “ce seraient les 
fonctionnaires de l’Empire qui traduisirent en Asie mineure persona par πρόσωπον dans les 
documents officiels” (282). Noting that “l’étymologie” of “[p]ersona […] est obscure” (284; for a 
series of speculations, see 284–293), Nédoncelle adduces a number of folk (or paronomastic) 
etymologies—one of which (certainly specious) is taken up by Aquinas (“Summa theologica, I, 
q. 29, a. 4”): “persona dicitur quasi per se una” (qtd. in: Nédoncelle 286n.; with: “Sénèque est 
un raffiné qui joue sur les étymologies”, 299); as to the former, cf. Mauss (20); also on “the 
notion of the Latin persona” (13; with 14–17). For the etymology, see Boriaud/Schouler: “bei 
Homer […] bezeichnet [‘prósopon’] […] das menschliche Antlitz, aber auch die Fassade eines 
Gebäudes. Im 4. Jh. v.Chr. übernimmt es eine zusätzliche Bedeutung, die gewöhnlich von der 
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With dramatic affinities, it may also be encountered in grammar, but 
particularly in rhetoric.112 
While said art has tended to chiefly (if not exclusively) denote a mode of 
expression since Ramus or Descartes—and is still routinely reduced to elocutio 
even in ostensibly academic settings (to say nothing of its facile use as a 
nondescript value judgment)—the rhetorikè téchne (comprising discovery, 
disposition, diction, memory, delivery) represents a versatile arsenal of noetico-
semiotic devices, with decidedly interdisciplinary, diachronic, transcultural, 
supra-personal, hence altogether universal(ist) applications potentially.113 
|| 
Ableitung πρόσωπεῖον […] wiedergegeben wird: die von den Schauspielern im Theater 
getragene Maske. […] Das Wort evoziert schließlich eine dramatische Rolle mit einem deutlich 
umrissenen Charakter” (790; cf. Fuhrmann “Persona” 97–98; Hirzel Person 40–42)—the latter 
in terms of ethos, whereby the two terms are linked (de re); thereto, see also the further line of 
argument herein. The initial, quasi Homeric notion seems to align with the usual employment 
in Marcus Aurelius, who utilizes the Greek equivalent of persona for ‘facial exterior’: “serenity 
of countenance [‘tou prosópou’]” (146–147, VI.30.2); “[a]n angry scowl on the face [‘tou 
prosópou’] is beyond measure unnatural [‘parà phýsin’]” (174–175, VII.24); cf. “countenance 
[‘prósopon’]” (180–181, VII.37; in a similar context: 188, VII.60). As to the etymologies of 
“‘πρόσωπον’” and “‘persona’”, Oesterreich indicates “ein bereits in der Antike lebendiges 
theatralisches und rhetorikaffines Verständnis”, and notes “die seit der Antike gebräuchliche 
Metapher der dramatischen ‘Rolle’, die der homo rhetoricus auf dem theatrum mundi spielt” 
(“Person” 862). As to the latter, see the n. below (in the present segment, and subch. 4.2). 
112 As to theater and grammar, Fuhrmann notes: “Man hat wohl mit Recht vermutet, daß die 
alexandrinischen Philologen durch die drei πρόσωπα des griechischen Dramas angeregt 
wurden, die drei ‘Personen’ oder besser ‘Sprecherrollen’ des Pronomens und des Verbs mit 
demselben Ausdruck zu bezeichnen; die römischen Grammatiker gaben ihn dann durch 
persona wieder” (“Persona” 94; cf. Nédoncelle 296, 296n.; contrast Hirzel Person 41n.). 
Concerning the term ‘πρόσωπον’ in rhetoric, Hirzel notes: “Dieser ganze Gebrauch führt uns in 
die Welt des Dramas” (Person 41). As to the nexus, see Nietzsche: “Actor and orator: the former 
presupposed” (KSA 7. 758, 32[14]; trans. dsm; with Mayfield “Interplay” 11; passim). Bonner 
notes: “the Roman student of rhetoric […] needed to be something of an actor” (Declamation 
21). On the concept of the ‘persona’ in this regard (with further references), see Mayfield 
(“Interplay” 21n.). For the German context, Burger cites from “Grimms Deutsches Wörterbuch 
[…] 1571: ‘person, ein gmachts angsicht, ein schempart, ein butznantliz’ […] eine Formulierung 
aus dem Jahr 1516: ‘personatus, der in einem spyl ein person ist’. Eine Person wird demnach 
gespielt’” (Rolle 89)—emphatic of the ‘making’, in addition to the ‘playacting’. 
113 Cf. Sloane (“Education” 165); Bloemendal (“Polish Pindar” 130–131); Mayfield (“Interplay” 
5–8; passim). On “the interrelation of the various levels […] of rhetoric”, see Kibédi Varga (88; 
with 90; passim). Lewis stresses: “In rhetoric, more than in anything else, the continuity of the 
old European tradition was embodied” (61). As to “the ‘ubiquity of rhetoric’” (with Dockhorn), 
cf. Schanze (107). Noting “the pervasive influence of rhetoric” (506), Gray has: “The humanists 
applied to their analysis of many disciplines the ideas and the vocabulary of rhetoric” (506); 
“the studia humanitatis […] represent[…] an interconnected whole, sharing the common 
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 As conceived in Ancient and Early Modern times (especially where inflected 
by Humanism), the art of rhetoric is integrated with (and, to a considerable 
extent, constitutes) the respective civic ‘sphere’ or shared domain. In such 
environments, ‘persona’ will usually refer to a ‘function’ or ‘office’ (a communal 
‘front’); and ‘ethos’ to a corresponding, equally customary set of contextually 
relevant (socio-moral) habits or acquired dispositions—being ‘voiced’ (more or 
less consistently), or otherwise expressed (semiotically speaking).114 An initially 
|| 
purposes and methods of eloquence” (502). See Eden: “Renaissance rhetoric made league […] 
with poetry, philosophy, and history to form a new liberal arts—the studia humanitatis” 
(“Rhetoric” 829). Humanistic approaches will be emphatically supra-disciplinary, transgeneric, 
diachronic, contextual, comparatist: “‘Literature’ as strictly distinct from […] other discourses 
is not a phenomenon, it is an ideal[ist] concept” (Küpper “Hypotheses” 9). See subch. 2.2. 
114 In a structural or formal view, ethos is effected by giving an impression of consistency. Cf. 
Barthes’ ch. “Personnage et figure”: “Lorsque des sèmes identiques traversent à plusieurs 
reprises le même Nom propre et semblent s’y fixer, il naît un personnage. Le personnage est 
donc un produit combinatoire: la combinaison est relativement stable” (74, XXVIII; with 67, 
XXVIII). Any use of the term ‘ethopoiía’ renders recourse to the (contextual, multilateral) 
concept of ‘ethos’ requisite (cf. subch. 4.1). See these caveats: “Das Wort [‘ἦθος, ἠθικός’] ist eine 
sog[enannte] vox media, ein neutraler Begriff” (Schwartz 14; cf. 18; contrast Gill “Question” 
472). “Der Begriff ‘E[thos]’ bezeichnet in der Rhetorik komplexe Zusammenhänge, die durch 
verschiedene Denk- und Überlieferungsströme gebildet wurden” (Fortenbaugh et al. 1516; cf. 
passim). Contrast Kennedy: “even in classical rhetoric the concept of ethos was broadened” 
(Comp. Rhet. 223). Rather (and more likely), it was used sensu lato from the onset (since this is a 
spec. hypoleptic terminus technicus, if that)—and (reductively) narrowed in certain technicians 
(resp. -ocrats). Cf. Wisse (31); contrast Süss (215–216; passim)—who does give the factual state 
of affairs also: “Man sieht, der Terminus ἦθος ist in einem nimmer ruhenden Flusse begriffen” 
(224); and logs a lack of “eindeutige[r] Bestimmtheit”, “heterogene[…] Begriffsfüllungen” for 
“ἦθος” in Antiquity (1). Pertinently, Hellwig notes: “die Grenzen zwischen de[n][…] Begriff[en] 
von ἦθος [‘erweisen sich’] als fließend” (259; cf. Sattler 55). Cope refers to a “variety of ἦθος” 
(112)—three, to his mind; cf. Wisse (60–61); Bruss (35; 35n.; 36n.). Ptassek has: “Der griechische 
Terminus ἦθος läßt sich in seinen Bedeutungsnuancen nur schwer mit einem einzigen 
Ausdruck übersetzen” (67). Schütrumpf claims: “Einerseits ist ἦθος ein recht unbestimmter 
Begriff. […] Andererseits ließ sich auf vielfältige Weise die Verflochtenheit von ἦθος mit den 
ἠθικαὶ ἕξεις nachweisen” (25; with 36–37). “In den ethischen Schriften ist ἦθος […] mit einer 
Bedeutungsverengung gebraucht” (37); but in the Rhetoric, one is dealing with a “Gebrauch 
von ἦθος” in an “erweiterten, umfassenderen Sinne” (29; cf. “erweiterte[r] Gebrauch”, 35; with 
36–37); the term is not used “in einem […] so engen Sinne wie in der Ethik” (30): “Dieses ἦθος 
bezeichnet […] die besondere Eigenart, Angewohnheit eines Menschen, ohne sich auf den Kreis 
der ἠθικαὶ ἕξεις zu beziehen. – An diese Bedeutung von ἦθος und ἠθικός knüpft die 
nacharistotelische Rhetorik an”; as to the latter, Schütrumpf offers “eine der drei Formen von 
Ethopoiien, die ἠθική” in “Hermogenes” (31). Generally, he notes: “Diese Vielschichtigkeit der 
Bedeutung hat ἦθος von Anfang an […]. Der Begriff ἦθος ist nicht einmal auf Menschen 
beschränkt, sondern kann die ‘gewohnten Stätten’ bezeichnen” (36). For the concept’s history, 
 Variants of Rhetorical Ventriloquism | 63 
  
recognizable, then apparently familiar, outbound ‘character’ pertains and 
conduces to the overall ‘public image’ (the ‘face’ received for the duration of a 
|| 
cf. “Gr[eek]. êthos usage, character, personal disposition, f[ormed on] I[ndo-]E[uropean]. 
*swedh-, f[ormed on] refl[exive] pron[oun] *swe- oneself + *dhē place, DO” (Onions et al. 329, 
s.v. ‘ethic’). See Eden: “Denoting physical location before it becomes a psychological construct, 
ēthos pertained first to the place or habitat most natural for an animal—its ‘haunt’” 
(Rediscovery 18). Cf. “In der Sprache Homers sind ἤθεα die Aufenthaltsorte von Tieren, ihre 
συνήθεις τοποι. Die Alten haben ja immer den Zusammenhang mit ἔθος empfunden” (Schwartz 
15). “Weil in ἦθος das ἔθος mitempfunden wird, darum werden die ἤθη gern mit den νόμοι 
(letzteres im Sinne von Herkommen, Überlieferung) zusammengestellt” (16); cf. Sattler (55); 
contrast Wisse (64n.). Pearson stresses: “The word ethos in the sense of ‘character’ does not 
occur in Homer”; instead, “noos” appears to be used (Ethics 57). In Hesiod, “[t]he word noos” 
may “be coupled with a word that will replace it in time, ethos” (Ethics 83): “when Zeus creates 
Pandora, he orders Hermes to put in her ‘a shameless noos and a deceitful character (ethos)’” 
(Ethics 60; with 83). On a “‘very peculiar’ use of the word ethos” in Antigone, cf. Pearson (Ethics 
247n., giving it as “rule of conduct”; 246n.), referring to Schwartz: “Sehr eigenartig […] ein 
singulärer Gebrauch des Wortes, gewaltsam und katachrestisch; normalerweise würde man 
μίαν γνώμην sagen” (15). See Sophocles (68–69, v.705, where the trans. of “ἦθος” as “mood” 
seems misleading; cf. Wisse 62; 64); the context or Haemon’s drift suggest that a (notional) 
‘héxis’ on the part of Creon is meant—wherefore said use might not seem all that ‘unusual’. Cf. 
Sattler: “the idea of custom is often […] implicit in the rhetorical application of […] ethos” (55). 
“Ethos is derived from the Greek word for custom, habit, or usage”; he logs “a close similarity 
in meaning between ethos and ‘folkways’, […] accepted and approved practice […] mores”; 
“ethos may be defined as ‘totality of characteristic traits’” (55). See Hellwig: “In der Theorie 
sind die ἤθη auch auf ἕξεις zurückgeführt” (259). “Once a certain ἕξις is established, […] we 
expect appropriate and predictable actions ‘in character’ to follow, but this may be a more 
important consideration for oratory than tragedy” (Pearson “Character.” 80). Similarly De 
Temmerman/Emde Boas: “the Platonic-Aristotelian notion of stable (adult) character […] is the 
result of the confluent effects of inborn nature, habituation, and reasoned choice, and 
therefore relatively permanent” (“Intro.” 10; with 10n.). Niehues-Pröbsting gives this perceived 
state of affairs as a condition of possibility for rhetorical plausibility: “Weil dem Charakter eine 
gewisse Konstanz zukommt, kann er zum eikos beitragen. Aufgrund seines Charakters ist der 
Mensch relativ berechenbar. Das ist weniger als totale Durchsichtigkeit, aber mehr als völlige 
Unberechenbarkeit” (“Ethos” 347; cf. Hellwig 259). For the process, see Quintilian (de re): 
“frequens imitatio transit in mores” (Inst. Orat. 1–2. 236, 1.11.2). Hellwig accentuates: “Nur als 
ἔθος kann wohl das ἦθος unmittelbar handlungsauslösend wirken […] Ἦθος bedeutet […] eine 
bestimmte Disposition des Menschen, bei der die natürlichen Gegebenheiten wie das Alter und 
die äußeren Umstände […] zwar noch eine bestimmende Rolle spielen, selbst aber das Tun des 
Menschen nicht mehr auslösen können. Zu den formenden Kräften des ἦθος darf man wohl 
auch die Bräuche, Satzungen und Vorteile der verschiedenen Staatsformen rechnen […] die 
Staatsform [‘prägt’] auch das Wertdenken der Bürger” (236). Consequently, “[e]thical theory 
presents ēthos as inferable from observable praxis […]. Aristotle (Po. 1449b35–1450a7, 1454a17–
19) is explicit that in tragedy the qualities (poious tinas) regarding character (ēthos) and 
disposition (dianoia) are revealed by action” (De Temmerman/Emde Boas “Intro.” 22n.). 
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given speech act, or quasi-dependably).115 While seemingly ‘natural’ (or even 
ostensively wonted), it is literally a product (while factures vary).116 In expedient 
|| 
115 Aphthonius implies a method for describing the (conceptual) affinity or interrelation of 
‘prósopon’ (‘persona’) and ‘ethos’: “Ethopoeia has a known person as a speaker [‘πρόσωπον’] 
and only invents the characterization [‘τὸ ἦθος’], which is why it is called ‘character-making’; 
[…] Heracles is known, but we invent the character in which he speaks [‘τοῦ λέγοντος ἦθος’]. 
[…]. In the case of prosopopoeia, everything is invented, both character and speaker [‘καὶ ἦθος 
καὶ πρόσωπον’], as Menander invented Elenchos (Disproof)” (“Exercises” 115–116, §11.34R–45; 
“ΠΡΟΓΥΜΝΑΣΜΑΤΑ” 44–45, [101], §11). In line therewith, a ‘prósopon’ might be seen as the 
(virtual) ‘carrier’ or ‘bearer’ of various éthe—qua socio-morally relevant habits, (ostensively) 
settled conduct relative to the resp. context. In keeping with Kennedy’s giving “πρόσωπον” as 
“speaker”, Aphthonius seems to use said term in a spec. grammatical sense, and (apparently) 
sans reference to its root meaning of ‘mask’ or ‘face’. Since the aspect of being “known” is 
generally contingent (and upon nominal references), a pluralization of personae would seem to 
result by implication—and also as regards what are otherwise considered to be human agents. 
116 In rhetoric, ‘ethos’ is a linguistico-semiotic phenomenon and fabrication—a product and 
effect of craft: Aristotelian “ἦθος […] consists in conveying to the audience a favourable 
impression of your own character (auctoritas, Quint. III. 8. 12), in making them believe by the 
speech itself that you are an honest man and incapable of misrepresenting the facts of the case, 
intelligent enough thoroughly to understand them, and well disposed to your hearers and their 
interests. In this way you express your own character in the speech; it is the ἦθος τοῦ λέγοντος 
that is herein represented” (Cope 109; cf. 110). See Quintilian (de re): “I must not omit to 
mention […] the credibility [‘fidem’] which the personal authority [‘auctoritas’] of the narrator 
lends [‘adferat’] to his story. We have to earn this [‘mereri debemus’], primarily, by our life 
[‘vita’], but also by our style [‘genere orationis’]” (Inst. Orat. 3–5. 280–281, 4.2.125; hence 
apparently including, or even privileging, ‘atechnic’ aspects). Volkmann glosses: “Daher muss 
alles […] berechnet [A]uffällige vermieden werden” (164, I.i.13). With respect to Aristotle 
(Rhetoric 16–17, 1356a, I.ii.3–7), Pearson takes the speaker’s “ἦθος” qua amounting to “‘[…] 
presenting himself as a person who commands credit’” (“Character.” 77; contrast: Garver 173; 
175–176; cf. the discussion below). For his Latin environment, Quintilian deems the 
(polysemous) Greek concept untranslatable: “ἦθος, cuius nomine, ut ego quidem sentio, caret 
sermo Romanus” (Inst. Orat. 6–8. 48, 6.2.8; cf. 54–55, 6.2.17; on his use of the term, see also 
Inst. Orat. 11–12. 30–31, 11.1.42). Cf. Dockhorn (“Kritische Rhet.?” 269; with “Rhet. movet” 25; 
32); Niehues-Pröbsting: “Die lateinische Übersetzung von ethos durch mores trifft nicht genau 
das, was rhetorisch damit gemeint ist” (“Ethos” 350). Contrast Roth’s overstatement, claiming 
“[d]asz Quintilian mit dem ἦθος nicht zurechtkommt und die ganze macht der rede im πάθος 
sucht und findet” (858). See the rhétor’s definition: “ēthos means […] a certain special aspect of 
mores [‘morum quaedam proprietas’]” (Quintilian Inst. Orat. 6–8. 48–49, 6.2.9). Cf. Wisse (5), 
the context cum grano salis. Eden pertinently accentuates the qualifying term: “morum 
quaedam proprietas: the particular mental attitudes that” (are made to) appear to “belong to 
the […] speaker” (“Lit. Property” 34; cf. 35–36). See Freese’s note: “ἦθος ‘in the widest sense, 
includes all that is habitual and characteristic; in a limited sense, it expresses the habitual 
temper or disposition’ (Twining)” (Aristotle Rhetoric 248n.–249n.). As to the latter, cf. the 
ensuing formula (cited in Quintilian): “Adiciunt quidam ἦθος perpetuum, πάθος temporale 
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instances, an effectual ethos will dissimulate (or all but eclipse) the overall 
artfulness and ongoing process of rhetorical ‘personation’ (as far as the 
reception is concerned).117 Technically speaking and with a descriptive measure, 
any essentialist construals—and (their routinely concomitant) moralizing—must 
seem misguided (especially, while not only, in this respect).118 
|| 
esse” (Inst. Orat. 6–8. 48, 6.2.10). See Volkmann (273, I.i.28). Grube has: “The Roman critics 
themselves were evidently confused by the word [sc. ‘êthos’] and made no attempt to translate 
it; even Quintilian is not very sure, though he suggests mores, or rather morum quaedam 
proprietas, ‘a certain appropriateness of temper’. […] He then mentions another meaning of 
êthos […] namely characterization, when we portray character […] the êthos of a speech may 
refer to characterization or to speaking in character, to the character of the speaker himself, to 
the less exalted emotional tone or the naturalness of his manner” (291–292). Cf. Bruns: “Die 
Rede soll ἦθος, d. h. sittliche Grundstimmung des Wesens verrathen” (433). See also Dockhorn 
(Macht 49–68; spec. 52–54, 58), who (with recourse to Cicero, Quintilian) glosses “Ethos” as 
“Charakter, Eigenart menschlichen Verhaltens […] ‘mores’ […] ‘naturae et mores et omnis vitae 
consuetudo’, ‘morum proprietas’ […] ‘omnis mentis habitus’”; as well as the scholar’s 
counseling (with Quintilian) against conceiving of “Ethos […] im Sinne der Moralphilosophie 
[…], also nicht Norm und Regel” (Macht 54; cf. 52, 57–58); cf. Stolt (18–30). See the n. below. 
117 Cf. Blass: “ungezwungen, wie es dem Ethos angemessen ist” (Beredsamkeit I. 418). For the 
present context, the ensuing may seem decisive: “The great virtue in expressing it [sc. ‘Ἦθος’] 
lies in making it seem [‘videantur’] that everything flows [‘fluere’] from the nature of the facts 
and the persons [‘ex natura rerum hominumque’], so that the speaker’s character [‘mores 
dicentis’] shines through his speech [‘ex oratione perluceant’] and is somehow recognized [‘et 
quodam modo agnoscantur’]” (Quintilian Inst. Orat. 6–8. 50–51, 6.2.13)—crafting, by way of 
speech, an impression of effortlessness in one’s projected self-‘characterization’. The rhétor 
reiterates this emphasis on generating an effectual appearance with regard to what might be 
termed vicarious coloring: “ēthos in all its forms requires a good and even-tempered person 
[‘virum’]. Since the orator needs to demonstrate these qualities, if he can, in his client too, he 
must at any rate possess, or be thought to possess, them himself [‘ipse aut habeat aut habere 
credatur’]. He will thus do the best service to his Causes, as his own good character [‘ex sua 
bonitate’] will lend them credibility [‘faciet fidem’]” (Inst. Orat. 6–8. 54–55, 6.2.18). Figuratively 
put, the orator’s ethos should not only ‘rub off onto’ the defendant, but almost ‘bleed into’ him 
(if this textile metaphor be permissible). On celare artem, cf. also subchs. 4.1 and 6, herein. 
118 See Schwartz’ needful caveats: “Das Wort [‘ἦθος, ἠθικός’] ist eine sog[enannte] vox media, 
ein neutraler Begriff” (14; cf. 18). “Platon spricht viel von ἦθος ψυχῆς; da ἦθος allein zu 
allgemein ist, hält er den Zusatz des Genitivs für nötig, wenn er das Wort auf den menschlich-
moralischen Bereich anwenden will” (15; see Schütrumpf 37–38). Contrast Kennedy: “Ēthos in 
Aristotle means ‘character’, esp. ‘moral character’, and except in 2.21.16 is regarded as an 
attribute of a person, not of a speech. Aristotle does not use the term in the technical sense of 
‘rhetorical ethos’, the technique or effect of the presentation of character in a discourse” (Civic 
Disc. 37n.; cf. and contrast: 163n.; “Prooemion” ix). Apart from bypassing the text (e.g. at Civic 
Disc. 78–79; 120; 235–236), Kennedy also contradicts himself (cf. Civic Disc. 163n.–164n.; 186n.), 
stating (incidentally): “This widens the concept of ēthos” (Civic Disc. 77n.; cf. Comp. Rhet. 223)—
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 Both personae and éthe will effectively involve craft, hence the ars par 
excellence: theirs is an ‘entechnic’ production and -jection.119 Given its end focus 
|| 
which he himself had narrowed; when coming up against what does not fit his schematizing, 
the critic resorts to this ruse: “An unusual expression for Aristotle” (Civic Disc. 186n.). As a 
result, the severance of dissimilar éthe (“something rather different”) seems labored, if not 
forced (Civic Disc. 163n.). His ed. practice invades the text to such an extent that the reader may 
seem to be facing Kennedy’s ‘Rhetoric’, rather than Aristotle’s. In general, it will hardly be 
plausible to sidestep an express nexus with the affine treatise (cf. Aristotle “Poetics” 50–51, 
1450a, VI; 78–81, 1454a, XV). While also encountered elsewhere (to an extreme degree in 
Garver’s textually untenable construals: cf. e.g. 43; 173; 175–176; passim), Kennedy’s sustained 
moralizing cannot reasonably do justice to the pragmatic philosopher; cf. Elam’s reference to 
“the sober Aristotelian account of the speaker–discourse relationship” (218). In his 
comparative approach, Kennedy performs the same: “ethos, the moral character of the speaker 
projected into a speech (or text) to secure credibility or sympathy with the audience” (Comp. 
Rhet. 42). “To be a means of persuasion, ethos, or moral character, requires an understanding 
of the moral values on the part of members of a society” (Comp. Rhet. 42). Such an (implicitly) 
substantialist use of the word “moral” will be misleading (not least in unrhetorically limiting 
the scope of the noun it qualifies); similarly Carey: “the moral character of the speaker (ethos)” 
(“Intro.” 10). Garver tries to unilateralize, bend ethos (and rhetoric) into a ‘philosophically’ 
palatable (essentialized, moralized, logified) notion (cf. passim; spec. 173, 175)—leading him to 
assert (untenably, in an Aristotelian context): “Art and ēthos are incompatible” (43); circularly: 
“any ēthos that can be the product of art can’t be real ēthos” (176). Contrast Naschert (noting 
the crafting, projecting, insinuating involved): “Die Erzeugung von Ethos gerät […] in den Rang 
einer herstellbaren Qualität. Den Terminus technicus ‘E[thopoeia]’ verwendet Aristoteles zwar 
nicht, allerdings gibt er den Rat, zur Glaubhaftmachung des eigenen Charakters unangenehme 
Dinge, besonders Vorwürfe, anderen Personen in den Mund zu legen” (1513; with Rhetoric 
460–463, III.xvii.16–17, 1418b). See below; as well as subchs. 4.1 and 5.1, herein. 
119 Aristotle’s ‘ethos’ emphasizes (intra-discursive, speech-related) ‘entechnicity’ (cf. Rhetoric 
14–17, 1355b–1356a, I.ii.2–6; Dionysius “Lysias” 60–61, §19; Süss 125–129, largely cum grano 
salis). Aristotle has: “since all men are willing to listen to speeches which harmonize with their 
own character [‘ἤθει’] and to speakers who resemble them [or: ‘speeches which resemble (or 
reflect) it’], it is easy to see what language we must employ so that both ourselves and our 
speeches may appear to be of such and such a character” (Rhetoric 254–255, 1390a, II.xiii.16; 
254n., giving the reading qtd. in brackets). This ties in with his opening remarks: “The orator 
persuades by […] character [‘τοῦ ἤθους’] when his speech is delivered in such a manner as to 
render [‘ποιῆσαι’] him worthy of confidence; […] this […] must be due to the speech itself […] 
character [‘τὸ ἦθος’] […] constitutes the most effective means of proof. […] persuasion is 
produced by the speech itself” (Rhetoric 16–17, 1356a, I.ii.4–5); see Dionysius (“Lysias” 60–61, 
§19; with Bruss 39–41). Cf. “das ist […] die wichtigste Quelle der πίστις” (Schwartz 17). Niehues-
Pröbsting stresses “die wesentliche Funktion, die sie [sc. die ‘aristotelische Rhetorik’] dem 
Ethos beimißt” (“Ethos” 340). Oesterreich has: “Die Personenzentriertheit der peitho bezeugt 
[…] die Aussage des Aristoteles, daß das Ethos des Redners das wichtigste Überzeugungsmittel 
sei” (Fundamentalrhet. 49; cf. 5, 85, 112–113). See Carey on (Aristotle’s) ‘entechnic’ písteis (qua 
“produced by the rhetorician’s art”, “Rhet. means” 26); Sprute (282); Elam (217–219); Eden 
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on the ‘making’ factually involved, the compound ‘ethopoiía’ is most apposite.120 
|| 
(Fiction 12–13, 13n.); Niehues-Pröbsting (“Ethos” 342); Süss (125–126; 144–145; 212–214), cum 
grano salis. Kennedy gives “entechnic” as “‘embodied in art, artistic’” (Civic Disc. 37). Cf. Cope: 
“These three kinds of proof are all effected secundum artem by means of the speech itself” 
(109). See Elam: “The character that appears to lie behind – but is instead the creation of – the 
speech, acts (or speech acts) of the stage speakers has much the same status as the product of 
the speech and acts of Aristotle’s orator (who is, in this sense, a kind of actor-dramatist)” (218–
219; with 217). Baumlin defines ‘ethos’ qua “‘character as it emerges in language’” (qtd. in: 
Sloane “Selfhood” 113). In citing the former, the latter does not seem to note that said definition 
jars with his own—being a direct result of the critic’s essentializing (“Ethos, identity or selfhood 
[…] highly individualized personalities”), plus a (concomitantly) problematic reliance on 
Greenblatt: “ethos” is “the means whereby a speaker or writer projects a self-image” (Sloane 
“Selfhood” 113; cf. “rhetorical selfhood”, 115–116). On the contrary: it is an “effect” (Baumlin 
xxvi)—and spec. one produced in, and by way of, language (see xv–xviii; “necessarily 
linguistic”, xx; “quintessentially a linguistic phenomenon”, xxiii; xxvi; passim). As such, it 
may be instrumentalized (with a view to ‘handling’ the reception in an advantageous manner). 
Generally, see Küpper (“Subjektivität” 139). Niehues-Pröbsting stresses: “Lediglich das in der 
und durch die Rede ausgedrückte Ethos gehört zur rhetorischen Theorie, nicht der Charakter 
des Redners als solcher beziehungsweise das Vorurteil des Publikums darüber” (Die antike 
Phil. 121; cf. “Ethos” 342; 352). Kennedy opts for “regard[ing] authority as a ‘nonartistic’ 
counterpart to ethos” (Comp. Rhet. 42), and posits: “The emphasis on ethos and the neglect of 
authority in classical rhetoric derives from the egalitarian assumptions of Greek democracy” 
(Comp. Rhet. 43; on said “Topos”, cf. Oesterreich Fundamentalrhet. 89). To be speaking of a 
“neglect” will seem too strong; the other notions must be nuanced by the competitiveness of 
said culture: if the best craftsman prevails (in whichever genre), this will inevitably conduce to 
a focus on ‘entechnicity’ as pertaining to that which is manipulatable by art (including the 
recipient). Moreover, ethos could be described as tying in with communal “authority”: any use 
of (per se supra-personal) language will be ‘ethical’ to the extent of being hypoleptic (tying in 
with a foregoing competence)—whether consciously so or not; the téchne ensures the former, 
hence conduces to victory by an artful recourse to habitualized givens. Kennedy does grant this 
in the latter part of the ensuing: “the authority or ethos of the speaker […] partly derive[s] from 
natural ability, partly from imitating effective speakers of the past” (Comp. Rhet. 79); “formal 
language […] carries the collective values of the community” (Comp. Rhet. 79)—especially, 
while not only, said ‘official’ kind of speaking. In general, Kennedy stresses: “nonartistic 
authority and artistic ethos are primary means of persuasion throughout the world, often 
adequate in themselves to secure persuasion” (Comp. Rhet. 223). Cf. Baumlin: “The terms are 
often equated[:] loosely speaking, to have ethos is to be an authority” (xxix, qua n.)—for the 
spoken time being. In a meta-rhetorical view, the economy (selection, arrangement) of 
‘atechnic’ písteis will (most likely) have to count as artful (thereby making them so, in a sense). 
On assorted samples for “autorité”, cf. Montaigne (Essais III. 223, III.viii; with 215). 
120 Roth appears to be using the term for the orator’s ‘crafting’ of his own ‘ethos’: “Dasz die 
ἠθοποιία eine gute aus der rede erkennbare gesinnung des redners g e g e n  s e i n e  
z u h ö r e r  voraussetze, ist ganz unzweifelhaft” (855); “der redner [‘musz’] so zu sprechen 
wissen, dasz er nicht nur nicht gegen die mores civitatis verstöszt, sondern dasz seine zuhörer 
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 From a technical perspective, “the rendering [‘Darstellung’] of another 
human being is effected by the same means as those” employed with regard to 
someone’s self-(re)presentations (Hellwig 257; trans. dsm).121 Prefixed by ‘auto-’, 
the latter may therefore be described as variants of prosopopoeia and 
|| 
auch die conformität seines ἦθος mit dem ihrigen erkennen” (856). While routinely 
advantageous, showing a favorable disposition toward the audience or spectators may not 
always be the most expedient course to take; likewise, being ostensively at variance with the 
customary may prove effectual under certain circumstances; the setting decides, not the 
overall directive. Yet Roth generally defines “das ἦθος des redners” as “die in seiner 
persönlichkeit und seiner ausdrucksweise hervortretende gesinnung, welche dem sinne seiner 
zuhörer correspondiert” (856); in so doing, he wishes to modify Aristotle’s view of ethos: “bei 
dem groszen werthe, den das altertum der ὑπόκρισις (actio) belegt, ist es ganz undenkbar dasz 
die persönlichkeit des redners jemals oder irgendwo als entbehrlich zur ἠθοποιία angesehen 
worden ist” (856)—once again using the term in question for the orator’s ‘auto-etho-poíesis’ (so 
to speak); at any rate, the performance would also count as ‘entechnic’. 
121 Hellwig (257) gives the relevant passages in Aristotle: “when speaking of these [sc. ‘virtue 
and vice’, etc.], we shall incidentally bring to light the means of making us appear of such and 
such a character [‘ex hon poioí tines hypolephthesómetha katà tò ethos’] […]; for it is by the 
same means that we shall be able to inspire confidence in ourselves or in others in regard to 
virtue” (Rhetoric 90–91, 1366a, I.ix.1); plus this intratextual reference backward: “The means 
whereby he may appear [‘phanein’] sensible and good must be inferred from the classification 
of the virtues; for to make himself appear such he would employ the same means as he would 
in the case of others” (Rhetoric 170–171, 1378a, II.i.7). Cf. Ptassek thereto, speaking of the 
“Selbstdarstellung des Redners” (68). Apart from being replete with hardly descriptive value 
judgments such as “ownership” and “truth” (cf. “obtrusive”, 313), Currie’s article evinces a 
problematic bias against the art: “rhetorical poses do relatively little to characterize the poet” 
(312–313). This directly affects his grasp of the concept at issue: “Epinician ēthopoiia, unlike the 
ēthopoiia of oratory, is more concerned with constructing the character of the laudator (a rather 
shallow rhetorical construct) than of a historical person; again, the way Cicero draws on his 
own historical (or would-be historical) character is different” (313). Particular and contextual 
functionalizations will inevitably vary (needless to say, rhetorically speaking); formally or 
structurally, the devices utilized are similar or comparable, while their degree of application 
(hence prominence) may differ. Currie’s (implicitly substantialist) value judgments cannot tend 
toward tenability: a resp. recipient’s presuppositions are likely to cause a severance of the 
same—the beholder’s eye being always already primed and directed by previous experiences 
and (generic) knowledge. The ensuing is pertinent initially, but then veers round to said 
essentialism: “Epinician characterization takes very different forms according to who is being 
characterized: laudator, laudandus, or the characters of the mythical narrative. The ēthopoiia of 
the epinician laudator is very roughly analogous to the ēthopoiia of the speaker in (forensic) 
oratory, but we are dealing more with a rhetorical construct than a real person, mimetically 
conceived” (314). On the contrary, the decidedly artful techniques for crafting ethos—which, in 
any of its actively semioticized, rhetorico-poetic variants, is always ‘entechnic’ (cf. Aristotle 
Rhetoric 14–17, 1355b–1356a, I.ii.2–6; 442, 1416b, III.xvi.1)—differ but in terms of the ever 
needful adaptation to the spec. context and functionalization, hence in degree only; see below. 
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ethopoeia—considering the craft (‘poiein’) formally or structurally implicated.122 
 Signifying a role determined by a communal outlook and praxis, prósopa 
are generally based on, and established by, a collective defining itself in 
competitive terms as regards (artfully) performing or representing such 
personae effective- and expediently—hence with a view to what will typically be 
considered apposite at a given time. The latter immediately involves (culturally) 
acquired habits, a settled bearing: “Ethos necessarily overlaps with decorum” 
|| 
122 Pertinently accentuating that this particular variant of the craft does not fundamentally 
alter the rhetorical production and projection (resp. performance) of a received ‘self’, Bakker’s 
consistently lucid analysis also tenders an exemplification of what one might refer to as ‘auto-
ethopoiía’: when “the orator talks about himself, and is not writing a speech on someone else’s 
behalf […][,] the terms and topoi […] Lysias uses to describe himself and his family as well as 
his opponents [are ‘similar’], and […] his technique of contrastive characterization matches that 
of his other speeches” (“Lysias” 423). “Lysias evaluates himself and his family in terms that are 
no different form his other speakers” (“Lysias” 424). On two consecutive pages, Carey refers to 
“Lysias’ characteristic vividness” (“Comment.” 210), to the oration’s “speaker himself” qua 
“not emerg[ing] as a vivid personality”, and to “[t]he mother”, ventriloquized “as a powerful 
personality […] not […] defined in detail” (“Comment.” 211). The first instance applies a stylistic 
measure, and intimates a writerly ethos; the second refers to a speaker’s recognizable persona, 
and is equally elicited from a written text; the last statement cited aims at defining a female 
protagonist rendered in what are deemed typical terms, as portrayed in and by words 
attributed to her by the intratextual speaker and extratextual author. In all three cases, ethos is 
conceived of as being (or having been) crafted by linguistic (or, more generally, semiotic) 
expedients (sc. rhetorico-poetically)—and this includes the (and any) reception also (meaning, 
in hermeneutic respects). The ensuing survey of instances from Carey’s text provide applied 
examples for the three potential ‘carriers’ of ethos outlined above. First, concerning the 
speechwright: “The reader who can resist the spell of Lysias’ characterization” etc. 
(“Comment.” 90). “It is […] difficult to believe that a speech so typical of Lysias is spurious” 
(“Comment.” 208); or the reverse, where ‘inauthenticity’ is presumed on account of “the 
absence of any quintessentially Lysiac trait, particularly the lack of ethopoiia” (“Comment.” 
147). As to the client’s projected ethos and that of a persona in his discourse: “the strongest 
argument […] is made obliquely through the narrative […]. The effect is to create the impression 
of a man so simple as to be incapable of any kind of trickery […]. He falls neatly into the role of 
the gullible cuckold found in popular tales in many cultures […] the stereotype was familiar in 
Greece” (“Comment.” 61); “as well as the rhetorical effectiveness of the choice of character we 
should note Lysias’ subtlety. The character presented is not complex, but the presentation is 
skilful. […] Euphiletos is Lysias’ most impressive creation. […] The wife […] remains a vague 
presence. She plays the archetypal unfaithful wife to Euphiletos’ archetypal cuckold. […] The 
speech as a whole is persuasive. Its greatest strength is the remarkably vivid persona which 
Lysias has created for Euphiletos” (“Comment.” 62). “Euphiletos’ clear affinities with the 
cuckold type support the view […] that the characters projected by Lysias’ clients are dramatic 
creations” (“Comment.” 62n.; cf. 71). Cf. Bakker (“Lysias” 422n.). 
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(Herrick 136).123 As regards the Roman environment, Fuhrmann elucidates the 
nexus between the aforesaid concept’s various applications: 
The figurative usage, that is[,] the meaning persona = role, character in life […] evinces 
several typical areas. These are mainly ‘systems’, which are similar to the theater in that a 
certain ‘ensemble’[,] with respectively specific roles[,] acts in them, as well: […] the 
judicial system […] the state […] the society […] the family […]. The [metaphorical] 
transition from the theater to the court was particularly effortless: for[,] here as there[,] 
there were actions in the emphatic sense (agere, actio, actor) […] fixed roles, and […] the 
entirety – from the first to the fifth act in drama, from the complaint or summons to the 
sentence in the lawsuit – […] could only emerge from a conjoint, reciprocal […], 
interdependent action. (“Persona” 88; trans. dsm)124 
|| 
123 In the progymnasmata, Lanham sees ‘ethopoeia’ as “character portrayal” (“Composition” 
120): “Considered to be among the more difficult of these preliminary rhetorical exercises was 
the speech in character, prosopopoeia or ethopoeia. This exercise was very popular […]. The 
larger rhetorical principle being stressed in this exercise was decorum, suiting one’s words […] 
to the situation” (“Composition” 121). Generally speaking, ‘ethos’ is a flexible term, and a 
relative category—hence the close nexus with the aptum (see also the above n. on ethos in the 
present subch.); it is contingent upon the given state of affairs (resp. that which is considered 
to be so), and thus (potentially) subject to change (and contingent in that sense also: it might 
as well be otherwise). Eden notes that “oikeion” signifies “a style that expresses those 
properties that best characterize” (“Lit. Property” 35) a speaker in the resp. setting (with a view 
to an advantageous position in a given context), wherefore a rhetorical “ethics or character-
formation” (“Lit. Property” 37) might be said to obtain. See Bruss: “Dionysius associates 
ethopoeia with […] Aristotelian ethos—persuasive proof through character” (36n.; cf. 38–40, 
39n.); with a view to crafting the latter, the critic notes the Dionysian “emphasis on style, or 
word choice, as a means” (38; her context is generally problematic; see the discussion in 
subch. 4.1, herein). As suggested in the opening of ch. 3 (above), a distinctive elocutio may 
(tend to) be taken as signaling ethos. For oratory’s general functionality in this respect, see 
Friedrich: “Man pflegt die rhetorisch-formale Kunst […] um ein biegsames Instrument zu 
gewinnen für die je nach Temperament, Charakter und Denkweise verschiedenen 
Ausdrucksbedürfnisse der […] Autoren” (83; infinitized). Cf. Eden: “Changing over time and 
place, […] style also differs between one stylist and the next” (“Montaigne on Style” 389). 
124 See Gill (“Personhood” 171; 177; 192–193; passim), spec. “These modern studies [sc. of 
‘social psychology’, by Goffman and others] resemble de Officiis in viewing the person from a 
strongly social perspective, and in regarding inter-personal relationships as the enactment of a 
set of largely pre-determined roles” (“Personhood” 195). Cf. “Bei den Römern tritt der Begriff 
der ‘P[ersona]’ hauptsächlich in der Sprache des Theaters, des Rechts, der Grammatik […] und 
der Rhetorik auf. […] Die P[ersona] ist zunächst die Maske im Theater (ein Äquivalent zu larva), 
die auf der Bühne die verschiedenen ‘Personen’ voneinander abhebt und die zu spielende Rolle 
festlegt: So gibt es die P[ersona] des Parasiten oder des Kupplers. Generell kennzeichnet die 
P[ersona] die Theaterrolle durch ihre soziale Dimension, an die sich eine psychologische 
Persönlichkeit mit ihren typischen Verhaltensweisen knüpft. Seit der Zeit Ciceros wird 
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Likewise, Blumenberg accentuates that “[t]he figurative uses of the term ‘role’, 
once more current today, rest on a very solid tradition illustrating life and [the] 
world as [a] ‘theater’” (“Annäherung” 417; trans. dsm).125 The overall (micro- 
and macrocosmic) metaphor appears to have seemed momentaneously 
evident—or been of heuristic value—from the very onset of drama’s prevalence 
in Western cultures.126 A corresponding synopsis of samples is likely to reveal 
|| 
‘P[ersona]’ im Sinne einer determinierten ‘Rolle’ vom Theater auf die Gesellschaft übertragen 
und bezeichnet die in ihrem Gesamtgefüge oder ihren Teil- und Subsystemen (z.B. im 
Gerichtswesen, Ämterhierarchie) zu übernehmenden bzw. übernommenen Funktionen” 
(Boriaud/Schouler 803–804). The above mention of a ‘psychological personality’ will have to 
be quarantined as inapplicable, here (a fact that might be acknowledged at 805). As to 
“medieval comments on the word persona”—spec. concerning its “polysemy”, and “tak[ing] 
advantage of it”—cf. Otter (161–163; here: 161). For a diachronic, comparative, anthropological, 
and global approach, see Mauss (passim), spec. “a whole immense group of societies have 
arrived at the notion of ‘role’ (personnage), of the role played by the individual in sacred 
dramas, just as he plays a role in family life. The function […] created the formula […] and 
subsists in societies at the present day” (12). Synoptically, Hollis remarks: “Mauss ranges from 
the Pueblo to the Romans, from mediaeval Christianity to the individualism of today, showing 
the different forms which the idea of the self has taken” (218); as to the aforesaid allocation of 
roles with a view to the functioning of society, see Hollis (221–222). 
125 Cf. Blumenberg: “Simmel hat darauf hingewiesen, daß die Rollenmetapher nur deshalb so 
leistungsfähig ist, weil das Leben eine Vorform der Schauspielkunst sei; […] Lebenkönnen und 
Sich-eine-Rolle definieren sind identisch” (“Annäherung” 417–418; with Simmel 80); as to the 
latter, cf. the n. below. Cervantes joins the (arch-familiar) metaphors of a play (“comedia”) qua 
‘mirror of human life’ (“un espejo […] de la vida humana”), of the world as a stage (“la comedia 
y trato deste mundo”), and as ‘a game of chess’ (“juego del ajedrez”), while putting the ensuing 
qualification in Sancho’s mouth (responding to Don Quijote): “Brava comparación […], aunque 
no tan nueva, que yo no la haya oído muchas y diversas veces” (Quijote II. 122, II.xii; with 
Quiring 14). Generally, see Moos (489n., §103; 509n., §106). As to said isotopy’s prevalence, 
Süss notes: “In unzähligen Variationen wiederholt die Weltliteratur den peripatetischen 
Vergleich der Komödie oder des Dramas überhaupt mit einem s p e c u l u m  vitae, wofür 
auch noch imago veritatis, imitatio consuetudinis eintritt. Dieses zu welthistorischer 
Berühmtheit gelangte Schlagwort ist […] der Sache nach gorgianisch” (87–88). 
126 For Ancient examples, see the dictum ascribed to Democritus: “ὁ κόσμος σκηνή, ὁ βίος 
πάροδος· ἦλθες, εἶδες, ἀπῆλθες” (qtd. in: Kranz Vorsokratiker II. 165, 68B115*84; formally, see 
Aristotle Rhetoric 420–421, 1413b, III.xii.4). Moos has: “Auch das Theatergleichnis ist wie viele 
andere dieser ‘exempla’ platonischen Ursprungs” (509n., §106). Cf. “Let us suppose that each of 
us […] is an ingenious puppet [‘θαῦμα’] of the gods, whether contrived by way of a toy of theirs 
or for some serious purpose—for as to that we know nothing” (Plato Laws I–VI. 68–69, 644D, I; 
with “θαυμάτων”, 68, 645B, I; cf. 106, 658B–C, II; on the former, see Heraclitus, qtd. in: Kranz 
Vorsokratiker I. 162, 22B52). See Palladas: “ALL life is a stage and a play [‘Σκηνὴ πᾶς ὁ βίος καὶ 
παίγνιον’]: either learn to play laying your gravity aside, or bear with life’s pains” (qtd. in: 
Greek Anthology 40–41, X.72; cf. Curtius 148, §7.5); for said tendency, cf. the Petronian take, as 
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both a diachronic invariance, and considerable differences with respect to 
contextual functionalizations.127 
|| 
discussed below. The Epictetian view proved particularly influential for Early Modernity (see 
subch. 4.2, herein): “Remember that you are an actor [‘hypokritès’] in a play [‘drámatos’], the 
character of which is determined by the Playwright [‘didáskalos’]: if He wishes the play to be 
short, it is short; if long, it is long; if He wishes you to play the part of a beggar, remember to 
act even this rôle adroitly […]. For this is your business, to play [‘hypokrínasthai’] the rôle 
[‘prósopon’] assigned you; but the selection of that rôle is Another’s” (“Encheiridion” 496–497, 
§17; cf. Nédoncelle 283–284; Niehues-Pröbsting Kynismus 232–233). Similarly, Marcus Aurelius 
(340–343, XII.36, with 56–57, III.8; 296–299, XI.6, with 294–295, XI.2–3; cf. Quiring 10); also 
Cicero (“De Senectute” 80–81, xix.70). The nexus of said metaphor with dramatico-rhetorical 
‘personae’ will suggest itself, and may be particularly plain in the (characteristically 
categorical) Stoic take as articulated in Epictetus; cf. the assertion of—and implicit claim to—
consistency (linking to the above via the terms employed): “But different characters [‘prósopa’] 
do not mix in this fashion; you cannot act the part [‘hypokrínasthai’] of Thersites and that of 
Agamemnon too” (“Disc. III–IV.” 308–309; IV.ii.10). For an affine tenor, cf. “Lay down for 
yourself, at the outset, a certain stamp [‘charaktera’] and type [‘týpon’], which you are to 
maintain whether you are by yourself or are meeting with people. And be silent for the most 
part” (“Encheiridion” 516–517, §33; with 530, §48). “If you undertake a rôle [‘prósopon’] which 
is beyond your powers, you both disgrace yourself in that one, and at the same time neglect the 
rôle which you might have filled with success” (“Encheiridion” 525–525, §37). Stoic(izing) 
instances will probably have conduced to (or even be responsible for) the semantic changes in 
the Greek term ‘charaktér’; generally, cf. Körte’s detailed conceptual history (passim; spec. 85), 
as outlined in subch. 3.1, herein. For a different (and ultimately anthropistic) take on said 
isotopy of life qua play, see the nexus of (rhetorical) sophistry, mercantilism, acting in the 
Hippocratic corpus: “The trainer’s art is of this sort: they teach how to transgress the law 
according to the law, to be unjust justly, to deceive […]. It is a display of the folly of the many. 
[…] Many admire, few know. Men come to the market-place and do the same things; men 
deceive when they buy and sell. He who has deceived most is admired. […] The actor’s 
[‘ὑποκριτικὴ’] art deceives those who know. They say one thing and think another; they come 
on and go off, the same […] yet not the same. A man too can say one thing and do another; the 
same man can be not the same; he may be now of one mind, now of another. So all the arts 
have something in common with the nature of man” (260–263, I.xxiv). For a nuanced view of 
dramatic deception, see Gorgias (as qtd. in: Kranz Vorsokratiker II. 305–306, 82B23; with 
Schwartz 80; 80n., referring to Plutarch). As to the above, Hippocratic passage, cf. Starobinski 
(Montaigne 11n.; Motion 309n.; with “Remarques” 343), cum grano salis. 
127 Cf. Curtius’ seminal subch. “Schauspielmetaphern” (148–154, §7.5; spec. 149–151; with 
Ancient samples likening life to drama at 148). Via John of Salisbury’s adaptive hypólepsis (see 
below), it is particularly Petronius’ take that seems to have ensured the metaphor’s persistence 
during Medieval times: “A company acts a farce on the stage [‘Grex agit in scaena mimum’]: 
one is called [‘vocatur’] the father, [/] one the son, and one is labeled [‘tenet’] the Rich Man. [/] 
Soon the comic parts [‘partes’] are shut in a † book †, [/] the men’s real faces [‘facies’] come 
back, and the made-up [‘simulata’] disappear [‘perit’]” (188–189, §80; cf. 189n.). On mime in 
this regard, cf. Walsh (24–27; for the passage cited, 25): “Petronius consistently compares the 
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 The dominantly pragmatic disciplines implied in the above tend to have 
|| 
action of his story to scenes from the mime […] almost every episode is at some point compared 
to a low comic drama” (24, referring to Salisbury; also 24n.). The critic calls this a “deliberate 
alignment” (25), indicative of “Petronius’ attitude”: “He wishes to present the whole of life as a 
series of risible, unexpected happenings, in which nothing is taken seriously and no man’s 
motives are what they seem. Every gesture is rehearsed, every attitude a studied pose” (27). Cf. 
Curtius (149, §7.5); Moos (509); and John of Salisbury’s highly influential—partly hypoleptic—
Medieval rendering and refunctionalization of the Petronian general drift (hence not verbatim): 
“fere totus mundus iuxta Petronium exerceat histrionem” (Policraticus I [1909]. 194, III.8, 
491a–b; cf. “fere totus mundus […] mimum uidetur implere”, 191, III.8, 489b; see the overall 
context: 190–194, III.8, 488c–491b; Policraticus [1479/81]. 174–177, in the digital facsimile; with 
Curtius 149–151, §7.5; Walsh 24, 24n.; Burger Rolle 82–83; 90; Quiring 12). On John’s uptake, cf. 
Moos (220–224, §59), spec. as to the “Theatermetapher”—being among “den einflußreichsten 
Stücken des Policraticus bis in die Barockzeit” (508–512, §106; here 508): “Johann gelingt es 
[…], mehrere Hauptthemen des Policraticus in diesem Bild des Rollenspiels brennpunktartig zu 
vereinen” (510, §106; it is among the “dispositionellen Großmetaphern”, 509n.). For Early 
Modern refunctionalizations (generally, cf. Mayfield “Interplay” passim; spec. 32n.–33n.; Artful 
64n.), see Erasmus (Praise of Folly 28–29, 49); Gracián (Criticón 74–83, I.ii); Calderón (passim; 
spec. 52, v.376; 53, v.427–428; 41, v.46–47, v.52–56; with 41n.). Moos believes: “was neu 
hinzukommt, ist […] die Vorstellung, daß Gott das Schauspiel leitet, und der Mensch trotz aller 
Scheinhaftigkeit des Theaters auf der Weltbühne seine Rolle verantwortungsvoll zu spielen 
hat” (510n., §106); cf. the Epictetian take, as cited above. Montaigne’s hypólepsis: “La plupart 
de nos vacations sont farcesques, Mundus universus exercet histrionam [sic: histrionem]” (Essais 
III. 327, III.x; with context: 328). “Most of our occupations are low comedy. The whole world 
plays a part” (Essays 773, III.10; cf. 774; Friedrich 366n., as to Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius; see 
Starobinski Montaigne 11–12, 11n.–12n.; Motion 1; 309n.; with “Remarques” 343; his context 
being problematic; cf. Moos 508n.–509n., 511n., §106). Florio’s 1603 rendering has: “Mundus 
universus exercet histrioniam [sic]. All the world doth practise stage-playing” (Essayes III [Florio]. 
262, III.x). Giving Lipsius as the source for the attribution to Petronius (Essais III. 557n.), the 
French ed. trans. Montaigne’s Latin line as “‘Le monde entier joue la comédie’” (Essais III. 
327n.). In a context associating (self-interested) hypocrisy and the theater (see “histrione”, 
“actitaret”, “repraesentandus”, “theatrum totum”, “Comoediam”, “luditis”, “velati persona”, 
Lipsius 54, I.viii; plus the emphatic appeal: “histrio pone personam”, 56), the Neo-Stoic’s 1584 
de constantia (cf. F. Neumann 426; 438), ascribes this to Petronius: “Mundus / vniuersus exercet 
histrionam, ait / Arbiter”—which Neumann gives as “Alle Welt spielt” (Lipsius 54–57, I.viii). 
Generally, see Barner’s seminal study on the metaphor of life qua play in the Baroque (86–131); 
for the German context, cf. Burger (Rolle 75–93; spec. 85–87). See Mayfield (“Interplay” passim; 
spec. 32n.–33n.; Artful 64n.); as to striking cases in Early Modern opera, cf. Feldman (passim; 
spec. 71, 80, 89; with Mayfield “Interplay” 21, 24). Like the affine one with recourse to the agorá 
(cf. Eden Fiction 6; Mayfield “Interplay” 32n.), the metaphor in question may be ‘internalized’: 
“Renaissance rhetorics depict the mind as a dramatic microcosm […] the mind as a stage” 
(Christiansen 319–320; cf. 321). On the whole, Moos’ general assessment in the present respect 
will (in all likelihood) continue to hold good: “zweifellos [‘bleibt’] noch eine große 
rezeptionsgeschichtliche ‘Dunkelziffer’ aufzudecken” (509n., §106). 
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their conceptual foundations in rhetoric and drama; Goffman (whom 
Blumenberg mentions in addition to Simmel, “Annäherung” 418) stresses that 
“issues dealt with by stage-craft and […] management are […] quite general; 
they seem to occur everywhere in social life” (26). This accent on the arts 
involved is further elucidated in the ensuing: 
Audiences tend to accept the self projected by the […] performer during any current 
performance […] of his social establishment. Audiences also accept the […] particular 
performance as evidence of his capacity to perform the routine and even as evidence of his 
capacity to perform any routine. (Goffman 235)128 
While their respective virtuosity will vary (and tend toward concealment or 
blatancy proportionally), oratorico-contextual ‘selves’ (diverse personae, or 
particular éthe, crafted and projected with regard to, and in, a given setting) are 
always ‘products’ in fact (involving a form of ‘poiein’, ‘facere’)—even (and 
especially) where they may yield the impression of being ‘natural produce’.129 
|| 
128 See Blumenberg: “Die ‘Zustimmung’ die das Ziel jeder ‘Überredung’ (sogar der 
Selbstüberredung) sein muß, ist die in allen Situationen gefährdete und immer neu zu 
sichernde Kongruenz von Rollenbewußtsein und Rollenerwartung seitens der anderen. […] Im 
Grunde kommt es darauf an, keinen Widerspruch zu finden, sowohl im internen Sinne der 
Konsistenz als auch im externen Sinne der Hinnahme. Rhetorik ist nicht nur ein System, um 
Mandate zum Handeln zu werben, sondern um eine sich formierende und formierte 
Selbstauffassung bei sich selbst und vor anderen durchzusetzen und zu verteidigen” 
(“Annäherung” 418). There may seem to be an affinity with the Aristotelian notion of rhetorical 
‘ethos’, in the above (cf. e.g. Rhetoric 16–19, 1356a, I.ii.3–7; 90–91, 1366a, I.ix.1; 168–171, 1377b–
1378a, II.i.1–7; 254–255, 1390a, II.xiii.16; 262–265, 1391b, II.xviii.1–3; 378–381, 1408a, III.vii.6–7; 
446–447, 1417a, III.xvi.8–9; with Dionysius “Lysias” 60–61, §19). Rhetorically, ‘apt’ (always) 
signifies ‘situationally advantageous’; for further references, see Mayfield (“Interplay” 18n.; 
21n.). Cf. Evans: “dialectic and rhetoric […] are activities which […] involve other actual people 
[…] success is achieved when one has secured the agreement of a particular opponent. To 
secure this agreement one must produce a sense of conviction, but one must produce it in a 
particular person […]. Pure logic is not concerned with the vagaries of the individual’s 
reaction” (74–75). On “the central concept of rhetoric”, the scholar logs: “what is persuasive is 
[…] persuasive to someone”; “the persuasive and the apparent syllogism, […] the province of 
rhetoric and dialectic, are […] relative concepts. The persuasive must persuade someone […] 
this element of relativity […] characterises all the concepts in ethics and dialectic” (76). Cf. 
Ptassek: “So überzeugt auch der Logos […] nicht voraussetzungslos: Glaubwürdiges ist immer 
nur in bezug auf bestimmte Adressaten glaubwürdig und damit vom Ethos abhängig” (66). 
129 The (technical) question being “wie der Verfasser es ‘macht’ – denn daß er es ‘macht’, 
steht fest” (Blumenberg Literatur 74; infinitized). Like the Ancients, Early Modern writers were 
aware of the ‘poiein’ entailed in “the maker or poet” (Puttenham 234, III.5; cf. 323, III.19). 
Boriaud/Schouler refer to ‘personae’ “as rhetorical creation[s]” (798; trans. dsm). Avoiding 
metaphysico-substantialist, organicist construals (tacitly) underwriting a considerable number 
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Pertinently signaling the device’s artful instrumentality, Hellwig refers to 
“ἠθοποιία” qua “Kunstmittel” (270).130 In its very make, the Greek compound 
|| 
of positions on ethopoiía, Kasprzyk expediently accentuates the constructive aspect: “all of 
Dio’s speech is used to characterize the speaker, as, according to the principles of ēthopoiia, 
words reflect ēthos, and this fact allows the orator to build his own ēthos” (527); said remark, 
spec. the latter, may be seen or taken to apply more universally. Cf. De Temmerman/Emde 
Boas: “In its broadest sense, this term [‘ēthopoiia’] refers to the construction (poiia) of ēthos in 
general, i.e. both direct and indirect characterization in all its forms” (“Intro.” 22). Bruss notes: 
“Ethopoeia, literally, ‘character making’ (ethos, ‘character’ + poiein, ‘to make’), is commonly 
described as dramatic characterization, which involves the fitting or plausible representation 
of a speaker’s (or other character’s) distinctive traits” (35). While the critic rejects this view as 
far as Dionysius is concerned (see the discussion of her take in subch. 4.1, herein), she also 
fails to render problematic the trans. as “character” (here); thereto, cf. subch. 3.1. The term 
‘ethos’ is frequently (or even typically) encountered in the vicinity of the verb ‘poiein’, 
including its various (participial, adjectival, nominal) derivatives (e.g. Aristotle Rhetoric 246, 
1388b, II.xii.1; 256, 1390b, II.xv.1; 262, 1391b, II.xviii.1; 288, 1395b, II.xxi.16; 446, 1417a, III.xvi.8; 
454, 1418a, III.xvii.8; with “Poetics” 48–50, 1449b–1450a, VI; 7, 1454a, XV); such will probably 
have conduced to the formation of the compound ‘ethopoiía’. In a decidedly ‘somatic’ (rather 
than rhetorico-virtual) context, a variant of the latter is found within the corpus of the ps.-
Aristotelian Problémata: “black bile […] has an affect [sic] on character [‘τὸ ἠθοποιὸς εἶναι’] 
([…] heat and cold are the greatest agents in our lives for the making of character [‘ἠθοποιὸν’]), 
just like wine according as it is mixed in our body in greater or less quantity it makes our 
dispositions of a particular kind [‘ποιεῖ τὸ ἦθος ποιούς τινας ἡμᾶς’]” (“Problems II” 168–169, 
955a, XXX.1). Cf. and contrast Bruss, who speaks thereof as “this early reference to ethopoeia” 
(34n.); in a contextual, functional analysis, such an equation between expressly somatic and 
entechnic (or virtual) uses of the term will not be tenable. Even so, the above is also of import 
in that a short paragraph on ‘héxis’ follows immediately afterward, testifying to a (notionally) 
customary nexus thereof with ethos (de re): “Why is it that in some branches of knowledge we 
say that we have a habit [‘ἕξιν’], and in others not? Are we said to have a habit [‘ἕξιν’] in respect 
of those branches of knowledge in which we make discoveries [‘εὑρετικοί’]? For discovery [‘τὸ 
(…) εὑρίσκειν’] depends on habit [‘ἕξεως’]” (“Problems II” 168–169, 955b, XXX.2). 
130 As to the crafting of a (representative) ethos, contrast Foucault’s Idealist construal, which 
deprioritizes rhetoric (as generally; cf. “Author” 193; Hermeneutics 381–386; Courage 13–14), 
restricts the technique’s functionality (rendering it descriptively inexpedient): “As an element 
of self-training, writing has, to use an expression that one finds in Plutarch, an ethopoietic 
function: it is an agent of the transformation of truth into ēthos” (“Self Writing” 209). In his 
lectures, Foucault defines “‘ethopoetic’ knowledge (savoir)” as “knowledge which provides or 
forms ēthos” (Hermeneutics 238) qua “the subject’s mode of being” (Hermeneutics 238): “the 
subject’s way of doing things” is “his ethos. The Greeks had a very interesting word, which can 
be found in Plutarch as well as in Denys [sc. Dionysius] of Halicarnassus. It exists in the form of 
a noun, verb, and adjective. It is the expression, or series of expressions, of words: ēthopoiein, 
ēthopoiia, ēthopoios. Ēthopoiein means making ēthos, producing ēthos, changing, transforming 
ēthos, the individual’s way of being, his mode of existence. Ēthopoios is something that 
possesses the quality of transforming an individual’s mode of being. […] We will keep more or 
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might be taken as a most precise taxonomic condensation of Aristotelian 
‘entechnicity’ (see Rhetoric 14–15, 1355b, I.ii.2). 
 In Antiquity, one encounters this rhetorico-theatrical view of, and approach 
to, the concept of personae in the Roman arch-orator, who (among other uses) 
employs it for a lawyer’s arguing in utramque partem—here as an anticipatory 
technique for tentatively taking the perspective of the other (forensic) parties 
implicated.131 With a view to describing the virtual and vicarious procedure of 
|| 
less to the meaning found in Plutarch […]: producing ēthos, forming ēthos (ēthopoiein); capable 
of forming ēthos (ēthopoios); formation of ēthos (Ēthopoiia)” (Hermeneutics 237). In so doing, he 
(underhandedly) reverses the diachronic, conceptual, and (above all) discursive dependencies. 
Foucault notes: “In Denys of Halicarnassus, the word ēthopoiia is found in the sense of a 
painting of mores […]. In Plutarch, however, the practical meaning is present […] 153b” 
(Hermeneutics 245n.). He thus dismisses out of hand the reference to the rhetorico-literary 
scholar (see Dionysius “Lysias” 32–35, §8; as well as subch. 4.1, herein)—hence to the téchne 
the latter represents professionally. Foucault’s notion of the general term in question—inserted 
into the sequence “the management techniques, […] the morality, the ēthos, the practice of the 
self” (“Freedom” 298)—is (almost) entirely philosophical sensu stricto (i.e. in terms of the scope 
allowed, the tendency presupposed, and his tacit omissions): “Alētheia becomes ēthos. It is a 
process of the intensification of subjectivity” (“Technologies” 239; cf. “Freedom” 293); “ēthos 
was a way of being and of behavior […] for the subject, along with a certain way of acting, a 
way visible to others. A person’s ēthos was evident in his clothing, appearance, gait, in the 
calm with which he responded to every event, and so on. […] extensive work by the self on the 
self is required for this practice of freedom to take shape in an ēthos that is good, beautiful, 
honorable, estimable, memorable, and exemplary” (“Freedom” 286; cf. “subject and truth”, 
289). On the contrary, any variant of ethos involves a kind of adaptation (to communal mores, 
prevalent customs, cultural habits). In its more actively ‘poietic’ (crafty) forms with a view to 
an always (already) alter-related (‘conative’, to adopt Jakobson’s term, 67) self-representation, 
it includes (seemingly) taking up and tying in with, or (plausibly) impersonating common 
values, estimates, views generally held (humoring the narcissism of the recipients)—since such 
will seem utile in a given situation. An impression expedient under the spec. circumstances 
(expressive of, conforming to, communal assumptions) is crafted and projected to produce 
effects of recognizability and familiarity, and conduce to yielding (the appearance of) a 
(temporary) consensus. This approach presupposes that audiences will usually be susceptible 
of socio-moral (sc. gregarious) phenomena (ostensively) concerned with their self-interests. 
131 Cf. Skinner: “Cicero’s immensely influential analysis centres around the term persona, […] 
the mask that actors wore in the ancient theatre to indicate what roles they had assumed. 
When I speak or act for others, Cicero suggests, it is as if I put on their mask, in consequence of 
which I may be said to ‘bear’ or ‘sustain’ their person—to play their part, to act in their name” 
(“Representation” 161); “just as we may be said to have many officia or duties to perform, so we 
may be said to have many personae or roles to play” (“Representation” 162; 180n.). On 
‘argument (always) also on the other side(s)’, see Mayfield (“Interplay” 15n.–16n.; “Otherwise” 
passim). Cf. Moos: “Die Argumentationskunst, deren Beherrschung im Streit Erfolg […] 
verspricht, beruht auf der Kenntnis oder geistigen Präsenz aller möglichen Gesichtspunkte für 
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preparing for a lawsuit, Cicero has ‘Antonius’ state that, his client having 
“departed, in my own person and with perfect impartiality I play three 
characters, myself, my opponent and the arbitrator [‘Itaque cum ille discessit, 
tres personas unus sustineo summa animi aequitate, meam, adversarii, 
iudicis’]” (De Orat. I–II. 274–275, II.xxiv.102).132 Comparably, Quintilian counsels 
that a prospective orator learn roleplay from drama: 
|| 
und wider einen Gedanken, […] in der Ausbildung eines […] allseitigen Problembewußtseins”; 
“in Ermanglung eines Opponenten”, one may “mit sich selbst einen fiktiven Disput […] führen” 
(253, §63; cf. 410, §88). He notes “den experimentellen Dialog als Denkform […] das eristische 
Als ob in der Wissensbildung […] die hypothetische Ernstfall-Simulation […] ‘Denken in 
Alternativen’” (253–254, §63; cf. 290–291, 290n., §70). Moos logs the nexus with the 
“praeexercitamina” (“der von der Spätantike bis zur frühen Neuzeit konstanten 
Progymnasmata-Praxis”): “Die Methode, aus Fiktionen aller Art, insbesondere aus fiktiven 
Konfliktsituationen denken und reden zu lernen, gehörte längst vor ihrer hochmittelalterlichen 
Blüte und Expansion […] zu den Grundpfeilern des mittelalterlichen Bildungswesens, das im 
wesentlichen dasjenige der spätantiken Rhetorenschule fortsetzte. […] dazu [‘gehörten’] auch 
Prosopopoeien und Ethopoeien, erfundene Reden historischer Personen in denkwürdigen 
Entscheidungslagen (Suasorien in nuce)” (254, with 254n.–255n., §63; 256, 256n.). Cf. “Nicolaus 
[…] recommends practicing the exercise of ethopoeia in letter form, because one must take into 
account the character (êthos […]) of both the sender and the recipient of the letter” (Lanham 
“Composition” 121). “The link between ethopoeia-theory and real letters is made explicit by 
Cassiodorus” (“Composition” 122). With Macrobius, John of Salisbury defends “erfundene[…] 
Gespräche[…] mit historischen Dialogteilnehmern: d[ie] platonischen Dialoge[…], de[n] 
Somnium Scipionis und d[ie] Saturnalia” (406–407, §88; with 407n., plus the relevant rhetorical 
terms). See subch. 5.1, herein. For ‘hypothetical anticipation’ from a philosophical angle (with 
reference to rhetoric), cf. Oesterreich (Fundamentalrhet. 83, 83n.), who mentions Kant’s ch. on 
the “sensus communis” (Urteilskraft 173–177, B156–B161[293–296], §40, I.i.2; here 173); cf. these 
formulations: “sich in die Stelle jedes anderen versetzt” (Urteilskraft 174, B157[294], §40, I.i.2); 
“an der Stelle jedes anderen denken” qua “e r w e i t e r t e[…] Denkungsart” (Urteilskraft 
175, B158[294], §40, I.i.2); “aus einem a l l g e m e i n e n  S t a n d p u n k t e  (den er 
dadurch nur bestimmen kann, daß er sich in den Standpunkt anderer versetzt) über sein 
eigenes Urteil reflektier[en]” (Urteilskraft 176, B159[295], §40, I.i.2). Lobsien reads the 
conclusion of the essayist’s “Des Cannibales” (“Je parlai à l’un d’eux fort longtemps”, Essais I. 
410, I.31) as a sermocinatio: “Hier spricht, mit anderen Worten, Montaigne durch die persona 
des Besuchers aus der Neuen Welt. […] [er] spielt den anderen” (136; “Bauchrednerisch”, 137); 
cf. Wells (251; 254; 258–260). In other words, (the vicariousness constitutive of) ventriloquism 
conduces to notional anticipation, (virtual) perspective-taking: “The exercise [of ‘ethopoeia’] 
was […] devised to train the fledgling orator to put himself in his client’s place” (Altman 48). 
With regard to Early Modernity, said scholar states: “the student was taught to imagine himself 
in circumstances utterly unlike his own and to see with eyes other than his own” (45).  
132 Where the Latin has “personas” for all of the above (including the speaker’s), Rackham 
trans. “person” and “characters”; such may serve as an indication of the alterity faced, hence 
of the issues involved, in the present respect. Writing well before the (rhetorically inapplicable) 
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I think he [sc. Menander, the comic poet] has even more to contribute to declaimers, 
because they have […] to play many different roles [‘plures subire personas’]: fathers, 
sons; […] husbands; soldiers, farmers; rich men, poor men; the angry and the submissive; 
the gentle and the harsh. In all these, this poet preserves propriety [‘decor’] marvelously. 
(Inst. Orat. 9–10. 288–289, 10.1.71)133 
|| 
Idealist essentialization of the term, Hobbes can plausibly refer to all three as “Persons” when 
trans. Cicero (Leviathan 112, I.xvi.80). Generally, cf. Currie: “the split between patronus and 
cliens parallels that of laudator and laudandus in epinician (Greek oratory lacks a tradition of 
advocacy)” (312); where it factually obtains, said ‘gap’ may be bridged by techniques of 
(notional, anticipatory) virtual vicariousness; see the Hobbesian uptake below (with n.). Apart 
from the several layers of sermocinatio in effect at the above point, and throughout Cicero’s 
treatise (featuring various orationis personae as expedient, poly-perspectival mouthpieces), the 
spec. setting is fundamentally dramatic: while the defendant to be is still present (hence for his 
benefit), ‘Antonius’ (or Cicero) initially impersonates the client’s (putative) forensic antagonist, 
in anticipation of the court case proper (cf. De Orat. I–II. 272–275, II.xxiv.102; on the speaker 
and context, 270–271, II.xxiii.97–98). For a variant of the above setup in Cicero, see Volkmann 
(280, I.i.28); cf. Oesterreich (“Polypersonalität” 78). On the diverse uses of the term “persona” 
in Cicero (including the above passage as the first cited), see Nédoncelle, listing (at least) seven 
(297–298). Oesterreich states: “Gemäß seiner theatralischen Ursprungsbedeutung und ihrer 
spezifisch rhetorischen Fortentwicklung versteht Cicero unter ‘Persona’ in Analogie zur Maske 
des Schauspielers zunächst die jeweilige ‘Rolle’, welche der Redner zu verkörpern hat, um auf 
den öffentlichen Foren der res publica erfolgreich agieren zu können. Von daher erschließt sich 
sein Personbegriff vornehmlich aus der Perspektive der glaubwürdigen Selbstinszenierung des 
Orators inmitten der öffentlich-politischen Lebenswelt. Dieses […] auf die res publica bezogene 
römische Persona-Modell basiert auf einem durch das Decorum geregelten topischen Rollen-
Repertoire, welches sich aus den Standardsituationen der politischen und gerichtlichen Rede, 
der Ämterlaufbahn und den Amtspflichten der staatlichen Behörden ergibt. Dementsprechend 
widmet sich die römische Redekunst […] der artifiziellen Professionalisierung rednerischer 
Persondarstellung. […] So schenkt der […] Übungsbetrieb innerhalb seiner Suasorien und 
Kontroversien der Prosopopoiie […] besondere Aufmerksamkeit. Die Kunst der rhetorischen 
Persondarstellung wird hier durch die […] Simulation […] trainiert” (“Polypersonalität” 77). 
Oesterreich’s trying to square the latter with “Subjektivitätsphilosophie” (“Polypersonalität” 
84) is fundamentally anti-rhetorical, and descriptively untenable—in that he consistently 
presupposes ‘the self’ (to be crafted first of all): the typical move of any Cartesianizing slant. 
133 Cf. Russell (Criticism 10). Altman accentuates: “The cross-fertilization between drama and 
oratory is everywhere apparent” (49n.). “In the […] rhetorical treatises of Cicero and Quintilian, 
examples of ethopoeia are often drawn from the tragic or comic actor, and the orator is urged to 
imitate the stage performer” (48–49). For nuances concerning the nexus of rhetoric and drama, 
see Quintilian (Inst. Orat. 3–5. 490–491, 5.13.43), with Eden (“Refutation” 68). Quintilian refers 
to “Theophrastus” as “say[ing] that reading the poets is very useful for the orator”—and affirms 
this also with respect to ethos and the prépon (“ab his […] in personis decor petitur”, Inst. Orat. 
9–10. 266–267, 10.1.27). On the import of the aptum in oratory, see Eden (“Lit. Property” 33–37), 
spec. “to prepon designates the chief excellence of style that Cicero will translate as decorum 
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That comedy can conduce to a feckful rhetorical ‘(auto-)impersonation’ (or 
‘characterization’)—the redescribing (or crafting) and conveying of ‘selves’ (or 
éthe) likely to be plausible and advantageous in a given context—had also been 
indicated by Cicero, who accentuates that orators might learn from performers 
how to pick and play roles in keeping with their (tempo-corporal) capacities: 
we should not let actors [‘scaenici’] display more practical wisdom [‘prudentiae’] than we 
have. They select, not the best [‘non optimas’] plays [‘fabulas’], but the ones best suited to 
their talents [‘sibi accommodatissimas’]. (De Officiis 116–117, I.xxxi.114)134 
The ever requisite, particularly active and attentive acclimatization to contexts 
(hence the inevitable pluralization of roles) also includes the respective 
speaker’s elemental aptitudes. Moreover, all relevant terms are in the plural: the 
givens and contexts being contingent, many parts will be played. 
|| 
[…] and that rhetoricians from antiquity through to the eighteenth century will consider the 
single most important standard of literary composition” (“Lit. Property” 35). Oesterreich notes 
the “vom Theater und der Rednerbühne auf das gesamte menschliche Leben übertragene, 
maßgebliche Ordnungsprinzip des Decorum” (“Polypersonalität” 77). 
134 Cicero continues: “Those who rely most upon the quality of their voice [‘voce’] take the 
Epigoni and the Medus; those who place more stress upon the action [‘gestu’] choose the 
Melanippa and the Clytaemnestra […]. Shall a player [‘histrio’] have regard to this in choosing 
his rôle upon the stage [‘in scaena’], and a wise man fail to do so in selecting his part in life [‘in 
vita’]” (De Officiis 116–117, I.xxxi.114). Noting a nexus with pronuntiatio—“[t]o perform a speech 
was to interpret it as the expression of a character in a drama” (314)—Christiansen refers to “the 
acting of plays as a preparation for oratory” (314). The scholar stresses actio throughout, and in 
a comprehensive sense: “The holistic practice of rhetoric in the schools […] suggests that the 
principles of delivery apply to all discourse […]; that delivery is not an expendable appendage 
of rhetoric, since all texts, both arguments and dramas, are embedded in a larger social drama” 
(318). On the Ciceronian theory of the four personae, see Fuhrmann’s reading (“Persona” 97–
102), with spec. reference to the above: “Das Ganze der ciceronischen Darlegungen sucht den 
Einzelnen zur richtigen Rollenwahl und zum richten Rollenverhalten anzuleiten. Der Autor 
illustriert diese Absicht durch einen Vergleich aus der Sphäre des Theaters (1, 114)” (“Persona” 
99–100). Generally, cf. Gill (“Personhood” passim; “Particulars” passim); Reiss (127–129), cum 
grano salis. Eden sees “Cicero’s De officiis” as “the most popular ancient philosophical text in 
early modern Europe” (“Acclaim” 51–52). As to the “anthropologischen Polypersonalismus 
Ciceros”, cf. Oesterreich (“Polypersonalität” 76–81; here: 76; spec. also: “die […] rhetorikaffine 
und pluralistische Vier-Personen-Lehre”, 77); the critic does not seem to appreciate (see spec. 
“Polypersonalität” 79) that the Ancient writer’s arguing Stoico-ethically in De Officiis (hence 
along the lines, and as per the limits, of moral philosophy) is fundamentally at variance with a 
‘technico-rhetorically affine’ view—the overall ars being supra-discursive, polyfunctional and 
transpersonal (sc. generally ‘impartial’, prior to particularization or ‘finitization’). 
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 In the seventeenth century, Hobbes emphatically takes up the Ancient 
implications of the term at issue—in a chapter entitled “Of PERSONS, AUTHORS, 
and things Personated” (Leviathan 111, I.xvi.80).135 His succinct remarks might be 
taken to reflect the Early Modern view more generally: 
The word Person is latine: insteed whereof the Greeks have πρόσωπον, which signifies 
Face, as Persona in latine signifies the disguise, or outward appearance of a man, 
counterfeited on the Stage; and sometimes more particularly that part of it, which 
disguiseth the face, as a Mask or Visard: And from the Stage, hath been translated to any 
Representer of speech and action, as well in Tribunalls, as Theaters. So that a Person, is 
the same that an Actor is, both on the Stage and in common Conversation; and to 
Personate, is to Act, or Represent himselfe, or an other; and he that acteth another, is said 
to beare his Person, or act in his name. (Leviathan 112, I.xvi.80–81)136 
|| 
135 Hobbes’ (legal) view of authorship (and delegation) follows shortly after: “Of Persons 
Artificiall, some have their words and actions Owned by those whom they represent. And then 
the Person is the Actor; and he that owneth his words and actions, is the AUTHOR: In which case 
the Actor acteth by Authority” (Leviathan 112, I.xvi.81). 
136 See also Greenblatt (“Psychoanalysis” 221–223), albeit in a highly problematic context: if 
ideology may be described as a critic’s holding on to his mindset—qua normalized system of 
‘seeing’ and ‘speaking’—even (or especially) when facing a blatant alterity, the twist in the tail 
of Greenblatt’s article will hardly prove surprising. The critic refers to the abovecited segment, 
glossing: “in Hobbes the ‘natural person’ originates in the ‘artificial person’—the mask, the 
character on a stage […]. There is no layer deeper, more authentic, than theatrical self-
representation. This conception of the self does not deny the importance of the body […] 
authority is vested in an artificial person who represents the words and actions of the entire 
nation. All men therefore are impersonators of themselves […]. A great mask allows one to own 
as one’s own face another mask. […] for Hobbes there is no person, no coherent, enduring 
identity, beneath the mask; strip away the theatrical role and you reach either a chaos of 
unformed desire that must be tamed to ensure survival[,] or a dangerous assembly of free 
thoughts […] that must—again to ensure survival—remain unspoken. Identity is only possible 
as a mask, something constructed and assumed […]. In his conception of a person as a 
theatrical mask secured by authority, Hobbes seems far closer than Freud to the world of 
Shakespeare” (“Psychoanalysis” 222–223). With this segment—and irrespective of his attempt 
at salvage by making the case a matter of degree (cf. “closer”), rather than of inapplicability—
the critic not only confutes the (declared) historicity and (descriptive) pertinence of his 
argument in said article, but also any of the (essentialist) claims with regard to what Greenblatt 
calls ‘self-fashioning’ (for a discussion thereof, see subch. 4.2, herein). Immediately after said 
auto-refutation, the critic continues in applying his terminology (and the latter’s implications) 
to Early Modern times: “identity”, “identity is fashioned”, “the prepsychoanalytic fashioning of 
the proprietary rights to selfhood” (“Psychoanalysis” 223); as well as the finalistic “notion that 
psychoanalysis is the historical outcome of certain characteristic Renaissance strategies” 
(“Psychoanalysis” 224). Contrast Bjørnstad, who—calling “for methodological sobriety” (5)—
wishes “to complicate a story often too hastily told, […] that of a linear development towards 
modern authorial consciousness and selfhood” (12). As regards (tacit) essentialisms, the often 
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The vicarious aspect is underscored in that Hobbes proceeds to cite Cicero’s 
line: “Unus sustineo tres Personas; Mei, Adversarii, & Judicis, I beare three 
Persons; my own, my Adversaries, and the Judges” (Leviathan 112, I.xvi.80).137 In 
reference thereto, Skinner confirms: “invoking the theatrical understanding of 
the issue that Cicero had […] put into currency […] this originally theatrical 
terminology was eventually generalised” (“Representation” 168; cf. “Persons” 
160)—the sources being Greek, of course. A general awareness as to the 
rhetorico-dramatic, forensico-pragmatic concept in question appears to have 
been prevalent throughout Early Modern times; applied to the present, it may 
seem akin to what tends to be called a ‘(personal, public, corporate) image’.138 
 Being explicit in the first part of the Greek compound ‘prosopopoiía’, the 
Ancient and Early Modern, rhetorico-dramatic concept of ‘personae’ is 
indispensable to the present study and the phenomena described, since—as 
Quintilian observes (see Inst. Orat. 9–10. 50–51, 9.2.32)—it is always de re 
|| 
concomitant (hence symptomatic) recourses to teleological construals pertain to the problem. 
137 See Cicero (De Orat. I–II. 274–275, II.xxiv.102; with Nédoncelle 297); it is notable what 
Hobbes excludes from the quote. On vicariousness with regard to the above, see Trüstedt 
(“Novelle” 547–553; passim), spec. “Der Leviathan is ein Theater besonderer Art, in dem die 
Vertretbarkeit konstitutiv für jeden Agenten ist” (“Novelle” 551). 
138 Cf. “Auch dort, wo sich der Begriff P[ersona] dem heutigen Verständnis der 
‘Persönlichkeit’ nähert, indem er mehr die konstanten Eigenschaften eines Menschen als ihre 
gesellschaftliche Rolle meint, bleibt er von der Außenperspektive der sozialen Wahrnehmung 
bestimmt: Er weist dann auf das mehr oder weniger fixierte Bild, das sich die Gesellschaft von 
dem Einzelnen aufgrund wiederkehrender Verhaltensmerkmale macht, und entspricht somit 
etwa dem modernen ‘Image’” (Boriaud/Schouler 805); mutatis mutandis, this description 
would also seem applicable to the Ancient use of ‘ethos’. For the basis of Modern sociology in 
the aforesaid respect, see Simmel (if prepared to quarantine any Idealist implications): “Das 
‘Spielen einer Rolle’ […] als das Einströmen des persönlichen Lebens in eine Äußerungsform, 
die es als eine irgendwie vorbestehende, vorgezeichnete vorfindet – dies gehört zu den 
Funktionen, die unser tatsächliches Leben konstituieren” (79); “meistens sehen wir eine 
präexistierende Form vor uns, die wir mit unserem individuellen Verhalten erfüllt haben” (80); 
“daß der Mensch ein vorgezeichnetes Anderes […] darlebe oder darstelle, damit aber dennoch 
sein eigenes Sein nicht schlechthin verläßt, sondern das Andere mit diesem Sein selbst erfüllt 
[…] – das ist die Vorform der Schauspielkunst […]. In eben dieser Bedeutung sind wir alle 
irgendwie Schauspieler” (80); “wir tun nicht nur Dinge, zu denen die Kultur und 
Schicksalsschläge uns äußerlich veranlassen, sondern wir stellen unvermeidlich etwas dar, 
was wir nicht eigentlich sind. Das ist freilich nicht, oder nicht immer, Darstellung nach außen 
um eines Effektes willen” (79). “Der Schauspieler ist nicht die Marionette der Rolle. […] Die 
schauspielerische Kunstleistung ist selbst das Ziel des Weges und nicht eine Brücke, über die 
hin es zu einem weiterhin gelegenen Ziel ginge” (78–79). “Schauspielen ist keine reproduktive 
Kunst […]. Reproduktiv ist ein Schauspieler, der einen anderen kopiert” (81). “Das Sein hat auf 
der Bühne nichts zu suchen”—“Being has no place on the stage” (77; trans. dsm). 
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implied in any form of rhetorical ventriloquism (regardless of the specific 
taxonomies respectively utilized). At once, ‘putting words into one’s own 
mouth’ (so to speak) will be conducive to selfcraft and -portrayal (the producing 
and projecting of personae and corresponding éthe).139 
 Emphasizing the plane of application, the issues delineated in the above are 
to be taken up in part 4—where the facture involved in ‘ethos’ is described (4.1); 
and the focus on oratorico-dramatic selfcraft (‘auto-etho-poíesis’) is 
reaccentuated with a view to rhetorico-authorial self-representation (4.2). 
3.4 Taxonomico-Conceptual Synopsis (Subchapters 3.1–3.3) 
in verbis summa diligentia[.] 
Quintilian (Inst. Orat. 3–5. 276, 4.2.117) 
While frequently reduced to elocutio, rhetoric comprises neither one of its partes 
only; nor is the overall téchne tantamount to a partisan (‘ideologically’ 
inflected) form of expression.140 Its various diachronic artes conduce to a 
respective approach to, and view of, the world. The oratorico-dramatic term 
‘persona’ evinces such a conceptually sedimented tendency pars pro toto. As 
Quintilian notes, its prevalence extends to all forms of rhetorical ventriloquism: 
“for we cannot of course imagine a speech except as the speech of a person” 
|| 
139 Generally speaking, the instantial “say” (Lanham “Composition” 125) might be said to 
signal an auto-sermocinatio. The intratextual ‘Epictetus’—typically taken to be “speak[ing] in 
propria persona” (Dobbin 126)—makes copious use of (auto-)allocutiones in his diatribes, which 
are utilized in a virtually dia-, but factually monologic setting, and functionalized with a view 
to preemptive reprehensio; cf. e.g. “Epictetus, we”, and so forth—“Then it would be my part to 
say: ‘Men[’]” etc. (Disc. I. 20–21, I.9.12 and 16). Montaigne talks to himself (and thus to his 
readers) by way of (auto-)sermocinationes: “When I have been told, or have told myself” 
(Essays 667, III.5)—then follow several sentences or phrases put into the mouth of others (and 
his own); inter alia: “‘You are too thick in figures of speech. […] Here is a dangerous phrase’ […] 
‘Yes’, I say” etc. (Essays 667, III.5); generally as to the latter, see Eden (“Montaigne on Style” 
392); cf. the scholar’s reference to “Montaigne’s pointed accusations of these unnamed 
adversaries” (Rhet. Tradition 102). On said technique, see the samples in subch. 5.1, herein. 
140 Cf. Sprute: “Nach Aristoteles ist die Rhetorik eine Kunstlehre, die wie u.a. die Dialektik in 
moralischer Hinsicht neutral ist. Die Möglichkeit moralischer Qualifizierung ergibt sich für 
Aristoteles erst bei der Anwendung der an sich wertneutralen Technik” (281; 281n.; with 
Rhetoric 12–15, 1355b, I.i.13–14, I.ii.1). See Niehues-Pröbsting: “Rhetorik wurde im Lauf ihrer 
Geschichte immer mehr auf Stilistik reduziert” (“Glauben” 25); with Oesterreich, noting Kant’s 
(characteristic) ‘reductionism’ (Fundamentalrhet. 98–99). See Mayfield (“Interplay” 4n.–6n.). 
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(Inst. Orat. 9–10. 51, 9.2.32).141 Said concept permeates the various rhetorico-
poetic planes, pertaining to the auctor as much as to the protagonists into 
whose mouths words (or silences) are being put.142 
 The ensuing taxonomic synopsis recapitulates the terms tentatively 
advanced, provisionally described, and applicatively utilized—taking as its 
initial guideline their (etymologico-)linguistic implications in the respective 
compounds and transliterations.143 As always, scholarship is in the nuance. 
|| 
141 See Sidney: “But heereto is replyed, that the Poets gyue names to men they write of, which 
argueth a conceite of an actuall truth, and so, not being true, prooues a falshood. And doth the 
Lawyer lye then, when vnder the names of Iohn a stile and Iohn a noakes [sc. ‘John atte stile’, 
‘John atten Oke’, de re equivalent to ‘John Doe’, ‘John Roe’] hee puts his case? But that is easily 
answered. Theyr naming of men is but to make theyr picture more liuely, and not to builde any 
historie; paynting men, they cannot leaue men namelesse. We see we cannot play at Chesse 
but that wee must giue names to our Chesse-men; and yet, mee thinks, hee were a very partiall 
Champion of truth that would say we lyed for giuing a peece of wood the reuerend title of a 
Bishop. The Poet nameth Cyrus or Aeneas no other way then to shewe what men of theyr fames, 
fortunes, and estates should doe” (185–186; 394n.; cf. Trimpi Muses 33n.; generally: 32, 34n.). 
142 On conveying ethos via prohaíresis, see Mansfield: “Machiavelli remarks in Discourses II 
10 that Livy indicates his opinion by failing to mention something when one would expect him 
to mention that thing; it is possible, then, for an author to contrive a pregnant silence […][, 
which] consists in an obvious answer to a suggested question that one must have the sense to 
ask oneself” (Modes 10). Cf. “‘Zu den redenden Künsten gehört die schweigende’. Jean Paul” 
(Nietzsche KSA 7. 693, 29[142]; with 707, 29[186]). Blumenberg: “Ein Schweigen, eine sichtbare 
Unterlassung in einem Verhaltenskontext können so rhetorisch werden wie ein vom Blatt 
abgelesener Aufschrei” (“Annäherung” 407); see his reference to “die implikative, rhetorisch 
verschwiegene Voraussetzung” (Sorge 216). As Bakhtin notes, there are “various forms of 
silence” (Speech 149); cf. his modifying the dictum “Things fraught with the word” (Speech 162; 
“Methodology” 66) qua “fraught with the word and the potential word. The ‘unsaid’ as a 
shifting boundary” (Speech 163; “Methodology” 67). On ethopoiía by way of silence, see the 
remarks on Plato in subch. 5.2; as well as Gomperz: “Mitunter charakterisiert sich eine Figur 
durch das, was sie verschweigt, nicht viel weniger als durch das, was sie ausspricht” (Griech. 
Denker I. 421). Cf. Carey: “For the projection of ethos what is unsaid may be as important as 
what is said” (“Rhet. means” 38). He stresses omissiveness as an ethopoetic tactic—considering 
its (implicit) recourse to playing by the “tacitly accepted norms […] of decorum”: “in practice 
this etiquette allowed a speaker credit for good moral character by refusing, implicitly or 
explicitly, to call a spade a spade. […] The result is a sustained presentation of the speaker as a 
man who will not stoop to describe vile behaviour, and the effect is to create a rapport between 
speaker and audience and [a] commensurate gulf between audience and opponent” (“Rhet. 
means” 38). While a resp. “silence may become explicit” (“Rhet. means” 38), the opposite 
might be just as expedient (as the case may be); for a potential use of ‘digressions’ qua 
functional with a view to ‘obscuring’ matters ‘omitted’, see Carey (“Comment.” 117). 
143 To accommodate the synoptic aims of the present précis, further references are given as 
expedient. Cf. Priscian’s concise summa: “Impersonation [‘A d l o c u t i o’] is the imitation of 
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 The Rhetorica ad Herennium (subchapter 3.1) offers the term ‘effictio’ (also 
called ‘charakterismós’) for the device of vividly sketching and strikingly 
portraying primarily a persona’s exterior (usually sans attributed utterances)—
with a discernible nexus to theatrical practice, especially comedy (and farce).144 
Accordingly, quasi-equivalents of this concept appear in Cicero and Quintilian 
as ‘imitatio’ (‘mímesis’), including advice against effecting affinities with mime 
(stressing the proximity ex negativo). 
The term ‘notatio’ (otherwise ‘ethopoiía’) denotes an evocative, verbal 
(re)description and likely (re)presentation (that is to say, the crafting and 
projecting) of a persona’s familiar, habitual, characteristic marks (‘notable’ 
traits)—including, and especially, via attributed speech acts—thereby to render 
a complex (and contextually relevant, hence) ethopoetic portrait.145 
|| 
speech [‘imitatio sermonis’] accommodated to imaginary situations and persons [‘ad mores et 
suppositas personas accommodata’] […]. This becomes personification [‘c o n f o r m a t i o 
(…), quam Graeci προσωποποιίαν nominant’] […] when the speaker is given a personality 
contrary to its true nature [‘quando rei alicui contra naturam datur persona loquendi’] […]. 
There is also another part of this kind of figure [‘Est praeterea s i m u l a c r i  f a c t i o , 
quam Graeci εἰδωλοποιίαν dicunt’], when words are put in the mouths of the dead [‘quando 
mortuis verba dantur’] […]. Speeches of impersonation [‘adlocutiones’] can be addressed either 
to particular persons [‘finitarum (…) personarum’] or to indefinite [‘infinitarum’] ones; an 
example of a speech to an indefinite person would be the use of the kind of speech anyone 
might address to his family […]. There are simple forms of impersonation [‘Adlocutionum’], as 
when one creates a speech as though he were speaking to himself [‘supponitur aliquis ipse per 
se loquens’]; and […] double impersonations, as though he were speaking to others. […]. 
Always […] be careful to preserve the character of the persons and times being imagined 
[‘Ubique autem servanda est proprietas personarum et temporum’]” (“Fundamentals” 64, §9; 
“praeexercitamina” 557–558, §9, ‘de adlocutione’). “Always […] adhere to a style suited to the 
imaginary speaker” (“Fundamentals” 65, §9; cf. López Grigera 95–96; 157, 157n.). See Baldwin’s 
overview (Medieval Rhet. 303–305), giving “sermocinatio” as “direct discourse”; “effictio” as 
“portrait”; “notatio” as “ethopœia”; “conformatio” as “prosopopœia” (Medieval Rhet. 305). 
144 Cf. “Effictio, or portrayal, is concerned with the externals” (McDonald 45). Quintilian calls 
this ‘ethopoiía’ (Inst. Orat. 9–10. 68, 9.2.58), which may lead to confusion. The apparent 
volatility of terms is often due to the set of problems inevitably incurred in translations: lacking 
equivalents in the target language; rendering of only one connotation pertaining to the term in 
the emitting context; more or less etymological, as opposed to rather liberal renderings; etc. 
145 Cf. Isidore: “We call that figure ethopoeia, in which we achieve the expression of a man’s 
character [‘in qua hominis personam fingimus pro exprimendis affectibus’], age, interests 
[‘studii’], rank [‘fortunae’], pleasures, sex, habits [sic, misreading ‘moris’; Halm’s ed. has: 
‘maeroris’, sc. sorrows, griefs], courage. […] In this type of speaking these points must always 
be borne in mind: Who is speaking? In whose presence? About what? Where? When? [‘quis 
loquatur et aput quem et de quo et ubi et quo tempore’]” (“Concerning Rhet.” 95, XIV.1–2; “de 
arte rhet.” 514–515, XIV; cf. Baldwin Medieval Rhet. 97; Lanham “Composition” 121; 130). 
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With a view to describing cases of extraordinary and vehement passions, 
later theoreticians would coin ‘pathopoeia’ as a complementary term.146 
|| 
Isidore adds a short definition later: “E t h o p o e i a est, cum sermonem ex aliena persona 
inducimus” (“de arte rhet.” 520–521, XXI.32, instancing Cicero); it is preceded by 
“P a r r h e s i a” (“oratio libertatis”, “de arte rhet.” 520, XXI.31), followed by “E n a r g i a” 
(“rerum gestarum aut quasi gestarum sub oculis inductio”, “de arte rhet.” 521, XXI.33). 
146 Distinguishing between ethos and páthos—cf. “Adiciunt quidam ἦθος perpetuum, πάθος 
temporale esse” (Quintilian Inst. Orat. 6–8. 48, 6.2.10)—Emporius adds pathopoiía: “Although 
impersonation [‘a d l o c u t i o’] is not the whole substance of the orator’s duty, still it is a 
major part of the material and is necessary in the preparation of all the material. Attitudes 
[‘Adfectus’] are […] essential to all orations, and major attention must be given to the art of 
reproducing [‘imitandi’] them. Some there are who call this use of material ethopoeia, because 
it brings out [‘effingat’] the character [‘ethos’] or the emotional state [‘adfectum’] of the 
speaker” (“Ethopoeia” 33; “de ethopoeia” 561); “we should express in every phrase the life-
style [‘mores’] of him whose words are being created [‘cuius verba fingenda sunt’]. […] this kind 
of impersonation [‘adlocutionis’] […] is called ethopoeia. Pathopoeia is also valuable, being an 
extension of ethos. Through it we also imitate those attitudes [‘adfectum’] which are not 
natural, but are cultivated [‘incidentem’]. […] Some accident of mood [‘affectus’] often 
undermines one’s natural approach to life [‘morem’] […] when a passing mood is predominant 
[‘cum incurrens praeponderabit adfectus’], then the process of imitation is called pathopoeia, 
although the native [‘ingeneratus’] character [‘adfectus’] is not completely eliminated still” 
(“Ethopoeia” 34; “de ethopoeia” 562). Iulius Rufinianus defines “Παθοποιία” thus: “Hac vel 
odium vel iracundia vel misericordia commovetur” (47, §36). Cf. Nicolaus: “Some ethopoeias 
are ethical, some pathetical, some mixed” (165, §10.64); “ethopoeia is speech suiting the 
proposed situations, showing ethos or pathos or both […] it is necessary to take account of the 
speaker and the one to whom he is speaking […] one looks either to the universal or to what 
came from the circumstance […] this is how ethos differs from pathos” (164, §10.64). Cf. 
Peacham’s definitions of prosopopoeia, sermocinatio, mimesis, pathopoeia. He gives 
“Proſopeia” as “the fayning of a perſon, that is, when to a thing ſenceleſſe or dumme, wee 
fayne a fit perſõ, this figure Orators vſe as well as Poets,an Oratoure by this figure maketh the 
common welth to ſpeake […] and ſometime they rayſe as it were the deade agayne,and cauſe 
them to complayne or to witneſſe that they knewe […] and it is not only vſed of Poets and 
Orators,but alſo in holy ſcriptures” (O.iij.r). “Sermocinatio” is “when we fayne a perſon and 
make him ſpeake much or little, according to comelineſſe,very like to that before,whẽ the 
perſon which we fayne,ſpeaketh al him ſelfe, then is it Proſopeia,but when we anſwere now and 
then to the queſtyon,which he putteth vnto vs,it is called Sermocinatio,in this figure wyſedome 
and warineſſe muſt be vſed,that the ſpeech may be agreeable,for the perſon that is fayned,and 
that it be no otherwiſe, then is lykely the ſame perſon woulde vſe […] Therefore in this place,it 
behoueth vs dilligently to conſider the circumſtaunces,both of persons,and thinges” (O.iiij.v; 
cf. Skinner Forensic 206; 258). Peacham adds: “Poets and Oratoures, haue alwayes bene 
dilligent in obſeruing a comelyneſſe” (O.iiij.r). “Mimiſis” ensues, defined as “an immitation of 
ſpeech, wherby we counterfeit not only what one ſayd,but alſo vtteraunce and 
geſture,immitating euery thing as it was […],ſeruing to the purpoſe.To rehearce a wiſe mans 
words,and to immitate his modeſt mãners,cauſeth great attentiueneſſe,and bringeth much 
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The term ‘notatio’ is related to ‘sermocinatio’ (otherwise ‘dialogismós’, 
‘allocutio’)—denoting the rhetorical expedient of ‘putting speech into someone’s 
mouth (in accordance with his received or conceivable ethos)’. This connects 
the device to drama and all dialogic genres.147 The concept of ‘distributio’ may be 
considered affine (in that it indicates the allocation of roles); and similarly 
subiectio (hypophorá), which (deliberatively) anticipates an opponent’s 
probable rejoinders or objections. 
Lastly, the Rhetorica ad Herennium tenders the term ‘conformatio’ 
(otherwise ‘prosopopoiía’), which signifies the ‘fabrication’ of personae from 
non-(respectively no-longer-)human entities or notional abstract(ion)s—often 
(but not necessarily) including likely speech and action on their part.148 
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delectation to the hearers,for a cunning Orator will make a wyſe mans tale appeare very pithy 
and pleaſant” (O.iiij.r). Finally, “Pathopeia” is “when the Oratoure mooueth the mindes of his 
hearers […] of this there be two kynds,the fyrſt is when the Oratour being moued with [certain 
‘vehement’][…] affections […] doth apply and bend his ſpeeche, to ſtirre his hearers to the ſame 
[…] this kynde is called immaginatiõ […]. The other is, when the Oratour by lamenting ſome 
pittiful caſe,maketh his hearers to weepe,and alſo mooueth them to pittye, and mercy” (P.iij.r). 
As Vickers notes, the term “pathopoeia”—defined as “‘a form of speech whereby the Speaker 
moves the minds of his hearers to some vehemency of affection[’]” (Defence 331)—was also 
taken up by “John Smith” in “The Mysterie of Rhetorique Unvail’d (1657) […], which had ten 
editions by 1721” (Defence 330). On ‘páthos’ and ‘ethos’ (the latter with reference to ‘schésis’ 
and ‘héxis’), cf. Scaliger (83, III.i; cf. 104, s.v. “MORES”, III.xx; also 122, III.xxxiii). With 
recourse to Quintilian, see Dockhorn (“Kritische Rhet.?” 268–270). Cf. Lausberg (Handbuch 
141–144, §257). On the “distinction” between “ethos and pathos”, see McDonald (50–53; here 
53), who gives this as having “an important effect upon the form and dynamics of all Stuart 
tragedy” (53); and “as of central significance in interpreting both the classical and Renaissance 
construction […] and critical evaluation of drama” (83; cf. 86). 
147 Cf. Bruss: “Arguably, all ethopoetic activity can be understood as dramatic, for all forms of 
ethopoeia involve scripting words for another character” (56; the critic’s context is generally 
problematic: see subch. 4.1, herein). The nexus of ‘charactercraft’ with playwrighting will be in 
the vicarious, as well as the decidedly ‘poietic’, aspect. 
148 Raising (‘re-forming’) the dead (in that state) to speech (acts) is sometimes referred to as 
‘eidolopoiía’. Cf. “Ethopoeia (êthopoiia) is an imitation of the character of a person supposed to 
be speaking; for example, what words Andromache might say to Hector. It is called 
personification (prosôpopoiia) when we personify a thing, like Elenchus (Disproof) in 
Menander and as in Aristeides’ speech where ‘The Sea’ addresses the Athenians. The difference 
is clear: in ethopoeia we imagine words for a real person, in prosopopoeia we imagine a non-
existing person. They say it is image-making (eidolopoiia) when we attribute words to the 
dead” (Hermogenes 84, §9.20; cf. Bonner Declamation 150; Baldwin Medieval Rhet. 34; Murphy 
“Habit” 67–68). Kennedy notes that, as to when the deceased “are imagined as coming back to 
life […][,] Sopatros claimed this was ethopoeia rather than eidolopoeia since the speakers were 
represented as alive. The best example of eidolopoeia in ancient oratory is probably Cicero’s 
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 Quintilian (subchapter 3.2) condenses the range of concepts referring to 
ventriloquistic practices. He employs ‘prosopopoeia’ (loan translated ‘fictio 
personae’) as the general and comprehensive term, wherein he expressly 
encompasses ‘sermocinatio’ (respectively ‘adlocutio’, qua ‘attributing speech’), 
seeing that ‘prósopa’ (personae) are inevitably (if latently) involved in all forms 
and variants of rhetorical ventriloquism. Quintilian’s decision seems to signal 
his general accent in that matter—apparently deprioritizing ‘sermo’ and ‘ethos’, 
here; or rather (and more likely), considering them comprised in the term 
‘persona’ (see subchapter 3.3, as well as the overall chapter 4, herein). 
 In a semiotic respect, the aforesaid terms signal aspects of the oratorico-
ventriloquistic phenomena under scrutiny, while none yields the entire range of 
nuances—this being one reason for their diversity, and their continuing 
utility.149 Rather than adhering to the (often highly thetical) language regime of 
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evocation of the ghost of Appius Claudius Caecus in Pro Caelio 33–34; speeches by ghosts occur 
in Greek and Latin tragedy” (Hermogenes 85n.). Along these lines, the speaking specter of 
Hamlet the Elder (Shakespeare Hamlet 215–221, I.v.1–91; cf. 192–197, I.iii.189–258) would 
(metapoetically) be an eidolopoiía; de re, the second part of this compound is stressed in the 
verses: “If it assume my noble father’s person” (Hamlet 196, I.iii.244); “Thou com’st in such a 
questionable shape / That I will speak to thee. I’ll call thee Hamlet” (Hamlet 211, I.iv.43–44)—
with a naming process that ‘personifies’ the phenomenon. Initially, it does not speak, as 
Horatio reports: “But answer made it none. Yet once methought / It lifted up it [sc. its] head 
and did address / Itself to motion like as it would speak” (Hamlet 194, I.ii.215–217); also with 
Hamlet, at first: “It will not speak. Then I will follow it” (Hamlet 213, I.iv.63). Cf. Plett: “The 
ghosts of deceased persons are […] a favourite element in dramas of the Senecan type […] – like 
the ghost of the murdered king in Hamlet” (Culture 288). As to eidolopoiía with a view to 
Senecan and English Renaissance drama, see McDonald (45; 121n.; 129–130, 132; 150; 212). 
149 A (quasi) etymological approach is discernible in Aphthonius; he spec. accentuates the 
dominant ‘crafting’ involved: “Ethopoeia (êthopoiia) is imitation of the character of a proposed 
speaker. There are three different forms of it: apparition-making (eidôlopoiia), personification 
(prosôpopoiia), and characterization (êthopoiia). Ethopoeia has a known person as a speaker 
and only invents the characterization, which is why it is called ‘character-making’; for 
example, […] Heracles is known, but we invent the character in which he speaks. In the case of 
eidolopoeia[,] the speaker is a known person, but dead and no longer able to speak […]. In the 
case of prosopopoeia, everything is invented, both character and speaker, as Menander 
invented Elenchos (Disproof); for elenchos is a thing, not a person at all; which is why this is 
called ‘person-making’” (“Exercises” 115–116, §11.34R–45); cf. Altman (48; 49n.). The focus on 
the reception (“known”) as the decisive gauge is of central import, here (as elsewhere in 
rhetoric qua ‘poetics of effect’). See Kennedy’s assessment of the above passage: “Aphthonius 
thinks of ethos in Aristotelian terms as the presentation of moral character by a speaker 
through words and arguments. There are three species: eidolopoeia is a speech attributed to the 
ghost of a known person […]; prosōpopoeia, the term used […] by Aphthonius to mean 
personification of an imaginary or mythological character; and ēthopoeia in the narrow sense 
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one theoretician only, the present study purposes to tie in with and employ the 
extant taxonomies de re—in their descriptive signifying potentials, including a 
scholarly regard for etymological implications and notional affinities. 
 As a specifically pertinent instance in said respect, ‘ethopoiía’ thus refers to 
the contextual (socio-moral) concept of ‘ethos’.150 The latter is dependably 
associated with the dramatico-rhetorical term contained in ‘prosopopoiía’. 
Conjointly, they imply that the speaker, who places words into the mouth of a 
certain (historico-)rhetorical ‘persona’, effectually crafts “their characteristic 
diction” (Lausberg Elemente 143, §432; trans. dsm)—again foregrounding 
ethos.151 The focus in ‘sermocinatio’ will be on its first part (qua ‘speech, words, 
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of personification of a historical character” (New History 205–206). The latter will seem 
problematic (certainly de re); while frequently encountered with respect to the concept of 
‘ethos’, the qualifying adjective “moral” is infelicitous, since it evinces an almost inevitable 
tendency to be misleading. Cf. also Devries’ concise summa: “following Aphthonius, we may 
define ἠθοποιία as the portrayal of the character of a known and living being, εἰδωλοποιία as 
the dramatic representation of a known but dead person, and προσωποποιία as the 
personification of a person or object entirely fictitious and non-existent” (9); as well as his 
more detailed outline: “Ethopoiia is dramatic delineation of character, especially as displayed 
in speeches written for court by a logographer, who has studied and depicted in the thought, 
language and synthesis of the oration, the personality of the client who delivers the speech. It 
differs from προσωποποιία, or personification, in that the latter is the feigned speech of an 
absent party, or of and inanimate object treated as a person. […] εἰδωλοποιία […] is dramatic 
representation of the dead” (9). Contrast Süss (217). Given its misleading connotations, a use of 
the term “personality” will be problematic, in this context. Unlike Aphthonius’ accent, Devries’ 
choice of the words “delineation”, “displayed”, “depicted”, does not seem to sufficiently stress 
the craft involved; but the critic does signal the latter in the ensuing formulation: “The 
practical value of ethopoiia as a tool in the oratorical workshop was as a means of persuasion” 
(12; cf. 13). M. Morgan also gives “ἠθοποιία” as “delineation of character” (“Intro.” xxx, §27; cf. 
xxxv, §31; “XXXII. Intro.” 156). Such may seem to deprioritize the art entailed, which may 
conduce to problematic presuppositions concerning a speaker’s (extratextual) ‘person’ being 
rendered in quasi-mimetic terms, as in M. Morgan’s construal: “His method was to study his 
client’s character quite as carefully as his client’s case, and to bring out that character in 
speech which he put into the client’s mouth […] by suiting the speech to the speaker” (“Intro.” 
xxx, §26; cf. xxix). Consistency is a (rhetorico-linguistically induced) effect, and conduces to 
the impression of a ‘character’, which is a product, and of art. While Devries appears to 
proceed from a ‘mimeticist’ assumption, he does note the possibility of craft: “When his life 
affords no opportunity for this method of treatment, Lysias himself makes up such a character 
for his client” (14); cf. M. Morgan’s uptake (“Intro.” xxxi, §27); he also observes “characters so 
clearly and successfully drawn that they are […] real to the reader” (“Intro.” xxxii, §28). 
150 See the detailed n. in subchs. 3.3 and 4.1, herein. 
151 This also explains why it might be termed ‘mímesis’ or ‘imitatio’. Cf. Lausberg (Handbuch 
408, §820–822): “sermocinatio […] allocutio […] ἠθοποιία […] ist eine einer Person zum Zwecke 
ihrer Charakterisierung in den Mund gelegte ausgearbeitete Rede über einen beliebigen 
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discourse’)—an aspect usually implicit (to various degrees) in other 
nomenclatures. The term entails what the English (para)phrase (‘putting words 
into someone’s mouth’) also highlights—while simultaneously implying a 
(quasi) dramatic dynamization of voices (qua ‘conversation’, dialogismós).152 
Like allocutio (a taxonomic variant stressing the directedness of said process by 
way of the prefix ‘ad’), the term ‘ventriloquism’ contains another Latin word for 
‘speaking’ (‘loqui’); the latter uses a physical potential figuratively, in order to 
describe the techniques at hand.153 On the whole, a heuristic value may be seen 
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Gegenstand. Es kommt darauf an, das dem Charakter und der Stimmung der betreffenden 
Person entsprechende πρέπον […] zu treffen […]. Die ἠθοποιία dient eigentlich der Zeichnung 
des ἦθος, der dauernden Gemütsverfassung […]. Darüber hinaus aber kann auch […][ein] πάθος 
[…] [der] betroffenen Person gezeichnet werden. […] Die ἠθοποιία wird von der προσωποποιία 
[…] unterschieden, die unpersönlichen Dingen eine Rede in den Mund legt […]. Die εἰδωλοποιία 
[…] legt Verstorbenen als Verstorbenen eine Rede in den Mund” (Handbuch 543, §1131–1132)—
the qualification (“als Verstorbenen”) being significant. 
152 Emphasizing its dynamic implications (here), ‘sermocinatio’ typically refers to a dialogic 
situation—cf. the Greek term ‘dialogismós’; the latter is still used in several derivations: 
Lausberg mentions French “dialogisme”, English “dialogism”, Italian and Spanish 
“dialogismo”, each with different shades of meaning (Elemente 143n.). Such a ‘Zwiegespräch’ 
(to use the pertinent German loan trans.) may also take place with(in) oneself—this being Iulius 
Rufinianus’ take on ‘dialogismós’ (43–44, §20). Puttenham defines “dialogismus, or the Right 
Reasoner” (321, III.19) as follows: “We are sometimes occasioned […] to report some speech 
from another man’s mouth […], in which report we must always give to every person his fit and 
natural, and that which best becometh him” (320, III.19). The emphasis is on the ‘conferring’ 
involved; in other words: it is to sound plausibly like him or her to the given recipient—which 
need not necessarily be how what is reported factually took place (if it did). Frequently, the 
“report” will be fabricated entirely, e.g. “Vergil, speaking in the person of Aeneas” (320, III.19). 
While not using the term, Puttenham also subsumes what would amount to eidolopoiía under 
this figure: “if by way of fiction we will seem to speak in another man’s person, as if King Henry 
VIII were alive, and should say” etc. (320, III.19). Wigham’s/Rebhorn’s gloss ad locum seems 
insufficient (omitting the term adduced last), spec. in that they comment: “Why Puttenham 
translates the figure as ‘the Right Reasoner’ is obscure” (320n.). Knowledge of the tradition, 
especially the progymnasmata (which they also fail to mention in this respect), dispels the only 
ostensive issue: dialogismós (resp. sermocinatio) is particularly useful for the deliberative 
genus, and the corresponding declamatory exercises (suasoriae), which display a process of 
‘reasoning’ in a dramatico-dialogic manner (also as virtually multipurpose and -part 
soliloquies). Generally, see Moos on “den experimentellen Dialog als Denkform” (253, §63; cf. 
254, 256, 256n.). With regard to “suasoria”, Bonner notes that “the purpose of that exercise” is 
“to train the speaker in deliberative oratory”: “the object of a suasoria was ‘consilium dare’” 
(Declamation 53). Cf. Plett on “Dialogismus” in Puttenham (Culture 286n.). Perelman/Olbrechts-
Tyteca wish to distinguish “the fictitious attribution of words to a person (sermocinatio) or to a 
group of persons engaged in conversation (dialogism)” (New Rhetoric 176, §42; cf. 176n.). 
153 At the linguistico-formal level, the very signifier ‘allocutio’ may (incidentally) be 
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to inhere in all of these concepts.154 A comparable use and prevalence may be 
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refunctionalized for exemplifying (in a quasi-performative manner) the accommodative 
assimilation de re involved in its signifieds. Quintilian (cf. Inst. Orat. 9–10. 54, 9.2.37) has the 
unassimilated rendering; as do Consultus Fortunatianus (125, III.8), Emporius (“de ethopoeia” 
561–562), and Priscian (“praeexercitamina” 557–558, §9); in Halm’s ed., Iulius Victor has both 
variants (“adlocutionem”, 422, XV); the anon. “Schemata Dianoeas” have “alloquimur”, for 
instance (“schemata dianoeas” 71, §1). Scaliger uses the forms “alloquutiones”, “alloquimur”, 
“alloquutiones” (126, III.xlviii). Cf. the etymology of ‘ventriloquism’, defined as the “art of 
throwing one’s voice so that it seems to come from some source other than the speaker. 1797, 
formed as a descriptive noun to ventriloquist […] the word has generally replaced the older 
ventriloquy […]. 1584, formed from Late Latin ventriloquus […] ([…] venter […] + loqui […]) […] 
patterned on Greek engastrímȳthos, literally, speaking in the belly” (Barnhart/Steinmetz 1198, 
s.v. ‘ventriloquism’); cf. “speaking so that the sound appears to come from somewhere other 
than the speaker” (Onions et al. 974, s.v. ‘ventriloquy’). For the figurative use, see the ensuing 
definition (the second s.v.): ‘ventriloquism’, “the expression of one’s views and attitudes 
through another / especially […] such expression by a writer through a fictional character or 
literary persona” (Merriam-Webster “ventriloquism”). Generally, cf. Hodkinson’s formulation 
(infinitized): “characters are ventriloquized by the author of […] mimetic dialogues” (556). 
154 Nominally, Harvey uses said metaphor in her resp. volume (Voices passim), taking it spec. 
qua “male appropriations of the femine voice”—hence “transvestite ventriloquism” (Voices 1; 
cf. 4; 11; 12; 13; 32; 50–53; 118; 133), “accentuat[ing] the issues of gender, voice, and authorial 
property” (Voices 1). She has these variants (inter alia): “ventriloquistic cross-dressing” (Voices 
2); “ventriloquizations” (Voices 5; 7; cf. 6, 141); “ventriloquizers” (Voices 9); “ventriloquized” 
(Voices 8; 9; 10; 11; cf. 13); “[v]entriloquizing” (Voices 9; cf. 116–139); “strategies of 
ventriloquism” (Voices 7; cf. 10; 11; 12)—plus a nexus with vicariousness: “Ventriloquism […] is 
a […] strategy of silencing, of speaking on behalf of another, of disrupting the boundaries of a 
propertied utterance” (Voices 142). Having mentioned the term “persona” and its ‘utility’ (cf. 
“useful”), Harvey discards it for being “neither historicized nor gendered as a theory” (Voices 
3). She allows that “[w]e can no longer assume that the authorial ‘voice’ resides in the text to 
which a particular signature is affixed, or that a text is the same for different readers, or that 
there is a clear correlation between the gender of a body and the gender of a text” (Voices 5). 
Fueling—sans defusing (save by assertiveness: “our construal of transvestite ventriloquism […] 
will nevertheless be contingent upon the intersection of three factors: gender, property, and 
the author”, Voices 12)—the objections to her take, Harvey declares: “the various authorial and 
cultural voices that inhabit these texts […] undermine the illusory sense of closure and stability 
sometimes attributed to them. In this respect, ventriloquism and intertextuality overlap” and 
“destabilize[…] questions of origin, authorship, and ownership; an intertextual allusion opens 
a text to other voices and echoes of other texts, just as ventriloquism multiplies authorial 
voices” (Voices 10). It may not seem sufficiently clear how Harvey’s thesis might square with 
that last sentence; or this: “Ventriloquistic cross-dressing […] transgresses the laws of gender, 
propriety, and property by undermining in a fundamental way the conventional relationships 
between author and voice, making visible in the process the radical contingency of poetic and 
authorial voice” (Voices 134; cf. “Sappho” 98). Enterline speaks of “ventriloquizing” (Body 3)—
or derivatives (cf. e.g. Body 11; 20–21; 40; 87; 89–90; 181–183; 187; 195–197; “Shakespeare’s 
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noted for the oratorico-theatrical concept of ‘prósopon’ (persona)—being present 
(if latently) in all variants of the rhetorical attribution or ascription of speech (as 
Quintilian accentuates, Inst. Orat. 9–10. 50, 9.2.32). 
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ventriloquism”, 197; 224)—spec. by recourse to Ovid: “the poet who developed the art of female 
complaint in the Heroides into its own influential genre also gives us a narrator in the 
Metamorphoses who constantly engages in acts of ventriloquism” (Body 11; cf. 3: “Ovid’s 
penchant for ventriloquizing female voices”; 21, 40, 89; Schoolroom 79–80; 87–88); he “honed 
his art of transgendered prosopopoeia” (Body 21); his “trademark habit of ventriloquizing 
female voices – a rhetorical technique Quintilian calls prosopopoeia” (Body 40; 238n. refers to 
the orator, but sans discussion of the term, while her entire study is based thereon; cf. 48–49, 
87). Enterline equates said concepts passim; together with an insistent essential- and biologism 
(plus psychoanalytical positivism), this leads to taxonomic construals such as “transgendered 
prosopopoeiae” (Body 40; cf. 87–88, 226). The critic’s idea of ‘ventriloquism’ (which takes up 
Harvey’s, see Enterline Body 233n.–234n.; 238n.) is substantialist, reductive (presupposing a 
historical author’s biological sexuality, deeming it present in virtual narrators, etc.), hence 
unrhetorical; more pertinent formulations (“efficient fictions for producing a convincing effect 
of gendered identity”) remain incidental (cf. “femininity effect”, Body 201). Enterline confesses 
to her essentialism outright: “It will be clear by now that throughout this book I view the voice 
as embodied” (Body 22)—apparently taking the term “ventriloquism” (also given as “the […] act 
of ‘lending a tongue’”, Body 21) literally, instead of describing its factual virtuality; as a result, 
her claims to an entechnic take (cf. “the […] rhetorical practice of ventriloquism”) will be void 
(Body 87; 164, 182, 195; they culminate in this contradiction in terms: “a psychoanalytic and 
historical account of the poem’s rhetorical practice”, 185). Cf. further essentialist jargon, such 
as the critic’s construal of “early modern representations of the self”, “subjectivity” (Body 2; cf. 
164; “authorial subjectivity”, 55; 168, 180; “the subjects”, 61; “the self”, 93; 94, 164–165, 168; 
“identity”, 164)—presupposing, mono-lateralizing the latter (hence unable to describe a factual 
pluralism). While dealing with semioticized artifacts, Enterline premises a perceived author’s 
somatic status: “male authors took Ovid’s poetry as the locus classicus for their attempts to 
speak in or through the voices of women” (Body 21; referring also to Shakespeare). Such a slant 
inevitably leads to self-made contradictions: “part of the problem for clearly identifying the 
author-ventriloquist as ‘male’ is that this act of supplying a mute woman with a voice involves 
some form of identification with the victim” (Body 182; cf. 196–197). On the contrary, the 
vicarious taking of other perspectives is a technically transpersonal potentiality. As a result of 
her essentialist, anti-pluralistic presuppositions—precluding reciprocities and multilateralism 
as even conceivable—the critic spirits away the recipient’s position, decisive participation in 
the processes of perusal, appresentation. In general, functional (re)readings would be requisite 
throughout (spec. at Body 182). When, in the conclusion to her ch. on Shakespeare’s “Lucrece”, 
the critic incidentally arrives at descriptively pertinent, pluralistic formulations (cf. “several 
acts of lending a tongue […] multiple […] overlapping […] various voices”, Body 197), it seems to 
be malgré soi—her positivistico-biologistic, psychoanalytico-essentialist jargon and premises 
being in the way. In her later monograph, Enterline’s affective bias produces the ensuing 
density of value judgments: “acts of poetic ventriloquism, in this [sc. Early Modern] period, 
could be at once profoundly moving and deeply enigmatic; and they therefore testify to the 
heuristic pallor of the term persona” (Schoolroom 29). 
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 On the agorá and stage alike, the techniques in question are related to the 
forensically provisionary, deliberative practice of arguing ‘also on the other 
side(s) of a given question’ (“in utramque partem vel in plures”, Quintilian Inst. 
Orat. 3–5. 156, 3.11.2).155 With an anticipatory function (for instance), a speaker 
may vicariously adopt the viewpoint of his adversary—or any alter—and 
virtually simulate potential conduct or statements, in order to be prepared for 
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155 It is also of import during the officium of inventio. Cf. Cicero: “mihi semper 
Peripateticorum Academiaeque consuetudo de omnibus rebus in contrarias partes disserendi 
[…] quod esset ea maxima dicendi exercitatio; qua princeps usus est Aristoteles, deinde eum 
qui secuti sunt” (Tusc. Disp. 154, II.iii.9)—stressing “consuetudo”, “usus”, the ‘habitualized’ 
praxis of in utramque partem; “discussing both sides of every question […] because I found it 
gave the best practice in oratory” (Tusc. Disp. 155, II.iii.9). The ensuing offers an overview of the 
phenomenon’s pervasiveness, particularly in rhetorical contexts. Cicero puts these words in 
Crassus’ mouth: “we must argue every question on both sides [‘disputandumque de omni re in 
contrarias partes’], and bring out [‘eliciendum atque dicendum’] on every topic [‘in quaque re’] 
whatever points can be deemed plausible [‘quod probabile videri possit’]” (De Orat. I–II. 108–
109, I.xxxiv.158). Cf. the reference to “debates [‘disputationes’] allowing copious [‘copiose’] 
arguments to be advanced both pro and contra [‘in utramque partem disseri’] in regard to the 
general question [‘de universo genere’]” (“De Orat. III” 84–85, III.xxvii.107); “we orators are 
bound to possess the intelligence [‘animos’], capacity [‘et vim’] and skill [‘et artem’] to speak 
both pro and contra [‘in utramque partem dicendi’]” on virtually anything (“De Orat. III” 85–87, 
III.xxvii.107); also translingually (Cicero to Atticus)—“disserens in utramque partem tum 
Graece tum Latine”—and linked to utility: “et τῶν προὔργου τι delibero” (Atticus III. 28, §173.3, 
IX.4). Apart from the above, Quintilian also uses these formulations (inter alia): “in utramque 
partem valent arma facundiae” (Inst. Orat. 1–2. 374, 2.16.10); “in utramque partem tractantur” 
(Inst. Orat. 3–5. 40, 3.5.5); cf. (embedded): “in utraque parte […] probari” (Inst. Orat. 3–5. 500, 
5.14.1); “cogitare […] quid ex diverso dici possit” (Inst. Orat. 3–5. 490, 5.13.44); hence: “A good 
teacher [‘bonus praeceptor’] ought in fact to praise a pupil just as much for having a smart idea 
[‘acriter excogitavit’] for the opposite side [‘pro diversa’] as for having one for his own [‘sua 
parte’]” (Inst. Orat. 3–5. 490–491, 5.13.44). Generally, see Lausberg (Handbuch 51, §55; 62, §69). 
Sloane describes “a rhetorical cast of mind […] [as] an insistence that one get down to cases, 
and – above all – a lawyerly willingness to argue both sides of a question” (“Education” 164; 
cf. 172)—stressing “Ciceronian and humanist disputatio in utramque partem” (“Education” 165): 
“The ancient alliance of rhetoric and two-sided argument is historically unmistakable” 
(“Education” 165). He notes: “even in the advisory suasoria[,] when no opponent is manifest[,] 
the speaker must still refute unspoken objections in his hearers’ minds – and rhetorical 
education trained him to do that by training him to play his own opponent’s role, requiring him 
to give voice to those objections through arguing the other side of the case in a dissuasoria. 
This centrality of disputatio in utramque partem is made abundantly clear by Quintilian” 
(“Education” 167); “rhetorical inventio […] relies […] on generating arguments with one eye on 
the opposition[; a]nd, in educational practice, on actually developing ideas on both sides of the 
question” (“Education” 174). Generally, see Mayfield (“Otherwise” passim). 
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the actual situation.156 The aforequoted Ciceronian locus classicus is decisive, in 
this respect (“tres personas unus sustineo summa animi aequitate, meam, 
adversarii, iudicis”, De Orat. I–II. 274–275, II.xxiv.102).157 Curtius stresses the 
applicability of this praxis in educational settings: “The student puts himself in 
the place of any well-known [or: familiar] persona[…] of the past[,] and 
deliberates the course of action” (78, §4.3; trans. dsm).158 Such and similar 
taking of perspectives—respectively the (virtual) crafting or adopting of 
personae—as occurs in the various forms of rhetorical ventriloquism marks a 
practice of vicariousness (notional activity by proxy) that decisively links 
rhetoric and drama, while also highlighting a nexus with (predominantly) 
diegetic genres (such as historiography). Within the present study, the 
applicative part 5 (and specifically subchapter 5.2) tenders a diachronic and 
poly-perspectivally comparatiste diversity of variants in said respects. 
 To conclude this synopsis, the ensuing descriptions—which Lausberg 
distills and formulates by recourse to assorted rhetorical traditions (and strands 
thereof)—may prove expedient: 
|| 
156 Cf. “Die Anwalt-Rolle in der declamatio ist bereits der erste Schritt auf dem Wege zur 
ἠθοποιία = sermocinatio […]. Die Konkretisierung der sermocinatio erfolgt dadurch, daß der 
Übende nicht als Anwalt, sondern als Prozeßführender, der sein eigener Anwalt ist, spricht” 
(Lausberg Handbuch 548, §1147)—causing a pluralization of perspectives (potentially, virtually, 
vicariously) taken (serially, quasi-simultaneously). Ottmers/Klotz give ‘Sermocinatio’—“in 
welcher der Redner vorgibt, die Rede eines anderen wiederzugeben oder einen Dialog mit ihm 
zu führen”—a certain “Sonderstellung unter den kommunikativen und appellativen Figuren”, 
adding: “In der Sermocinatio kann freilich auch die Meinung eines anderen Sprechers oder der 
Gegenpartei Ausdruck finden, wenn der Redner einen anderen Redner wörtlich zitiert”; and 
stressing its Ancient function as “eine von der eigenen Meinung abweichende Position 
einzunehmen” (191). As to “argumentative hypothesis”, Perelman/Olbrechts-Tyteca log that 
the orator “imagines what the behavior and reactions of each […] would be in this fictitious 
situation [sc. which he ‘supposes hypothetically’] in order to deduce the correct behavior and 
reactions in the real situation” (New Rhetoric 146, §37; infinitized); referring to Ruyer, they link 
this to “utopia”, which “confronts reality with an imaginary presence” (New Rhetoric 146, §37). 
157 See Hobbes’ reception (Leviathan 112, I.xvi.80–81); cf. Skinner (“Representation” 162; 
168); generally, see Mayfield (“Interplay” 15n.–16n.); and subch. 3.3, herein. Cf. “the theme of 
the actor recurs in Cicero’s advice on appropriate styles […] Cicero seems to presuppose a 
degree of awareness of one’s own actions, and of other’s reactions, that assimilates social life 
to a theatrical performance” (Gill “Personhood” 194). 
158 In the absence of (reliable) records, and where featuring direct speech, historiography will 
be entailed; a writer may tentatively adopt the viewpoint of the (apparently) factual personae 
involved in a given setting—since, for instance, the (general) outcome is known (or has been 
ascertained to some degree of plausibility), while not the precise steps or process leading to it. 
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Serving for the characterization of natural (historical or fictional) person[ae], sermocinatio 
is the crafting [‘Fingierung’, hence also: simulation, fabrication] of statements, 
conversations [also: dialogs] and soliloquys or unstated notional reflections on the part of 
the respective person[ae][.] (Handbuch 407, §820; trans. dsm) 
In terms of content, sermocinatio need not be historically accurate [literally: true][;] it 
must only be ‘verisimilar [‘wahrscheinlich’, likely, probable, credible]’, i. e. [it must] 
especially correspond to the character of the speaking person[a] [envisioned]. (Handbuch 
408, §821; trans. dsm)159 
Ethopoeia as a literary exercise […] transitions into literary forgery without the possibility 
of drawing a line of demarcation. (Handbuch 549, §1150; trans. dsm)160 
|| 
159 “Neque enim refert an […] pro veri simili probabilem credibilemve dicamus” (Quintilian 
Inst. Orat. 3–5. 234, 4.2.31; cf. 244–249, 4.2.52–60). Cf. Mayfield (“Interplay” 10n.). 
160 As to what one might call epideictic logography (taking advantage of the virtual 
vicariousness and delegative potentials inherent in ventriloquistic techniques), see Volkmann: 
“Der Archidamus des Isokrates ist ein Product der Kunstberedsamkeit, eine Prosopopoeie, d. h. 
eine Rede, die nicht wirklich gehalten, sondern einer bestimmten Person in den Mund gelegt 
ist. Derartige Reden finden sich nun zahlreich bei den alten Historikern von Thucydides an, 
und sie sind […] nach denselben Kunstregeln gearbeitet, welche für die Anfertigung wirklicher 
Suasorien in Geltung waren. Solche Prosopopoeien wurden auch von bereits anerkannten 
Rednern vielfach zur Uebung angefertigt” (312, I.i.32). Blass (whose stance is hardly impartial) 
considers only the intratextual instance a variant of prosopopoiía: “Prosopopöie haben wir nur 
am Schluss des Archidamos; sonst überhaupt keine künstlichere Einführung von Reden 
Anderer, jenen unschuldigen Kunstgriff ausgenommen, dass er manchmal die in seiner Schule 
über eine Rede gepflogene Verhandlungen naiv erzählt und dabei manches sagen lässt, was er 
in eigener Person nichts sagen möchte” (Beredsamkeit II. 168; cf. 168n.); as to the latter, see 
subch. 5.1. The Isocratean passage in said speech for the Spartan is hedged: “if in imagination 
[‘ei tais dianoíais’] you could see your parents and your children standing, as it were, beside 
you” (“Archidamus” 410–411, §110). Generally as to the above, see Moos: “Wir werden immer 
in erster Linie fertige Ergebnisse der literarischen Praxis vergleichen müssen” (257, §63). Cf. 
Boriaud/Schouler: “Die Besonderheit der Chrie [chreía] ist es, historische Personen in die 
[rhetorischen] Vorübungen einzuführen. Diese Eigenschaft hat sie mit bestimmten Formen der 
Ethopoiie gemein. Es findet hier ein doppelter Prozeß statt: Das literarische Werk bereichert 
sich mit realen P[ersonae] der Geschichte, und die reale P[ersona] wird in die Welt der 
literarischen Schöpfung versetzt, wo sie sich inmitten rein fiktiver Ausführungen befindet” 
(793); see Moos (174–176, §48; 219, §59). Rhetorically, any persona and ethos crafted and 
projected will be an artful, ‘entechnic’ product. On ‘Diogenes’ in a comparable respect, cf. 
Mayfield (Artful 11–12; 19n.; 21; 30n.; 43; 57n.; 77; 309n.; passim; “Interplay” 21n.; “Talking 
Canines” 22; 23n.; 25; 27). As to “Biographies of saints” (“Vitae”), Lanham “think[s] it likely 
that” their “revision” (qua “stylistically […] rewritten, prefaced […] replaced”) “was also done 
as a school exercise to practice paraphrase, narrative, and ethopoeia” (“Instruction” 92–93). 
Generally, the Enlightenment took such and similar assumptions as a pretext for culling many 
(Ancient) anecdotes as ‘unhistorical’, claiming (e.g.) that the “Zuspitzung der Anekdote […] 
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Rhetorical personae or éthe may be—and are factually—crafted as well as 
disseminated. In an “[e]pideictic” context (“genus ostentationi compositum”), 
Quintilian likens the orator to “a sort of salesman of eloquence [‘institor quidam 
eloquentiae’] […] allow[ing] the customer to see [‘intuendum’] and almost 
handle [‘paene pertractandum’]” his rhetorical ‘produce’ (Inst. Orat. 6–8. 346–
347, 8.3.11).161 Such craftsmanship in the realm of momentaneous evidentia 
might be seen in connection with ethos: ‘selves sell’.162 
|| 
‘nur exercitii gratia von Sophisten aufgesetzt worden’ [ist]. Diese aus Übungsgründen 
Dokumente fingierenden Sophisten spielen in der Theorie der kritischen Reinigung der 
Tradition eine große Rolle” (Blumenberg “Sturz” 49; here as to Bayle). 
161 Cf. Martial: “vendere verba” (342, V.16.6). See Montaigne: “Étalé, il est à demi vendu”, 
“put on display, it is half sold” (Essais III. 345, III.x; Essays 783, III.10). Generally, Hacking 
notes: “advertising […] is largely engaged in trying to make up people” (236). 
162 In Gorgias, the “ἐγὼ” is mirrored phonetico-paronomastically in “γέγονεν” (754, 49.2). 
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4 Selling Selves. Variants of Rhetorical Selfcraft 
Pure self seems to me an illusion; but a plausible illusion[.]  
—Hollis (229; cf. 231) 
and many fine names beside. 
—Emerson (234) 
[a]nd words and dogmas are other masks[.] 
—Santayana (128; §30)163 
Aller Charakter ist erst R o l l e.  
Die ‘Persönlichkeit’ der Philosophen — im Grunde persona. 
—Nietzsche (KSA 11. 438, 34[57])164 
Philosophical discourse cannot be anything else than [a] mise en scène of self. 
—Kablitz (193; trans. dsm) 
|| 
163 Cf. “it is not urged against cuticles that they are not hearts; yet some philosophers seem to 
be angry with images for not being things” (Santayana 131, §32; with Goffman 7, in the fm; cf. 
64–65). See also Santayana’s various chs. on ‘masks’ (128–139, §31–33; 160, §38). The source of 
the above may (or will) be Nietzsche: “Jede Philosophie v e r b i r g t  auch eine […]; jede 
Meinung ist auch ein Versteck; jedes Wort auch eine Maske” (KSA 5. 234, IX, §289). 
164 “Any [or: Every] character is [a] r o l e [,] first [of all]. The ‘personality’ of the 
philosophers — persona at bottom” (KSA 11. 438, 34[57]; trans. dsm). Cf. comparable remarks 
(KSA 11. 577–578), spec. “Wir enthalten den E n t w u r f  zu vielen Personen in uns: der 
Dichter verräth sich in seinen Gestalten. Die Umstände bringen Eine Gestalt an uns heraus: 
wechseln die Umstände sehr, so sieht man an sich auch zwei, drei Gestalten. — Von jedem 
Augenblick unseres Lebens aus giebt es noch viele Möglichkeiten: der Zufall spielt i m m e r  
mit!” (KSA 11. 45, 25[20]); “Und wenn sich Einer tausend Male widerspricht und viele Wege geht 
und viele Masken trägt und in sich selber kein Ende und ‹keine› Horizontlinie findet” (KSA 11. 
656, 40[57]; with Mayfield Artful 341–345). Cf. this passage on the auto-partus of metaphysics 
by way of essentializing linguistics: “ein Gedanke kommt, wenn ‘er’ will, und nicht wenn ‘ich’ 
will; so dass es eine F ä l s c h u n g  des Thatbestandes ist, zu sagen: das Subjekt ‘ich’ ist 
die Bedingung des Prädikats ‘denke’. Es denkt: aber dass dies ‘es’ gerade jenes alte berühmte 
‘Ich’ sei, ist, milde geredet, nur eine Annahme, eine Behauptung, vor Allem keine 
‘unmittelbare Gewissheit’. Zuletzt ist es schon mit diesem ‘es denkt’ zu viel gethan: schon dies 
‘es’ enthält eine A u s l e g u n g  des Vorgangs und gehört nicht zum Vorgange selbst. Man 
schließt hier nach der grammatischen Gewohnheit ‘Denken ist eine Thätigkeit, zu jeder 
Thätigkeit gehört Einer, der thätig ist, folglich —’” (KSA 5. 31, I, §17). Contrast Ellrodt, who, as 
to Nietzsche (and his “admiration for […] Montaigne”), speaks of “the plurality of the self” (7; 
20n.), presupposing it (as throughout). For the philosopher’s reading of the essayist, see 
Kablitz: “Montaigne zählt zu jenen Autoren, die die Wertschätzung […] Nietzsches genossen” 
(144; with further references, 144n.–145n.); cf. Mayfield (Artful 95n.; 202n.; 380). 
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In the first motto, a critic may seem to be playing the monolithic language game 
intermittently en vogue since Akhenaton, Plato (with Parmenides passing for the 
latter), or Paul of Tarsus (to name but the more time-worn): the decisive phrase 
being “to me”; the advantage of the ‘illusory’ that there are so many of them.165 
 Otherwise, a pluralistic neo-Nominalism will be preferred, proceeding from 
Blumenberg: “While the names for this center of being [‘Daseinsmitte’] may well 
have changed – initially: image of God, imperishable soul, later: Reason, then: 
personality, finally: character, consciousness” (Literatur 101–102; trans. dsm)—
the terminological festivities are verily open-ended, with anyone free to bring 
their own concoctions; some time in the twentieth century, a critic apparently 
felt like home- or micro-brewing “Pure self”.166 
 Such wholesale will hardly seem all that noteworthy, save for his doing so 
in an article entitled “Of masks and men”—placed in a joint monograph on The 
category of the person (in Anthropology, philosophy, history), taking its cue from 
a seminal Maussian essay of 1938. Whereas the latter (as per its reception) will 
likely be deemed notable indeed, the most significant aspect of the volume it 
prompted nearly fifty years later may seem to be a prominent absence (not only 
in its title)—while clearly not all that conspicuous to its contributors.167 
 Even so, said latency does not appear to be out of the ordinary; in an article 
expressly on Ancient oratory indeed, one might still read: “Socrates represented 
so many and differing images to his contemporaries that modern scholars must 
|| 
165 Calling for a “reconsideration” of rhetorical “ethos”—in the process of which “selfhood, as 
a category, comes under question” (xvii)—Baumlin tenders this diachronic synopsis of an 
enduring state of affairs: “with a few striking exceptions, Western intellectual culture has 
tended to embrace the […] philosophical model of selfhood over the ‘social’, dramatistic, or 
rhetorical model. Western culture […] has largely identified itself with the tradition beginning 
with Plato […] and developed by Augustine, Aquinas, Descartes, Kant—all of whom treat the 
self as a moral, metaphysical, and ultimately, theological category (rather than as a function or 
effect of verbal behavior). An alternative, sociolinguistic model is only occasionally affirmed—
by Aristotle […], by the sophists Gorgias and Protagoras, by […] Machiavelli and Montaigne, by 
Nietzsche” (xviii); while “Western culture asserts the existence of the self as a philosophical 
category, its own literary and rhetorical practice confirms quite the opposite” (xx). 
166 Generally, Kablitz notes that the latter may be thought of as being replaced by language: 
“Philosophiehistorisch betrachtet läßt sich dieser Perspektivwechsel als eine Umbesetzung der 
Funktionsstelle beschreiben, die in der Kantschen episteme das Bewußtsein einnahm. An 
dessen Stelle tritt nun die Sprache” (117). As to the above, cf. Blumenberg: “Die Namen 
dirigieren uns” (Sorge 89; 91). “Die Tyrannei der Namen ist darin begründet, daß sie einen 
Ruch von Magie behalten haben: Umgang mit dem Unbegriffenen zu versprechen” (Sorge 92). 
167 In Mauss’ essay (passim), as well as throughout the resp. volume (cf. Carrithers et al. 
passim), rhetoric is passed over—and quickly relegated in Momigliano’s brief mention (89). For 
a pertinent reaccentuation in expressly rhetorical terms, see Baumlin (xix–xx; xxii). 
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continue to seek the ‘real’ person” (Thomas/Webb 3).168 Apart from an apparent 
displacement of the fact that said “images” are in effect mediated by second or 
third (to say nothing of further removed) parties, the end-focused assertion will 
seem problematic for reasons of method and tendency (hence fundamentally).169 
 Habitually skeptical of such essentialisms as ‘unchangeable Being’, ‘stable 
subject’ (see “μέμνησ’ ἀπιστεῖν”, KSA 11. 487, 34[196]), Nietzsche rhetorico-
dramatizes philosophical auctoritas—a take one might extend to authorship in 
general. It may be likely to have affinities with donning various masks; with 
crafting, honing, projecting ‘images’ for public display; with putting words into 
the mouths of said personae (auto-sermocinationes, so to speak). The structural 
position of ‘auctor’ generally (or ‘rhétor’ and ‘playwright’ specifically) forms 
part of a text’s (respectively an oration’s or drama’s) economy: a role assumed 
or expected to exist, a function to be filled (if tacitly).170 Reciprocally and 
|| 
168 Gill’s take is comparably problematic (cf. “Question” 471–472); while nuanced, this also 
applies to De Temmerman/Emde Boas (“Intro.” 4–5; spec. 5n.; 11; 13). Kennedy believes: “The 
Apology of Plato and a similar work by Xenophon are reconstructions of what Socrates said, or 
might have said, at his trial in 399 B.C.” (New History 64); though the phrase signaling (a poetic 
use of) contingency may seem to mitigate matters, the term “reconstructions” all but urges 
misconceptions—spec. since the critic repeats it as to oratorical “speeches” (even intensifies 
the issue by adding the phrase “after the fact”, New History 65; cf. 68). Contrast Niehues-
Pröbsting’s warier formulation (emphatic of sermocinatio): “Schließlich hat Platon fast seine 
gesamte Philosophie dem Sokrates in den Mund gelegt, so dass es unmöglich ist, zwischen 
dem, was davon historisch auf diesen und was auf ihn selbst zurückgeht, zu unterscheiden. 
Doch besteht kein Grund, daran zu zweifeln, dass Platon dem historischen Vorbild das Ethos 
seines Protagonisten verdankt” (Die antike Phil. 67). In its inductive thrust, the latter is not a 
Platonizing argument: for such would probably (have to) presume that ‘the idea Socrates’ is 
supratemporal. Niehues-Pröbsting may seem to be arguing along basically Aristotelian lines, 
by emphasizing that certain forms of elemental hypolépseis always tend to obtain (including in 
ethopoetic praxis)—wherefore they will be plausible, hence must be reckoned with. 
169 Referring to a Montaignian context, see Cave: “Socrates himself, the oral man, has to be 
mediated to us by his friends and disciples” (Cornucopian 305; cf. 308); and spec. with the 
ensuing qualification against taking an effect as a cause: “Socrates, the natural man, is itself a 
product of art” (Cornucopian 311). As Prins demonstrates with respect to another notorious 
(textual) persona of (Greek) Antiquity, there are alternative approaches: “Rather than 
reclaiming Sappho’s ‘original’ voice, I approach the Sapphic fragments as simultaneous cause 
and effect of translation. […] it is the performance of translation itself that ensures Sappho’s 
afterlife” (37). Baumlin’s relevant caveat will be in effect: “To say that a text has ‘voice’ […] is to 
resort to a fundamentally incarnationist metaphor[,] in which the text ‘speaks’ as a unified, 
consistent, self-present consciousness” (xxiii). Being a decidedly rhetorical device, 
prosopopoiía has frequently been utilized to generate various metaphysicae. 
170 As to “the image of self projected” (204), Goffman logs: “When an individual appears 
before others, he knowingly and unwittingly projects a definition of the situation, of which a 
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bilaterally, an authorial persona pertains to the impressions and (rhetorical, 
literary, dramatic) experiences on the part of any (given or potential) receiving 
party—irrespective of (historical) accuracy (to say nothing of ‘Truth’).171 
|| 
conception of himself is an important part” (234–235; cf. 204). “It is always possible to 
manipulate the impression” (243; cf. 20)—the vector being to “sustain” it (225). While this is a 
trans-discursive phenomenon, a genre’s rhetorical contours will reflect back onto the resp. 
persona. Schulz-Buschhaus logs a “wechselseitige Abhängigkeit […] zwischen morali(sti)schen 
Argumenten und poetologischen wie rhetorischen Formen”; “[D]iskursgebunden[heit]”; and 
“Möglichkeiten zur Selbststilisierung […], die dem lyrischen Ich etwa in der […] Renaissance-
Dichtung zur Verfügung stehen. Auch hier erweist sich, daß gerade die moralischen Konturen, 
die das Ich annimmt, jeweils mit den rhetorischen Gegebenheiten der verschiedenen 
(petrarkistischen, burlesken […] horazisch-satirischen) Genera zusammenhängen” (246). For a 
similar set of (narratological) issues, cf. De Temmerman/Emde Boas (“Intro.” 4–5). 
171 The notion of an authorial, authoritative persona will be of spec. import when (as is often 
the case in Ancient, Medieval times) works (or mss.) were ascribed to a well-known author, and 
read—hence copied, later reprinted—(solely) due to that name. Aware of a misattribution, 
modern criticism might tend to neglect the resp. texts, based on their (apparently) being 
contrived—inverting the effect in so doing, while in fact (if tacitly) retaining the argument from 
authority. The Rhet. ad Her. is a relevant case—dependably attached to a notorious name for 
more than a millennium: “The fact that the treatise appeared, from Jerome’s time on, as a work 
by Cicero gave it a prestige which it enjoyed for over a thousand years” (Caplan “Intro.” vii–
viii; Eloquence 2; cf. 2n.). For (logographic) oratory, cf. Blass: “an Lysias’ Hinterlassenschaft, 
wie an die […] ander[er] […], [‘haben sich’] […] unechte Reden angeschlossen” (Beredsamkeit I. 
353–354; cf. 375–377). See Grube’s wording re “On Style”: “The manuscript tradition attributes 
it to Demetrius” (110). In such and similar cases, the authorial personae pertaining to a set of 
texts seem to have been deemed compatible (to some degree); generally, the factual reception 
(citation, allusion, emulation) will prevail. See Foucault’s meta-analysis (with neo-Nominalist 
affinities): “an author’s name is not simply an element of speech […]. Its presence is functional 
[…] serves as a means of classification […] can group […] a number of texts […] differentiate 
them from others […] establishes different forms of relationships among texts. […] that […] texts 
were attached to a single name implies that relationships of homogeneity, filiation, reciprocal 
explanation, authentification [sic], […] common utilization were established among them. […] 
the author’s name characterizes a particular manner of existence of discourse. […] [it] is not to 
be […] consumed and forgotten; […] its status and […] manner of reception are regulated by the 
culture in which it circulates. […] the name of the author remains at the contours of texts—
separating one from the other, defining their form, […] characterizing their mode of existence. 
It points to the existence of certain groups of discourse and refers to the status [there]of […] 
within a society and culture. […] the name of an author is a variable that accompanies only 
certain texts to the exclusion of others. […] the function of an author is to characterize the 
existence, circulation, […] operation of certain discourses within a society. […] books or texts 
with authors […] are objects of appropriation” (“Author” 184); “discursive […] returns […] tend 
to reinforce the enigmatic link between an author and his works. A text has an inaugurative 
value precisely because it is the work of a particular author, and our returns are conditioned by 
this knowledge” (“Author” 191–192). While the art seems to be passed over here (and routinely 
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 A writer will not only be seen to craft texts (including vicariously, on behalf 
of others), but also (and concomitantly) to insinuate a polyfunctional, (more or 
less) ‘characteristic’ image—usually several, multifaceted (public) ‘faces’ over 
time, or simultaneously—for underwriting, intensifying said effect: by seeming 
recognizable, (even) familiar; by appearing consistent or to be speaking from a 
position of authority; and via other means (and to ulterior ends), as well.172 With 
selective recourse to intratextually sedimented signals (as well as, typically, any 
other contingent source), such personae—and their associated éthe—are also in 
large part constructed by a diachronic readership (including by simply deeming 
them likely).173 It is not only an ‘elemental (or source) self’ under variation that, 
in its capacity as physical auctor, (decidedly) crafts and conveys the impression 
of ‘public prósopa’ through a particular textual information policy; but also the 
(transtemporal) recipients, who take up and read a nominally ‘identified’ writer 
(or voice) in considerably diverse ways—syn- and diachronically. 
 Over the course of the past centuries, such processes have yielded myriad 
and dissimilar portraits of the (authorial) personae customarily referred to as 
‘Lysias’, ‘Shakespeare’, ‘Cervantes’ (for instance). Tying in with subchapter 3.3, 
the latter two will be considered in 4.2. The ensuing deals with the Greek arch-
rhétor, who—via the mediation (and due to the assessment) of the Ancient 
comparatist Dionysius—is particularly renowned for variants of ethopoiía.174 
|| 
rejected later), the philosopher’s otherwise pertinent account may require a rereading in 
rhetorical terms. See the n. on Foucault’s construal of ethopoeia in subch. 3.3, herein. 
172 Cf. Quintilian (Inst. Orat. 3–5. 122, 3.8.12–13; 280–281, 4.2.125); with Aristotle (Rhetoric 16–
17, 1356a, I.ii.3–6; 168–171, 1377b–1378a, II.i.1–7); Dionysius (“Lysias” 60–61, §19). Volkmann 
has: “Ethos ist […] eine […] sich gleichbleibende […] Haltung […], die in der […] Ausdrucksweise 
des Redners hervortretende […] Gesinnung, welche im allgemeinen dem Sinne seiner Zuhörer 
entspricht und bei ihnen den Eindruck hervorruft, dass sie es mit einem […] wohlwollenden 
Manne zu thun haben” (273–274, I.i.28; value judgments quarantined); “ἦθος” is “das 
C h a r a k t e r i s t i s c h e  der Darstellung” (562, III.54). Cf. “forms of typification are […] 
instrumental in generating authenticity, credibility […] persuasion” (De Temmerman/Emde 
Boas “Intro.” 9). With “Rhetorik II 1”, Schütrumpf states: “Die Selbstdarstellung des Charakters 
des Redners als ein Mittel im Zuhörer eine Überzeugung zu schaffen, hat Aristoteles von 
älteren rhetorischen Theorien übernommen. […] Eine solche Übernahme einer vorgeprägten 
Wendung sehe ich auch in Rhetorik II 13” (33). See the n. in subchs. 3.3. (above), 4.1 (below). 
173 In case the author pertains to what has tended to be called ‘world literature’—qua having 
been read, if to intermittent degrees (of intensity), over several generations, in various cultures, 
or even (quasi-)globally. Generally, see Auerbach (Weltliteratur passim; “World Literature” 
passim); Küpper (Approaches passim; “Remarks” passim; “National Lit.?” 35, with context). 
174 See Bonner: “The extensive use of comparative criticism was one of the most promising 
departures made by these Augustan critics [sc. ‘Caecilius’ and ‘Dionysius’]” (Lit. Treatises 9–10; 
cf. “the great predominance of the comparative method”, 62). 
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4.1 Dionysius of Halicarnassus on ‘ethopoeia’ (with a view to 
‘evidentia’ and respect to ‘decorum’) 
intueri ex ipsis operibus[.] 
—Quintilian (Inst. Orat. 1–2. 404, 2.20.8)175 
in […] literary criticism, he was a hard and assiduous worker.  
[…] He united most effectively philological with rhetorical studies.  
He was at once a scholar and a critic. Thoroughness was his watchword.  
—Roberts on Dionysius (47–48)176 
In the ensuing, a close reading of select passages in Dionysius’ treatise “Lysias” 
will serve to illustrate the particular nexus between evidentia, decorum, and 
ethopoeia—while also linking the latter to various forms of vicariousness.177 
|| 
175 Cf. “Dionysius’s main message in each case was ‘Read the orator’” (Usher “Intro.” xxi)—
followed by comparing and contrasting: “For many things which appear fine and admirable 
when considered on their own turn out to be less good than they had seemed when they are set 
side by side with other things that are better” (Dionysius “Pompeius” 357, §1; cf. Bruss 47n.). 
176 “Dionysius had a[…] [‘practical’] aim […] bound up with the exercise of his profession as 
an active rhetorician in the metropolis. He was not a solitary worker” (Bonner Lit. Treatises 11). 
His “basic concern, like […] Isocrates[’] […], is with the social function of rhetoric” (Conley 44). 
If graced with a Humanist’s sense of humor, see Norden, (symptomatically) claiming “daß mir 
der von vielen bewunderte Kritikus Dionys ein äußerst bornierter Kopf zu sein scheint” 
(Kunstprosa I. 79, I.i.iv). What cannot be spirited away, Norden ascribes to others: “Das Gute, ja 
Ausgezeichnete, was er enthält, hat er aus den feinen Erörterungen eines Theophrast” etc. 
(Kunstprosa I. 80, I.i.iv); “er [hat] sich aus allen das Beste zusammen gelesen und daraus ein 
neues Gewebe gemacht […]. Daß wir ihn […] trotzdem öfters werden nennen müssen, verdankt 
er nicht sich, sondern seinen Quellen” (Kunstprosa I. 81, I.i.iv; cf. 82). Norden outperforms 
himself in li- or labeling ‘Dionysius’ as “ein[en] Mann, den die Musen bei seiner Geburt mit 
zornigen Augen angeblickt haben” (Kunstprosa II. 884–885, II.Anhang.I.viii). Süss alike: “Die 
verwaschenen Kunsturteile des Dionys sind höchstens für ihn selbst charakteristisch” (219n.). 
177 To précis: the Dionysian “Lysias” is a rhetorical tract and ethopoetic portrait. It evinces a 
nexus between evidentia, the aptum, ethopoeia—while illustrating, practicing the latter. The 
present study covers §1–15, focusing on §7–9 (“Lysias” 20–53, §1–15; spec. 32–37, §7–9). Such 
adheres to the text, in that §16 opens: “Having completed my discussion of the virtues and the 
elements of Lysias’s style, I shall now consider him in relation to the forms of debate which 
must be studied by an aspirant to public life” (“Lysias” 53, §16)—giving the function (docere), 
and the envisioned addressees, of the overall tract. With the exception of §19 (see below), its 
remainder (“Lysias” 52–99, §16–34) cannot be dealt with en détail, here. For readings of Lysias 
through, or with reference to, Dionysius, see Blass (Beredsamkeit I. 388–407); Devries (9–17, 
spec. 11, 14–15); M. Morgan (“Intro.” xxx–xxxvi, §27–32; he largely relies on the former passim; 
cf. xxxi–xxxii, §27–28, with n.); Bruns (432–434, with 433n.; 439); Bonner (Lit. Treatises 43–48; 
98; 100–101), cum grano salis (Romanticist value judgments); Harding (202); Bakker (“Lysias” 
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 After a biographical sketch, and assigning to Lysias the (stock) rhetorical 
virtues of puritas, perspicuitas, brevitas, Dionysius proceeds to the description 
of the rhétor’s capacity for ‘vivid description’ (‘enárgeian’, “Lysias” 32–33, §7), 
“characterisation [‘ethopoiían’]” (“Lysias” 32–33, §8), observing “propriety [‘tò 
prépon’]” (“Lysias” 34–35, §9)—all conducing to his marked “quality [‘areté’]”: 
Lysian “χάρις” (“charm”), said to be “beyond description and too wonderful for 
words” (“Lysias” 38–39, §10), an ineffabile effected in and by speech.178 
|| 
409–410; 416); De Temmerman/Emde Boas (“Intro.” 6); Bruss (passim). Contrast Süss (10–12, 
spec. 11). Wisse’s take may seem ambivalent (57–58; 58n.; 64)—perhaps due to a taxonomic 
bias: defining the term in question as “the need of making the client speak ‘in character’” (32), 
he declares that “the word ethopoiia […] will be avoided as far as possible” in his study (5). 
178 For a synopsis of the “‘virtues’”, see Russell (Criticism 137). Dionysius commends Sappho’s 
“eloquence [‘εὐέπεια’] and charm [‘χάρις’]” (“Composition” 198–199, §23). On enárgeia, cf. also 
Hermogenes (86, §10.22; with Kennedy’s gloss, 86n.). Dionysius proffers a percursio of the steps 
taken: “I shall […] summarise the virtues of style […] I have assigned to him: purity of language 
[‘tò katharòn’], correct dialect, the presentation of ideas by means of standard [‘kyríon’], not 
figurative expressions; clarity [‘saphéneia’], brevity [‘syntomía’], concision, terseness, vivid 
representation [‘tò hypò tàs aisthéseis ágein tà deloúmena’], the investment of every […] 
[‘prósopon’] with life and character, the pleasing [‘hedonè’] arrangement [‘synthéseos’] of 
words after the manner of ordinary speech, the choice of arguments to suit the […] [‘prosópois’] 
and the circumstances of the case, the ability to win over [‘tò pithanótes’] and persuade [‘tò 
peistikòn’], charm [‘cháris’] and a sense of timing [‘kairós’] which regulates everything else” 
(“Lysias” 45–47, §13). As to the initial virtues, Dionysius logs Lysias’ linguistic ‘purity’ (see this 
density: ‘katharós’, ‘tò kathareúein’, ‘katharótatos’, ‘katharos’, “Lysias” 22, §2); his using 
“standard [‘kyríon’], ordinary [‘koinon’], everyday [‘en méso keiménon’, sc. lying in the middle] 
language” (“Lysias” 24–25, §3); his “lucidity [‘saphéneian’]” (“Lysias” 28–29, §4; also ex 
negativo: ‘saphéneia’, ‘asaphe’, ‘saphès’, ‘tò saphés’, ‘saphéneian’, ‘tou saphos’, ‘asapheías’, in 
the same §4); and (linked thereto) Lysian “brevity [‘tó (…) brachéos’]”—of both “expression” 
and “subject-matter” (“Lysias” 28–29, §4–5). Cf. “He […] combin[ed] brevity with lucidity; the 
secret of his success being his refusal to allow the matter to be slave to the manner” (Bonner 
Lit. Treatises 44). The “terseness and concentration”, “the brevity [‘tèn brachýteta’] of Lysias”, 
his “manner of expression in which ideas are reduced to their essentials and expressed tersely” 
(“Lysias” 30–31, §5–6) is repeatedly stressed—leading to Dionysius’ contrasting Demosthenic 
speech as “labored and harsh” (‘periérgos kaì pikros’, “Lysias” 31–32, §6) with Lysias’ “limpid 
simplicity” (‘leukos’, ‘aphelos’, “Lysias” 30–33, §6). See Vives: “non una fuit Atticismi facies”—
giving “Lysias” as “macilentus, et textura tenui” (134–135, R3.v–R4.r, II; with Quintilian Inst. 
Orat. 9–10. 170–171, 9.4.17; Webster 78). Cf. Blass: “Kürze charakterisirt wesentlich Lysias’ Stil: 
[…] nicht Gedrängtheit, sondern Magerkeit” (Beredsamkeit I. 393; cf. 399, 411–412). For the 
effectuality of said impression, see Quintilian: “if the orator’s only business were to give 
information [‘docere’] one could ask for nothing more perfect” than “Lysias” (Inst. Orat. 9–10. 
292–293, 10.1.78; cf. Blass Beredsamkeit I. 391n.; 390–391). Said (taxonomic) sketch is to evince 
Dionysius’ crafting conceptual densities by iteration with (grammatical, lexical) variation. The 
first three qualities seem linked (de re); synoptically, cf. Lausberg on the “virtutes elocutionis” 
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 In the present context, the focus will be on the decisive affinity and 
inseverable nexus—accentuated by sequence, hierarchization, taxonomic 
interrelation—between the triad of capacities ascribed to the arch-rhétor.179 
|| 
of “puritas” (“Latinitas”, ‘hellenismós’)—including “consuetudo, usus” (Elemente 44–45, §103–
104)—“perspicuitas” (Elemente 50, §130). See Carey’s functional, historico-cultural, rhetorico-
literary contextualization, arguing that it is with a view to “avoiding a glaring inconsistency 
between the professions and style of the litigant[,] and facilitating concealment of rhetorical 
devices within the speeches”, that the logographers—‘reacting’ “to the grand style” of 
Gorgias—“opted on pragmatic grounds for a style […] less obviously removed from the Greek 
spoken by […] the audience”: “Lysias belongs to this reaction” (“Intro.” 7). Blass logs “[d]ass 
Lysias sich bewusst in diesen diametralen Gegensatz zu Gorgias gestellt hat” (Beredsamkeit I. 
389). Cf. Lamb: “We may well believe that he [sc. Lysias] found little or no use for the jingling 
epigrams of Gorgias […]. The mere limitations of the time allowed to the speaker, and the 
constant endeavour to produce an impression of sincerity, would naturally preclude any 
scholastic pomp of words or phrases” (“Intro. [Lysias]” xvi). Cf. M. Morgan (“Intro.” xxx, §26; 
xxxiv, §29). On Lysias qua logographer, see also subchs. 2.1 and 5.2, herein. 
179 See Devries for the nexus (the rest cum grano salis): “The difference between τὸ πρέπον, or 
appropriateness, and ἠθοποιία is not clear at first. […] Dionysius states that τὸ πρέπον concerns 
the character of the speaker, […] audience and […] speech. […] the two terms are almost, if not 
quite, synonymous. […] the sphere of ἠθοποιία is more restricted than that of τὸ πρέπον, […] the 
former […] is […] a subdivision of the latter. […] ἠθοποιία is also closely allied to […] ἐνάργεια” 
(11); “τὸ πρέπον” is “of prime importance as the ultimate origin of the distinctive characteristics 
of this orator [sc. Lysias]. […] ethopoiia is linked in closest union with τὸ πρέπον” (16). See M. 
Morgan (“Intro.” xxxv, §32). On the relation of tò prépon and ethopoiía in the progymnasmata, 
cf. Lanham: “The larger rhetorical principle being stressed in this exercise [sc. ‘ethopoeia’] is 
decorum” (“Instruction” 111). Contrast Carey: “Dion. Hal. Lysias 9 […] sees to prepon solely in 
terms of style” (“Rhet. means” 44n.). Bruss notes a tendency to see a “connection between 
ethopoeia and faithful representation”: “character-drawing is akin to dramatic portraiture” 
(35). “The emphasis on dramatic characterization continues in later accounts of ethopoeia” 
(43). “Descriptions of ethopoeia in […] Greek progymnasmata […] emphasize faithful portrayal” 
(36). “Ethopoeia and prosopopoeia appear […] in the […] progymnasmata […] these writers differ 
somewhat in their description of characterization, [but] all of them emphasize plausible 
imitation rather than persuasive proof through character. […] Although character dominates 
such portrayals, it is not likely the same as the persuasive ethopoeia created by Lysias” (44). 
She tries to delimit the latter from the former—which severance hinges on a (strictly) ‘mimetic’ 
construal of the prépon (cf. spec. 45–46)—and so fails to take into account the governing aim of 
effectuality: what appears apt will seem (hence be) plausible; the familiar is eo ipso (more) 
credible; one cannot sever propriety from persuasiveness. Yet Bruss’ purpose is “to produce a 
clearer understanding [of] ethopoeia, particularly in Dionysius’s Lysias” (38); she “promote[s] a 
clear distinction between senses of ethopoeia”, “propose[s] that the characterization Dionysius 
describes can be understood most precisely as persuasive ethopoeia, the function of which is to 
create trustworthy speaker-centered ethos” (37); “when Dionysius speaks of ethopoeia, the 
‘character’ in character-making is persuasive ethos” (42). The latter cannot be detached from 
what is deemed ‘appropriate’ at a given time (sc. the contingency of the aptum)—to say nothing 
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 “Vividness [‘enárgeian’][…] consists in […] conveying the things” an orator 
“is describing to the senses [‘aisthéseis’] of his audience”—produced via artful 
description: “it arises out of his grasp [‘lépseos’] of circumstantial detail” 
(“Lysias” 32–33, §7).180 By way of ‘likeness’ (‘eikòs’), this promotes or facilitates 
the receiving party’s ‘taking up or tying in with’ (‘hypolépsetai’) the (notional) 
impressions insinuated or effected: the recipient “can see the actions which are 
being described going on”, apparently “meeting face-to-face [‘parousin’] the 
characters [‘prosópois’] in the orator’s story” (“Lysias” 32–33, §7; cf. 46–47, 
§13)—personae crafted precisely to be vividly envisioned (evidentia).181 
|| 
of the fact that Bruss’ thesis and her choice of terminology might be taken to imply that what 
she conceives of as the other and separate variants of ethopoiía would not be “persuasive” 
(which must seem untenable, considering the directedness of the overall téchne). 
180 Volkmann glosses: “d. h. doch wohl aus der Gabe der lebendigen Auffassung der für die 
Gegenstände charakteristischen Merkmale und deren Wiedergabe durch geschickte Rede […]. 
Sie hängt […] mit der […] Virtuosität dieses Redners in der Kunst der Charakterzeichnung, der 
ἠθολογία, zusammen. Wir haben es bei der ἐνάργεια gleichsam mit einem kunstvollen Gemälde 
in Worten zu thun” (442, III.46). While the nexus with evidentia must be upheld against such 
construals as would sever these interwoven Dionysian segments, Volkmann’s positing an 
‘external portrayal of character’ (in place of its ‘poiein’) seems reductive; proceeding from a 
largely (if not exclusively) aesthetic (rather than forensico-pragmatic) estimate of the Lysian 
orations, Volkmann appears to assume that the orator’s spec. capacity is ethología (qua 
charakterismós), not ethopoiía (with Rutilius’ terminology): “Gerade durch die lebendige 
Anschaulichkeit der Schilderung, durch die lebensgetreue Darstellung der dabei auftretenden 
Personen ist die Erzählung des Lysias so meisterhaft, oft […] von vollendeter Schönheit. Man 
nehme […] die Erzählung der ersten Rede, die mit köstlichem Humor gewürzt ist, oder das 
herrliche Bruchstück, welches Rutil. Lupus I, 21 als Muster feiner Charakterzeichnung 
aufbewahrt hat” (163, I.i.13). Volkmann’s gloss on the latter reads: “Als ἠθολογία, denn so ist 
bei ihm zu lesen. Die Ethologie (synonym mit χαρακτηρισμός) ist das, was wir Charakteristik, 
Charakterbild nennen […], und darf mit der Ethopoeie nicht verwechselt werden” (163n.–164n.; 
see Rutilius 12, I.21; with Halm’s gloss, 12n.; cf. Süss 218, in a highly problematic context). 
181 To be speaking of ‘prosopopoiíai’ would seem pertinent here (de re). The text continues: 
“And he will require no further evidence of the likely [‘εἰκὸς’] actions, feelings, thoughts or 
words of the different persons” (“Lysias” 32–33, §7). The immediacy of impression produced by 
enárgeia may be said to effect something akin to what Blumenberg terms ‘momentaneous 
evidence’ (see e.g. “Möglichkeit” passim; spec. 10–12; 15; 26; also Arbeit 533; Selbstverständnis 
111; 122–123; 124; Quellen 43; Beschreibung 161; Lebenswelt 180; Lebenszeit 114; 127; 137; 139; cf. 
Mayfield Artful 48n.; 92, 92n.; 256n.)—which effectually renders other forms of ‘proof’ 
(virtually) irrelevant. The Dionysian comment cited at the onset of this gloss may seem to be an 
especially abysmal remark in what is (after all) a forensic context also. For comparable 
instances in said respect, see Küpper (“Düstere Welt” 184n.; Mayfield “Talking Canines” 23n.). 
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 The latter links to the ensuing segment on ‘ethopoiía’ (“characterisation”, 
“Lysias” 32–33, §8; cf. 46–47, §13).182 Functional with a view to the effect of 
|| 
182 Cf. Eden (Rediscovery 43; 43n.). Blass logs the nexus: “Damit [sc. with ‘ἐνάργεια’] hängt 
eng zusammen die Tugend der E t h o p o e i e” (Beredsamkeit I. 394). Said transition is 
spec. artful, in at once acknowledging the Lysian capacity for ‘anthropistic’ ken (on this term, 
cf. Mayfield “Variants of hypólepsis” passim) as subtending ‘enárgeia’, ‘ethopoiía’ (as well as tò 
prépon): Lysias “was the best of all the orators at observing human nature [‘phýsin anthrópon 
katopteusai’] and ascribing to each type of person the appropriate emotions [‘páthe’], moral 
qualities [‘éthe’] and actions [‘érga’]” (“Lysias” 32–33, §7). A gloss adds: “ἠθοποιία never means 
individual or personal characterisation” (“Lysias” 33n.)—which is pertinent; for said adjectives 
are not (being anachronistic discursively). The (rhetorical) distinction of ‘páthos’ and ‘ethos’ 
tends to signal the (observable) difference between situatively extraordinary (strong) affects, 
and a ‘general disposition’ (a regular, typical, habitual ‘state of mind’). Dionysius accentuates 
the above in a sequence of negations—‘ouk éstin (…) oudè (…) oudè (…) oudè (…) oudè (…) oud’ 
(…) oud’’—assessing Lysian style as being generally ‘en tois éthesín (…) pithané’, while unable 
to effectuate vehemence (‘en tois páthesin ischyrà’, negated); the trans. of said passage may 
seem problematic: “the style of Lysias […] [is not] able to match its moral persuasiveness with 
an equal power to portray emotion” (“Lysias” 46–47, §13). A nexus between ‘vividness’ and 
‘character(ization-qua-)craft’ is also given ex negativo—in the accent on what the latter is not to 
result in: “devoid of character [‘anethopoíeton’] or vitality [‘ápsychon’]” (“Lysias” 32–33, §8; cf. 
46–47, §13; the first term recurs in the context of avoiding excess, unfamiliarity, laboredness: 
34, §8; for the second, “Dinarchus” 268, §7); cf. Bruns (433; 433n.); Bruss (35; 45; 53–54), cum 
grano salis. A categorically ‘un-etho-poietic’ language seems impossible; words will likely be 
deemed so, when ‘unfitting’—i.e. failing to be effectual in terms of crafting ethos qua pístis—in 
a given setting. In the Dionysian context, the ultimate function of ethopoiía appears to be 
‘momentaneous evidence’ (vivid, subtly overwhelming immediacy); its basic guardrail is the 
apposite—ever contingent upon the conditions. Performed with a view to easing the rhetorical 
business at hand, (the impression of) propriety enables, conduces to, hypolépseis. Generally, 
‘prépon’ or ‘aptum’ are quasi-paradiastolic terms, signifying flexibility in adaptation, hence 
effectuality (sc. the rhetorical facilitation of victory)—at the kathólou plane; and comparably so 
as to spec. forensic circumstances. Stressing “Lysias’ characterizing strategy” (“Lysias” 418), 
Bakker pertinently observes its given context: “the demands of the Athenian jury system were 
overriding in composing his speeches” (“Lysias” 427), since “a convincing characterization of 
those involved in the lawsuit could be crucial and make the difference between life and death” 
(“Lysias” 410–411; cf. 427). Consequently, “Lysias […] did not portray his speakers and their 
opponents as individuals, but made their behavior and utterances adhere to certain distinctive 
recognizable types” (“Lysias” 410)—“‘fram[ing]’ the characters of his speeches within 
recognizable categories that were identifiable for the jurymen” (“Lysias” 412), spec. by using 
“transparent, contrastive schemes of characterization” (“Lysias” 427); cf. Bakker’s reference to 
“the effect of creating a Thersites-like character” (“Lysias” 416), to “a topical characterization 
of the Athenians” (“Lysias” 418). In particular, “Lysias may have applied a certain degree of 
typification to allow the average member of the jury to recognize the characters involved and 
thereby enhance the credibility of his speeches. […] [These] had to be composed with an eye on 
their performance. Juries usually did not remain silent during their delivery, but responded 
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enárgeia, the specific technique for the oratorico-dramatic ‘crafting and 
projecting of ethos’ is guided by the rhetorically universal gauge of relative 
propriety (see Herrick 136; contrast: Süss 218)—a dependable groundswell of the 
art, in that it warrants a maximal degree of probable efficacy with respect to the 
given circumstances (audiences, viewers).183 Generally speaking, ‘ethopoiía’ 
|| 
vocally to the drama as it unfolded on the stage. Any sensible orator should take this situation 
into account. Clarity and consistency about the main events of the case, as well as the 
characters involved, were of crucial importance, and too much complexity was to be avoided” 
(“Lysias” 411); “the corpus Lysiacum reveals a consistent methodology in characterization. 
Lysias prefers clarity to complication” (“Lysias” 426; cf. 427). The oratorico-dramatic nexus will 
not seem incidental. As regards affinities between play- and speechwright, see Bakker’s 
ensuing formulation: “Lysias makes his speakers portray themselves, as well as their 
opponents” (“Lysias” 412). Generally (and with reference to Dionysius), Bonner gives ethopoiía 
as “character-drawing” (Lit. Treatises 42; 44), “character-representation” (Lit. Treatises 44), 
“portrayal of character” (Lit. Treatises 45), “character-portrayal” (Lit. Treatises 46). Bruss 
stresses: “One of the first extant works in which the term ethopoeia appears is Lysias, written 
by […] Dionysius […] in the first century BC” (34). In conceptual respects, cf. subch. 3.3, herein. 
183 Demoting the pragmatico-forensic context, its needful (vital) adapting to givens (charges), 
Süss construes: “Lysias läßt die ἤθη reden, nicht wie es gerade ihr ἦθος erfordert, sondern wie 
ihnen der Schnabel gewachsen ist” (218). Carey believes: “In the matter of ethos Lysias goes far 
beyond the establishment of the good moral character necessary for credibility. He also makes 
extensive use of ‘dramatic’ character, termed by modern scholars ethopoiia” (“Intro.” 10). 
“Usher […] rightly argues that Dionysios when praising Lysias’ ethopoiia (Lys. 8) meant moral 
character. Dionysios treats dramatic characterization under ‘vividness’ and ‘propriety’, Lys. 7, 
9” (“Intro.” 10n.). Said claim seems to be based on a (forced) severance of three sequential 
Dionysian paragraphs interrelated at a thematic level—plus a formal nexus of taxonomic 
signifiers in transition from §7 to §8 (in consecutive sentences): “ἤθη” (“Lysias” 32–33, §7, on 
“Vividness”), “εὐπρεπεστάτην”, “ἠθοποιΐαν” (“Lysias” 32, §8). Usher’s giving the latter as 
“characterisation” (“Lysias” 33, §8) may appear to be spiriting away the ‘poiein’ involved. His 
choices in trans. the terms crucial to his construal seem problematic: rather than as ‘trait’ (or 
‘imprint’), “χαρακτὴρ” is given as “nature” (“Lysias” 34–35, §8); the variants of ‘prósopon’, 
found in all three segments (“προσώποις”, “Lysias” 32, §7; “πρόσωπον”, §8; “προσώπων 
πρόσωπα”, 36, §9), are trans. as “characters”, “person” (“Lysias” 33, §7, §8), “characters” 
(“Lysias” 37, §9)—whereby Usher changes his nomenclature precisely in §8, on ethopoiía. Yet it 
is also here that ‘personae’ are (ex negativo) referred to as having “character or vitality” (“οὐδὲν 
εὑρεῖν […] πρόσωπον οὔτε ἀνηθοποίητον οὔτε ἄψυχον”), whereby §7–9 are dependably linked 
at the taxonomic level (via the reference to dramatico-rhetorical ‘prósopa’); cf. a later, affine 
segment (“Lysias” 60, §19). As Usher’s gloss for the first sentence of §8—stating that “ἠθοποιία 
never means individual or personal characterisation” (“Lysias” 33n.)—might render patent, the 
critic’s tacit premises, hence his scales, are (post-)Cartesian, Kantian (even Romanticist). In 
most (and likely all) of its variants, the Greek conception of ‘ethos’ refers to contextual 
(customary, socio-moral) factors (aspects, phenomena), which inevitably suggest something 
‘typical’; but the same holds good for the oratorico-theatrical notion of prósopa (personae)—as 
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might be said to signify a ‘contextually effectual charactercraft’—the ‘poiein’ of 
‘ethos’, with respect to a contingent ‘prépon’ and a view to ‘enárgeia’.184 
|| 
opposed to the (Platonically inflected, Stoicizing, Christian) essentialism of ‘the person’ (see 
subch. 3.3, herein). Sans Idealist premises, and with respect to (rhetorico-poetic) technique (as 
well as de re), there will hardly be a descriptive difference between an orator’s (resp. 
philosopher’s, etc.) producing, projecting an ethos in ‘staging’ himself; a logographer’s 
performing the same procedure vicariously (on behalf of a client); a playwright’s (or any 
writer’s, including all of the above) comparable process when putting words into the mouth of 
(potentially or factually performed) dramatic (or diegetic) roles—counting an actor’s possible 
performance thereof, giving voice to such rhetorico-poetic ventriloquisms; see Quintilian’s 
nexus of histriones, speechwrights, (oratorical) “declaimers”, “advocates” (Inst. Orat. 11–12. 
28–31, 11.1.38–42; here: 29, 11.1.38–39). If said (and similar) practices and their effects are 
considered to be ‘essentially’ different, such a (metaphysical) construal will neither be taking 
into account, nor be made on the basis of, the craft involved (hence be tantamount to an 
‘untechnical’, ‘nonrhetorical’ estimate). To return to Carey—after having endorsed Usher’s 
position, he may seem to invalidate the latter (de re): “By fitting the speech to the character of 
the speaker, Lysias both hides his own role […] and builds a consistent character-outline for the 
speaker which enhances the plausibility of the statements he makes about himself. In the same 
way, Lysias sometimes creates a consistent picture of the opponent’s character […]. It is 
possible that Lysias was inspired in such cases by the actual personalities of his clients. But it 
is more likely that these are dramatic creations. […] the delineation of character was so 
conceived by the ancients” (“Intro.” 10). The latter—with the gloss ad locum, referring to 
Aristotle (“14088a25ff.”), to all three related paragraphs in Dionysius (“Lys. 7–9”)—plus Carey’s 
accent on the craft involved (“builds”, “creates”, “creations”), on an analogy of method (“[i]n 
the same way”), do not seem to square with the previous endorsement of Usher’s severing what 
he construes as ‘ethopoiía’ (in a narrow, moralizing sense of ethos, unemphatic of the ‘poiein’) 
from ‘dramatic characterization’. At once (like Usher), Carey seems to proceed from essentialist 
premises; cf. “actual personalities” (“Intro.” 10); “the real personality of the speaker” (“Intro.” 
11). His fluctuating use of “personality” (qua ‘historical’ being, but also as a type, role) seems 
problematic (“Comment.” 62; 89; 90, by parallelism equated with “character”; 147; 183; spec. 
211; also: “Rhet. means” 29; 36; 41; 42; 44n.); “persona” (“Comment.” 62; 66; 99; 106; 211; cf. 
“Rhet. means” 36; 39) would be more descriptive (in any case). 
184 See the conceptual caveats in subchs. 3.1, 3.3. In discussing the ‘entechnic’ písteis (“τὸ 
πρᾶγμα καὶ τὸ πάθος καὶ τὸ ἦθος”), Dionysius speaks of Lysias’ “constructing proofs from 
character [‘ἐκ τῶν ἠθῶν’]. He […] makes us believe in his client’s good character by referring to 
the circumstances of his life and […] parentage, […] by describing his past actions and the 
principles [‘προαιρέσεων’] governing them. And when the facts fail to provide him with such 
material [‘παρὰ τῶν πραγμάτων’], he creates his own moral tone [‘αὐτὸς ἠθοποιεῖ’], making his 
characters [‘τὰ πρόσωπα’] seem by their speech to be trustworthy and honest [‘τῷ λόγῳ πιστὰ 
καὶ χρηστά’]” (“Lysias” 60–61, §19; a trans. as “moral tone” will be misleading). Bruss glosses: 
“The influence of Aristotle’s theory of ethos is unmistakable in this passage” (41; with 38–40, 
39n., 41n.). “Dionysius was thoroughly familiar with the Rhetoric of Aristotle” (Usher “Intro.” 
xi). Contrast Wisse (57–58; 58n.). Cf. further mentions of the logographer’s ‘ethopoietic’ art: “He 
credits them with […]; he makes them voice […] introduces them as […] represents them as […] 
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 It is by virtue of (and with regard to) “thought [‘dianoías’], language 
[‘léxeos’] and composition [‘synthéseos’]” that the orator will perform the verbal 
redescription, (partial) modulation of a (rhetorico-theatrical) ethos—an 
(apparently) habitual, acquired disposition (in contextual, socio-moral terms), 
which is to be rendered pertinent to the “πρόσωπον” (forensically, a client’s 
public ‘image’) staged, conveyed in a likely manner (“Lysias” 32–33, §8).185 
|| 
ascribes to them every” thing as may “ἦθος φανείν” (Dionysius “Lysias” 60–61, §19). Bruss 
observes: “Lysias’s speeches […] possess recognizable character and are presented in a lifelike 
and animated manner. Dionysius […] defines ethopoeia […] as a stylistic virtue aimed at 
creating a persuasive and lifelike sense of character” (38–39; cf. 50–52). “Lysias’s characters 
are deemed lifelike […] on the degree to which they sound unscripted. […] animation […] is an 
ideal of persuasive ethopoeia” (56). The terms used (“recognizable”, “sense of”, “deemed”, 
“sound”) entail a recipient (which Bruss apparently tries to spirit away throughout). It is with 
respect to a given audience or reader that the craftedness is not to show; sans context, celare 
artem is point- and aimless; being a received impression, the appearance of ‘artlessness’ will 
always be (culturally, temporally) contingent. See the n. below, subch. 4.2, and part 6, herein. 
185 Cf. Devries (14), cum grano salis. Contrast Süss (216–222; spec. 220–221, where his claims 
do not square with the Dionysian text, for which he faults the latter; see 222–225). On the nexus 
of lógos qua ethos seeming eikós, cf. “the thoughts” Lysias “ascribes to his clients” are “worthy, 
reasonable and fair, so that their words seem to reflect their good moral character [‘hóste 
eikónas einai dokein ton ethon toùs lógous’]” (Dionysius “Lysias” 32–34, §8). The trans. gives 
an (implied) ‘quale (resp. qualis) sit’ (“good moral”) as stated—backed by a gloss claiming that 
ethopoiía signifies “favourable characterisation, portraying the moral qualities which will win 
the audience’s good will” (“Lysias” 33n.). Crafting the likeness of a client’s general disposition 
is to conduce to such a valuation. In its overtness, the trans. arguably spirits away the (not only 
forensically) decisive nuance that hardly any (and surely no artful) rhétor will state the 
aforesaid outright; rather, the judge or jury are to arrive at this (insinuated) impression as if on 
their own—to their minds, and ‘ideally’ sans any awareness as to this processuality even. See 
Dionysius’ formulation of Lysias’ ‘artful artlessness’ (“Lysias” 34–35, §8); also the n. below, 
subch. 4.2, and part 6. On “the inclusion of […] material” not directly related to a case’s “main 
issue”, Carey logs: “the most important factor is cultural. […] the Athenians viewed the trial 
within the lives of the parties, the judges and the community as a whole” (Trials 18); it was vital 
“to project a character which invited trust”, “present oneself as deserving […] goodwill” (Trials 
18), “project a personality which invited belief” (“Rhet. means” 36); “the Athenian tendency to 
view the trial as a detail in a broader canvas […] made appeal to activity beyond the courts 
inevitable. In such a context, […] general conduct […] offers a useful means of determining the 
balance of probability in […] [a given] instance. This implicit view was reinforced […] by the 
increased reliance on argument from probability. Ethos may […] overlap implicitly with explicit 
argument. The simplest way to project the appropriate persona was to list explicitly the 
services one had bestowed on the city. […] Less blatant is the use of […] general observations. 
By laying claim to certain beliefs […] agree[ing] with accepted social values a speaker can with 
contrived inadvertence reveal something of his character. A wide range of effects may be 
sought” (“Rhet. means” 36; cf. 37). Cf. Kennedy on “portray[ing] […] character by citing 
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When detailing the aforesaid, Dionysius refers back to the qualities introduced 
earlier—purity, perspicuity, simplicity—qua generally effective guidelines.186 
|| 
honorable actions of the past” (Comp. Rhet. 124; infinitized). Morford logs: “even […] legal 
tactics” may be “used in the cause of ethopoiia” (243)—i.e. that one chooses to apply them, and 
which. Having noted “the stress laid in Greek rhetoric on argument from probability ([…] from 
general tendencies to specific instances)”, Carey shows the notional process: “the importance 
of this mode of argumentation will have reinforced the commonsense assumption that the 
plausibility of specific statements about […] [someone] can be assessed with reference to […] 
established patterns of behaviour” (Trials 18; cf. “increased reliance on argument from 
probability”, “Rhet. means” 36); “argument from the general (the evidence of character 
implicitly presented to the court) to the particular (the specific allegations) on the basis of 
probability […] is the staple of argumentation from the birth of Greek rhetoric” (“Rhet. means” 
42); it “had evolved during the fifth century [BCE]” (“Intro.” 10; for applications linked to a 
‘crafting of characters’, cf. “Comment.” 61, 90, 117). “[I]n Lysias”, “characterization effects an 
implicit argument” (Trials 82): ostensibly “providing necessary background information […] in 
fact presenting a characterization” (Trials 96; infinitized)—a response to the status qualitatis 
(here as regards the speaker). Kennedy also stresses “the use of argument from probability” as 
spec. relevant to “Greek speeches”: “If the facts were in doubt, as they often were, the question 
became one of what such a person as the defendant or the prosecutor was likely to have done. 
His character was the key” (New History 67)—a ‘personalizing’ shift from ‘quale’ to ‘qualis sit’ 
(deprioritizing the res, focusing on the ‘make’ of the persona, its ethos). Cf. Pearson: “the τέλος 
of a speech was not so much to prove that X injured Y as to show that X and Y are ‘of a certain 
character’; because once that is established, it will be easy to jump to the conclusion that X 
injured Y; […] the matter of character has logical priority over the action” (“Character.” 77). Cf. 
Eden’s (forensico-poetic) observation as to the (usual) reading habits on Montaigne’s part, who 
tends to “tak[e] more interest in the advocate […] than in the case he pleads” (Rediscovery 
109)—a focus on ethos. The (decidedly) rhetorical poetics operative in the essayist’s signature 
work may seem to yield a similar bent in the reception, inasmuch as (virtually) all attention is 
characteristically directed to said speaker—thereby crafting ‘him’ (for the time being, as the 
case may be)—rather than to language, (which facilitates) ‘personifying’ the latter first of all. 
186 See Dionysius’ sýnkrisis of Isocrates and Lysias (“Isocrates” 106–107, §2; 132–133, §11: “ἐν 
ταῖς ἠθοποιΐαις”, 132; cf. Blass Beredsamkeit II. 188–189; 189n.); of Thucydides, Demosthenes 
with Lysias (Dionysius “Demosthenes” 244–247, §2; 252–253, §4; cf. 276–277, §11, plus context; 
288–289, §13; 294–295, §15; see “Thucydides” 616–623, §51, §53; with Blass Beredsamkeit I. 227; 
399). Cf. Atkins (104–136, spec. 121–122, 125–126); Trimpi (“Meaning” 15n.). Dionysius logs that 
the “style [‘léxin’] […] appropriate to [‘oikeían’]” an ethos is to adopt “clear [‘saphe’], standard 
[‘kyrían’], ordinary [‘koinèn’] speech […] thoroughly familiar to everyone” (“Lysias” 32–35, §8; 
cf. “persuasiveness […] depends on […] clarity [‘saphei’] and familiarity [‘synéthei’]”: Demetrius 
478–479, §221)—since (in terms of function) the accustomed will (eo ipso seem to) be plausible 
(contrast: Bruss 45–46). Avoiding “pompous [‘ónkos’], outlandish [‘tò xénon’]”, “contrived [‘tò 
epitedeúseos’]” language, the “composition [‘syntíthesí’]” is to be ‘altogether’ “simple 
[‘aphelos pány’]”, “straightforward [‘haplos’]” (Dionysius “Lysias” 34–35, §8). Hence 
“characterisation [‘tò ethos’] is achieved not by periodic structure and […] rhythms, but by 
loosely constructed sentences”—leading to an articulation of ‘artful artlessness’ (“Lysias” 34–
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 He proceeds to “propriety [‘tò prépon’]”—qua “most important […] crowning 
virtue” (“Lysias” 34–35, §9).187 Given its applying “to the speaker [‘légonta’] […] 
audience [‘akoúontas’] […] subject [‘pragma’]” (“Lysias” 34–37, §9), it is likely 
said comprehensiveness regarding the factors relevant to any speech (emitter, 
recipients, reference, cumulatively the setting) that its particular eminence 
|| 
35, §8). “Lysias possesses charm naturally [‘péphyke’]; Isocrates is always looking for it” 
(“Isocrates” 110–111, §3; cf. Blass Beredsamkeit I. 398, 398n.; Beredsamkeit II. 188); “properties 
of Thucydides’s style […] are forcefulness […] compulsion, while […] Lysias[’] can deceive the 
listener […] conceal the facts from him [‘κλέψαι τὰ πράγματα’]”; he “is apparently unstudied 
[…] an illusion which the orator deliberately fosters” (Dionysius “Demosthenes” 246–247, §2; 
with 247n.; “Lysias” 58–59, §18); cf. Bonner on the Lysian capacity “to mislead and to conceal” 
(Lit. Treatises 63). Seeing that “[t]he dominant impression created is one of artlessness” 
(“Intro.” 8), Carey logs: “surface simplicity is deceptive”; “the narrative is […] used to create an 
image of the speaker or his opponent […]; its plausibility […] contribut[es] to […] persuasion. 
His narratives are vivid […] internally consistent […] fluent […] economical; details […] are not 
laboured […]. There is throughout a simple […] apparently artless inevitability which […] is […] 
the product of precise skill” (“Intro.” 9). Cf. Blass: “Lysias […] besitzt, nach Hermogenes, eine 
ausserordentliche rednerische δεινότης, nur von der Art, welche es ist ohne es zu scheinen” 
(Beredsamkeit I. 400); “die scheinbare Kunstlosigkeit ist das Produkt der höchsten Kunst” 
(Beredsamkeit I. 396). “Es ist […] künstlerische Nachbildung der gewöhnlichen Rede, nicht 
diese selbst, obwohl […] der Anschein dies glauben lässt” (Beredsamkeit I. 390; cf. 390n.; with 
Cicero “Orator” 362, xxiii.76). See Bakker: “Behind this—almost deceptive—accessibility […] lie 
subtle strategies of characterization. For these, Lysias was […] praised in antiquity […] 
particular[ly] his talents in ēthopoiia […] guaranteed his reputation as a canonical orator” 
(“Lysias” 409). On Lysian subtlety, cf. Devries (13); Morford (247); Carey (“Comment.” 62); 
Kennedy: “Lysias’ style conceals its art” (New History 66); cf. M. Morgan (“Intro.” xxxiv, §29). 
Pearson insinuates his virtuosity: “Although it is usual to think of Lysias as the master of 
ἠθοποιΐα, it is Isaeus who lets us see more clearly what he is trying to do” (“Character.” 76). 
187 As to a textual cohabitation of “lucidity”, “brevity of expression”, Dionysius logs these as 
“two ingredients which are naturally difficult to blend in due proportion [‘kerásai metríos’]”—
“Lysias manages this combination”, by “not mak[ing] his subject the slave of his words, but […] 
the words conform to the subject” (“Lysias” 28–29, §4). An overarching concern for tò prépon is 
accentuated passim. As to textual economy, cf. ‘oikeía pány kaì anankaía’ (“Lysias” 30, §6), 
‘kairós’ (“Lysias” 46, §13), ‘oikeías’ (“Lysias” 50, §15), ex negativo, ‘ákairós’ (“Lysias” 28, §5), 
‘ou (…) kairo’ (“Lysias” 48, §14); also (performatively) the writer’s: “κατὰ τὸ παρόν” (“Lysias” 
30, §6), ‘katà tòn oikeion […] kairón’ (“Lysias” 32, §6), ‘katà tòn oikeion (…) tópon’ (“Lysias” 38, 
§10), ‘ouk écho kairòn en to parónti lógo’ (“Lysias” 50, §14); on (rhetorical) ‘kairós’, cf. the n. 
below. There is a nexus of timely pragmatism with tò prépon, of necessity with appositeness—
linking to ‘oikonomía’ (literally, de re), where ‘oikeion’ is used. On the affinity of ‘prépon’ and 
‘oikeion’, cf. Eden (Rediscovery 14–27, spec. 20, 27; 43; 45; passim; as to Dionysius, 43n.); see 
Blass (Beredsamkeit I. 402–403). The description of Lysian discernment seems to imply an 
assimilation, simultaneity of appositeness and expediency: “κριτικὸς ὧν δεῖ λέγειν” (“Lysias” 
50, §15)—rhetoric being an art of effect(uality), seeing that ‘one cannot argue with results’. 
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resides in—accommodation being ever needful and expedient.188 Its effectuality 
|| 
188 A conditio sine qua non in a dominantly audience-focused art, the aptum (a noetic 
lubricant) facilitates hypólepsis for a recipient—the feckful prevailing upon whom being the 
gauge: “The rhetorical […] is a dispute in which it is important to gain victory over the 
opponent, not to approach the truth” (Bakhtin Speech 152); see Plato (Laws VII–XII. 470–471, 
937E–938A, XI); Hobbes (Man and Citizen 231, X.11); Mayfield (“Interplay” 18n.–19n.). As to a 
logographer’s (client’s) tying in with the contextual (socio-moral, cultural) givens, see Bakker: 
“Lysias could make his clients appeal to […] values […] commonly shared and held in esteem” 
(“Lysias” 411). Carey logs “a consistent tendency to present the offence as an attack on values 
important to the city as a whole” (“Rhet. means” 30; cf. 31–32; Bakker “Lysias” 411–412; 414; 
417; 421; 423; 425; 427); “it was useful, given the […] hostility towards meddlesomeness 
(polypragmosyne), to stress the public spirit” (Carey “Rhet. means” 28; cf. 32). “Nobody ever 
alienated a Greek jury by praising the laws” (“Rhet. means” 36). Cf. Hellwig’s pragmatic take: 
“das in der Rede sichtbar gemachte ἦθος [‘gewinnt’] nur dann das Vertrauen der Zuhörer […], 
wenn es sich in den Grenzen eines Maßes, des πρέπον, bewegt. Dieses Maß wird […] nicht nur 
von allgemeinen […] Normen, sondern auch von den Vorstellungen der Hörer bestimmt” (265); 
“in der Anpassung der Rede und ihrer τέλη an […] Publikum bzw. […] Staatsform zeigt sich: die 
Rede wird ‘ethisch’, wenn in ihr erkennbar wird, daß die […] Grundsätze, […] die [d]er 
[‘Redner’] in seinen Worten vertritt, den allgemein oder in einer […] Gruppe anerkannten 
Normen entsprechen” (265). Cf. Oesterreich: “in der Rhetorik der Lebenswelt […] [‘wird’ eine] 
für die […]praxis bedeutsame […] pragma […] thematisiert”; “die parteilich interessierte […] ihre 
Überzeugungen verkörpernde […] Persönlichkeit des Redenden (ethos) [‘ist’] ausschlaggebend 
beteiligt” (Fundamentalrhet. 5; cf. 85, 112–113). “Das Gewinnen des anderen durch Konvenienz 
[…] der Werthaltungen ist eine wesentliche Funktion persuasiver Rede” (Fundamentalrhet. 69; 
cf. 87–88); besides ‘value’, said word may also take ‘world’ (qua view): via “Aufweis der 
Topizität der Lebensweltbilder [‘wird’] die […] kulturelle Vermitteltheit lebensformtragender 
Hintergrundüberzeugungen herausgestellt” (Fundamentalrhet. 82; cf. 85). Cf. Ptassek: “Es ist 
[…] vernünftig, bewährten Meinungen zu folgen […] endoxa, […] die für Aristoteles eine 
überindividuelle Orientierungsfunktion ausüben, sind das sich stets neu bestimmende 
Resultat des Meinungsaustausches” (63). “We ought […] to consider in whose presence we 
praise […] speak of what is esteemed among the particular audience” (Aristotle Rhetoric 99, 
1367b, I.ix.30; cf. Sattler 59–60). “If you wish to write a pleasing speech, be careful as far as 
possible to adapt the character of your speech [‘τὰ ἤθη τῶν λόγον ὁμοιοῦν’] to that of your 
public. You will achieve this if you observe their character [‘τῶν ἠθῶν’]” (“Rhet. ad Alex.” 364–
365, 1434b, XXII; contrast: Wisse 51n.). Cf. Sprute (283–284); Cope: “as all men readily accept, 
like to hear, words and sentiments in accordance with their […] character and resembling 
themselves, i.e. those […] they […] are in the habit of using, we may act upon this” (111). This 
serves as a diagnostic in Vives (cf. 179, Z2.r, II.xvi). Thucydides logs: “it is a hard matter to 
speak in just measure on an occasion where it is with difficulty that belief in the speaker’s 
accuracy is established”—spec. if what is (to be) said will not align with the audience’s 
“wishes”, “knowledge”, exceed its “capacity” (History I–II. 319–321, II.xxxv.2). Hellwig glosses: 
“Wahrheit gerät in Gefahr, unglaubwürdig zu werden, wenn sie das Erkenntnis- oder 
Vorstellungsvermögen der Hörer übersteigt” (266n.); “ἦθος wirkt nur, wenn es vom Zuhörer als 
solches anerkannt werden kann, […] [seinen] Anschauungen […] nicht zuwiderläuft” (265). Cf. 
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(or sheer reception) being contingent upon the context, rhetorico-dramatic 
|| 
Cope: “appeals to their understanding and feelings must be made in accordance with their 
known sentiments and habits of thought” (110; see Aristotle Rhetoric 254–255, 1390a, II.xiii.16). 
“Es gibt kein ethosfreies Pathos. […] wer Stimmungen beeinflussen will, [‘muß’] die Charaktere 
seiner Adressaten in Rechnung stellen” (Niehues-Pröbsting “Ethos” 348; cf. Die antike Phil. 53). 
Aristotle gives (infinite) sententiae as “of great assistance to speakers”—due to “the vulgarity of 
the hearers, who are pleased if an orator, speaking generally, hits upon the opinions which 
they specially hold. […] The maxim [‘gnóme’] […] state[s] […] the general [‘kathólou’]” (Rhetoric 
286–287, 1396b, II.xxi.15). See the function of (the phrase) ‘everyone knows’ (Rhetoric 378–381, 
1408a, III.vii.7): “For most people will think so [‘dóxei te gàr tois pollois’]” (Rhetoric 98–99, 
1367b, I.ix.29); cf. subch. 3.2. “Wortspiele [‘gehören’] […] dem populären Sprachgebrauche 
an[…]wie […] Metaphern […] Gleichnisse […]. Derartiges stört also das Ethos nicht” (Blass 
Beredsamkeit I. 412): in (likely) producing familiarity (an impression of the wonted, hence apt), 
these devices conduce to the crafting of ethos. Unlike Idealist critics, Aristotle will not spirit 
away the (decisive factor that is the) reception. With Jakobson, one may speak of a dominant 
“CONATIVE function”, described as “[o]rientation toward the addressee” (67; see 66–71, for his 
overall model). Cf. “Polyphony and rhetoric […] Rhetorical speech argues from the viewpoint of 
the third party” (Bakhtin Speech 150). As Küpper logs, an “aesthetics of effect consistently” 
underwrites the Stagirite’s “line of reasoning” in the Poetics (“Ordnung” 213n.; trans. dsm)—
likewise in the affine (rhetorico-political) works. Cf. “die primäre Orientierung der Rhetorik an 
der Wirkung” (Niehues-Pröbsting “Ethos” 351); “Wirkungsästhetik der Rhetorik” (Dockhorn 
Macht 69); “das Regulativ der Publikumswirksamkeit” (Fuhrmann Dichtungstheorie 133; as to 
Horace). Said nexus is inseverable (in form, function, de re), spec. given Aristotle’s dictum that 
human beings are the comparatively ‘more political animal’, since men “alone of the animals 
possess[…] speech”—“λόγος” being their “special property” (Politics 10–11, 1253a, I.i.10; cf. 
“Poetics” 99, 1456b, XX; Rhetoric 18–19, 1356a, I.ii.7; 18n.–19n.; 89, 1366a, I.viii.7). Even so, 
differing agendas obtain—spec. as to ethos; Pearson (“Character.” 76–78; with “Poetics” 50–51, 
1450a, VI) logs Aristotle’s “drawing” an implicit “contrast[…] between poetry and […] forensic 
oratory” as to “characterization”: “the purpose of tragedy” is not “to illustrate character”; 
“action, not ethical quality, is the τέλος of tragedy”; “ἦθος” is not “essential to tragedy” 
(“Character.” 76). Cf. “In der Poetik geht es bei[…] Ethos um […] kunstgerechte Darstellung von 
Charakteren […]. Wie drückt sich in Reden und in welchen […] Charakter aus? Das […] [‘haben’] 
Poetik und Rhetorik gemeinsam […] Präsentation des Ethos im Logos [‘ist’] die Hauptaufgabe. 
[…] die Gesichtspunkte [‘sind’] für […] Dichter und […] Redner nur partiell dieselben. Jener muß 
darauf achten, daß der Charakter […] zur Handlung […] paßt […] in sich stimmig ist. 
Stimmigkeit ist […] für die rhetorische Ethopoiie eine notwendige Bedingung, aber keine 
hinreichende. […] der Redner [‘will’] nicht bloß stimmige Charaktere dem Publikum zum 
Vergnügen präsentieren, sondern […] mit der Charakterdarstellung […] überzeugen” (Niehues-
Pröbsting “Ethos” 341). Qua ‘philosophóteron’, drama is (free, able) to convey the ‘kathólou’ 
(Aristotle “Poetics” 58–59, 1451b, IX). Pragmatico-inductively, rhetoric proceeds from 
particular givens, passes to a general plane (as expedient), reapplies the latter to the case at 
hand. Even so, neither the (rhetorico-poetic, formal) techniques, nor the (ultimate) aim, will 
differ in a final (functional) analysis: “the dramatist, like the orator, adopts […] various means 
to achieve the verdict […] he wants his audience to pass” (Pearson “Character.” 78). 
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ethopoiía is underwritten (respectively superstructured) by—hence cannot be 
severed from—what tends to be deemed apposite at a given point in time.189 
|| 
189 Generally: “Ethos necessarily overlaps with decorum” (Herrick 136). Cf. “Mit […] Ethos 
hängt zusammen, dass Lysias […] τὸ πρέπον […] [‘beobachtet’], indem er seine Rede […] nach 
den [S]prechenden […] einrichtet, […] [‘und’] nach den Hörenden” (Blass Beredsamkeit I. 396). 
See Cicero: “in alioque ponatur aliudque totum sit, utrum decere an oportere dicas—oportere 
enim perfectionem declarat offici quo et semper utendum est et omnibus, decere quasi aptum 
esse consentaneumque tempori et personae” (“Orator” 360, xxii.74). Bruss logs “Lysias’s […] 
ability to dramatize his characters”, “excel[ling] at suitable, distinctive characterization” (36), 
but rejects the “mistake” of calling this “ethopoeia” in “Dionysius”: “he makes this observation 
not in his discussion of ethopoeia, but of propriety. Ethopoeia […] is concerned with a wholly 
different sense of characterization, […] the creation of persuasive ethos” (36; cf. 44). Rifting an 
(if not the) overarching directive from spec. devices is fundamentally unrhetorical. Yet (the 
possibility of) said severance makes (hence breaks) Bruss’ case: “the focus” is “on persuasive 
proof through character, not propriety. […] Dionysius […] addresses ethopoeia in a separate 
section […], suggesting a clear distinction” (37); his “description of Lysias’s propriety may seem 
like an elaboration of the speechwriter’s ethopoetic art […], but Dionysius discusses ethopoeia 
and propriety as distinct virtues” (45). Bruss deprioritizes that §7–9 are sequential (which may 
suggest affinity); that there are taxonomic, semantic links (to say nothing of inextricable 
interrelations in application). Her “classificatory” (37; cf. “the need for classification”, 56) take 
appears to construe severances, where associations, continuities would else be seen to obtain. 
In case her claim—that the serial listing in the “summary of Lysias’s virtues” (§13) “reinforc[es] 
the separation” (45)—should not seem a non sequitur: a succession may argue the opposite just 
as well (rhetorically put). Here as passim, the critic fails to give a functional analysis of the 
aptum. It is a means for easing persuasion, rendering it more effectual (saturating, lasting): one 
cannot sever the plausible from the apposite. Bruss’ postulate appears to entail that there could 
be ethos sans taking tò prépon into account—an assumption that must seem misguided. Apart 
from gainsaying the very ground swell of rhetoric, the critic’s dichotomism is also inexpedient 
to her case, since it urges a modification: “Both propriety and persuasive ethos are relevant to 
character portrayal, but the two concepts should not be conflated in Dionysius’s Lysias” (45). 
Such only seems to relativize her contrived rigor; for Bruss sets up an extreme case—to be able 
to reject it: from tò prépon and ethopoiía not being ‘identical’, it does not follow that they are 
‘clearly separate’. “As described by Dionysius, the style of persuasive ethopoeia focuses not on 
the fitting representation of a character’s manner of speaking (as is the case with propriety-
oriented ethopoeia) but rather on unaffected, plain-spoken naturalness” (38): like the (equally 
reductive) take she counters, Bruss seems guided by (ultimately) Romanticist premises; failing 
to allow for the contingency of the customary (with decontextualization, depragmatization qua 
corollary) tends to be paired with a want of appreciation for the craftedness of what is seen as 
(the) ‘natural’ (Bruss uses the phrase “artfully mimics nature”, which appears to presuppose 
the latter: 56). The aforesaid is linked to the critic’s further claims: “Dionysius makes a novel 
move, departing from the theories of his […] predecessors and introducing an aesthetic 
dimension to persuasive ethopoeia” (53); “noteworthy […] is Dionysius’s attention to the critical 
role of artless composition […] in the portrayal of favorable ethos. Effective ethopoeia […] is not 
only persuasive but also aesthetically pleasing, as indicated by his emphasis on lifelike, 
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 Having rendered ‘τὸ πρέπον’ paramount, Dionysius returns to the 
‘ventriloquistic’ praxis on the part of the speechwright ‘Lysias’—meaning, as he 
sees and (ethopoetically) conveys the latter’s textually sedimented ‘image’.190 
Since ‘persona differs from persona’ (‘diaphérei ton prosópon prósopa’—which 
Usher gives as “characters differ from each other”, “Lysias” 36–37, §9), 
Lysias puts words [‘phonàs’] in their mouths which suit [‘oikeías’] their several conditions. 
Similarly, with regard to his audiences, his words are gauged to suit [‘oikeíos’] their 
several dispositions[.] (“Lysias” 36–37, §9; cf. 46–47, §13)191 
|| 
charming composition. The term apsychos (unanimated, lifeless) […] appears to be unique to 
Dionysius’s account, […] underscor[ing] the aesthetic dimension of persuasive ethopoeia” (38; 
cf. 53). “With his attention to charm and animation, Dionysius expands the vocabulary of 
characterization, adding an aesthetic dimension to the portrayal of persuasive ethos” (56–57). 
It will not be needful to stress a critic’s apparent failure to perceive the ‘suavis’ in ‘persuasion’ 
(cf. Mayfield “Proceedings” 210; see this telltale phrasing: “not only persuasive but charming 
and lifelike”, Bruss 56); nor her (tacitly Kantianizing, Romanticist) view of ‘aesthetics’ (aligning 
with a depragmatizing slant passim); nor that, in so doing, she brings the (all but) excluded 
‘mimetic’ assumptions or connotations (cf. 35–36; 44–45) back into her argument. The central 
(dependable) problem of Bruss’ construal is a (general) lack of functional analyses—here: the 
fact that (so-called) ‘aesthetic’ pleasure (delectare) conduces to (an effectual) persuasion. As a 
crafted impression, the latter depends on the presence of an alter (spectators, readers); such 
were needless to say, if Bruss’ overall logic (of severance) did not relegate the reception and 
context passim. While referring to aptness in a given setting—“as is the case in forensic 
pleading”, “well-suited for the courtroom” (40; cf. 40n.), “best suited to the task”, “particularly 
useful in the ancient Greek courtroom” (46; cf. 47, 47n.; plus a mention of Plutarch’s pertinent 
sample: 55), “‘untimely’” (48; cf. 48n.; 51, on “the rhetoric of display”)—Bruss does not (seem 
to) apply this to her overall claim. Along with a proclivity for depragmatization and neglecting 
functional analysis (spec. the decisivemost query ‘why’), the critic also deprioritizes the ever 
requisite contextualization passim, hence (all but) spirits away the reception (a direct corollary 
of Bruss’ thetical severance). There can be no rhetoric sans situatedness; a conative tendency 
characterizes the art; every effect pertains to the moment, environment; a speaker cannot be 
isolated from the spec. conditions, audience: a given probability will (always) be persuasive 
(only) in a resp. setting; what is (per-, received as) verisimilar varies; effectuality is tied to what 
is considered apt under the particular circumstances. The latter would implicate Bruss’ thesis—
hence render its key claim (a severance of ethopoeia from tò prépon) fundamentally untenable. 
190 Cf. “modern judgements on Lysias’ style take as their starting-point the perceptive essay 
of Dionysius” (Carey “Intro.” 6n.). Roberts sees a “singularly happy estimate” as to “purity of 
expression […] gift of characterisation […] unfailing propriety […] vividness […] inimitable 
charm” (21). In this “most substantial of the three early essays” (Usher “Lysias. Intro.” 16), 
Dionysius “give[s] a clear […] comprehensive description of the archetype of […] Attic style, 
which furnishes a basis for the examination of subsequent models” (“Lysias. Intro.” 17). 
191 On this basis of diversity, Dionysius tenders a legitimization of (stylistic) variation with 
respect to settings (audiences) and the partes of (a forensic) speech (cf. “Lysias” 37, §9). 
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Being an (expressly) verbalized practice of propriety here, the semiotic act of 
accommodating—of rendering suitable and (apparently) pertinent (‘oikeion’)—is 
immediately connected to the ‘crafting’ of ‘character’ (‘ethopoiía’), in that it 
conduces to, or ensures, an effectual reception (with this always being the 
rhetorical measure).192 The result of this consistent alliance between the aptum 
and an ethos verbally rendered (poietón) will tend to be a likely, vivid 
(re)presentation (evidentia) via description or (semiotic) enactment. 
 At the metalevel, the express nexus of ‘enárgeia’, ‘ethopoiía’, ‘tò prépon’ 
(see Blass Beredsamkeit I. 397; with 396, 394, 398) implements an ‘ethopoietic’ 
portrait of the arch-rhétor’s persona—the quasi-performative treatise “Lysias” 
itself.193 For ‘characterizing’ is precisely what Dionysius is ‘doing’: both in the 
sense of ethos—qua (ostensively) consistent, habitual, (con)textual, general 
praxis, as (plausibly) ascribed to a persona denotated or crafted; and in terms of 
a more particular (speech-writerly, oratorical) ‘profile’, specifying a distinctive, 
memorable (if nominally or de facto elusive) trait: in this case, Lysian ‘cháris’ 
(cf. “Lysias” 38, §10; 40, §11; 42, §12; 44, 46, §13).194 By way of end focus in the 
|| 
192 Cf. “When persuasive ethos is the aim, style should be clear, simple, […] uncontrived, 
whatever the character type” (Bruss 49). This will not be so generally (let alone regardless of a 
given setting): in drama or epideictic, the case may (and often will) differ—elocutio is always 
contextual also. There can be no ethopoiía sans taking into account what is regarded as prépon 
at a given time (including ex negativo). Apart from the general inapplicability of presuming 
‘non-fluid’ demarcations between rhetorical categories (considering the téchne’s universality), 
unconditionalities and decontextualizations will be seen as going against the art’s very grain. 
193 This will be conducive: “Lysias shows self-consistency [‘homologoúmenós estin’] in both 
his private and his public speeches” (Dionysius “Dinarchus” 264–267, §6). Said impression of 
the orator’s (textual) ethos will also be due to the Ancient critic’s praxis of reception—removing 
from (not adding to) the corpus any oration as will not seem to ‘fit’. Mainly descriptive initially, 
the tract also cites the logographer, effecting a ‘characterization’ by speech (cf. “Lysias” 62–85, 
§20–27; with a ventriloquistic act: 74–77, §25); the parts given by Dionysius are the only 
remaining source for that oration (cf. Carey “Comment.” 207)—hence for the (speech-writerly) 
persona, its projected ethos, (latently) present therein. The ‘ethopoietic’ character of Dionysius’ 
rhetorical disquisition (focusing on docere) seamlessly integrates with the epideictic (chiefly 
geared toward delectare). Some formulae imply performance: “But I shall keep my eye on the 
time [‘chrónou’]” (“Lysias” 36–37, §10). This links to a justification of Lysian “terseness”: “Far 
from introducing inessential material, he may sometimes appear to have omitted much that 
might have helped his case; but of course he does this not through poverty of invention, but in 
order to keep within the time [‘chrónou’] allowed for the delivery of his speeches. The short 
[‘brachýs’] amount of time […] was adequate for the ordinary citizen to explain his case, but 
insufficient for an orator […] to display his rhetorical powers” (“Lysias” 30–31, §5). 
194 See the term ‘notatio’ in subch. 3.1. On cháris, cf. Plutarch: “καὶ σκόπει τὴν Λυσίου πειθὼ 
καὶ χάριν” (“Talkativeness” 408, 504C, §5). Blass gives it as “A n m u t h” (Beredsamkeit I. 397, 
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Ancient critic’s summa (of the devices detailed), “χάρις” is superstructured by—
or all but equalized with (the latter being reinforced by paronomasía)—the (not 
only oratorically) critical concept of “καιρός” (“Lysias” 46, §13; cf. 48, §14).195 
|| 
cf. 398–399). Dionysius employs the term “χαρακτῆρα” in contexts concerning the (stylistic, 
effectual) “quality” (“ἀρετή”) of “χάρις” (“Lysias” 38–39, §10): “This charm […] is the most 
important [‘kratísten’] and characteristic [‘charakterikotáten’] virtue [‘aretèn’] of Lysias’s style 
[‘léxeos’]” (“Lysias” 40–41, §11; cf. 44, §13). The nexus with ‘léxis’ is dependable (see “Lysias” 
44, §13; 50, §15; “Composition” 192, plus 199, §23); here ex negativo: “if the style [‘ho tes léxeos 
charaktèr’] is devoid of grace [actually: ‘hedonèn’] and beauty [‘aphrodíten’]” (“Lysias” 40, 
§11); cf. “certain characteristics of style [‘állous idíous léxeos charakteras’]” (“Lysias” 40–41, 
§11)—the (formal) ‘peculiarity’ (‘ídios’) is put in relief. Cf. Körte: “Auch […] Dionysios […] ist der 
Gebrauch von χαρακτήρ für den individuellen Stil des einzelnen Schriftstellers nicht fremd. […] 
Von dem χαρακτὴρ Λυσίου ist mehrfach bei ihm die Rede” (82). The discernment of ‘cháris’ is 
due to the ‘critic’ (in the etymological sense: cf. ‘krínas’), as Dionysius takes care to accentuate 
(“Lysias” 36–37, §10; here: 36; cf. 40, §11; 42, §12). In his metapoetical treatise, he gives ‘cháris’ 
as a subcategory of ‘hedoné’ (“Composition” 70–71, §11; see Russell Criticism 133–134; Usher 
speaks of their being “related”, “Lit. Comp. Intro.” 7; cf. Bruss 53n.). In §12, and §14 (vs. 
Theophrastus), Dionysius uses this ‘aisthetic’ (cf. “Lysias” 38, 40, §11) “criterion [‘tekmerío’]” 
of charm (“Lysias” 40–41, §12) for establishing a work’s authorship (see “Lysias” 40–45, §12; 
46–51, §14; “Dinarchus” 268–269, §7)—in addition to more ‘commonsensical’ gauges pertaining 
to questions of probable dating (“Lysias” 42–45, §12). As regards the former, see M. Morgan’s 
remark, telltale in its brevity: “If the Charm is there, the speech is genuine” (“Intro.” xxxvi, 
§32); comparably Bonner (Lit. Treatises 47–48; 100–101). In his essay on Dinarchus, Dionysius 
also offers a reading of this orator as contrasted with Lysias (“Dinarchus” 264–269, §6–7). 
195 Cf. “charm [‘cháris’] and a sense of timing [‘kairós’] which regulates everything else” 
(“Lysias” 46–47, §13); a phenomenon such as “felicities [‘charientizómenos’] at an infelicitous 
time [‘ou charíenti kairo’]” (“Lysias” 48–49, §14) reinforces said nexus, rendering ‘cháris’ sans 
‘kairós’ incongruous. Generally, cf. Quintilian: “Lysias’ delicate, clean-shaven texture [‘dicendi 
textum tenue atque rasum’] was not to be spoilt by richer rhythms. He would have lost the 
exceptional charm [‘gratiam’] of his simple, unaffected tone; […] also […] his credibility 
[‘fidem’]. He wrote in fact for others [‘Nam scribebat aliis’], and did not deliver the speeches 
himself [‘non ipse dicebat’]; his words, therefore, had to have a rough, unstructured look; yet 
this itself is a type of Composition” (Inst. Orat. 9–10. 170–171, 9.4.17; cf. Blass Beredsamkeit I. 
396n.; with 390, 393, 395–396). Quintilian links ‘celare artem’ to rhetorical ventriloquism, here. 
See Grube: “the simple style is as much a product of art as any other” (106). With respect to a 
sermon on Luther’s part (and his praxis generally), Stolt summarizes her rhetorical analysis as 
follows: “alles ist bewußt, gekonnt und nirgendwo auffällig. Daß das einfache Lesepublikum 
sich all dieser Kunstmittel nicht bewußt wurde, versteht sich von selbst” (77); cf. part 6, herein. 
For the elusiveness of ‘kairós’, see Dionysius’ lucid (meta-rhetorical) remark: “in every field of 
activity, how are we to define what is called ‘timeliness [‘kairòs’]’? And where do we find the 
mean [‘tò métrion’]? In each case it is our senses [‘aisthései’] and not our reason [‘ou lógo’] that 
provide the key” (“Lysias” 38–39, §11; cf. 40–41; “Composition” 86–87, §12; with Roberts 46n.). 
Seeing that ‘tò prépon’ had been given as the overarching rhetorical virtue earlier (“Lysias” 34, 
§9), it seems to be assimilated to (even equalized with) the ‘kairós’ in the concluding clause of 
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 Dionysius thus tenders (or rather, renders) a rhetorical ethopoiía of (and for) 
the (textually) perceived prósopon of the orator ‘Lysias’—including his capacity 
for precisely that technique: a structural mise en abyme (iterated in an affine 
context, below).196 The reader is facing an ‘ethopoietic’ description of a persona 
highly capable of rendering vivid, momentaneously evident éthe—also by 
putting suitable (hence plausible) words into the mouths of the protagonists (to 
be) envisioned or (re)presented (respectively staged). 
The ‘etho-poet’ Dionysius will indeed perform the latter at another point in 
his treatise, where a ‘characteristically’ Lysian oration is selected and quoted at 
length (see “Lysias” 62–85, §20–27).197 A sermocinatio also occurs at another 
|| 
Dionysius’ summa of the Lysian (and more generally rhetorical) “virtues of style”: “and a sense 
of timing which regulates everything else [‘kaì ho pánta metron kairós’]” (“Lysias” 46–47, 
§13)—a function it shares with appositeness (see “Composition” 86n.; with Aristotle Rhetoric 
380–381, 1408a, III.vii.8). On the timely, calculatedly ‘occasional’ cast of Lysian logography, cf. 
Plutarch’s anecdote (“Talkativeness” 408–409, 504C, §5; with Bruss 55, 55n.). Generally, see 
Schwartz: “der καιρός spielt bei Gorgias eine außerordentliche Rolle” (80). Contrast Süss (166–
168, spec. 167). See the Theophrastan portrait of “ἀκαιρία” (86–89, §12; here: 86; cf. Gomperz 
Griech. Denker III. 409; with context, 403–411)—which may seem to be the most ‘rhetorical’ of 
the extant sketches (de re). Niehues-Pröbsting deems ethopoiíai as “rhetorische Schulübung” a 
hypólepsis from the Peripatetic tradition; on an “Entwerfen von Charakterbildern, wie wir sie 
aus […] Theophrast kennen”, he notes: “Hintergrund dieser didaktischen Praxis dürfte […] die 
Advokatennotwendigkeit sein, nicht nur sich selber dem Publikum günstig zu präsentieren, 
sondern auch den Klienten zu charakterisieren und […] den Charakter der Gegenpartei in ein 
ungünstiges Licht zu rücken: Charakterdarstellung als Teil der Präsentation des Falles, der zur 
Beurteilung ansteht. Die Rhetorik hat jene eigenartige […] höchst wirkungsträchtige, für die 
Moralistik unverzichtbare Literaturgattung der Charakterbilder, die in der aristotelischen 
Schule aufkommt und die Ethik, Poetik […] Rhetorik integriert, in ihre Ausbildungspraxis 
aufgenommen und fortgeführt” (“Ethos” 351–352). On ‘negative’ ethopoiía, see subch. 5.1. 
196 The reception displays its effectuality. Cf. Carey: “The reader who can resist the spell of 
Lysias’ characterization” (“Comment.” 90). “It is […] difficult to believe that a speech so typical 
of Lysias is spurious” (“Comment.” 208). “Charm is a hallmark of Lysias’s art” (Bruss 53; with 
53n.). See Blass on the Lysian ‘Gesammtcharakter’ (Beredsamkeit I. 381–421). “Ausmalung und 
Verwerthung eines Ethos […] ist ja seine besondre Stärke” (Beredsamkeit I. 283). “Nicht minder 
charakteristisch […] für Lysias” (Beredsamkeit I. 418; cf. 419). Devries: “Lysias as we know him 
in his logographic speeches” (17; “distinctive style”, 16). Cf. “this excellence in ἠθοποιία” (M. 
Morgan “Intro.” xxxiii, §29; with xxxi, §27; “XXIV. Intro.” 119). “Lysias war ein Virtuose der 
Kleinmalerei […] die lysianische Kleinkunst” (Gomperz Griech. Denker II. 330). “Dionysius is […] 
showing Lysias to be supreme in the rendering of character (ἠθοποιία)” (Grube 214); see 
Fuhrmann (Die antike Rhetorik 122). Generally, cf. Cope’s note that “Sophocles […] was said to 
be δεινὸς ἠθοποιεῖν” (113; he gives no citation, but refers to Aristotle’s “Poetics”, ch. VI). 
197 Lysias is present in words (ascribed to him). As noted in subch. 3.3 (with Hellwig 257), the 
device is ‘technically’ the same, whether used for a given speaker, or on behalf of (resp. with a 
view to) another. As to what one might call ‘vicarious ethopoiía’, Bruss has: “the speeches [‘of 
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structural level, when the Ancient critic mentions Aristotle’s successor as 
(claiming to be) citing the arch-orator: “I suppose that there will be no objection 
if I quote the actual words of Theophrastus. They are as follows” (“Lysias” 48–
49, §14).198 In said passage—precisely on the grounds of inappropriateness 
(‘hetton harmóttei’, ‘aprepès’)—the philosopher criticizes ‘Lysias’ for ‘indulging 
in wordplay (‘onómasi paízein’) in a serious (‘spoude’, ‘spoudázonta’) context’ 
(“Lysias” 48–49, §14). Theophrastus (being quoted) then apparently cites from 
the orator to prove the point that Dionysius aims to refute—not on stylistic and 
propriety-related grounds (being in line with the philosopher in this respect), 
but by challenging the respective oration’s ascription to ‘Lysias’, deeming it 
words put into the latter’s mouth mistakenly and inequitably: 
If this had really been written by Lysias, he might justly be thought deserving of censure 
for introducing felicities [‘charientizómenos’] at an infelicitous time [‘en ou charíenti 
kairo’]. But if the speech is by someone else, which it is, it is the unfair critic who deserves 
blame, not Lysias. (“Lysias” 48–49, §14)199 
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Lysias’] were written for performance by the very person being characterized” (55). “The task of 
the ethopoet […] is to create this sort of character [sc. a ‘fair-minded, reasonable speaker’] when 
writing for a client” (40); “the aim of ethopoetic style is to create an impression of favorable […] 
character” (48). Bruss’ (generally problematic) severance of logographic ethopoeia from other 
forms of said technique cannot plausibly apply to Dionysius—precisely since his is also a 
rhetorico-theoretical metatext. The Ancient rhétor is concerned with describing the practice of 
vicarious, forensic ethopoiía—as available in written form: relegating (let alone detaching) the 
epideictic or deliberative will hardly seem plausible, much less descriptive (de re). 
198 As suggested (cf. subchs. 3.1, 5.2), the ventriloquistic devices seem to evince a tendency 
toward layering, proliferation (even ‘virality’). Devries frames his paraphrase in such a way as 
to render it a sermocinatio: “Of Lysias’ use of ethopoiia Dionysius […] says in substance: ‘Lysias 
proved himself the superior of all the orators in perception of human nature […]. Every detail 
that will serve […] the orator does not fail to introduce’. Such is the opinion of the Greek critic 
on Lysias’ use of ethopoiia” (14–15; cf. M. Morgan’s uptake at “Intro.” xxxi–xxxii, §27). 
199 Cf. Blass (Beredsamkeit I. 386); contrast Norden (Kunstprosa I. 120n., I.i.iv). Webster thinks 
that “Plato’s treatment of Lysias in the Phaedrus” might “lie[…] behind” the Theophrastan 
“judgment[…]” (122). Dionysius uses a timeless ploy: “That Lysias did not write the speech for 
Nicias, […] that it is written neither in his spirit [‘psyches’] nor his style [‘léxeos’], I can prove by 
an abundance of evidence [‘pány tekmeríois’]; but the present treatise does not afford me the 
opportunity [‘kairòn’] to do so. I am […] composing a monograph […] in which […] I shall show 
which are his genuine speeches, […] giv[ing] a detailed account of this speech and its […] 
authenticity” (“Lysias” 48–51, §14). A validation being unattainable—with claims to historicity 
tending to be rhetorical (ruses) at any rate—focusing on the process of sermocinatio will suffice. 
On the oratorico-poetical nexus, cf. Fuhrmann: “Dionysios hat durch sein Œuvre eine […] stark 
literarisierte Art der Rhetorik […] entscheidend gefördert” (Dichtungstheorie 196). One may note 
his yield for a (neo-)Humanistic, comparatist approach generally—pace Vickers (Defence 51n.). 
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4.2 Toward an Oratorico-Dramatic Approach to Authorship: 
Selfcraft in Shakespeare and Cervantes 
Do we yet appreciate fully the effect of rhetoric upon even so obvious a field as education? 
Diplomatics? Preaching? Science? These are […] questions whose answers  
[…] require concerted, persistent efforts over time. 
—Murphy (“Authors” 36)200 
at homines […] non nascuntur, sed finguntur. 
—Erasmus (“Declamation” 31, LB493)201 
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200 Cf. “Renaissance rhetoric must surely be one of the most-mentioned and least-studied 
subjects in modern scholarship” (Murphy “Authors” 29). 
201 Cf. “Los maestros de retórica se empeñan en fabricar oradores, según aquello de que poeta 
nascitur, orator fit” (Rico Verdú 11). See Vives, in particular: “neque vero tam spectabimus quid 
eum, quem loquentem facimus, deceat, ut personam, quam nos ei imponimus […] tales ipsi 
non sunt, at nos facimus” (185, Aa.r, II.xvi). Cf. Hacking (cum grano salis): “anyone who thinks 
about the individual, the person, must reflect on this […] idea, of making up people” (233). This 
heuristic segment aims at applying the taxonomic reflections of subch. 3.3 to spec. cases—the 
publicly (textually) projected personae named ‘Shakespeare’, ‘Cervantes’—with the purpose of 
conducing to a comprehensive reassessment of authorship in terms of rhetorical selfcraft. An 
extended notion of the term in question is common in Antiquity: “Die Bedeutung persona = 
dramatische, literarische Figur deckt sich nicht selten mit der Bedeutung persona = historische 
Figur oder geht fugenlos in sie über” (Fuhrmann “Persona” 87n.); for “a similar transition from 
the persona in drama to th[at] in [real] life”, he refers to De Officiis (“Persona” 87n.; trans. dsm; 
cf. 98; Cicero De Officiis 98–99, I.xxviii.97). As to the Byzantine context, cf. “Der Gebrauch des 
P[ersona]-Begriffs, der bald den Adressaten (Hörer, Leser, Richter […] Publikum), bald den 
Autor des literarischen Werkes bezeichnet, weitet sich aus” (Boriaud/Schouler 800). For 
further references, see Mayfield (“Interplay” 26n.–27n.). Greenblatt appears to be writing off 
the rhetorico-dramatic term in a half-line on Chaucer (Self-Fashioning 1): while not making an 
etymologico-conceptual (let alone descriptive) use thereof, he explicitly rejects the utility of 
“the view that the speaker is a persona” in one case, apparently since he takes the latter to be 
“detached” from “both poet and audience” (Self-Fashioning 151)—a separation disallowed in 
view of the resp. text’s “remarkably intense […] presence” (Self-Fashioning 152). In so doing, the 
critic takes the unified identity of the sender (as well as that of any receiver) for granted; and 
the impression (linguistically) effected as proof for an expressive essence. The concept in 
question appears to be discarded due to Greenblatt’s (tacitly) presupposing ‘the’ self (passim); 
cf. e.g. “More’s […] engagement in the world involved precisely the maintaining of a calculated 
distance between his public persona and his inner self” (Self-Fashioning 45; reiterated at 68); 
neither are pluralized—so as to preserve the consistent identity of the latter by severance from 
the former (with the externalization, essence posited). When the critic speaks of “Elizabeth’s 
conscious sense of her identity as at least in part a persona ficta and her world as a theater” 
(Self-Fashioning 167), he similarly presupposes the substance believed to be (partly) shrouded 
by the drapery. It will hardly be incidental that Greenblatt writes off rhetoric summarily (Self-
Fashioning 162); the proportions must seem problematic, given the téchne’s pervasiveness—in 
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Given a culture suffused with an all-encompassing oratorical education (with 
worldviews and forms of conduct reliably guided by rhetorical conceptions), it 
may seem plausible to apply the latter to the litterae also—hence see a given 
writer or playwright as (virtually) performing a role, taking on personae in 
keeping with the (con)textual (socio-moral, pragmatic) situation at hand.202 
Cultural settings as may be deemed especially rhetorical in said 
comprehensive sense are (inter alia) the Greece of the (itinerant) Sophists, the 
Hellenistic Age tout court; the (Republican, Imperial) Rome of Cicero, Seneca, 
|| 
terms of education, social (public, civic, communal) life; as to forensic, politico-deliberative 
oratory, homiletics, pamphleteering, letter writing, the affine arts (particularly the theater), etc. 
202 The set of problems inherited from an Idealist, Romanticist terminology may seem spec. 
patent in takes laying claim to a rhetorical approach otherwise. M. Crane aims “to resituate the 
commonplace book in its intellectual, social, […] ideological milieus”, whose “twin discursive 
practices of ‘gathering’ […] textual fragments and ‘framing’ […] them” she deems “an 
influential model for authorial practice and for authoritative self-fashioning” (3). She uses a 
narrow view of oratory: “Gathering and framing were not just rhetorical strategies” (3; also: 9, 
202n.). Instead of perceiving the téchne qua versatile, poly-purposive, (potentially, historically) 
transcending disciplinary, sociopolitical confines (being the Ancient, Humanist case), M. Crane 
submits an ideologically loaded dichotomy, positing “individualistic, imitative, imaginative, 
[…] aristocratic paradigms for selfhood and authorship” on the adverse side, claiming rather “a 
version of authorship that was collective instead of individualist, published instead of private” 
(4; the dualism is repeated at 6). While she opposes “overly teleological accounts” (11), wishes 
“to begin to understand the English Renaissance in all its otherness” (199), “to push aside 
anachronistic assumptions”, the latter is qualified by this tacit presupposition: “about the 
nature of the self” (11). Still, M. Crane refers to “subjectivity and authorship” (5), “the process 
of forming the ‘modern subject’ as a ‘self-regulating bourgeois individual’”, “individuality” (6), 
a “curiously modern subjectivity” (197). The critic confesses her projecting “a mix of theoretical 
fragments, divorced from their […] systems” (referring to Derrida, Foucault, Bourdieu, 
“Lacanian subject-formation”) back onto the Early Modern Age, thereby to counter the 
“Renaissance” that is “the product of the nineteenth century” (10): she apparently believes to 
be remedying the latter’s anachronisms by another—and in the name of “the demands of 
historicism” (10). M. Crane adopts a teleology construing that “those nineteenth-century 
concepts of self and work had not yet been fully formulated in the Renaissance”, asserting a 
“halting and uncertain movement in this period toward ‘modern’ concepts of self and work”; 
then claims that she is “concerned […] to excavate traces of sixteenth-century difference from 
these modern concepts”—while her next sentence proffers a self-refutation: “In the long 
process of creating the individual” etc. (10; cf. 202n.–203n.). There may be (linguistic) traces of 
a more rhetorical view; in passing, she speaks of “versions of self”, a resp. “present self”, “rival 
versions of the self” (which still presupposes ‘it’), “Shakespeare’s sonnet speaker project[ing] a 
self”, “tak[ing] up” a “role”; these partly descriptive insights decidedly jar with the Idealist 
terminology used passim—M. Crane has “modern subjectivity”, “shap[ing] the subject” on the 
same page (197; cf. 198). The critic’s take is also problematic due to its narrow focus on the 
English Renaissance—Early Modern rhetoric being a pan-European phenomenon. 
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Quintilian, and the Second Sophistic, up to (and including) Augustine; (Late) 
Medieval times (under the influence of Nominalism), as well as the Early 
Modern Age throughout Europe—from the rise of Humanism to the Baroque.203 
|| 
203 Baumlin, giving a comparable list (xviii), logs: “In each of these epochs […], rhetoric 
achieves a dominant position in intellectual culture” (xxviii, an endn.); he states that “the early 
Renaissance” is “described as a third sophistic” (xviii). Despite a brief mention of Altman’s 
study (cf. passim)—noting that arguing “in utramque partem […] permeated intellectual life in 
the early sixteenth century” (Greenblatt Self-Fashioning 230–231)—and ostensibly irrespective 
of his incidental claim (in the same paragraph) that “the cornerstone of the humanist project 
was a rhetorical education” (Self-Fashioning 230), this is neither reflected in the critic’s overall 
take (or applications); nor do said remarks seem to conduce to any more precise, detailed (let 
alone sustained) deliberations in Greenblatt’s inexplicit use of the polyfunctional, universalist 
téchne kat’ exochén. Apart from casual references (cf. Self-Fashioning 17, 22, 215, 283n.)—almost 
always sans technical taxonomies (added here for the reader’s convenience)—the art of rhetoric 
(including the resp. adjective, adverb, words relating to ‘eloquence’) is incidentally referred or 
alluded to in terms of persuadere (Self-Fashioning 102; 105; 215), movere (Self-Fashioning 103), 
elocutio (Self-Fashioning 23; 65; 87; 155), copia (Self-Fashioning 81), actio (Self-Fashioning 29–
30; 87), often downplayed in so doing (Self-Fashioning 16, “simply”; 60; 86; 97, “inflated”; 235, 
“rhetorical extremism”; cf. Negotiations 2, “anxious”), or used as an (ideological) offhand (see 
Self-Fashioning 69, 79, 89, 141, 151, 164, 203, 206, 253). With a passing reference to Burckhardt 
as his chief source for presuming the existence of what he calls “Renaissance self-fashioning” 
(Self-Fashioning 161), Greenblatt takes “established forms of identity” to be replaced by a view 
of “the self and the state as works of art”, whose act is given said label (Self-Fashioning 162); as 
the critic’s intertext signals (cf. Self-Fashioning xiii; 258n.), that construal is ultimately indebted 
to Mirandolian Neo-Platonism (see Greene 242–243). In this context, Greenblatt has a rundown 
on the art: “men created new models […]. The chief intellectual and linguistic tool in this 
creation was rhetoric, which held the central place in the humanist education to which most 
gentlemen were at least exposed. Rhetoric was the common ground of poetry, history, […] 
oratory; it could mediate […] between […] past and […] present […] the imagination and the 
realm of public affairs. Encouraging […] to think of all forms of human discourse as argument, 
it conceived of poetry as a performing art, literature as a storehouse of models […] offered […] 
the power to shape […] worlds, calculate […] probabilities, […] master the contingent […] 
implied that human character itself could be similarly fashioned, with an eye to audience and 
effect. Rhetoric served to theatricalize culture, or rather it was the instrument of a society […] 
already deeply theatrical” (Self-Fashioning 162). Apart from ostensively giving an account as 
minimally invasive as possible, this précis will hardly seem balanced (see “at least exposed”, 
“could”, his bias implied in “storehouse of models”), or precise (cf. “Rhetoric”, “oratory”); the 
want of any descriptive taxonomies must seem problematic, spec. with respect to ethopoiía—
where Greenblatt’s (titular) thesis is directly concerned (cf. “human character itself could be 
[…] fashioned”—the reflexive stress signaling a discordant essentialism). As to “Theatricality” 
(qua “disguise and histrionic self-presentation”) the value judgments continue (“alienated”, 
“uneasily”, “fetishistic”, “essentially”, “simply”); and while the “handbooks for actors” are 
seen as “closely related to the rhetorical” ones, their purpose—“offering an integrated rhetoric 
of the self, a model for the formation of an artificial identity” (Self-Fashioning 162)—is seen in 
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 In line with its guiding metaphor—seeing every human being as performing 
on the stage of the world—the latter period might seem to stand out, in that it 
conceives of actor and orator as one, of rhetoric as an “eminently social 
phenomenon” (Barner 89; trans. dsm; see 86–131).204 Such may well be said of 
|| 
substantialist terms (premising “the self”, a preestablished “identity” veiled by an “artificial” 
one). Greenblatt is dressing (up) an essence. As per a tacit ethopoetic hint, he seems prepared 
to log an “ethos of rhetorical self-fashioning”, plus “a sophistic view of the world”, amounting 
to “a celebration of Protean man”; but disavows all of the above by prefixing value judgments 
presuming an authenticity or verity said descriptions fail to meet (cf. “several convenient 
distortions”, “discreet omission”, Self-Fashioning 164). A similar take colors a related case: 
“Confident in his shaping power, Iago has the role-player’s ability to imagine his nonexistence 
so that he can exist for a moment in another and as another. […] ‘Were I the Moor, I would not 
be Iago’ (1.1.57)” (Self-Fashioning 235); this all but descriptive remark leads to the query “Is the 
‘I’ in both halves of the line the same?” (Self-Fashioning 235)—but the critic directly dualizes, as 
per his premising “identity”, “the subject” (Self-Fashioning 236). At once, the passage on ‘Iago’ 
had been prequalified as “a parodically sententious theory of self-fashioning” (Self-Fashioning 
235). The critic’s devotion to psychoanalytico-biographistic speculations superstructures all of 
his construals, inhibiting descriptivity: “Iago is not the playwright’s only representation of 
himself. […] Shakespeare […] possessed a limitless talent for entering into the consciousness of 
another, perceiving its deepest structures as a manipulable fiction, reinscribing it into his own 
narrative form” (Self-Fashioning 252). That leads him to declaring “Montaigne” an ‘inventor’ of 
a “mode of non-narrative self-fashioning” (Self-Fashioning 252), while Shakespeare is construed 
as “the supreme purveyor of ‘empathy’, the fashioner of narrative selves” (Self-Fashioning 252–
253). The critic’s reductive, non-diachronic, ideological take on rhetoric affects his claims (here 
as elsewhere), renders problematic his wish to be guarding against “losing a sense of the larger 
networks of meaning” (Self-Fashioning 4; cf. 5); as well as his asking “what forces were at work 
in sixteenth-century England that enabled individuals to conceive of themselves as malleable 
roles in life itself as well as in writing” (Self-Fashioning xiii). A failure to pertinently address the 
art’s linguistico-technical aspects will typically result in a disregard for (or even a denial of) its 
methodical, poly-purposive, transgeneric, universal im- and applications. In Greenblatt’s later 
monograph, the lack of any significative, detailed discussion of rhetoric—let alone as a whole 
(cf. passing remarks, Negotiations 2, 6, 46, 54, 57)—seems spec. problematic, given the critic’s 
focus on “cultural transactions”, “collective production”, “the social dimension of literature’s 
power” (Negotiations 4), “contingent social practices”, “a poetics of culture” (Negotiations 5; cf. 
Self-Fashioning 5)—all of which not only imply the noetico-linguistic téchne par excellence; but 
would, in any (discourse) historical, descriptive approach to Early Modernity, unequivocally 
necessitate a sustained, methodical, thorough recourse to the art and traditions of rhetoric. Cf. 
Küpper’s critico-functional evaluation of Greenblatt’s overall (and narrowly “‘national’”) take, 
spec. as to the latter’s “metonymy of circulating social energy” (“Hypotheses” 5; with 3–6). 
204 Cf. Plett: “in the Renaissance […] practically every pupil was trained to be an actor-poet” 
(Culture 283). “The world […] becomes one grand stage on which the actor-poet performs in 
varying costumes” (Culture 288). Stressing “[d]ie große Theaterfreudigkeit der Menschen”, 
Burger logs: “Im Zeitalter des Barock lebt der Mensch in der Tat […] sein Leben als Rolle […] als 
mehrere wechselnde Rollen” (Rolle 85). “Modell der Barockgesellschaft ist der Hof […]er […] 
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Early Modernity overall—whose rhetorico-dramatic worldview is condensed in 
notable lines from the Shakespearean corpus: 
Life’s but a walking shadow, a poor player, / That struts and frets his hour upon the 
stage[.] (Macbeth 288, V.v.23–24) 
All the world’s a stage, / And all the men and women merely players. / They have their 
exits and their entrances, / And one man in his time plays many parts[.] (As You Like It 
227, II.vii.140–143; with 227n.)205 
This socio-dramatic isotopy—prevalent for well over two millennia of Western 
culture—refers to an oratorico-theatrical conception of the term ‘persona’, with 
|| 
bedeutet die Welt. Ein Mann von Welt […] heißt der Hofmann. Er spielt […] eine Rolle” (Rolle 
87). Cf. “Barockrhetorik […] ist auf Mitspielen, auf Kommunikation ausgerichtet, ein eminent 
soziales Phänomen” (Barner 89; with Heudecker/Wesche 104). “Durch […] Gestaltung und 
Durchstilisierung seines leibhaften Auftretens rückt den Redner in die Nähe des Schauspielers” 
(Oesterreich Fundamentalrhet. 129; cf. 136). Moos observes: “Da jedermann schauspielert, muß 
es auch Zuschauer geben” (512, §106); “quia spectaculum facti sumus mundo, et angelis, et 
hominibus” (1Cor 4:9; Vulgate; with Moos (512n.); Quiring (11). Cf. “zur epochalen Metapher 
wurde nicht die ‘Weltmusik’, sondern das ‘Welttheater’: weil […] hier der Mensch wirklich als 
agierende persona in Erscheinung tritt, als Schauspieler […] Rhetor” (Barner 93; with Marschall 
520). Cf. Gordon on “Peletier du Mans”—for whom, “as for Shakespeare[,] all the world’s a 
stage”, with “the poet […]play[ing] the most conspicuous role” (380). As to Hermogenes’ 
influence on Delminio’s “gnoseo-magical system” elaborated in his “Theater of the World”, cf. 
Monfasani (186). On the metaphor of the ‘world qua theater’, see Blumenberg (Höhlenausgänge 
373, as to Condillac; Paradigmen 27; 34–35; with Bacon’s Advancement 85, [II.ii.3]; Schiffbruch 
39–40; 45–46; with Trüstedt “Schiffbruch” 108); cf. Quiring (8): “der Erfolg der Metapher 
[‘hängt’] mit ihrer enormen Variabilität und […] Zirkularität zusammen[…] sie kann […] dazu 
dienen, die Welt als Theater zu repräsentieren, […] das Theater als Welt; beide Elemente […] 
können die Position des Bildspenders wie die des Bildempfängers einnehmen” (7); “als 
theatrum mundi kann […] die gesellschaftliche […] [und] die kosmische Ordnung bezeichnet 
werden; […] die Metapher kann eingesetzt werden, um d[eren] Spannung […] zu verdecken […] 
zu betonen” (19). On Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, see Marquard: “In dieser Vorstellung namens 
Welt spielen wir unsere ‘Rolle’ […] werden […] zu dem, ‘was einer vorstellt’” (Aesthetica 110; cf. 
Schopenhauer 315; 350–401). For further references, see Mayfield (“Interplay” 27n., 32n.–33n.). 
205 Cf. Prospero’s affine remarks (Tempest 253–254, 4.1.148–158; 285–286, Epilogue.1–15). In a 
(meta-)soliloquy (“the world is populous / And here is not a creature but myself”), with 
“thoughts” vicariously “peopl[ing] his little world” (Richard II. 461, 5.5.3–4, 5.5.9), Richard 
engages in virtual roleplay: “Thus play I in one person many people” (Richard II. 463, 5.5.31; 
with 463n.). Cf. “The stage of Shakespearean theater is the […] world (Theatrum mundi). […] 
This […] is a […] legacy of the medieval theater […] public spectacles” (Bakhtin Speech 171n.; 
“Methodology” 74n.). “‘Totus mundus agit histrionem’ […] ein möglicher Epochenschlüssel der 
Renaissance” (Plett “Theatrum Rhet.” 328). See Curtius (150–151, §7.5); Moos (508–512, §106); F. 
Neumann in Lipsius (379n.–380n.); Quiring (14–15); Dusinberre (42–43). Cf. subch. 3.3, herein. 
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decidedly communal and public implications (see subchapter 3.3, above).206 
Even so, the ‘modern’ state of play as regards the word ‘person’ is at variance 
therewith: its dramatico-rhetorical associations have largely been displaced, 
primarily due to Pauline, (Neo-)Platonizing, Stoicizing Christianity—including 
modifications, (secularized) derivatives, (tacit) byproducts.207 Fuhrmann notes:  
the Romans took persona […] to mean something like ‘function’ or role, but not, what we 
today ([…] since Kant, at the latest) are wont to understand by [the term] ‘person’. 
(“Persona” 83; trans. dsm; cf. 85)208 
|| 
206 Cf. “la tragédie utilisait masques typiques […]. La comédie […] aussi, de types généraux” 
(Nédoncelle 280). On “persona”: “Comment s’est effectuée la transposition du théâtre à la vie? 
[À] la fois par l’idée de masque et […] de personnage. La première conduit plutôt à la notion 
d’un type ou […] caractère observables du dehors […]. La seconde […] mène à une conception 
sociale ou morale de la personne” (298). Said article (all but) neglects the art—apart from brief 
(forensic) references: “rôle en justice” in Cicero (297; cf. “fonctionnaires”, 282; “juristes”, 298). 
207 See Fuhrmann (“Persona” 102–104). Cf. “Tragende Bedeutung erhält die P[ersona] in zwei 
[…] Bereichen der […] Theologie: […] der Trinitäts- und […] Inkarnationslehre. […] prósōpon 
entspricht […] de[r] neuplatonischen […] Hypostase oder […] der Person” (Boriaud/Schouler 
799). See Oesterreich: “Ciceros pluralistisches Modell menschlicher Selbsterfindung in seiner 
Vier-Personen-Lehre […] [‘bildet’] die für eine rhetorikaffine Rekonstruktion des Begriffs der 
P[erson] vielleicht wichtigste antike Quelle. Dagegen kommt es in der christlichen Metaphysik 
[…] zu einer […] Substantialisierung, Rationalisierung […] Uniformisierung des Personbegriffes. 
[…] Durch diese […] geht für die […] Personen der […] Trinität der typisch theatralische […] 
rhetorische Rollen-Charakter des römischen Persona-Modells verloren” (“Person” 865; cf. 
“Polypersonalität” 77; Cicero De Officiis 108–109, I.xxx.107; 116–119, I.xxxii.115). On the idea of 
the “‘subject’”, of “individual autonomy […] at least since Descartes and Kant”, Gill notes: 
“underlying this idea […] is the conviction, which forms part of Christian thought, that each 
individual person, or soul, is an object of special concern to God” (“Particulars” 129). Qua 
shoots of such (otherworldly) construals, Cartesianism, Idealism, Romanticism (plus countless 
spinoffs) assert a stable, substantialist ‘subject’, unified ‘identity’, sundry forms of entitlement 
to ‘dignity’, an essential, unchangeable, inalienable ‘Being’ for each ‘individual’ (soi-disant). 
From a rhetorical perspective, letting philosophers speak of ‘the Self’ may seem akin to having 
theologians preach about ‘the Soul’: ‘cui bono’. Thereto, cf. Lausberg (Handbuch 93, §158–159). 
208 “Die[…] rationalistische […] identitätslogische Tendenz der […] Subjektivitätsphilosophie, 
die von […] rhetorikaffinen […][A]spekten wie Leiblichkeit, Orationalität […] Rollenpluralität 
abstrahiert, läßt sich bis in die ‘Transzendentale Logik’ in Kants ‘Kritik der reinen Vernunft’ […] 
verfolgen”—which Oesterreich calls “rhetorikrepugnante[r] Kognitivismus” (“Person” 867; cf. 
“Subjektivität” 1292; Fundamentalrhet. 95–102). His attempt at a “fundamentalrhetorische 
Rekonstruktion der von Descartes ausgehenden Tradition der Subjektphilosophie, die für eine 
starke theoretische Positionierung des Ich plädiert” (“Polypersonalität” 76; cf. “Identität”, 
83)—Oesterreich’s “Projekt der Exploration dieser möglichen Symbiose von Rhetorik und 
Subjektphilosophie” (“Polypersonalität” 75)—amounts to a contradictio in adiecto. In line with 
a subjectivist slant, he (circularly) presupposes the self (cf. “Polypersonalität” 78: “der eigenen 
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For heuristic purposes, one might call to mind the Ancient and Early Modern 
|| 
Person”; Descartes projected backward: “Gesamtpersönlichkeit”, 81; with 83). On the contrary, 
rhetoric is transpersonal, contextually conative. Oesterreich’s mysticisms, -fications—seeing an 
“arkane[s] Wissen[…] um die artifizielle […] plurale Formbarkeit der eigenen Persönlichkeit” as 
“Berufsgeheimnisse[…] professioneller Rhetoriker” (“Polypersonalität” 78)—are Romanticist, 
(symptomatically) anachronistic. Such will not pertain to an Ancient context, where ‘rhetoric’ 
may have been many a thing, but hardly ‘arcane’ (to say nothing of the stock progymnasmata). 
Oesterreich’s seeing “drei gegeneinander relativ abgeschlossene Sinngebiete (inter-)personaler 
Überzeugungsbildung” (Fundamentalrhet. 83; cf. 82–88) seems fundamentally unrhetorical—a 
result of rationalistic, Enlightenment, Romanticist bias in said critic: “Essenz der […] Identität” 
(Fundamentalrhet. 82), “‘Geburtsstätte’ der Subjektivität” (Fundamentalrhet. 83), “‘eigentlicher’ 
Sinnidentität” (Fundamentalrhet. 86; cf. 87), “authentisch[…]” (Fundamentalrhet. 88; 132–142; 
most problematically: “das authentische Ethos”, 100); his moralizing is but consequential 
(“denaturieren”, “Deformation”, Fundamentalrhet. 88; cf. 87; passim). As to ideas of ‘the Selfe’, 
Reiss speaks of “whoness—from […] Petrarca’s time to […] Descartes’”, with “‘personhood’” qua 
“sense […] of who and what she or he was in everyday experience, in doing and being in the 
local world” (1). While wishing to offer “aspects”, “‘takes’ on experiences of who-ness” (6), to 
start from “a communally embedded sense of being human” (3; cf. 2, 23–24)—with “circles or 
spheres” that “precede[…] the person”, giving in “public and collective” terms “what a person 
was” (2)—Reiss essentializes the latter (cf. “integral to my very substance”, “existential”, 2; 
“essential”, 3, 21; “divine”, 5; “essential differences”, 16; despite disclaimers at 8–9, 23); such a 
‘socializing’ metaphysics obtains passim (cf. 2–3; 5–6). The critic thus rejects that these “were 
[…] social roles or positions […] adopted […]. These realms were what it was to be human” (3). 
He perseveres in said dismissal when faced with “Aristotle[’s] […] functional concept of the 
human”, Cicero’s theory of “roles (personae)”—by asserting: “this misdirects attention” (4)—
i.e. away from his presuppositions, to where he could hardly want it (a dramatico-oratorical 
view); in parentheses, apparently sans bearing on his case, Reiss notes that “(like others, 
Cicero stressed the theatrical meanings of persona)” (128). In light thereof, it will hardly be 
accidental that the critic (all but) entirely neglects that other “two-thousand-year overarching 
system” (23)—rhetoric—throughout (for incidental mentions, cf. e.g. 195, 288–289, 399, 430, 
478, 484–486, partly in citations or titles); in at least one instance, this (ostensively purposive) 
oversight seems to veer into outright contempt for the art: “At worst, these chapters may be 
useful in classicists’ and philosophers’ debates” (8). Referring to “divers personhoods”, Reiss 
apparently means various versions of his construal; coming up against “several names” (a 
structurally symptomatic instance), the critic supposes “unreliability”, premises an entity in 
stating: “who she was fades in and out” (24). Similarly: “The community had to know whether 
that persona was a mask or a person” (385). Reiss not only believes his coinage “who-ness” to 
“seem fairly neutral”, but also the concept of “‘person(hood)’” (25); virtually all of his mentions 
of the Ancient terms (‘persona’, ‘prósopon’) refer to Cicero’s Stoicizing “four personae” (127; cf. 
128–129, 210, 261), or affine takes (241; 252–253). For Petrarch, he logs that “[t]o choose the civic 
(‘political’) life was to elect a persona”—but qualifies: “What persona was available depended 
on one’s particular human natura” (322). A poetico-rhetorical conception of the term may be 
involved as to the Canzoniere: “the present persona […], by collecting the scattered rhymes, 
brings itself into existence […]. It is a persona rebuilt from and in all these poems” (342). 
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conception of personae (with their forensico-theatrical, politico-mercantilistic 
implications), and tentatively apply them to the present: Oesterreich, for 
instance, discerns a ‘pluralization or multiplication of roles’ in a globalizing 
world (cf. “Person” 862; 867; 869; 871); de re, the thoroughgoing virtualization 
characterizing the new millennium may seem to signal an intensely and 
comprehensively rhetorical age worldwide.209 
 Like ‘éthe’, the affine concept in question is (highly) contextual: personae 
are seen as agents in relation to the society they live and act in.210 
|| 
209 As to the multimedia cultures of a virtual age, Oesterreich discerns a “Rollenvermehrung 
des gesellschaftlichen Selbst”—a “general consciousness of the rhetorical artificiality of [one’s] 
own[,] personal roleplay”—while speaking of the “artificial rhetorical forming of [one’s] own[,] 
self-staged personality” (“Person” 871; trans. dsm); the latter might be pluralized. 
210 Cf. Bakhtin: “rhetoric has always to do with social man” (Dialogic 353). “The world has 
contextual meaning” (Speech 159; “Methodology” 63). As per Currie, “indirect characterization 
[…] through membership of the key micro- and macro-social groups (genos and polis)” (314) is 
paramount—not only in Ancient times and litterae; cf. Bakker on “characterization by group 
membership” (“Lysias” 423). De Temmerman/Emde Boas log: “characters […] are embedded in 
societal norms and codes” (“Intro.” 22n.; cf. 7–9)—with their references to Gill cum grano salis, 
given his routine deprioritizing of the art (wherein they partly partake). As to Cicero, Gill does 
note: “De Officiis […] presents officia, duties or obligations, as grounded in the nexus of roles, 
mores […] instituta that […] make[s] up the culture” (“Personhood” 196); “the decorum theory as 
a whole (of which the personae-theory is a part) presupposes a particular social structure” 
(“Personhood” 193; cf. “Particulars” 133). Yet said critic’s take seems enfeebled by an ostensive 
innocence of rhetoric’s import in this respect (its absence being spec. striking at “Particulars” 
137–138; 141n.; 142–143; likewise passim); while pointing to a significant lacuna in Gill’s slant 
(here re “kairos”), Hobbs equally eludes the art (150; passim). On contextualism, cf. “Jeder 
Persontopos besitzt einen gegenüber […] anderen Positionen mehr oder weniger definierten Ort 
im Ordnungsgefüge der Gesamttopik, den […] gesellschaftlichen status. […] einzelne[…] 
Persontopoi sind […]pragmatische Vor-bilder, […] Gesinnungs- […] Handlungstyp[en] […]. Diese 
[…]pragmatischen Persontopoi sind […] [als] ‘ethos’, ‘persona’ […] ‘soziale Rolle’ bekannt. […] In 
der Bedeutungstradition der persona als prosopon, […] Maske […], entwickelt sich mit der 
theatrum-mundi-Idee die Vorstellung der Person als rollenspielende”—acting “eine Pluralität 
sozialer Rollen” (Oesterreich Fundamentalrhet. 86). “Persontopoi” are “habitualisierte 
Gesinnungs- […] Handlungstypisierungen, die einem […] geschichtlichen Lebensweltbild 
zugehören”: “ein Reservoir für die […] Gestaltung” of roles; “jeder Topos ist aufgrund seiner 
Potentialität […] vielsinnig interpretierbar […], das jeweilige Rollenschema” is “ausgelegt, 
ausgestaltet […] situativ verwirklicht”; “die Kombination einer ganzen Reihe von Persontopoi” 
is possible, leading to ‘multidimensional social’ personae; “die Symbolizität der Persontopoi 
[‘besteht’] vor allem in den für sie bezeichnenden sprachlichen Typisierungen und persuasiven 
‘Rollen’”; “die Vorweg-Geltung des allgemeinen Sozialstatus [‘verbindet sich’] mit den in der 
[…] Realisation bedeutsamen […] Geltungselementen zur […] Autorität” (Fundamentalrhet. 87; 
see the felicitous wording: “Reservoir der rhetorischen Typisierungen”). As to the Baroque, cf. 
Burger: “die ‘Person’ [‘steht’] in […] Wechselbeziehung zur Mitwelt, zu den Mitmenschen, 
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‘Individualistic’ notions (soi-disant) are secondary (if that).211 Essentialist 
approaches must seem misguided, given the typical contingency of communal 
‘habits’ and ‘mores’, ‘parts’ or ‘roles’.212 Even so, the inductive description of 
variants may lead to the discernment of certain general tendencies.213 In Ancient 
Athens or Rome, Early Modern England, France, or on the Iberian Peninsula (for 
instance), one is dealing with societies—be they democratic, republican, 
imperial, or courtly—wherein actores are perceived with respect to the prevalent 
social fabric and its corresponding roleplay. The preponderance of a distinctly 
rhetorical worldview in Castiglione may be taken as a Renaissance case in 
point—specifically the emphasis on decorum qua situational effectuality: 
a universal rule […] valid […] in all human affairs whether in word or deed: […] avoid 
affectation in every way possible […] practice in all things a certain sprezzatura […] [‘usar 
in ogni cosa una certa sprezzatura’], so as to conceal all art [‘che nasconda l’arte’] and 
make whatever is done or said appear to be without effort[.] (Courtier 32, I.26; Cortegiano 
59, I.xxvi)214 
|| 
antwortet auf deren Anspruch […] bringt sich zur Geltung” (Rolle 88). See Davis (53; passim), 
cum grano salis: while wishing to differ from Burckhardt’s idea of individualism, stressing that 
“the exploration of self in sixteenth-century France was made in […] relation to the groups to 
which people belonged”, she proceeds from a dualistic premise (cf. “the conceptual self and 
the bodily self”), presupposes “the self” or “identity” (53; cf. 56, 63), speaks of “autonomy”, 
“individuality” (60; cf. 62), of “the person” (63)—and does not perceive that the notion of a 
‘persona’ is present, even when citing a resp. instance from her sundry sources (cf. 54). 
211 To say nothing of (Romanticizing, psychoanalytico-)metaphysical construals—premising 
‘the’ self, appending whichever terminological couture may happen to be en vogue at the time. 
212 Accentuating contingency (see Mayfield Artful 12n.; 36–38, 36n.; 53; 445–451; passim) will 
seem expedient with respect to defusing a fashionable desire for essentializing. Cf. “das Ethos 
[‘wird’] ständig durch den konkreten Fall modifiziert, […] neu ausgelegt” (Ptassek 65). Likewise 
Baumlin, noting that “ethos” will “change over time and among cultures” (xxii). See Geertz: 
“Human thought is consummately social: […] in its origins, […] functions, […] forms, […] 
applications. […] thinking is a public activity—its […] habitat is the houseyard, […] marketplace, 
[…] town square” (385, §14). “In […] anthropolog[y] […], the moral ([…] aesthetic) aspects of a 
given culture, the evaluative elements, have commonly been summed up in the term ‘ethos’ 
[…]. A people’s ethos is the tone, character, […] quality of their life, its moral and aesthetic style 
[…] the underlying attitude toward themselves and their world” (136–137, §5.i). He admits: “The 
concepts […], ethos and world view, are vague […] imprecise” (153, §5.iv). While employing a 
problematic gauge (cf. “Burckhardt”, “Renaissance princes”, 433, §14), Geertz’ application is of 
heuristic value: he describes “public men, […] for whom other aspects of personhood—
individual character, birth order, kinship relations, procreative status, and prestige rank take, 
symbolically at least, a secondary position. […] they, focusing on social position, say that their 
role is […] their […] selves” (411, §14; infinitized, essentialisms quarantined). 
213 See Blumenberg (Beschreibung 487; cf. 485); Mayfield (“Variants of hypólepsis” 238–239). 
214 Cf. Castiglione’s context: “facility in such things causes the greatest wonder; […] we may 
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Said accent on an apparently artless adaptation to given environs involves the 
concept at issue: to speak of ‘personae’ signifies the playing of ‘roles’, donning 
of ‘masks’, taken up from a civic, official inventory (always with variation); as 
well as the contextual crafting (redescribing), feckful conveying, of public 
‘faces’ or ‘images’ (with correlative ‘voices’, ‘bearings’)—‘worn’, performed, 
projected, staged, in accordance with customary, recognizable functions, within 
a social setting, as per prevalent cultural routines.215 The condition of possibility 
for a (decidedly) rhetorico-pluralistic ‘poetics of self’ will likely be the 
(ostensible) processual stability—a simultaneity of variance and consistency—
facilitated by a technico-natural héxis: one might lend a hand to habit.216 
|| 
call art true art which does not seem to be art [‘esser vera arte che non pare esser arte’]; nor 
must one be more careful of anything than of concealing it [‘nasconderla’] […] certain most 
excellent orators in ancient times [‘alcuni antichi oratori eccellentissimi’] […] tried to make 
everyone believe [‘far credere ad ognuno’] that they had no knowledge whatever of letters [‘sé 
non aver notizia alcuna di lettere’]; and, dissembling [‘dissimulando’] their knowledge, they 
made their orations appear to be composed in the simplest manner” (Courtier 32, I.26; 
Cortegiano 59, I.xxvi; cf. 59n.). Cf. Cicero’s “neglegentia […] diligens” (“Orator” 362, xxiii.76; 
with: “quod indicet non ingratam neglegentiam”, xxiii.77). See Plett: “The sprezzatura concept, 
which Castiglione—in accordance with classical authorities on […] celare artem […]—applied to 
the courtly code of conduct, means […] the alleged artlessness of art or the pretended 
effortlessness with which the artificiality of the courtly code is practiced in social life. The 
courtier fashions his existence into a work of art, but he does so in such a way that it has the 
appearance of supreme naturalness […]. The courtier is an actor playing roles; he takes 
pleasure in fictionalizing his existence” (“Style” 369). “Castigliones Traktat Il Cortegiano macht 
durch sein sprezzatura-Konzept, das auf dem rhetorischen celare artem-Theorem basiert, den 
Höfling zu einem Schauspieler” (“Rhet. der Renaissance” 9). Christiansen notes: “Castiglione’s 
The Book of the Courtier applies rhetoric to manners” (330n.). Cf. Oesterreich: “Dabei knüpft 
auch der frühneuzeitliche Idealtypus des Hofmannes, wie er i[m] […] ‘Libro del Cortegiano’ 
beschrieben wird, wieder an das durch die antike Rhetoriktradition vorgebildete Modell der 
artifiziellen Selbsterfindung der öffentlichen P[erson] an, die durch das äußere soziale decorum 
und das gesellschaftlich herrschende honestum reguliert wird. Das […] Vorbild des vollendeten 
Hofmannes, dessen weltläufiger Stil der Selbstinszenierung unter ständiger Berücksichtigung 
des rhetorischen Kunstverbergungsgebotes (celare artem) dem Ideal der Leichtigkeit 
(sprezzatura) zustrebt, bildet […] eine frühneuzeitliche Postfiguration des ciceronischen orator 
perfectus” (“Person” 866). Moralizing will be offset by stressing the pragmatico-factual value of 
appearances. Generally: “Rhetorische Bildung stellt einen unerläßlichen Bestandteil und die 
Legitimation des höfischen Menschen schlichthin dar” (Briesemeister 103). “Puttenham has 
merged his poetics and rhetoric manual with the core functions of a courtesy book” 
(Wigham/Rebhorn 60). On Castiglione and rhetoric, see Kahn (380–381); Hempfer (115–116; 
115n.; passim); Mack (History 296–298); Mayfield (“Interplay” 6n.; 37n.–38n.); cf. part 6, herein. 
215 Not the dressing or maquillage of a presupposed ‘identity’, ‘subjectivity’, ‘Being’ (or any 
fashionable substantialism else). 
216 Generally, see Schwartz: “κατὰ τρόπον ist ein pleonastischer Zusatz, der nichts anderes 
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 Where temporality, corporeality, and contingency are permitted to return 
from their enforced sojourn in essentialist neglect and negation, personae will 
be seen to vary: none are dealing with one only—certainly not over the course of 
a life, where a “pluralization of roles” (Oesterreich “Person” 862; 869; 871; 
trans. dsm) effectually obtains. Moreover, masks do have a ‘face value’, which 
may (and typically will) be read as such.217 Above all, incidentally expedient and 
poetico-selective acts of dependably multilateral, reciprocally effected, 
oratorico-virtual selfcraft occur at all times—yielding a factual pluralism of éthe 
and personae: neither does anyone play but one role, nor will these commonly 
be ‘homemade’; and even the craftier ones are hypoleptic in effect.218 
 As a matter of course, a somatic substratum (including vital, decidedly 
physical héxeis) is always to be reckoned with at an elemental level. A 
‘monopolylogic’ anecdote by one of the most multifaceted, rhetorically versatile 
writers of all time might prove expedient on and at this point: 
Noticing that the dancer had five masks [‘πρόσωπα’] ready—the drama had that number of 
acts—since he saw but the one dancer, he [sc. a ‘βάρβαρος’] enquired who were to dance 
and act the other rôles [‘πρόσωπεῖα’], and when he learned that the dancer himself was to 
act and dance them all, he said [to him][:] ‘I did not realise […] that though you have only 
this one body [‘σῶμα’], you have many souls [‘ψυχὰς’]’. (Lucian “Dance” 268–269, §66; cf. 
270, §67)219 
|| 
bedeutet als ἦθος selbst” (15; with Plato “Timaeus” 92, 42E). Cf. the Aristotelian notion of “ἕξις” 
qua “settled disposition” (Nicomach. Ethics 94–95, 1107a, II.vi.15; see 68–69, 1103a, I.xiii.20; 
364–365, 1143b, VI.xii.1; with Lausberg Handbuch 28, §7–8; Trimpi Muses 123; 259–260; 268–
269; 353). Cf. also these descriptions: “our actions […] determine the quality of our dispositions 
[‘ἕξεις’]” (Nicomach. Ethics 74–75, 1103b, II.ii.1); “dispositions [‘ἕξεις’] are […] formed states of 
character” (Nicomach. Ethics 86–87, 1105b, II.v.2). Hahn sees selves as “Habitusensemble[s]” 
(10). For the nexus of (a) rhetorical (concept of) ethos and héxis, cf. Aristotle: “Character 
[‘ἠθικὴ’] also may be expressed by the proof from signs, because to each class and habit [‘ἕξει’] 
there is an appropriate style. […] I call habits [‘ἕξεις’] those […] states which form [‘ποιός’] a 
man’s character in life; for not all habits do this. If then anyone uses the language appropriate 
[‘τὰ ὀνόματα οἰκεῖα’] to each habit [‘ἕξει’], he will represent [‘ποιήσει’, sc. ‘make, craft’] the 
character [‘τὸ ἦθος’]” (Rhetoric 378–379, 1408a, III.vii.6–7); see Eden, accentuating that the 
orator is “to present an ēthos that audiences find persuasive” (“Lit. Property” 35). 
217 The received ‘image’ of a (visible) speaker (‘face value’) is (politico-)rhetorically decisive. 
218 Cf. “the Renaissance conceived of human beings as actors who perform not one but a host 
of different roles in the social world, […] ‘figures’—that is, all the varied masks or personas or 
selves—that human beings might assume on the great stage of the world […] social interaction 
is always a matter of ‘counterfeiting’ one role or another” (Wigham/Rebhorn 59). 
219 Cf. Nédoncelle: “quand la tragédie, après Eschyle, comportera des rôles multiples, le 
nombre des acteurs restera fixé à trois et c’est grâce au changement de masques qu’ils pourront 
s’acquitter de leur tâche” (280). Generally, see Grube, with reference to Plato’s Republic (“397 
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It should always prove difficult to forego the (implicit) knowledge of a specific 
material body—an elementally polytropic, tempo-corporally variable ‘source 
self’—in the (notional) background of a given artifact floating in various 
(virtual) cultural networks. Yet this expedient bulwark against spiriting away 
the very humanity of art need not—and, from a scholarly perspective, will not—
open the provisory loopholes of the otherworldly: “The confounding of rhetoric 
and metaphysics belongs to the vices of our tradition [and] its interpreters 
likewise” (Blumenberg Präfiguration 25; trans. dsm). 
 For heuristic reasons, one may provisionally deprioritize said immediate 
evidence, and consider the éthe or personae projected and publicly vended via 
an objet d’art or œuvre: meaning, the (virtually) sedimented, semiotically 
induced ‘images’ of an auctor as crafted and conveyed by works of art—
including any reciprocities effected by a given recipient’s participation in said 
process.220 The various traditions of eloquence—polyvalent, transgeneric, 
universalist téchnai—may prove functional as regards describing authorship in 
terms of the rhetorico-dramatic concept of ‘personae’. Expressly with a view to 
future scholarship, the conceivable potentials of such an application will be 
provisionally suggested for two Early Modern writers in the ensuing.221 
|| 
e”): “we lose all our singleness of character by impersonating different types” (51; 51n.)—the 
(Idealist) presupposition par excellence, (tacitly) present in any substantialist account; it would 
seem difficult to forfeit what did not ‘preexist’. As regards “lysianische Kleinkunst”, Gomperz 
observes the flexible adaptation involved (as evinced in the prépon-related, rhetorico-
dramatically significative terms used, e.g. “anzupassen […] trefflich”, “in der Charaktermaske 
[…] aufzutreten”); he speaks of “[t]his art of ‘ethopoiía’”, perceived as a Protean quality—which 
is said to explain Plato’s animosity toward the rhétor, seeing that the former “frowned upon the 
capacity for [accommodatingly] transforming oneself into any possible shape whatsoever [‘sich 
in jede beliebige Gestalt zu schicken’]” (Griech. Denker II. 330; trans. dsm; cf. 574n.). 
220 Generally: “Characterization […] is to an important degree a readerly competence” (De 
Temmerman/Emde Boas “Epilogue” 650); “a dynamic […] integrative process” (“Intro.” 18). 
Bakhtin stresses “[t]he inclusion of the listener (reader, viewer) in the system (structure) of the 
work” (Speech 165; “Methodology” 68): “Nothing is more perilous […] than to ignore the […] 
role of the listener” (Speech 171n.; “Methodology” 74n.). Cf. Sloane’s insistence on “the reader’s 
craft as well as […] the poet’s” (“Reading” 410); “rhetorical reading may show […] some of the 
conscious craft whereby the […] poet turned that relationship [sc. of the reader, poet, text] into 
an art” (“Reading” 410); “rhetorical reading presupposes a certain attitude toward language: 
language reflects a speaker’s design as he confronts an audience, who he assumes are not 
possessed of tabulae rasae but of minds filled with associations, conventions, expectations, 
which he must direct, control, or take advantage of. This is the attitude that distinguishes 
rhetorical reading from other types of close analysis. […] rhetorical reading preserves the 
greatest potential complexity of [a] reader’s response and [a] poet’s control” (“Reading” 398). 
221 The scholarship and criticism having accrued on Shakespeare and Cervantes during more 
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 Due to sundry stages of reception (inter alia), manifold personae are 
associated with the given name ‘Shakespeare’.222 A (more or less ‘initial’) source 
conducive to a writer’s diverse voices or (publicly received) images will be the 
customary genre of the dedication.223 Nominally directed toward a specified 
addressee (typically a patron, benefactor), such and similar frontmatter also 
conveys (or is plausibly wrought and honed to express) an authorial ethos and 
persona (at said point in time): “early modern writers […] were […] acutely aware 
that they were writing in a larger discursive space” (Küpper et al. 7). 
 The epico-dramatic “Venus and Adonis” is dedicated to the “Earl of 
Southampton”, and signed “William Shakespeare”—suggesting that it speaks 
for the author recognized, referred to, by that name (“Venus and Adonis” 128).224 
The persona (re)presented or staged is setting itself within a decidedly social 
context. A tone of modesty and humility signals both the rhetorico-traditional 
tópos in this respect, and the communal function it serves: to be apposite (as per 
the estimate of a given time)—conducing to, if not effecting, the ‘face’ conveyed 
and ethos projected.225 The closing formula focuses on the word “duty”—again a 
|| 
than four centuries are beyond reckoning, and cannot plausibly be assessed in this context; the 
study at hand is heuristic in function, and aims at conducing to further research by tentatively 
suggesting applications of a rhetorico-dramatic approach to authorship. 
222 Cf. Bakhtin: “neither Shakespeare […] nor his contemporaries knew that ‘[…] Shakespeare’ 
[…]. There is no possibility of squeezing our[s] […] into the Elizabethan epoch” (Speech 4). 
223 Cf. and contrast Bakhtin’s hypomnémata: “The speaking person. As whom […] how ([…] in 
what situation) the speaking person appears. Various forms of speech authorship […]. It is 
customary to speak about the authorial mask. […] in which utterances (speech acts) is there a 
face and not a mask, that is, no authorship? The form of authorship depends on the genre of 
the utterance. […] The one who speaks and the one spoken to. All this determines the genre, 
tone, and style of the utterance […]. One and the same actual character can assume various 
authorial forms. In what forms and how is the face of the speaker revealed?” (Speech 153). 
224 Cf. Vickers, noting that “the dedication of […] Lucrece to Southampton” is “one of the few 
pieces which Shakespeare wrote in propria persona […]. Incidentally the dedication of Venus 
and Adonis is a good example of that vein of courtly, expanded metaphor which was to prove 
so useful later for characterizing gentlemen – […] Shakespeare sounds like Camillo” (Artistry 
36–37); “in his own person – as […] through the mouths […] of imagined characters – [he] 
writes prose which belongs to a widespread and vigorous tradition over two thousand years old 
at the time”; the critic’s added value judgment (“The dedication itself is insignificant”, Artistry 
38) is scholarly untenable. Duncan-Jones claims: “Shakespeare’s terse but richly rhythmical 
epistle is […] likely to have been closely read by its addressee” (68); she refers to “Lucrece” as 
“a masterpiece of terseness […] [c]arefully varying the earlier epistle” (75). 
225 In this sense, Lanham’s definition of the term may seem pertinent: “Establishing an 
authorial voice, an ethos, is a central task for any speaker or writer” (“Composition” 121). Cf. “it 
is the tenor of the speech […] that brings out the ethos of the speaker” (Morford 241); “ethos, the 
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socio-rhetorical term, equivalent to the Latin ‘officium’, pertaining to the public 
realm (“Venus and Adonis” 128).226 Moreover, the primarily demonstrative 
character of what ensues is stressed in the term “pleased” (the oratorical 
function of delectare); the work is labeled an “invention”, referring to the art’s 
first (heuristic) pars; and discernibly epideictic terms (“censure”, “praised”) are 
expressly employed in said dedication (“Venus and Adonis” 128). The tone 
insinuated, the terms used, the genre referred to, all signal a rhetorical culture, 
a respective persona (re)presented (qua public, contextualized ‘image’)—with a 
corresponding ethos being (semiotically) wrought and projected.227 
 In the Cervantine ‘Prólogo al lector’ (Novelas I. 50), the writer suggests that 
the recipient might be missing “a portrait” of the former—thereby 
to become familiar with the face [‘rostro’] and demeanor of one who dares to sally forth 
with so many fanciful notions [‘invenciones’] into the marketplace of this world [‘en la 
plaza del mundo’], in plain sight for all to see [‘a los ojos de las gentes’]. (Novellas 9; 
Novelas I. 50–51)228  
To satisfy this (supposed) desire, a “likeness” (“retrato”) not provided in the 
front pages of the Quijote is invoked—the responsibility for which oversight is 
delegated to a certain “friend” (Novellas 9; Novelas I. 50; cf. Kruse 171, 171n.). To 
remedy the apparent lack, a vivid description of the authorial persona (to be 
|| 
character of a speaker, […] is always implied in style; the ethos of a poet in particular is implied 
in the stylistic controls he places on his implied reader’s response” (Sloane “Reading” 410). 
226 Likewise, the dedication of Shakespeare’s “Lucrece” is to the “Earl of Southampton”, and 
equally accentuates “duty”—both within, and in the closing formula (“Lucrece” 232). Duncan-
Jones stresses: “Shakespeare […] sought worldly recognition on the world’s terms” (83). Cf. 
Greenblatt: “Shakespeare approaches his culture […] as dutiful servant, content to improvise a 
part of his own within its orthodoxy” (Self-Fashioning 253); while the biographistic tendency is 
problematic (and the overall context will have to be taken cum grano salis), said observation 
may be corroborated by recourse to the two published and printed dedications in 
Shakespeare’s name—precisely in terms of a socio-dramatic view of public life qua permeated, 
and decidedly inflected, by rhetoric, the latter perceived as a comprehensive whole (including 
its arsenal of techniques, inductive method, and the worldview the art induces, or conduces 
to). For the historico-cultural context in this respect, see Skinner (Forensic 32–33). 
227 Contrast Greenblatt, who (in line with his general relegation of rhetoric) wishes to see 
“identity as property”, and claims: “I think property may be closer to the wellsprings of the 
Shakespearean conception of identity than we imagine” (“Psychoanalysis” 220); the 
presupposition of the latter leads to an equation with the former—in a circular attempt at 
defining an ideologically loaded position projected backward. 
228 As to Cervantes’ accent on the public, ludic role of his Novelas ejemplares, see Velázquez 
(78–83, spec. 82–83). For a ‘rhetorical reading’ of the Quijote ‘in light of Hermogenes’, cf. López 
Grigera (165–178; on ventriloquism, spec. 175, 175n.; cf. 137–138; passim). 
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appresented by the recipient) is tendered, framed as a subscriptio to the portrait 
said to have not been printed.229 The “retrato” (Novelas I. 51), placed in a 
discernibly rhetorical context, suggests a desire on the part of the reader, refers 
to the prépon (“como es uso y costumbre”, Novelas I. 50), stages a certain 
situation as a pretext, then writes an ostensively lifelike, ethopoetic description 
(with a view to enárgeia) that is to circularly fulfill a demand the text premised. 
 The written portrait is similarly hedged: “this, I affirm, is the face of the 
author [‘el rostro del autor’] of La Galatea and of Don Quijote de la Mancha” 
(Novellas 9; Novelas I. 51); “[h]e is commonly known as [‘Llámase comúnmente’] 
Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra” (Novellas 10; Novelas I. 51).230 The entirety of this 
ethopoeia (a descriptio for evidentia) is given as peistikó-purposive—specifically 
as regards “the better to extend my fame [‘nombre’] and lend further credence to 
my talent [‘ingenio’]” (Novellas 10; Novelas I. 51). In said respect, providing 
anything as might conduce to effecting persuasion will seem expedient: 
|| 
229 The Cervantine œuvre is replete with such and similar techniques of indirection; generally 
thereto (with further references), see Mayfield (“Talking Canines” 11; 21; 31; passim). Regarding 
the comparable case of a “missing painting” in Montaigne, see Cave (Cornucopian 299, 299n.). 
230 Cervantes gives a detailed, auto-prosopographic description: “Este que véis aquí, de rostro 
aguileño, de cabello castaño, frente lisa y desembarazada, de alegres ojos y de nariz corva, 
aunque bien proporcionada; las barbas de plata, que no ha veinte años que fueron de oro, los 
bigotes grandes, la boca pequeña, los dientes ni menudos ni crecidos, porque tiene sino seis, y 
ésos mal acondicionados y peor puestos, porque no tienen correspondencia los unos con los 
otros[’]” (Novelas I. 51, Prólogo). The description of a face (per se) is called prosopographía, as 
Rico Verdú signals with respect to said Cervantine example (citing Barberá y Sánchez): 
“προσωπογραφία. ‘Cuando el orador expresa con palabras el semblante, figura y facciones del 
rostro de alguno’” (339). Cervantes proceeds to give an (auto-)effictio of the remainder: “[‘]el 
cuerpo entre dos extremos, ni grande, ni pequeño, la color viva, antes blanca que morena; algo 
cargado de espaldas, y no muy ligero de pies[’]” (Novelas I. 51, Prólogo). Distinctly, the face is 
given primacy (“rostro” also being repeated)—in terms of quantitative treatment, qualitative 
detail, and in the assertion ensuing after the last segment cited: “éste digo que es el rostro del 
autor” (Novelas I. 51, Prólogo). The deictic and the “digo” signal that this is not a ‘description’ 
simply (should said term be taken to mean a ‘mimetic’ representation): the poet’s ‘making’ is 
insinuated (to which the humorous tone will be seen as conducing, simultaneously hiding and 
highlighting the artfulness); the tractatio, the choice of foci (or facials featured), indicate that 
this (apparent) prosopographía’s function is ethopoetic. Puttenham Englishes the device as 
“the Counterfeit Countenance”, when “a poet or maker […] feign[s] as artificial […] the visage, 
speech, and countenance of any person absent or dead” (323–324, III.19); “prosopographia” is 
distinguished from “prosopopeia [sic]” in that the latter is said to refer only to otherwise 
abstract, mute, unfeeling entities; the margin renames this “the Counterfeit Impersonation”, 
which is defined as “feign[ing] any person” (emphatic of the ‘poiein’, “by way of fiction”)—
spec. when “attribut[ing] any human quality, as reason or speech, to dumb creatures or other 
insensible things, and […] to give them a human person” (324, III.19); cf. Elam (60; 315n.). 
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it is folly to think that such encomiums [‘elogios’] convey the exact truth, seeing that 
neither praise [‘alabanzas’] nor blame [‘vituperios’] are based on anything fixed or exact. 
(Novellas 10; Novelas I. 51)231 
The terms explicitly refer to the epideictic genus—including a corresponding 
focus on the status qualitatis—while the parrhesiastic admission of rhetorical 
‘colores’ being involved will likely conduce to the crafting of a writerly ethos. 
 To précis the Cervantine prolog from a rhetorical perspective: having 
availed itself of the conventional appeal to the reader’s indulgence (captatio 
benevolentiae: “dearly beloved reader”); having—supposedly, and with all 
modesty—tried to find an excuse for not penning the very prolog written 
(Novellas 9); having suggested a desire on the part of the reader to see a portrait 
of the (perceived) author; and having crafted a pretext for satisfying said 
demand, the preface expressly places itself in the demonstrative genus, 
downplays the verisimilitude of the vivid, ethopoetic description just given, and 
then (to cap it all) acts as if the entire setup had not occurred in the first place: 
“In short, since this opportunity [‘ocasión’] has now been missed, and I have 
been left, as it were, empty-handed and with no likeness [‘figura’]” (Novellas 10; 
Novelas I. 51)—eloquently disavowing rhetoric’s effectuality.232 
 The tone remains playful, aims at ‘entertaining’ (delectare), and offering 
some ‘expedient samples’ (docere) in what follows (see Novellas 10; Novelas I. 
52). Said portrait itself is initially a description of the projected persona’s 
features and stature (charakterismós), and then turns into a vita with (expressly) 
hypoleptic and ethopoetic functions—hence including what would likely have 
been considered the central events from a contemporaneous perspective 
(presupposing and tying in with the latter’s socio-moral assumptions). 
|| 
231 On the latter, see Lausberg’s concise synopsis (Elemente 21–22, §31.4). Cf. Gill, with regard 
to “Plutarch and most Roman historians”: “As though in some kind of historical law-court, 
they set out to answer the question ‘what sort of person was X?, what qualities, what virtues 
and vices did he have?’” (“Question” 477)—meaning, ‘qualis sit’. A reaccentuation of the 
(dramatico-)rhetorical implications will generally be needful in said critic’s case. 
232 “ocasión” implies (rhetorical) ‘kairós’. Generally, cf. “al cabo de tantos años como ha que 
duermo en el silencio del olvido, salgo ahora, con todos mis años a cuestas, con una leyenda 
seca como un esparto, ajena de invención, menguada de estilo, pobre de conceptos y falta de 
toda erudición y doctrina, sin acotaciones en las márgenes y sin anotaciones en el fin del libro, 
como veo que están otros libros” (Cervantes Quijote I. 96, Prólogo). As to humoring the 
recipient, see Vives (187–189, II, Aa2.r–Aa3.r; with Rico Verdú: “se debe captar su atención y 
benevolencia”, 238). Cf. Fothergill-Payne: “Benevolentiam parare is one of the main principles 
of rhetoric” (378). Montaigne has: “arrêter l’attention du lecteur” (Essais III. 306, III.ix); with 
Compagnon (29–30). Cf. Wisse (234; 237; 238n.; 243). 
 Variants of Rhetorical Ventriloquism | 135 
  
 Said persona (or overall ‘image’) is expressly tendered in dramatico-
rhetorical terms: not only by eloquently conjuring up a lifelike description 
(evidentia for delight); but also in accentuating its contextual character. With 
regard to function, it may appear as the verbal equivalent of an ethopoetico-
pictorial portrait crafted for the public eye—meeting the (customary) 
expectations of a given community, while (virtually) adding ornamental 
brushstrokes for purposes of pleasure (here and there).233 Simultaneously, this 
notable depiction articulates the theatrico-oratorical conception of ‘personae’ 
prevalent in the—decidedly pan-European—rhetorical culture from which the 
portrayal emanates, and to which it responds. The reader is likely to admire the 
witty diction (elocutio), and feel humored (conciliare); the ethopoetic 
description is vivid, and will have a similarly ‘enargic’ effect. Said Early Modern 
curriculum vitae is thoroughly rhetorical, and presents a corresponding 
authorial ethos and persona qua contextual, social ‘image’ conforming to 
expectations on the part of a potential reception—to which it effectually caters. 
 With respect to method, the present, oratorico-dramatic approach to 
authorship accentuates a pluralistic diversity of views, voices, and matters of 
degree, while aiming at contouring nuances and describe shifts of emphasis in 
provisional and heuristic terms. To a considerable extent, any rhetorical culture 
will be based on a certain framework of roles considered functional in given 
social settings: some of said personae may be taken on simultaneously (by 
‘elemental selves’, tempo-corporally under variation); all are susceptible of 
situational adaptation; and there will always be a potential for crafting, 
conveying, and circulating any number of nuanced variants—floating in, and 
(with diverse modulations) taken up from, (virtual) cultural networks. 
 The above instances from the Shakespearean and Cervantine corpus 
intimate textually sedimented authorial personae and éthe, as well as a density 
of indicators conducive to formulating their socio-rhetorical roles and functions. 
In either case, an ‘auto-etho-poíesis’ may be discerned by way of the textual (or 
otherwise semioticized) signals tendered: reticent, almost tacit (and virtually 
impervious) in ‘Shakespeare’—de re comparable to the ‘ventriloquist’ 
speechwright ‘Lysias’; oblique and ludic (while no less opaque) in ‘Cervantes’. 
 Rhetorical selfcraft is always reciprocal, multilateral: it not only implies, 
but requires an equally ethopoetic participation on the part of (diachronic, 
|| 
233 Kibédi Varga notes that, in 1760, Gérard de Benat “trie[d] to correlate the terminology of 
rhetoric and poetics by saying: […] ‘Le portrait est cette figure que les Rhéteurs appellent 
[É]thopée’” (88). The scholar glosses: “what are […] compared to rhetoric in these quotations 
are […] pictorial metaphors applied to poetics” (88n.). 
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transcultural) recipients.234 One is facing decidedly pluralized, assembled, 
‘engineered’ images, tendered with respect to what may be deemed suitable and 
effectual (prépon) at a given time—hence partially reflecting other projected 
personae, various socio-moral functions, received customs (relating to ethos).235 
 Ever is context decisive—meaning, what is thought to pertain to a particular 
situation, setting, overall culture. As far as Ancient and Early Modern times are 
concerned, one might therefore perceive authorship in such rhetorico-dramatic 
terms, specifically by recourse to the concept of ‘personae’ (and correlative éthe) 
qua highly contextual public ‘images’ (acquired, semiotically significative, 
settled dispositions)—crafted, scripted, (re)presented, performed, projected, put 
on, staged, changed, sold, outsourced (and so forth, as the case may be).236 
 As to public, official, communal roles, Fuhrmann notes that the word 
“always means the bearer of a social role, not the absolute person, [not] the 
individual. […] persona always points to something typical” (“Persona” 91; 
|| 
234 Given globalizing tendencies, rhetorico-comparatist case studies of a cosmopolitan make, 
take, purpose will ultimately be needful with a view to ‘world literature’ (in terms of reception). 
235 As to “the image of self” (240), Goffman refers to “engineering a convincing impression” 
(243; cf. 16, 25)—his closing sententia being: “the role of expression is conveying impressions of 
self” (241; caps removed). The ethopoietic effect will be a plurality of rhetorical selves. 
Generally, see Goffman on “techniques of impression management” (203–230; here: 228; cf. 
231, 233); his conceptions are dependably rhetorical (cf. 163; 246), as indicated by the ensuing: 
“preparing in advance for likely contingencies and exploiting the opportunities that remain” 
(212; cf. 210, 216); “ethos”, “decorum” (231); “persuasion”, “manipulation”, “coercion” (234); 
likewise his central statements, such as: “Power of any kind must be clothed in effective means 
of displaying it, and will have different effects depending upon how it is dramatized” (234). 
236 Blumenberg adduces: “personam agere, induere, mutuare, ferre” (“Epochenschwelle” 102); 
cf. “appetere […] capere […] sumere […] suscipere […] imponere […] induere […] gerere […] ferre 
[…] mutare […] abicere […] ponere […] deponere […] detrahere” (Fuhrmann “Persona” 88n.; 
with Mayfield “Interplay” 21n.). Cf. “what rôle [‘personam’] we ourselves may choose 
[‘velimus’] to sustain [‘gerere’] is decided by our own free choice [‘a nostra voluntate’]” (Cicero 
De Officiis 118–119, I.xxxii.115). “E t h i c a  igitur erit causa, id est moralis, cum erit 
suscipienda persona vel rustici vel dyscoli” (Sulpicius Victor 316, §6); “persona suscipitur […] 
sermo simulatur” (Isidore “de arte rhet.” 515, XIV); “inducitur aliena persona […] personam, 
quam nos ei imponimus […] nos facimus” (Vives 185, Aa.r, II.xvi); “persona nova infertur, 
fingere […] finxit” (186, Aa.v, II.xvi; taking up Horace’s “personam formare novam”, “Ars 
Poetica” 460, v.126). Seeing “Selbstmythisierung” as “ein rhetorisches Phänomen” 
(Präfiguration 18), Blumenberg applies the above to textual and public personae: “Friedrich II. 
[…] ist ein Mann der Selbststilisierung auf die Tat” (Präfiguration 22). “Goethe hat sich stilisiert” 
(Schiffbruch 50). “Das Artefakt der Kultfigur” (Goethe 64); “Es ist […] Inszenierung” (Goethe 66). 
Such also includes vicarious attempts (here with respect to Sartre): “wir müssen ja wohl nicht 
alles glauben, was Simone de Beauvoir uns an schöner Stilisierung zum Ausgleich des 
Unschönen der criteria realitatis erzählt hat” (Phänomenologische 148). 
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trans. dsm)—and likewise for ‘ethos’.237 A corresponding perspective pertains to, 
and obtains in, cultures or periods suffused with an oratorical education—
conducing to correlative views of society and the world.238 Considering the 
potential scholarly yield, it may seem plausible to apply this rhetorical 
approach (to authorial selfcraft) more generally—perchance also to the present. 
|| 
237 In addressing an issue as tends to be neglected (by much criticism), Schwartz’ caveat will 
seem spec. needful: “ἦθος mit ‘Charakter’ zu übersetzen, wäre […] unrichtig. Unter Charakter 
verstehen wir die individuelle Beschaffenheit eines Menschen; der Begriff ist über das 
Französische (charactère) zu uns gekommen. Das griechische χαρακτήρ ist der Prägestempel, 
genau wie τύπος, meist also, auf den Menschen bezogen, gerade das Gegenteil des heutigen 
Begriffes, nämlich der Typ, das Überindividuelle” (16; cf. subch. 3.1, herein). As per Bakker, it 
is requisite to “avoid equating the terms [‘ēthos and ēthopoiia’] with our concepts of ‘character’ 
or ‘personality’. In antiquity, ēthos used to be defined in terms of (moral) categories […] Lysias 
[…] did not portray his speakers and their opponents as individuals, but made their behavior 
and utterances adhere to certain distinctive recognizable types” (“Lysias” 410). While always 
tending toward particularization, rhetoric is the polyfunctional, universalist téchne par 
excellence—transpersonal like (the system, code of) language overall. 
238 Generally, see Kustas: “Rhetoric for the Byzantine was not simply an educational force but 
a way of life. παιδεία means both education and culture” (64). 
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5 The Economy of Rhetorical Ventriloquism: 
Applications from Antiquity to the Present 
prosopopoeia […] is particularly valuable also to future poets and historians.  
Quintilian (Inst. Orat. 3–5. 139, 3.8.49)239 
While its indisputable impact has tended to go unnoticed in ‘modern’ times 
(and the latter’s criticism or study of literature), the rhetorical practice of 
ethopoiía—‘the artful crafting (poiein) of ethos by way of descriptive and actual 
speech (sermocinatio, allocutio)’—decisively molded, dominated the Western 
literary tradition (sensu lato) from Antiquity to the Early Modern Age, with a 
sustained (if latent) effect on the present.240 During the Renaissance, versions of 
|| 
239 Quintilian subsumes sermocinatio under prosopopoeia (Inst. Orat. 9–10. 50–51, 9.2.31–32). 
For Aelius Theon, the latter “is not only an historical exercise but applicable also to oratory […] 
dialogue […] poetry, […] is most advantageous in everyday life […] conversations […] in study of 
prose writings” (“Exercises” 4, §1.60). Kennedy glosses “historical exercise” as “practice in the 
composition of speeches, a regular feature of ancient historiography”; “oratory […] dialogue 
[…] poetry” as “genres in which characters are imagined as speaking” (“Exercises” 4, with 4n.). 
Theon gives “prosôpopoeia” as “the introduction of a person to whom words are attributed that 
are suitable to the speaker and […] subject […] one should have in mind […] the personality of 
the speaker […], and to whom the speech is addressed” (“Exercises” 47, §8.115). He observes: 
“[d]ifferent ways of speaking belong to different ages of life” (“Exercises” 48, §8.115); in closing 
the section, he logs the device’s being “most receptive of characters and emotions” (“Exercises” 
49, §8.117). Kennedy notes that “Theon uses ‘prosopopoeia’ of any speech in character and is 
apparently unaware of the distinction between ‘prosopopoeia’, ‘ethopoeia’, […] ‘eidolopoeia’ 
found in the later progymnasmatic treatises” (“Exercises” 47, §8; italics removed). 
240 This sentence is indebted to Prof. Eden, urging a reaccentuation and “foreground[ing]” of 
“the central place of ethopoetic construction in the literary tradition […] as a way to account for 
the peculiar shape of at least some of its most well known texts” (email to the author: June 26, 
2017). Cf. Moos (254–257, with 254n.–257n., §63), spec. “Johanns [sc. of Salisbury] Vorliebe für 
Personifikationen und Ethopoeien [‘ist’] von literaturwissenschaftlichem Interesse” (290n., 
§70). See Naschert: “In der Praxis spielte die E[thopoeia] auch in der Poetik eine besondere 
Rolle” (1515; cf. Fortenbaugh et al. 1541). On the Medieval “exercise in prosopopœia”, cf. 
Baldwin (Medieval Rhet. 141n.)—qua “imaginary adaptations” (Medieval Rhet. 215); with a letter 
by Sidonius Apollinaris, he gives “Ethicam dictionem” as “prosopopœia” (Medieval Rhet. 83; 
83n.); and such as “imaginary addresses” (Renaissance 40). W. Crane logs: “The comments on 
ethopoeia by Emporius, Aquila […] Isidore […] were widely known in the Middle Ages. Erasmus 
drew some of his material for […] De copia from Emporius” (160). Scaliger handles it under the 
header ‘Expressio Personarvm’, praising Vergil for his “varia genera perſonarum” (83, III.ii); cf. 
spec. “Humilem quoque perſonam,atque eius officium nõ ſine Ethopœia, & Oeconomia” (85, 
III.ii; the former reappears in Greek, 227, V.iii; cf. the subch. on ‘Oeconomia’, 103–104, III.xix). 
He refers to “perſonæ fiƈtæ” under the header ‘Qvasi Personæ’—instancing (inter alia): “apud 
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the Aphthonian Progymnasmata proved especially influential in said respect.241 
|| 
Maronem Fama:apud Ouidiũ Fames […] apud Plautum Inopia,Luxuria,Lar,Arƈturus.apud 
Æſchylum,Vis,Neceſsitas.apud Ariſtophanem,Fas,Nefáſque” (85, III.iii). Cf. Spies (267). As to 
prosopopoiía with ethopoiía, sermocinatio, see Carruthers for “[a] courtly French treatise […] 
(1463) […], divid[ing] the procedures of rhetoric among twelve handmaids (dames), each of 
whom gives a speech ([…] enseigne, a rhetorical ‘character’ or ethopoeia)” (205). Cf. Herrick: 
“Renaissance schoolmasters emphasized the study of human character” in “the training of 
rhetoric” (132); “the Ad Herennium exerted a considerable influence” in said respect (134). See 
Sloane/Jost: “Ciceronian tactics drawn from judicial rhet[oric] […] fire[d] the […] imaginations 
[…]: arguing in utramque partem […] reappear[ed] in the […] fabric of Tudor poetry […] drama; 
qualis sit […] suffuses Boccaccian fiction […] Sidneyan crit[icism]; ethos and ethopoiesis […] 
pervade dialogues, mock encomia, […] most discussions of courtliness” (1179). Kinney logs “the 
common practice, […] in […] Tudor grammar schools, of delivering orations and disputations by 
what Sherry calls ‘effiguration’ or prosopographia or prosopopoeia, the description of a feigned 
person or the act [there]of” (388). McDonald uses “ethopoeia” in an extensive sense qua 
“ability to create character”, “‘character-sketches’”, “character portraits” (18; cf. 195, 291), 
“character delineation” (45), “set-passages of character-sketch” (49), as a “formal ethopoeia” 
(288–289; cf. 274, 297); cf. “the satiric ethopoeia of the typical courtier” (190). It is also taken 
technically: “Ethopoeia, the art of characterization” (83–84); cf. this felicitous formulation, 
linking ethos and (linguistic) héxis: a poet “endows his character” with “habits of speech” 
(291). All but equating the term with “illustrationes” (166; cf. 243), McDonald applies it to 
intratextual cases: “ethopoeiae or estimates of the character of other dramatis personae given 
by each figure in the play” (182); “varying ethopoeiae […] give ‘running estimates’” (223); “in 
his ethopoeia of himself” (257; cf. 258, 274, 289); on Marston’s Malcontent: “If Malevole supplies 
ethopoeiae of all the other characters, Mendoza supplies a variety of characterizations for 
himself” (173); the former “is a convenient […] mouthpiece for ethopoeiae of the other[s] […], 
strengthening […] impressions of their personalities gained from their own speech, or […] 
prejudicing the audience to accept their utterances at his evaluation” (165). This metapoetical 
view—also otherwise characteristic of the matter—is signaled by such phrases: “the […] 
ethopoeia given her” (234; cf. 235; 288); “Tourneur has his character make use of ethopoeia […] 
pathopoeia” (239)—linking various ventriloquist devices (sermocinatio, with a view to crafting, 
projecting ethos, páthos). While given in her title, Hutson’s use of the word—“the historical 
legacy of Shakespeare’s ethopoetic dramatic tradition” (145), “the rhetorical persuasiveness of” 
his “ethopoeia” (157)—hardly ties in with her claims; the progymnasmatic terms cited are 
problematic (140–141), possibly due to the ms. (cf. 158n.). Cf. Plett: “Die Prosopopoiie erlangt 
während des 16. Jahrhunderts in der Dichtung […] Popularität” (“Theatrum Rhet.” 356). 
“Estiennes […] The Art of Making Devises (1646) empfiehlt [s]ie […] als ‘a certain manner of 
speech used by Rhetoritians, very efficacious to move and strike the mind’ und kennt keine 
Grenzen in ihren Anwendungsmöglichkeiten” (“Theatrum Rhet.” 359); “teils wird [s]ie […] auf 
alle […] Impersonationen ausgedehnt” (“Theatrum Rhet.” 355). “Im Rhetorikunterricht der […] 
Renaissance nehmen […] Rollenübungen nach antikem Vorbild einen so großen Raum ein, daß 
praktisch jeder Schüler zum Schauspieler-Dichter ausgebildet wird” (“Theatrum Rhet.” 355). 
241 McDonald logs “[t]he phenomenal popularity of Aphthonius in the English Renaissance” 
(75n.), calling him “the mentor of practically every […] schoolboy trained up in the arts of 
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 Various forms of ventriloquism having featured prominently in such and 
similar “praeexercitamenta” (Handbuch 532–533, §1106; cf. 543, §1131–1132), it is 
particularly in this manner that the technique of sermocinatio “enters into 
poetry” (qua literature)—thereby providing a nexus between history, drama, 
and oratory, as Lausberg observes (Handbuch 548, §1146; trans. dsm): 
This complete merging of the practicing orator into the represented person[a] and […] the 
social and historical situation brings the practice of [rhetorical] exercises into proximity 
with the theater[.] (Handbuch 549, §1149; trans. dsm; cf. 128, §234; 409, §823)242 
|| 
composition”—here as to “ethopoeia” (124); “the Progymnasmata of Aphthonius in a Latin 
translation by […] Agricola and […] Cataneus, edited with extensive commentary by […] Lorich, 
[…] published in 1542, with […] frequent reprintings […], became almost the standard grammar-
school textbook of composition” (75; cf. 87); see Knape (6–7; 234–235); Clark (261: “It was 
printed at least 73 times from 1546 to 1689”); the latter tenders a (plausible) reason: “Without 
model themes[,] Theon could not hold the textbook market”; having such, “Aphthonius had 
been the most popular author of Progymnasmata in antiquity. Likewise in the Renaissance. 
From 1507 to 1680[,] he was given ten […] Latin versions by ten […] translators as well as an 
eleventh […] made by combining two previous translations. There were 114 different printings”, 
as far as Clark had “identif[ied]” (261; cf. 262). See Eden: “Aphthonius’ Progymnasmata formed 
the very bedrock of Renaissance rhetorical education”, hence of its “literary production” 
(“Rhetoric” 829). Cf. Burrow (42–43); Enterline (Schoolroom 20; 31; 79–88; 91–93; 113; 127; 
157n.; 175n.; 178n.), cum grano salis; her construal of “ethos” is not only unnuanced, but highly 
problematic, partly misguided (cf. “ἔθος”, Schoolroom 31; spec. 160n. “Aphthonius’s ἔθος is not 
quite the same as Theophrastus’s χαρακτήρ”). Monfasani notes: “Scaliger made extensive use 
of Hermogenes’ forms in his massive Poetics” (184). As to “cultural transmission” in said 
respect, he adds: “Dionysius […] was also translated in the sixteenth century and available in 
many editions, as were Demetrius […] and Aphthonius. These […] were significant authorities 
for the Byzantines […] the West was accepting a Byzantine perspective” (184; with 184n.). For 
the Progymnasmata’s impact on German schooling, cf. Asmuth (“Entwicklung” 280–287), spec. 
Gottsched’s “Von der Kunst, eine fremde Person zu spielen” (“Entwicklung” 283), which 
adapts Aphthonius’ definition: “Ethopoiie, […] ethopoiía, […] sermocinatio, […] die fiktive Rede 
einer fremden, meist historischen Person, durch deren Stil eben diese […] charakterisiert wird” 
(“Entwicklung” 281; on Gottsched, cf. Naschert 1515–1516). Asmuth inveighs against the 
elimination “der sich situationsgebunden gebenden Ethopoiie” in current German education—
itself a symptom of a “depragmatization”, “undervaluation of partisan argumentation”, loss of 
‘relation and reference to the situation, the other’ (“Entwicklung” 286; trans. dsm). 
242 Cf. McDonald (on the Rhet. ad Her., Progymnasmata, 44–46): “Sermocinatio […] introduces 
the problem of decorum in composing fitting dialogue for a character” (45); such “figures” 
show the “affinities of rhetorical teaching to […] dramatic composition”; most “examples” are 
“based upon dramatic practices” (46). Cf. “der schulrhetorische Übungsbetrieb […] [‘widmet’] 
der Prosopopoiie […] besondere Aufmerksamkeit. Die Kunst der […] Persondarstellung wird […] 
durch die […] Simulation von sozialen Charakteren […] trainiert. Innerhalb dieser spielerisch 
inszenierten Schulübungen studiert der Redner […] eine Vielzahl unterschiedlicher […] Rollen 
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Another link to the stage is provided by the oratorical art of ‘vivid description’ 
(enárgeia)—producing ‘a mimetic effect’ of “simultaneity”, visual or 
‘earwitnessing’, ‘putting something before the eyes of someone’ (Handbuch 
400, §810; trans. dsm).243 This rhetorical desideratum is evidently accomplished 
|| 
[…] nähert sich […] dem Schauspieler” (Oesterreich “Person” 863; cf. “Polypersonalität” 77–78). 
Cf. Mayfield (“Interplay” 11; 11n.–12n.); tailored to a rhétor’s actio, prosopopoiía, dialogismós, 
ethopoiía are affine to dramatic performance (in all physical aspects: motion, face, gesture). On 
the nexus of ‘hypókrisís’ (here rendered “impersonating”), ethos, the preservation of decorum 
(cf. “accommodating [‘tò eoikénai’] themselves to the rôles [‘prosópois’] […] they assume, so 
that what they say is not inappropriate”) with regard to “dancing” and “‘exercises’” on the part 
of “the rhetoricians”, see Lucian (“Dance” 268–269, §65; with Baldwin Ancient Rhet. 74n.). 
243 Cf. “In antiquity, prosopopoeiae were […] exercises in which writers took on the persona of 
a famous historical or mythological figure […]. At times, […] rhetorical and poetic theoreticians 
use prosopopoeia […] more expansively to indicate the vivid presentation of something absent 
or imaginary before the eye and ear” (Brogan et al. 1121). See Plett (“Evidentia” passim). These 
terms are (quasi) synonymous or affine: ‘enárgeia’, ‘hypotýposis’, ‘demonstratio’, ‘descriptio’, 
‘ékphrasis’ (cf. subchs. 3.1, 4.1). Being particularly interactive, various oratorico-ventriloquistic 
devices conduce to evidentia—the generally desirable, rhetorico-theatrical end (see Mayfield 
“Interplay” 15–17, spec. 16n.–17n.). In “Ocular Demonstration [‘Demonstratio’] […] an event is 
so described in words [‘ita verbis res exprimitur’] that the business [‘negotium’] seems to be 
enacted [‘geri’] and the subject to pass vividly before our eyes [‘res ante oculos esse videatur’]” 
(Rhet. ad Her. 404–405, IV.lv.68). Caplan glosses: “ἐνάργεια […] evidentia, repraesentatio, sub 
oculos subiectio […] ὑποτύπωσις […] descriptio” (Rhet. ad Her. 405n.); on the latter, see Priscian 
(“praeexercitamina” 558–559, §10, ‘de descriptione’). Cf. “Ἐνάργεια est figura, qua formam 
rerum et imaginem ita oratione substituimus, ut lectoris oculis praesentiaeque subiciamus” 
(Iulius Rufinianus 62, §15). Quintilian logs: “A considerable contribution to the effect [‘multum 
confert’] may be made by combining [‘adiecta’] the true facts [‘veris’] with a plausible picture of 
the scene [‘credibilis rerum imago’], which […] gives the impression [‘videtur’] of bringing the 
audience [‘perducere audientis’] face to face with the event [‘in rem praesentem’]” (Inst. Orat. 
3–5. 278–279, 4.2.123); the above qua “descriptio” (Inst. Orat. 3–5. 278, 4.2.123; cf. “dilucida et 
significans descriptio”, Inst. Orat. 9–10. 58–59, 9.2.44, qua “of places”; see Rhet. ad Her. 356–
357, IV.xxxix.51; 356n.). Latin syntax permits ‘juxtaposing’ the terms: “adiecta veris credibilis” 
(Inst. Orat. 3–5. 278, 4.2.123). When treating it as a ‘figure of thought’, Quintilian echoes Cicero 
on “evidentia” qua “‘putting something before our eyes [‘sub oculos subiectio’]’”, and gives the 
Greek (“ὑποτύπωσις”, Inst. Orat. 9–10. 56–57, 9.2.40). He notes: the “mode of vivid description 
[‘in diatyposi’]” is usually hedged by formulae such as “‘Imagine that you see [‘credite vos 
intueri’]’”; or (like Cicero) by referring to ‘the mind’s eye’ (“haec, quae non vidistis oculis, 
animis cernere potestis’”, Inst. Orat. 9–10. 56–57, 9.2.41; with 56n.–57n.). See Shakespeare: “In 
my mind’s eye, Horatio” (Hamlet 191, I.ii.185). Cf. Puttenham (323, III.19). The “Figure” is said 
to have “something particularly vivid [‘manifestius’] about it” (Quintilian Inst. Orat. 9–10. 58–
59, 9.2.43). For a quasi equivalent use of ‘tractatio’, ‘diatýposis’, ‘hypotýposis’, see Scaliger (122, 
III.xxxiii); he links these to ‘ethología’ (a linguistically enacted charakterismós; cf. below): “Eſt 
autẽ Traƈtatio,quum rem ſub oculis ponemus,luculenta narratione perſequentes eas 
partes,quæ ἠθολογίαν maxime comprehendunt in perſonis:in locis autem notabiles quaſdam 
142 | DS Mayfield 
  
on the stage, seeing that—in terms of “mimesis”—“drama” yields “the maximal 
degree of immediacy” (Handbuch 565, §1185; trans. dsm; cf. 560, §1171).244 
|| 
diſpoſitiones” (122, III.xxxiii); to ‘notatio’ (ethopoiía): “M. Gallio διατύπωσιν,perſonæ accuratam 
admodum ac feſtiuam poſuit in quarto,quam appellauit Notationem” (122, III.xxxiii). Having 
handled ‘hypo-’ resp. ‘diatýposis’, he turns to ‘demonstratio’, ‘descriptio’, ‘effictio’ (with respect 
to ‘prosopopoeia’): “Deſcriptionem,quam M. Gallio definit,perſpicuam rei expoſitionem.Quæ 
verò minutius circa perſonam verſaretur,Effiƈtionem.Non quòd ſit fiƈta,id eſt falſa:ſed quaſi 
effigiationem.Effiƈtio enim eſt pars fiƈtionis in Proſopopœia” (122–123, III.xxxiii). A brief 
segment on ‘Sermocinatio’ ensues, which Scaliger links to the preceding: “HVic adiunƈta eſt 
Sermocinatio,quũ certus attribuitur ſermo perſonæ […] Orationes enim quodam modo piƈturæ 
ſunt animorum.& qualis quiſque eſt, ita loquitur.& in obliquo” (123, III.xxxv). The nexus to 
‘diatýposis’ is reaffirmed for ‘attributio’ (qua general term) and ‘prosopopoeia’: “Attributio […] 
fit quoties Rei aut Perſonæ attribuim rẽ,aut perſonam,aut modum,aut orationem.Rei res,vt 
anno ſterilitas,aeri tempeſtas,noƈti ſilentium,ſaxo aſperitas” (126, III.xlviii); ‘prosopopoeia’ is 
given as “duplex”—the crafting of prósopa for phenomena not (or no longer) thought to have 
said status (comprising also what is else called ‘eidolopoiía’): “Primus modus,vbi fiƈta perſona 
introducitur,vt Fama à Virgilio,& Fames ab Ouidio. […] Alterum genus Proſopopœiæ,vbi non 
perſona fingatur eo modo,ſed orationis attributione.quę adeò pertinet ad διατύπωσιν,vt ſuprà 
eius partem fecerimus Sermocinationem. […] nánque ſi attribuam Æneæ orationem,erit 
ſermocinatio:propterea quòd vera perſona eſt.quòd ſi extra argumentum introducatur:veluti 
quum Æneas ait ſeſe à patre per ſomniũ obiurgari:ſanè eſt Proſopopœia. […] præſertim ſi rei 
mutæ ſermo attribuatur […] Eſt & alius modus, quo non oratio,ſed ſenſus rei brutæ aſignatur.ex 
re enim,quæ non eſt perſona,fit perſona […] quando alloquimur brutam rem,quæ non 
intelligit,quaſi intelligat. […] Quintilianus ſcribit,oportere eius perſonæ cui attribuitur 
oratio,habitum deſcribi:alioqui non eſſe Proſopopœiam,ſed διαλογισμόν.Mihi videtur omnis 
oratio eſſe διαλογισμός:Perſonæ verò habitum nequaquam pingi debere,ſed orationem per ſe 
ſatis poſſe ad perſonam illam declarandam” (126, III.xlviii). Scaliger logs the affinity of 
‘apostrophe’ (‘addressing those absent’) in said context of ‘attributio’ (qua ‘allocutio’): “Similes 
illis ſuperioribus attributionibus ſunt alloquutiones,quæ ad abſentes diriguntur:qualis Æneæ 
ad Palinurum iam non exaudientem.& Apoſtrophæ quædam” (126, III.xlviii). For a nexus of 
“Apostrophas et prosopopoeias in narratione”, cf. Consultus Fortunatianus (112, II.19; also: 
Iulius Victor 426, XVI; Fraunce F8v, I.30), who refers to “ἠθοποιία” as a ‘dianoetic figure’ (127, 
III.10; cf. “adlocutionibus”, 125, III.8). Sulpicius Victor logs the latter’s tending to be left out of 
narrationes; he permits a frugal use: “Ἠθοποιίαι quoque plurimorum praeceptis excluduntur a 
narratione: quae si quando erunt, et rarae et breves esse debebunt” (323, §19). Cf. Iulius Victor, 
giving a functional rationale for exceptions: “allocutio quoque aeque perquam raro admittenda 
est, nisi ubi opus tibi et ubi ad celeritatem et ad fidem plurimum confert” (426–427, XVI, ‘de 
narratione’). Conducing to movere, its proper place is seen to be in the peroratio (likewise for 
eidolopoiía): “in epilogo et adlocutionem permittitur inducere et defunctos excitare et pignora 
producere et cetera, quae animos audientium moveant” (422, XV, ‘de principiis’). 
244 As to Plato’s Republic, Grube logs: “any direct speech” is “counted as impersonation” 
(“μιμήσει”); “[d]rama proceeds […] by impersonation” (51; cf. 70n.–71n.); “rhapsodes […] 
dramatized […] speeches in recitation” (51n.). Cf. “Imaginary direct speech increases the feeling 
of presence by the […] attribution of words to a person (sermocinatio) or […] group […] engaged 
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 Focusing on rhetorical ventriloquism in application, this part takes up the 
exploratory approach employed earlier for (auto)biography, dialog—extending 
it to other (literary) genres, such as historiography, philosophy (sensu lato). 
5.1 Concerning the Nexus of ‘oikonomía’ and ‘dialogismós’ 
οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸς ὁ μῦθος. 
Dionysius, citing Demetrius’ quoting Euripides with respect to Plato 
(“Demosthenes” 256, §5; 257n.)245 
|| 
in conversation (dialogism)”; it “can have a variety of purposes”, e.g. “reveal the intentions 
ascribed to a person, or what is thought to be the opinion of other[s] […] regarding those 
intentions. It can be […] half spoken […] half thought […] [a] very equivocal form of imaginary 
speech” (Perelman/Olbrechts-Tyteca New Rhetoric 176, §42; with Vico, 176n.). Their bias seems 
problematic; terms are not always integrated with (or signal) the various traditions of rhetoric. 
245 Plato “is quite the hierophant [‘ὁ τελέτης’] […], as Demetrius […] and several of his 
predecessors said; for ‘the saying is not mine’” (Dionysius “Demosthenes” 256–257, §5; cf. 
257n.; “Pompeius” 364–367, §2; 367n.). On Aristides pro rhetoric, vs. Plato, see Vickers (Defence 
170–178; with ch. 3, 148–213); said critic’s (characteristic) value judgmentalism often gainsays 
a scholarly approach (cf. Defence 171; 173; spec. 177–178). Staging Plato qua speaker, Aristides 
defends rhetoric by recourse to what may seem to be a variant of a prosopo- resp. eidolopoiía: “I 
want it to be as if he were standing here in person […] testifying with his own voice [‘τῇ ἑαυτοῦ 
φωνῇ’]” (538–539, §394). A (literal) quote from the Nómoi ensues—words which Plato (as ever) 
had put into a protagonist’s mouth: here, the Athenian stranger (cf. Laws VII–XII. 126, 829A, 
VIII). Aristides thus takes the sermocinatio as stating Plato’s view, and by repeating it verbatim, 
deems him present. A hedged, layered eidolopoiía follows later, where the Sophist cites Plato 
for the technique, then adds an allocutio of his making: “what if” the Four Athenian statesmen 
“could somehow come back to life […], as Dion is represented by Plato talking to the 
Syracusans, and say this to him: ‘Plato[’]” etc. (553, §321; cf. 551n.; direct addresses also at 563, 
§331; 565, §334; 569, §339); the sermocinatio is closed with the formula “If our men said this”—
after which Aristides cites Plato’s eidolopoiía (“in the part where he represents the dead Dion 
speaking as still alive, we read”, 555, §324; “they would say”, 557, §325). Cf. Vickers: “Isocrates 
had validated Miltiades, Themistocles, […] Pericles by his […] account of their public-spirited 
[…] courageous actions[;] Aristides writes a prosopopoeia in which they speak in their own 
defence” (Defence 174). There often is a frame: “Speaking in his own person again” (Defence 
175). In writing on behalf of the dead by putting words into their mouths, the Sophist logs the 
tools employed (eidolopoiía, a bilaterally ethopoetic dialogismós): “‘Tell me, Plato’, any one of 
those men would be glad to ask, ‘did you lead the Athenians, or any other Greek or barbarian 
people, for the best? You would not be able to say […] you did, because you did not lead 
anyone” (563, §331). Rhetorical vicariousness, variants of ventriloquism are functionalized to 
attack Plato: “That is, I think, what they would say, and in my view they would be speaking 
with restraint” (565, §333). While subtly, Aristides had not done so afore: “how much […] would 
those who wish to be tyrants give for orators as a class […] to be mistrusted in their states […] 
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ἕτερον χρὴ λέγοντα ποιεῖν[.] 
Aristotle (Rhetoric 460, 1418b, III.xvii.16)246 
|| 
looked on as flatterers and no better than caterers” (549, §314)—so insinuating (nay, effectually 
saying) that Plato desired to be a tyrant (whereby he would have been one; see Rep. 6–10. 480–
481, 619b–c, X; with “Gorgias” 312–313, 462E–463B; 316–321, 464C–466A; 450–453, 502C–D). 
246 Aristotle’s context: “In regard to […] character [‘τὸ ἦθος’], since sometimes, in speaking of 
ourselves, we render ourselves liable to envy, to the charge of prolixity, or contradiction, or, 
when speaking of another, we may be accused of abuse or boorishness, we must make another 
speak in our place [‘héteron chrè légonta poiein’]”—(artfully) utile variants (Rhetoric 460–461, 
1418b, III.xvii.16). Cf. “The character of the speaker, since statements may be […] tactless, 
offensive, or too favourable to himself, is best conveyed by putting them into the mouth of 
some other” (Freese l). Naschert (1513); Sprute (287). Blass logs “Formen der Ethopoeie, wo der 
Redner eine fingirte Person an seiner Stelle sprechen lässt […] oder dem Gegner Worte in den 
Mund legt, die derselbe hätte sprechen müssen” (Beredsamkeit II. 483; cf. 483n.; with Tiberius 
63–64, §11). Blass notes cases “wo der Redner ein mit ihm vom Ankläger angestelltes Verhör 
fingirt” (Beredsamkeit III.2. 41); also “diejenige Ethopoeie, wo geständigermassen ein 
Phantasiestück gegeben wird” (Beredsamkeit III.2. 215); and “Antworten, die den Richtern zur 
Abwehr gegnerischer Ausflüchte in den Mund gelegt werden”: “Aischines [‘bringt’] unter 
dieser Maske eine Verdächtigung vor[…], die er vielleicht aus eigner Person zu äussern nicht 
wagte” (Beredsamkeit III.2. 216). Demosthenes “[‘führt’] die Reden der Gegner nachahmend 
vor[…]”, causing “hohe Lebendigkeit […], indem der ausgeprägten Rede des Gegners die des 
Sprechers scharf gegenübertritt. [er] […] führt […] vor, was der Gegner hätte sagen s o l l e n  
oder m ü s s e n” (Beredsamkeit III.1. 178); “legt […] den Richtern Antworten in den Mund” 
(Beredsamkeit III.1. 178–179); “führt […] Gedanken und Ueberlegungen vor, die ein Abwesender 
bei seinen Handlungen hatte […] der Redner [‘fingirt’] auch […] bestimmte Fälle hypothetisch 
[…]; es folgt […] eine lange Rede, in welcher der Redner vermittelst dieser Unterschiebung einer 
andern Person den Athenern alles viel schärfer sagt, als er es aus der eigenen könnte”; such a 
setup “[‘gibt’] dem Redner Gelegenheit […], mit minderem Anstoss von seinen Verdiensten zu 
reden” (Beredsamkeit III.1. 179). On the uses of delegation in Aristotle (spec. the “Einführung 
einer anderen sprechenden Person”), cf. Hellwig: “der Redner [‘gibt’] seinen Anspruch, einen 
[…] Sachverhalt aufhellen oder das Richtige raten zu können, an einen Dritten ab […] und sei es 
[…] die Autorität der communis opinio” (266). Kennedy sees said segment in strictly structural 
terms (sans functional focus): “an ‘ethical digression’, […] elaborating on the character of the 
speaker or […] opponent, at the end of the proof […] before the epilogue” (Civic Disc. 277n.; cf. 
New History 67). See Hellwig (262–266): “Zur Hervorhebung des eigenen oder eines fremden 
Charakters empfiehlt Aristoteles einen Verfremdungseffekt: Damit sich das eigene Ich nicht zu 
sehr in den Vordergrund drängt und so allzu leicht Vorwürfen aussetzt […], soll der Redner die 
Worte […] einem fiktiven Sprecher in den Mund legen. […] So[…] kann das ἦθος des Redners 
wie auch […] eines anderen […] in der Rede zum Gegenstand gemacht werden: […] durch den 
Redner selbst oder […] einen fingierten Dritten” (262–263). She states: “Einen Sammelnamen 
für dieses Kunstmittel gibt es in der antiken Rhetorik wohl nicht”; while noting the possibility 
of ‘employing the expression’ “‘Ethopoiie’” sensu lato, she prefers “Prosopopoiie” (263n.). As 
exempla, Aristotle tenders epideictic uses in Isocrates (delegated self-praise), Archilochus (“in 
censure”). The glosses add: “in the Antidosis”, “Isocrates puts compliments on his composition 
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Rhetorical economy (“dispositio”) is the expedient “selection and arrangement” 
(Lausberg Elemente 27, §46; trans. dsm) of the (verbalized) matter at hand: “it is 
|| 
into the mouth of an imaginary friend” (Rhetoric 461, 1418b, III.xvii.16; 460n.; cf. “Antidosis” 
264–271, §141–149; contrast: Blass Beredsamkeit II. 168); “Archilochus”—“instead of attacking 
the daughter directly”—“represented her as being attacked by her father” (Rhetoric 460n.–
461n.). “Sophocles […] introduces Haemon, when defending Antigone against his father, as if 
quoting the opinion of others [‘hos legónton hetéron’]” (Rhetoric 460–463, 1418b, III.xvii.16); 
the gloss has: “Haemon […] puts his own feelings as to Creon’s cruel treatment of Antigone into 
the mouth of the people […] refers to popular rumour” (Rhetoric 461n.); “for me it is possible to 
hear under cover […], how the city is lamenting for this girl […]. Does she not deserve, they ask, 
to be honoured with a golden prize? Such is the dark saying […] silently advancing” (Sophocles 
66–67, v.692–693, v.699–700; cf. 70–71, v.733). Hellwig: “Haimon verkleidet seine Meinung als 
[…] Volksgerede” (263n.). Such forms of delegation rely on the timeless effect of the ‘everyone 
knows’: cf. Aristotle (Rhetoric 378–381, 1408a, III.vii.7); subch. 3.2. See Vives: “Reprehendi […], 
admoneri a nobis eum in quem non credamur esse amico animo, inducitur aliena persona hæc 
aut hæc de illo dici, aut in illo desiderari, ab his aut illis, sive suppresso nomine, seu edito: cujus 
quidque persona dicetur, ei erunt aptanda omnia, non nobis, perinde prorsum atque ipse idem 
diceret, ut fiat verisimile sic eum nec aliter fuisse dicturum; neque vero tam spectabimus quid 
eum, quem loquentem facimus, deceat, ut personam, quam nos ei imponimus”; for: “tales ipsi 
non sunt, at nos facimus” (185, Aa.r, II.xvi; but cf. 186, Aa.v)—emphatic of the craft. Sans the 
virtually vicarious, ventriloquistic shift, such an effect may be attained by the art of the en 
passant—veiling its involvement (cf. part 6): “you should incidentally narrate [‘paradiegesthai’] 
anything that tends to show your own virtue [‘aretèn’]” (Aristotle Rhetoric 444–445, 1417a, 
III.xvi.5). Carey logs that dispositio conduces to “the presentation of ethos”, by stressing “the 
effects” of an “adroit presentation of the ‘facts’ […] Aristotle shows an awareness […] of the 
potential of narrative as proof. He notes (Rhetoric 141[7]a) […]: ‘You may slip in[…] such things 
as relate to your virtue[’] […] the exposition of character appears uncontrived […] the hearer 
draws the character by inference for himself. The resultant persona is therefore more 
plausible” (“Rhet. means” 38–39). A similarly incidental modus operandi will prove utile for 
opposing parties. Cf. Sattler (his context cum grano salis): “whenever Aristotle deals with the 
portrayal of the character of others in a speech, he indicates the relationship of such ethos to 
the ethos of the speaker” (60–61). Noting that “diabole […] is derived from […] diaballein, […] ‘to 
cause hostility between/against’”—an “element […] at home in any part of the speech”—Carey 
sees the tool of “destroy[ing] […] character” as spec. efficient if employed “in passing” (“Rhet. 
means” 31). Cf. the countermeasure (‘antidiabállein’: Aristotle Rhetoric 440, 1416a, III.xv.7; 456, 
1418a, III.xvii.10); Süss (245–246); Wisse (22): “διαβολή is relevant to ethos in any variant” 
(22n.). On “character assassination” in Lysias, see Carey (“Comment.” 147; with 72, 89n., 111, 
148, 162, 207). Bakker refers to “the negative ēthopoiia of his adversary” (“Lysias” 419n.). Cf. 
Pearson: “in […] lawsuits”, spec. “in those that have some political significance, the aim of a 
litigant is not only to prove that certain incidents took place, but to ruin his adversary’s career 
by blackening his character” (“Character.” 76). Cf. Bakker’s wording: “blackens […] reputation” 
(“Lysias” 415); Morford (242; passim). Pearson sees a “fashion of merciless characterization” 
(Greek Historians 40). Kennedy stresses: “Character assassination becomes a significant feature 
of Greek and later of Roman oratory” (New History 67; cf. Persuasion 136–138). 
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not only what we say and how we say it that matters, but also in what sequence: 
Disposition is therefore essential [‘opus ergo est et dispositione’]” (Quintilian 
Inst. Orat. 3–5. 22–23, 3.3.2).247 Likewise, Dionysius considers it to be paramount: 
|| 
247 Blass accentuates: “In der Art aber, wie die Verbindung hergestellt wird, offenbart sich 
gerade des Redners Kunst” (Beredsamkeit II. 168). Cf. “Dispositio est ordo et distributio rerum”; 
“Arrangement is the ordering and distribution of the matter” (Rhet. ad Her. 6–7, I.ii.3); 
“dispositio est per quam illa quae invenimus in ordinem redigimus” (Rhet. ad Her. 184, 
III.ix.16). Caplan’s glosses use “τάξις”, “οἰκονομία” interchangeably (Rhet. ad Her. 6n., 184n.), 
while noting that “Sulpitius Victor […] distinguishes between the Natural Arrangement (ordo 
naturalis) and the Artistic (ordo artificiosus, οἰκονομία) […]. Cf. Quintilian’s oeconomica 
dispositio in 7. 10. 11. Athanasius […] distinguishes τάξις from οἰκονομία on the same principle” 
(Rhet. ad Her. 184n.–185n.; see Sulpicius Victor 320, §14). The Rhet. ad Her. uses the term (“alia 
dispositio”) also for the latter, modified by “accommodated to circumstance [‘ad tempus 
adcommodatur’]” (Rhet. ad Her. 186–187, III.ix.17). Context constitutes the aptum—the guiding 
directive (as generally in the pragmatic art par excellence) being expediency (“commode”, “si 
commodum erit”, Rhet. ad Her. 186, III.ix.17). Cf. Quintilian, stating “that it is […] not always 
expedient to be lucid [‘nec dilucida semper sit utile exponere’]” (Inst. Orat. 3–5. 234–237, 
4.2.32); Russell glosses: “the expediency of the case is always decisive” (Inst. Orat. 3–5. 236n.). 
As to narrative arrangement, the orator likewise accentuates utility: “I prefer to narrate events 
in the order that is most advantageous [‘eo malo narrare quo expedit’]” (Inst. Orat. 3–5. 260–
261, 4.2.83). Whether or not one accepts the possibility of a ‘natural order’ will depend on the 
measure applied; taking the technical character of the ars into account (as does the Rhetorica), 
the ‘natural’ sequence will be tantamount to the ‘normal’ one as per “the rules of the art” 
(“ordine artificioso”, Rhet. ad Her. 186–187, III.ix.17; with 184n.). Any arrangement will be 
‘economical’ in this sense—all dispositio being artful (see part 6, herein). On “oeconomia”, cf. 
Quintilian (Inst. Orat. 3–5. 26–27, 3.3.9; 26n.; here: 27); including Russell’s gloss that “[t]he 
term οἰκονομία was widely used”, also defined as ‘éntechnos epíkrisis ton heurethénton’, a 
“technical review of what has been discovered” (Inst. Orat. 3–5. 26n.). Prior, and with respect to 
drama, the rhétor states: “The old Latin poets […] are also more careful [‘diligentior’] about 
organization [‘Oeconomia’] than most of the moderns, who have come to think that clever 
phrases (sententiae) are the only virtue in any work” (Inst. Orat. 1–2. 202–203, 1.8.8–9; cf. 
Herrick 102). Baldwin takes “the ancient term[s] […] dispositio, collocatio, or more generally 
οἰκονομία” to mean “composition in our larger modern sense” (Ancient Rhet. 103n.). Discussing 
the “rhetorical terms […] dispositio, ordo, and oeconomia” with respect to drama (94–106; here: 
94), Herrick observes: “The Terentian commentators, Donatus included, did not favor the term 
ordo though they were familiar with the conception of natural and artificial order” (101; cf. 98); 
they “preferred […] oeconomia, which they used to express the orderly, unified disposition of 
scenes in a comedy” (102)—following Quintilian, as cited above; in Renaissance drama, “Ordo 
[…] usually meant the arrangement of a particular speech. Oeconomia […] was larger than 
individual speeches” (102). The rhetorical variant: “duplex dispositio est: una per orationes, 
altera per argumentationes” (Rhet. ad Her. 184–186, III.ix.17). Herrick notes that “Ordo […] was 
not used by Robortellus as synonymous with dispositio and oeconomia”—while he does employ 
the latter two interchangeably (105); likewise Ben Jonson (“the oeconomy and disposition”), 
and Milton (“such oeconomy or disposition”, qtd. in: Herrick 106). 
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for the achievement of pleasing, persuasive […] powerful effects in discourse […] [‘the 
arrangement’] is far more potent than […] [‘the selection of words’]. […] composition 
[‘σύνθεσις’] […] possesses so much importance and potency that it surpasses and 
outweighs all the other’s achievements. […] the potentialities of composition are second in 
logical order to those of selection, but are prior in potency. (“Composition” 22–23, §2)248 
The practice of oikonomía applies to all written and delivered genres: given a 
(copious) substratum heuristically encountered during the phase of inventio—
whether factual and historical, or already based on a literary rendering, on (ex 
tempore) fabrication—no text or speech (nor any other work of art) could do 
without the procedures of selecting, assembling, arranging, organizing, 
framing, and displaying (in terms of ‘layout’) the material at hand in a manner 
deemed conducive to the respectively present case, the mode of treating it, and 
the desired effect: be it dissuading or accommodating, competitive and 
conflictual, pondering and assessing, or vituperative and laudatory (or again 
otherwise).249 That it is always significant rhetorically in whose mouth words are 
|| 
248 Cf. Roberts (9). Dionysius refers to rhetorical dispositio by way of forms and derivatives of 
sýnthesis and kataskeué—see e.g. ‘synthéseos’ (“Lysias” 32, §8), ‘syntíthesí’, ‘kataskeue’, 
‘kateskeuasménos’, ‘kateskeuásthai’, ‘synthései’ (“Lysias” 34, §8), ‘kataskeuon’ (“Lysias” 46, 
§13); also forms of ‘táxis’ (“Lysias” 38, §11), ‘táxei’, ‘táxin’ (“Lysias” 52, §15), and oikonomía: 
‘oikonomesai’ (twice, “Lysias” 52, §15); cf. Bonner (Lit. Treatises 46). Noting that “Lysias seeks 
to achieve his effects subtly”, Carey accentuates “his ability to suggest an emotional response 
by the skilful deployment of material (by selection, juxtaposition, expansion […] contraction)” 
(“Intro.” 11); “the ‘inartificial’ proofs admit of skill in drafting and deployment” (“Intro.” 10)—
spec. as to their placement in a speech’s rhetorical economy. On the import of Lysian dispositio, 
see Bakker: he “carefully weaves” facets “into his speeches wherever […] most effective” (cf. 
“the distribution of characterizing elements”, “Lysias” 412; with applications: 413–416). 
249 Cf. “Ammonius […] quotes Theophrastus as saying that every speech has two aspects, the 
content and the effect upon the audience; the philosopher is mainly concerned with the first, 
the poet or rhetorician mainly with the second: they choose their words for effect and arrange 
them harmoniously” (Grube 106). To impress ‘philosophical’ (including soi-disant) recipients, 
it is primarily the lógos (prágmata, res, nominal equivalents) that tends to be efficacious. Cf. 
Kustas: “Psellus […] remarks that philosophy without rhetoric has no grace, and rhetoric 
without philosophy no content. […] [‘]there is a philosophizing rhetoric as well as a 
rhetoricizing philosophy’” (69; with 69n.). Ever will effectuality be relative to the given context 
(its priming, presuppositions, hence expectations). Cf. Sprute (286; 289); Niehues-Pröbsting: 
“Rhetorik ist […] unverzichtbar, weil die große Menge […] wissenschaftlicher Belehrung 
unzugänglich ist. Selbst wenn die Wahrheit eines Sachverhaltes an sich beweisbar ist, ist sie 
das doch nicht immer für alle“ (“Glauben” 35). “Die sophistische Rhetorik ist nur so ‘logisch’, 
wie es im Hinblick auf das jeweilige Publikum und nicht im Hinblick auf die Sache notwendig 
ist” (Die antike Phil. 53). One may say the same about the relative ‘logicalness’ of philosophy—
since one might question whether something like a ‘res’ (‘lógos’) sans audience is even possible 
(beyond its nominal, propositional conceivability); rhetorically, anything (the issue at hand) is 
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being put—at what time, in which context and whose presence, by which 
means, and (above all) in the interest of what or whom (including vicariously)—
marks a decisive nexus between dispositio and sermocinatio.250 
|| 
constituted by, contingent upon, the context (being a case’s conditio sine qua non). As to the 
above, Theophrastan view, cf. Devries’ binarism for another elemental pístis: “There are two 
classes of ethos, the universal and the particular. The sphere of the former is philosophy; of the 
latter, oratory […] [where] it is the means by which the speech is adapted to the speaker, […] 
hearers, […] opponent, […] subject, […] circumstances” (10). A strict dichotomy seems 
problematic: any dissemination of ‘philosophy’ will require a form of (self-)representation (an 
agent, carrier being involved). The rhetorical accent on specifics, contextuality is to the point. 
250 Nicolaus claims that ethopoetic “speech” will not “be argumentative”, since “its only aim 
is to move the hearer to pleasure or to tears” (166, §10.67). He does not seem to grant rhetoric’s 
polyfunctionality, or that of its devices; see Mayfield (“Interplay” 5; 5n.–6n.; 8n.; 14n.; 33n.). 
Cf. Carey: “narrative can be varied, […] achieve more than one effect” (“Rhet. means” 43). 
Ventriloquism cannot be restricted to elocutio, ornatus. Noting that “Ēthopoiia is a concern of 
epinician, as it is of oratory”, Currie states (as to “Pindar and Bacchylides”): “[t]he relevant 
technique of characterization […] is […] speech, involving both ēthopoiia and gnōmai. But […] 
qualifications […] need to be recognized. First, […] the problem of who speaks” (312); this will 
usually apply. Describing variants of rhetorical ventriloquism may have a diagnostic function: 
“Pindar’s epinicians are full of gnōmai presented in the speaker’s persona (in Bacchylides there 
is a greater tendency to place them in the mouth of characters)” (Currie 313). On the dispositio 
of sententiae, see Vives: “sordent enim sententiæ non suo loco positæ, et sicut intempestivum 
omne, molestæ sunt”; one may ‘finitize’ them: “verum enimvero illud plurimi refert, quid cujus 
persona dicatur, nostra an aliena, sunt enim multa quæ a nobis nostro nomine et persona dici 
expedit, sicut non pauca alieno nomine, quemadmodum etiam in causis forensibus” (185, Aa.r, 
II.xvi). Cf. Corneille’s “Discours du poème dramatique”: “il les faut placer judicieusement, et 
surtout les mettre en la bouche de gens qui ayent l’esprit sans embarras, et qui ne soient point 
emportés par la chaleur de l’action” (qtd. in: Asmuth Dramenanalyse 166–167)—counseled, 
performed with a view to docere; other functionalizations are conceivable. The ‘aptum’ is 
involved: “in Platons Dialogen finden sich Lebensweisheiten fast nur im Munde älterer 
Personen” (Hellwig 265n.)—for reasons of plausibility (hence with a view to the recipients). The 
effect being the gauge, a flouting thereof may prove expedient (relative to the setting, genre): 
in a Theophrastan context, Rusten logs that Menander’s “philosophizing passages […] are often 
given an ironic turn when put in the mouths of unsuitable characters” (17); on the “affinity” of 
said philosopher and poet, see Fuhrmann (Dichtungstheorie 157; trans. dsm). In a context of 
paradoxography, burlesque, “cynicism”, Schulz-Buschhaus speaks of Rabelais’ “putting in the 
mouth of Panurge” an “encomium of creditors and debtors” (8; trans. dsm). In artful, even 
devious texts, inadvertency as to in whose mouth words are being put may lead to problematic 
views on what is supposed to be a text’s ‘meaning’ or ‘the author’s intent’. For one of Erasmus’ 
“most infamous” sermocinationes (“‘Saint Socrates, pray for us!’”, in the mouth of “Eusebius”), 
cf. Sloane (“Selfhood” 112; cf. 114). Among Cervantes’ “formal strategies”, Fuchs logs 
“moments of ventriloquism[,] in which marginalized characters voice the ideology that 
condemns them” (17). Cf. Mayfield (“Talking Canines” 14n.; 19; 19n.; 22; 22n.; 29; spec. 32n.–
33n.; Artful 91n.; 128; 182n.; 184; 273). As to the Machiavellian (and Livian) practice, see Strauss 
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 With respect to poetics, any writer will select, (dialogically) situate, specific 
personae (éthe), putting convenient words into their mouths; or (often at once) 
citing their (apparently) ‘historical’ counterparts (also with regard to selves) in a 
manner (deemed) advantageous to the respectively present purpose and context 
(this being the Platonic praxis generally)—sometimes so as to speak specifically 
in the extratextual writer’s stead (as received by the audience or reader).251 
 Concerning the internal economy, Lausberg logs “the poet’s conversation 
with the muse” as “a special variant” of sermocinatio (Elemente 143, §433; trans. 
dsm). On the stage, or in ‘autobiography’ (see part 1), it may tend to take the 
form of a “monolog” or “soliloquy” (cf. Elemente 143, §432; trans. dsm), and 
include a speaker’s putting words into her own mouth (so to say)—for instance 
with a view to (imagining herself in, preparing for) a future situation.252 
|| 
(10; 42, “mouthpiece”, 139; cf. 137–167; Mansfield Virtue 132; 320n.); see subch. 5.2, herein. In 
line with the above, Cicero’s ensuing claim must be modified: “the poet avoids impropriety 
[‘dedecere’] as the greatest fault which he can commit; he errs also if he puts the speech 
[‘orationem affingit’] of a good man in the mouth of a villain, or that of wise man in the mouth 
of a fool; […] even the actor seeks for propriety [‘si denique histrio quid deceat quaerit’]; what, 
then […] should the orator do” (“Orator” 360–361, xxi.74). A calculated indecorum will not 
exactly be out of the ordinary, given a téchne aiming for maximal effectuality: “Que es arte ir 
contra el arte quando no se puede de otro modo conseguir la dicha del salir bien” (Gracián 
Oráculo manual 138, §66). On (Diogenical) cynicism, cf. Mayfield (Artful 7n.; 50–51; 55, 55n.; 
129n.; passim). As France notes for another notorious case, Rousseau’s rhetoric “works[,] 
because it flouts the oratorical conventions of modesty and self-effacement, but also because it 
uses some of the old devices, notably prosopopoeia”—a tactic fusing “brutal effrontery” (259) 
with technical hypólepsis. On the nexus of dispositio and actio, see Cicero: “Aeschines […] 
thought that the same speech with a change of speaker would be a different thing [‘qui 
orationem eamdem aliam esse putaret actore mutato’]” (“De Orat. III” 169–171, III.lvi.213). 
Similarly: “Multa fiunt eadem, sed aliter” (Quintilian Inst. Orat. 1–2. 406, 2.20.10). 
“Wiederholung ist prinzipiell vom Wiederholten unterschieden” (Stierle “Moralistik” 2). “Each 
word of a text is transformed in a new context” (Bakhtin Speech 165; “Methodology” 68). 
251 This phenomenon seems pervasive (and elusive); it may also apply to a spec. citational 
practice (often with an ethopoetic agenda); cf. “‘au nom du dieu! […] ne me parlez pas de cet-
homme-là!’” (Voltaire ventriloquized, or qtd., in: Nietzsche KSA 13. 44, 11[95]347). It matters, 
who is cited—when, in what context, whose presence. Cf. Pfister on the “produzentenbezogene 
Phänomen der Verwendung einer Figur als ‘Sprachrohr’ für die Meinungen und Ansichten des 
Autors” (149) qua determining the process of reception. As Burger indicates with reference to 
Wittenwiler’s “Der Ring” (a “Monstrum, halb Lehrgedicht, halb Verserzählung von epischem 
Ausmaß”), sermocinatio may be functionalized in (ostensibly) didactic respects (Renaissance 
62): “Die lehrhaften Partien sind Personen der unterhaltenden Erzählung in den Mund gelegt. 
Ohne letztere, entschuldigt sich der Verfasser, fände die Lehre keine Leser” (Renaissance 63). 
252 Iulius Rufinianus refers to such ‘auto-sermocinatio’ as “Διαλογισμός”: “Haec fit ita, cum 
quis secum disputat et volutat, quid agat vel quid agendum putet. Apud Terentium: Q u i d  
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 From a (meta-)poetico-hermeneutic perspective, the above procedure might 
also be taken to apply to an author’s anticipating his recipients intratextually—
(tacitly, expressly) putting words into their mouths (sermocinatio functioning 
qua subiectio), so as to reply immediately (on the page).253 Dynamizing the 
|| 
i g i t u r  f a c i a m ? Vergilius: / E n ,  q u i d  a g o ? […] Cicero pro Cluentio: […] 
Q u o d  e s t  i g i t u r  r e m e d i u m ? q u o d ?” (43–44, §20). Also citing Terence 
(Inst. Orat. 9–10. 40, 9.2.11), Quintilian classes the process under “interrogare vel percontari”—
which Russell captions “Rhetorical Questions” (Inst. Orat. 9–10. 36–43, 9.2.6–16; here: 36, 
9.2.6): it includes “interrogandi se et respondendi sibi”; “imaginary interrogation” (“ficta 
interrogatione”)—e.g. via “Someone will say [‘dicet aliquis’]” (Inst. Orat. 9–10. 40–41, 9.2.14–
15); “ask[ing] a question and […], without waiting for the answer, supply[ing, ‘subicere’] one 
yourself”—“sometimes called Suggestion [‘per suggestionem’]” (Inst. Orat. 9–10. 42–43, 9.2.15). 
Cf. “man richtet an Jemand[en] eine Frage, […] ohne die Antwort abzuwarten, schiebt man ihm 
seine eigen unter”: “subjectio”, “ὑποφορά […] ἀνθυποφορά” (Volkmann 493, III.49; see Tiberius 
77, §39). Said scholar links “die Figur des διαλεκτικόν” to the affine “διαλογισμός” (492, III.49; 
the former with Tiberius 67–68, §19). See subch. 3.1. Bonner adduces Seneca’s “prosopopoeia” 
of Andromache, “in which she debates with herself” (Declamation 164; see “Troades” 228–229, 
v.642–662; “Quid agimus?”, v.642). Cf. Priscian on ‘onefold allocutions’: “Adlocutionum […] 
quaedam sunt simplices, quando supponitur aliquis ipse per se loquens” (“praeexercitamina” 
558, §9). Such pertains to the deliberative: “Die Fingierung von Selbstgesprächen beruht auf 
der coniectura animi” (Lausberg Handbuch 410, §823)—vicariously (anticipatingly, 
prudentially, purposively) putting oneself in the position of an (potentially any) alter. For 
epistolography, Lanham logs: “quasi praesens is the motto […] of ethopoeia, speaking in 
character” (“Composition” 123). Cf. Shawcross, on Wyatt’s “Patience, though I have not”: 
“While the poet seems to address a personified Patience, it is clear that he is counselling 
himself” (15). For (dramatic) realizations, cf. Plett: “fictio personae” (“Prosopopoiie”) is “eine 
theatralische Impersonation nach den Regeln des decorum. Ihre poetische Applikation führt zu 
Erscheinungsformen” such as “Rollenlyrik oder dramatic monologue” (“Theatrum Rhet.” 354; 
cf. 356); see Barner (103–104; spec. “Rollentrieb”, 103; “Lust zur Rolle”, “Spieltrieb”, 104). 
253 In Antiquity, declamatory praxis was decisive in this respect—‘performed’ (actio, delivery) 
in schools, but also later in life; it is present in Medieval scholastic disputations, Humanist 
dialogs; cf. Bloemendal (“Polish Pindar” 115–117); Feldman (75); Mayfield (“Interplay” 23; 24n.; 
29; 29n.). See Christiansen: “examples for imitation came from all disciplines (poetry, history, 
philosophy, oratory, […] scripture) and from all genres (sententiae, dialogues, epistles, verses, 
themes, […] orations proper), all texts were treated as ‘declamations’” (316). On the aspect of 
anticipation qua linked to the aptum, cf. Nicolaus: ethopoeia “is useful for the three kinds of 
rhetoric; […] we often need ethopoeia when speaking an encomium […] in prosecuting […] 
giving counsel. To me, it seems also to exercise us in the style of letter writing, since […] there is 
need of foreseeing the character of those sending letters and those to whom they are sent” (166, 
§10.66–67). In various formulations, the import of the aptum is stressed in the Progymnasmata 
(pace Bruss’ decontextualized construal 44): “Throughout the exercise [of ‘characterization’] 
you will preserve what is distinctive and appropriate to the persons imagined as speaking and 
to the occasions” (Hermogenes 85, §9.21). “Speeches […] need to fit the places and occasions 
[…]. We shall […] give what is appropriate to each” (John of Sardis/Sopatros 214, §11.196); “the 
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discourse, Blumenberg uses this technique in the following formulation: 
“Maybe someone [will] say” (Unbegrifflichkeit 38; trans. dsm).254 One also 
|| 
speech should be proper to those supposed to be speaking” (217, §11.209). Alberic emphasizes 
decorum in virtually every phrase on “ethopoeia” with respect to “letter writing” (151, VII.1; cf. 
Lanham “Composition” 120; 122; “Instruction” 115–116; with 115n.): “a suitable simplicity of 
language”; “take care to preserve […] balance with the greatest diligence”; “one will succeed in 
[…] moving the heart when he suits […] his words and […] thoughts to the dignity of the theme”; 
“he must study […] the person so as to determine who is speaking, to whom, when, how, and 
about what”; “he will be able to vary his approach according to the [resp.] nature”; “the 
qualities suitable to each” (Alberic 150, VII.1); “one must carefully adapt his material to the age 
of the listener. Nor should one ignore the background”; “one […] deals with each according to 
his […] nature”; “not all speak the same language”; “one must study who is speaking, what, 
where, with what aids, when, why, […] how; by scrutinizing all these elements very carefully, 
he will be able to treat each […] according to its merits” (151, VII.1). Cf. Lanham: “a letter should 
reflect the writer’s character and personality, […] be adapted to the relationship between writer 
and addressee” (“Composition” 122)—as is suitable, effectual under the given circumstances. 
For letters have purposes (normally more than one)—hence said ‘reflecting and adapting’ are 
governed by the case at hand (ultimately by expediency only). See Demetrius on the epistolary 
genre: “the letter […] is like one of the two sides to a dialogue” (481, §223; a remark given to 
Artemon). “Like the dialogue, the letter should be strong in characterisation [‘tò ethikòn’]” 
(482–483, §227). Kustas notes: “Photius […] list[s][…] βραχύτης, σαφήνεια, χάρις, ἁπλότης as the 
qualities by which to convey the ethos of the letter writer and his subject. […] a late anonymous 
writer reminds us that ἠθοποιΐα should be καθαρά, and without ruggedness” (67–68; see 67n.–
68n.). Cf. Sloane: “Humanists […] taught letter-writing as if letters were a kind of conversation” 
(“Education” 171). Eden associates ethos (“this understanding of character”) “with epistolary 
writing” (Rediscovery 109). Cf. Kustas: “Epistolography […] falls under the heading of ἠθοποιΐα, 
the progymnasma par excellence[,] which gave the freest scope to the expression of personality 
traits” (59). Citing the latter (“Instruction” 110), Lanham glosses: “ethopoeia […], the speech in 
character, was considered to be among the more difficult […]. The larger rhetorical principle 
being stressed in this exercise is decorum, suiting one’s words to the speaker’s age, rank, […] 
fortune, […] to the situation. Establishing an authorial voice, an ethos, is a central task for any 
speaker or writer, but character portrayal addressed the very essence of the letter, which is, 
after all, a substitute for one’s physical presence. […] one must take into account the […] ethos 
[…] of […] sender and […] recipient” (“Instruction” 110–111). The vicariousness characteristic of 
epistolae entails products of art as standing in for ‘nature’—evincing the craftedness of ethos, 
incidentally. As “[v]arious formulas” show, “a letter substitutes for face-to-face conversation”: 
“it seeks to bridge physical separation quasi (or tamquam) praesens, littera pro lingua, and 
absens corpore, praesens spiritu” (“Composition” 122; cf. 127n.; Lanham’s table of ‘epistolary 
formulas’, 131n.–134n.); see spec. “per vicarium meum” (“Composition” 132n.), referring to the 
letter as (quasi-personified) proxy. Such and affine phrases “dramatize[…] both the persona of 
the sender and the moment of receiving or reading the letter” (“Composition” 122). 
254 Cf. Blumenberg (Phänomenologische 11; 55); Sloane on “prolepsis, anticipatory refutation” 
(“Education” 163; Contrary 81): “one should always keep the opposition in view […]. 
‘Wariness’” (“Education” 173; Contrary 123)—“bold with all wareness” (Wilson 58, I; cf. 121, I). 
152 | DS Mayfield 
  
encounters it as a sequentialized structuring device in Seneca (conspicuously 
with a view to dispositio): “Now some person […] will say […] Again, the objector 
mentioned above wonders at our saying […] Again, this same objector wonders 
at our saying” (“Hoc aliquis […] ait […] Deinde idem admiratur, cum dicimus […] 
Deinde idem admiratur, quod dicimus”, Ep. 66–92. 224–227, LXXXI.11–12).255 
|| 
255 Cf. “‘But how’, you will reply [‘Dices’]” (Ep. 1–65. 22–23, V.7)—putting words in Lucilius’ 
mouth (as often in the epistles). See Augustine: “DICET aliquis”, “SOMEONE will say” (de civ. Dei 
I–III. 34–35, I.viii). Likewise, Machiavelli: “And if someone should reply” (Prince 64, XVI). 
Montaigne: “But, someone will answer [‘me répondra-on’]” (Essays 274, II.6; Essais II. 77, II.vi). 
As part of a hypophorá, sermocinationes serve as a setup for oneself. In Seneca, the technique 
may be seen as ‘fictionalizing’ an other (a prosopopoiía), while simultaneously ‘tying in with 
oneself’ (a hypoleptic dialogismós, so to speak)—for ethopoetic purposes. On “Letter writing” 
during the “Roman age” in connection with “portraiture and character expression”, see Kustas 
(58). As to the vivid crafting of presence by way of (plausibly) predicted recipient responses—
qua intratextual sermocinationes (not only expedient in letters)—cf. Iulius Victor: “Lepidum est 
nonnumquam quasi praesentem alloqui, uti ‘heus tu’ et ‘quid ais’ et ‘video te deridere’” (448, 
XXVII, in the ch. ‘de epistolis’; cf. Lanham “Composition” 120, 121n.). For a pertinent example 
(involving vicariously induced, cynical laughter), see Lucian: “I think I can see you laughing 
[…]—indeed, I hear you give tongue as you naturally [‘εἰκὸς’] would: ‘Oh, the stupidity! Oh, the 
vainglory! Oh’—everything else that we are in the habit of saying [‘λέγειν εἰώθαμεν’] about it 
all” (“Peregrinus” 4–5, §2; see 41, §37; cf. Hodkinson 552; with 557). Such might be described as 
a sermocinatio qua embedded reader response: the express reference being to this (epistolary) 
satire’s intratextual addressee (Kronios), hence to the general recipient. Often, one encounters 
sermocinatio in an imagined objector, (preventively) inserted (also in direct speech) into a tract 
or essay—a useful technique for stealing an opponent’s thunder, for dynamizing (what would 
else seem) a monolog by adding other voices; see Mayfield (“Otherwise” passim; spec. parts 1, 
6, therein). Cf. Sloane’s wording: “as Fish makes his enemy[,] the formalist[,] insist” 
(“Reading” 410). Hermogenes has these variants: “[t]here are characterizations of […] definite 
and indefinite persons […]. Those […] are single where someone […] is imagined as making a 
speech by himself; […] double[,] when he is speaking to someone else” (85, §9.20–21). This 
might as well be a sermocinatio qua setup (the verbalized alter a prosopopoiía): “Scribere me 
quereris, Velox, epigrammata longa. / ipse nihil scribis: tu breviora facis?” (Martial 120, I.110). 
Seneca puts a protest in Lucilius’ mouth: “‘Epicurus’ inquis, ‘dixit. Quid tibi cum alieno?’” (Ep. 
1–65. 72, XII.11)—only to invalidate it; or rather, to anticipate, defuse a conceivable objection, 
placed in the mouth of a protagonist equally functionalized. This dialogic rendering of the 
letter or essay has affinities to an ‘internal debate’—the persona ‘Seneca’ might be said to be 
externalizing an (otherwise) notional ‘Lucilius’ (prosopopoiía), interacting with him (quasi 
auto-etho-poetically) by putting words into his mouth (sermocinatio): “In secretum te meum 
admitto et te adhibito mecum exigo”; “I am admitting you to my inmost thoughts, and am 
having it out with myself, […] making use of you as my pretext” (Ep. 1–65. 192–193, XXVII.1). 
The above sententia had not been ascribed previously (as far as is assessable); hence Seneca 
synergizes its possible functionalizations. He first names a (noted) authority for a given dictum, 
then appropriates it: “Quod verum est, meum est […] quae optima sunt, esse communia” (Ep. 
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 With respect to ‘(famous) last words’, sermocinationes (likely the rule) are 
encountered qua attributing apposite (pregnant, laconic, prophetic) utterances 
to the departing—as, emphatically, their ‘last word’. Blumenberg’s Die Sorge 
geht über den Fluß ends with the ensuing sententia, wryly put into the dying 
Heidegger’s mouth (hypothetically): “Kein Grund mehr zur Sorge” (Sorge 222).256 
|| 
1–65. 72, XII.11). Focusing on Erasmus in said respect, see Eden (Friends passim; “Intellectual 
Property” passim). As suggested, it would probably not have been beyond the writer’s crafted, 
projected ethos (cultivated as ‘Seneca’) to have posited ‘Lucilius’ as a fictional addressee tout 
court, functionally standing in for another of ‘his own’ personae; the diction often yields the 
impression of a sender’s addressing himself; this circularity is then reproduced in (or by) the 
reader, who vicariously finds—or (deliberately) puts—himself in the position of the addressee 
and (if taken to be the same) the message’s (departed) emitter; such circuitousness seems spec. 
effectual in terms of auto-persuasion. Conversely, a writer might choose to reply implicitly to a 
friend (Montaigne to La Boétie); or teacher, often tacitly (Aristotle to Plato). For samples of said 
technique in John of Salisbury, see Moos: “Du sagst mir vielleicht [‘Sed dices fortasse’]” (293, 
293n., §71); “Sollte jemand [‘Si quis’]”, etc. (406, 406n., §88). Cf. Blumenberg, noting an affine 
use in Descartes: “Wahrscheinlich war es einer der fiktiven Antwortbriefe, die von ihm in 
Umlauf gesetzt wurden, um auf gedachte oder indirekt übermittelte Einwände einzugehen” 
(Höhlenausgänge 450)—delegating a dynamic disputatio to paper (seeing that scripta manent); 
in exploring a current genre, such also serves for tying in with (hence implicitly legitimizing) a 
given utilization. The various functions of rhetorical ventriloquism are polyvalent, Protean. 
256 Approx. ‘no longer any grounds for caring’—the discursive implications are not retained in 
trans. The section is entitled ‘Ein noch unbestätigtes Schlusswort’ (Sorge 222); Marquard takes 
it up with respect to Blumenberg (cf. “Entlastung 1991” 26). This sermocinatio (the philosopher 
putting apt last words in Heidegger’s mouth) is itself a (partial) citation of a (putative) Roman 
epitaph (given the telling caption ‘Das Dasein’): abbreviated as “N F F N S N C”, it is said to 
signify “NON FUI; FUI; NON SUM; NON CURO” (Begriffe 29); cf. quotes serving as last words 
(Goethe 88; Matthäuspassion 225–230). In “Ein Dementi”—as to the ‘future of reception’—
Blumenberg gives his motives for inventing “ein angemessene Sterbebettfazit” for Heidegger as 
‘not having wished to let him take his leave from Time and Being wordlessly’ (“habe ich […] 
[ihn] nicht wortlos aus Zeit und Sein abgehen lassen wollen”, Verführbarkeit 107); at once, he 
notes that “Bröcker” (notified by Heidegger’s wife) had sent him the (supposedly) actual last 
words: “Ich bleibe noch liegen” (Verführbarkeit 107; roughly, ‘I will stay in bed a while longer’); 
also cited in a more assertive, quasi-non-temporal version (as far as change or action in the 
future is concerned): “Ich bleibe liegen” (Vollzähligkeit 224). Counting himself a “lover of ‘last 
words’” (“Liebhaber ‘Letzter Worte’”), Blumenberg justifies his having ‘crafted the apposite for 
lack of the factual ones’ (“in Ermangelung des faktischen das angemessene […] erfinden”), and 
declares his ‘confiding in the fact that fiction will prevail’: “Trotzdem bin ich zuversichtlich, 
daß meine Fiktion – weil Fiktionen doch immer stärker sind als Fakten – überleben wird” 
(Verführbarkeit 108). See another of Blumenberg’s characteristic remarks to this effect: “Letzte 
Worte dürfen erfunden sein, wenn sie gut erfunden sind, da sie ohnehin zumeist erfunden 
werden müssen” (Höhlenausgänge 386n.; cf. Mayfield Artful 42n.). On legitimization as per the 
(effectuality of the) aptum, Blumenberg logs: “Auch wenn den pointierten Überlieferungen von 
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5.2 Variants of Rhetorical Ventriloquism in Historiography, 
Literature, Philosophy (inter alia) 
Quae omnia vera esse sciet si quis non orationes modo  
sed historias etiam […] legere maluerit  
quam in comentariis rhetorum consenescere[.] 
Quintilian (Inst. Orat. 3–5. 146–148, 3.8.67)257 
|| 
[…] Malraux nicht durchweg zu trauen ist, wird man doch geziemend finden, als letztes Wort 
des sterbenden […] Valéry gesagt zu finden” etc. (Lebensthemen 152). Cf. Meyer: “Blumenberg, 
immer auch ein Sammler ‘letzter Worte’” (115). With respect to Fontane, the philosopher 
suggests a short poem on the former’s part as his plausible ‘last word’ (“der […] Fünfzeiler […], 
der Fontanes ‘letztes Wort’ sein könnte”, Blumenberg Fontane 38). Cf. the short essay “Letzte 
Worte Wielands”, which opens: “Not everyone gets the chance to die as he deserves. Death is 
simply the precise opposite of a chance. This has an effect on [‘färbt auf (…) ab’, sc. ‘dyes’] the 
circumstances. Also on the last words, for which there still is time. Or on those, who have 
conveyed them to us” (Goethe 101; trans. dsm). For the arch-Phenomenologist, Blumenberg 
suggests: “‘E i n  Buch möchte ich noch fertig machen, das sollte mir vergönnt sein’. […] Als 
letztes Wort […] Husserls wäre das eines Gelehrten würdig” (the latter qtd., commented on, in: 
Lebensthemen 136); cf. “Daß es eine ‘unendliche Arbeit’ sein würde, war nicht nur eine Phrase” 
(Lebensthemen 137). With respect to Benn, Blumenberg writes a short essay entitled “Letztes 
Wort des Zynikers” (Lebensthemen 170–172; here: 170), which opens: “Letzte Worte spielen im 
Bestand des Überlieferten eine eigene Rolle. Der sie gesprochen hat, ist in absoluter Weise der 
Belangbarkeit für sie entzogen. Er erfährt nicht mehr und kann nicht mehr bestätigen, was ihm 
zugeschrieben wird. Der sie gehört hat oder haben will, ist in singulärer Weise für sie 
verantwortlich. Die Intimität der Situation, in der sie gesprochen oder geschrieben sind, 
verleiht Bedeutung auch dem, der dabei oder ihr Adressat war. Der Zeuge ist dem Bild dessen 
verpflichtet, der danach zu ihm nichts mehr gesagt hat” (Lebensthemen 170; cf. Jünger 148). 
Such may entail the notion of a concluding ‘image’ or impression—the (for somatic reasons) 
‘ultimate’ variant among a series of éthe projected; while it lasts, the reception will add others, 
as a matter of (virtual) course. Cf. the initial words of the essay entitled “Das eine letzte Wort”: 
“Letzte Worte werden von den anderen überliefert, die sie gehört haben oder gehört haben 
wollen. Sie fallen sehr verschieden aus, sonst wäre es nicht interessant, sie zu berichten noch 
sie kennenzulernen” (Jünger 143). The eds. of this posthumously published volume group 
further essays with said theme in the resp. section (“IX. Letzte Worte”, Jünger 143–151)—among 
them a miniature entitled “Letztes Wort”, giving that on the part of “Ernst Robert Curtius” (via 
Hochhuth, then Jünger) as “Aufmachen!” (Jünger 147); Blumenberg’s comment: “Kann man das 
ausdenken?” (Jünger 147). In the same essay, he refers to “Jünger” as a ‘collector of last words’ 
(“seine Sammlung Letzter Worte”, Jünger 147; cf. 149), which might will apply to his own 
practice also. With respect to Goethe’s (supposed) “‘Mehr Licht’”, see Jünger’s quote, cited in 
Blumenberg (Jünger 148; cf. the appropriation thereof in Höhlenausgänge 55). 
257 See Kennedy: Quintilian “thinks that historical narrative is best taught by a rhetorician” 
(New History 202; cf. Inst. Orat. 1–2. 300–301, 5.1); generally, Lanham (“Composition” 128–129). 
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Applying the concepts described in parts 3 and 4, the present subchapter offers 
instances of rhetorical ventriloquism as occur in different genres and discursive 
contexts. To facilitate the reader’s tying in with the ensuing samples, the latter 
are drawn from (what are likely to be) more or less familiar sources and authors 
(as in parts 1, 2, section 4.2).258 Moreover, they are emphatically comparatist—
diachronic, transgeneric, interdisciplinary, diverse (contentwise, discursively)—
precisely with a view to describing the functions and applications of the various 
ventriloquistic devices in their specific context, as well as de re.259 
 In historiographic genres, such as the Thucydidean, Sallustian, Livian, or 
Tacitean corpus, one encounters the nexus of dispositio and sermocinatio at 
every turn.260 Any writer will inevitably choose the specific material to be 
|| 
258 See Goffman’s statement, tying in with Simmel’s method: “The illustrative materials used 
in this study are of mixed status […]. The justification for this approach […] is that the 
illustrations together fit into a coherent framework that ties together bits of experience the 
reader has already had” (9–10). In other words: it is to conduce to hypólepsis. 
259 As ‘universally’ (qua Aristotelian ‘kathólou’) as possible (see “Poetics” 58, 1451b, IX). 
260 Cf. “Außer bei Lysias findet sich […] E[thopoeia] […] häufig in der rhetorisch beeinflußten 
Historiographie. THUKYDIDES […] setzt […] Reden und Charakterisierungen berühmter Politiker 
und Feldherren zur Darstellung von Geschichte ein” (Naschert 1514). Rusten sees “the famous 
sketches of historical figures in Sallust and Tacitus” (19) as inspired by the Theophrastan 
tradition of “Character sketching”, qua ‘charakterismoí or ethologíai’ (18; cf. Cicero “Topica” 
446, xxi.83; Quintilian Inst. Orat. 1–2. 210, 1.9.3; 210n.; with Rutilius 12, I.21; see Halm’s gloss, 
12n.; Murphy Middle Ages 23; 25; 26n.): Rusten seems to mean ‘ethopoiíai’ plus ‘charakterismós’ 
(qua ‘effictio’—with the latter typically referring to externals only). He notes that Gill “slights 
rhetorical influence” in this respect (19n.; cf. Gill “Question” passim); the same holds true for 
another article on the latter’s part (“Personhood” passim; a brief mention of the art: 194). As to 
the function of the Theophrastan Characters, Rusten notes: a “suggested purpose is rhetorical 
instruction. […] this is the use to which the work was eventually put; […] it owes its […] survival 
to its inclusion among the handbooks of the schools” (22; cf. Grube 103); “every […] medieval 
manuscript […] contain[ing] it is derived from collections of treatises on rhetoric […] it must 
owe its preservation to a decision to make it part of a rhetorical corpus, doubtless as an aid to 
the description of character” (Rusten 29; cf. 33). Contrast Gill’s ideological, unrhetorical take on 
“Theophrastus’ Characters” (declaring “the relative triviality of this work”): “It is not apparent 
whether the ‘characters’ are intended to be one-dimensional caricatures (types of personality 
dominated by one overriding trait), or simply collections of the behavioural ‘marks’ or ‘tokens’ 
(charaktēres) of a given defective trait” (“Question” 469n.). Monolateral value judgments tend 
to prove unconducive to a scholarly approach. On “Charakterzeichnung” in Horace, see 
Fuhrmann (Dichtungstheorie 135; with “Ars Poetica” 462–465, v.153–178; spec. “notanda sunt 
tibi mores”, 462, v.156; “decor”, v.157; “morabimur aptis”, 464, v.178; cf. Baldwin Ancient Rhet. 
245); Fuhrmann logs a nexus with “Hellenism, especially […] Theophrastus, who […] had given 
considerable attention to characterology” (Dichtungstheorie 136; trans. dsm); as to a 
“Rhetorisierung der Poetik”, he notes “die bedeutende Rolle […] die […] dem Konventionellen 
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modeled from a vast corpus of contingent particularities—few of them based on 
his own experience, the far greater share gathered from various sources already 
extant, frequently amplified, varied, reaccentuated by personified collectives, 
dead men revivified, attributed speeches and envisioned dialogs, appearances 
verbally sketched, (re)descriptions of ethos (prosopopoiía, eidolopoiía, allocutio, 
dialogismós, charakterismós, ethopoiía).261 He will be likely to aim at arranging 
actualities, pragmatic fabrications (such as conceivable speech acts, probable 
portrayals of ‘character’), in a plausible, appositely expedient manner, always 
being—in his way, and as a matter of course—‘economical with the facts’.262 
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und Typischen zukommt. Die Kategorie der Angemessenheit, des Passenden und Schicklichen 
(prepon, harmotton; decorum, aptum) entstammte der Rhetorik” (Dichtungstheorie 156); “das 
Konventionelle und das Typische […] scheinen in dem Aristoteles-Schüler Theophrast den für 
die hellenistische Zeit wichtigsten oder gar maßgeblichen Theoretiker gefunden haben” 
(Dichtungstheorie 157). Cf. Baldwin: “Ancient poetic was […] rhetoricated” (Ancient Rhet. 240); 
“most of the Ars Poetica applies equally to ars rhetorica” (Ancient Rhet. 246). 
261 White refers to Michelet’s conception of “the historian” as “writing on behalf of the dead”, 
and as “also writing for the dead”—i.e. as a “Prometheus”, who “will bring to the dead a fire 
sufficiently intense to melt the ice in which their ‘voices’ have been ‘frozen’, so that the dead 
will be able to ‘speak once more’ for themselves”; moreover, “[t]he historian must be able to 
hear and to understand ‘words that were never spoken […]’. The task of the historian, finally, is 
‘to make the silences of history speak[’]” (158–159). Rhetorically, such would be eidolopoiía; in 
a ‘philosophóteron’ view (hence de re), the cultural fundamentals of vicariousness, delegation 
are involved. Thereto, cf. Blumenberg (Sorge 137–138; Beschreibung 223; 490; 512; 539; 551; 630; 
777; 863; 879; 891; “Nachdenklichkeit” 57; “Grenzfälle” 65; Höhlenausgänge 351; Arbeit 13; 106; 
182; on rhetoric in an affine respect, cf. Niehues-Pröbsting “Glauben” 26). White also mentions 
Marx’ putting words into the mouths of “[t]he French bourgeoisie” (cf. “has them say”, 325)—a 
sermocinatio with a view to a collective, hence also a prosopopoiía. While diachronically and 
dependably central to historiography—as well as to White’s own project de re—he does not 
seem to focus on such ventriloquistic processes, and in one instance explicitly recants their 
interpretive function: “The protagonist of The Old Regime was the old regime itself […]. It is too 
strong to say that Tocqueville actually personified the old regime and made of it the Tragic hero 
of his story, but there is a certain Lear-like quality about its dilemma” (215). 
262 Norden has: “insofern der ἱστορικός mit Hilfe seiner Phantasie die Lücken der Tradition 
ausfüllt, ist er auch ein ποιητής” (Kunstprosa I. 91, I.i.iv). Even so, it is not primarily (let alone 
only) inventio, but dispositio, that matters: form prevails (being constitutive). In his reflections 
on retroact- and -spective ‘charactercraft’ on the part of (or for) others, Montaigne’s ethopoetic 
focus is on fabricating (“à former”), weaving, a certain “contexture” of (and for) such éthe, 
particularly in relation to the task of being ‘economical with the factual’—i.e. rhetorical 
dispositio, ‘selecting and arranging’ (‘choisir et ranger’), which inevitably includes ‘concealing’ 
(‘dissimuler’); the technique described proceeds from a human being qua ‘agent’ (“actions d’un 
personnage”), and organizes a ‘self’ to be wrought and ‘marketed’ around a recognizable 
‘aspect’ or ‘appearance’ (“air”) to ‘characterize’ it (Essays 239, II.1; Essais II. 14, II.i). By 
‘buying’, retailing, hence circulating said ostensively holistic ‘image’, recipients decisively 
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 In a renowned procedural passage, Thucydides explicates his professional 
guidelines concerning sermocinationes within historical narratives: 
As to the speeches that were made by different men […] it has been difficult to recall with 
strict accuracy [‘akríbeian’] the words actually spoken, both for me as regards that which I 
myself heard, and for those who from various other sources have brought me reports 
[‘apangéllousin’]. Therefore the speeches are given in the language in which, as it seemed 
to me, the several speakers would express, on the subjects under consideration, the 
sentiments most befitting the occasion [‘perì ton aieì parónton tà déonta málist(a)’], 
though at the same time I have adhered as closely as possible to the general sense of what 
was actually said. (History I–II. 38–39, I.xxii.1)263 
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partake in the process. Consequently, said personae (plus éthe ascribed to them) are inevitably 
pluralized—above and beyond the fact that their projected appearance of distinct particularity 
is always (already) based on a (tempo-corporal, virtual) diversity, variety to begin with. 
263 Cf. Burckhardt (413); Blass (Beredsamkeit I. 233–234; for a systematization of the speeches, 
cf. 231–244); Norden (Kunstprosa I. 85; 87n.; 88–89, 88n.; I.i.iv); Gomperz (Griech. Denker I. 
420–424); Pearson (Greek Historians 40; 148; 181); U. Neumann (264–265); Trimpi (Muses 57n.). 
Distinguishing “Reden und Dialogen”, Blass finds two for the latter, “41” for the former—“die 
sich ziemlich ungleichmässig über die ersten 7 Bücher vertheilen” (Beredsamkeit I. 231). The 
scholar logs the “Zweckwidrigkeit” of “getreuer Wiedergabe” (Beredsamkeit I. 233): “Nicht nur 
weil dies ein seltsames Gemisch […] gegeben hätte, sondern […], weil vieles […] Gesprochene 
für das Ergebnis bedeutungslos gewesen […] war”—whereas the purpose of the speeches is 
“Motivirung” (Beredsamkeit I. 234); “es spricht in dieser Hinsicht überall Thukydides. […] Alles 
Verdienst […], das eine Rede als solche besitzt, gehört […] Thukydides” (Beredsamkeit I. 234; cf. 
244; 242: “der Grundcharakter der thukydideischen Sprache [‘bleibt’] überall”). Pertinently, 
Blass stresses the hypoleptic dimension (significant in rhetorico-poetic, hermeneutic respects): 
“Sinnsprüche und allgemeingültige Ausführungen […] hat Thukydides überall” (Beredsamkeit 
I. 236). Dionysius takes the historian at his (abovecited) word (“Thucydides” 588–589, §41), 
finds him wanting (spec.) as to the Attico-Melian dialog (discussed at length, “Thucydides” 
574–593, §37–41; see the last part of the fifth Book, History V–VI. 154–177, V.lxxxiv–cxiv). Cf. 
Forster Smith: “the language of the speeches has a uniform character, both in the structure of 
the sentences and in particular expressions—[…] it is that of Thucydides […] at the same time 
the character and mode of thought of the assumed speaker are […] manifest in each speech. In 
the hands of Thucydides such a means of presenting to us a critical situation is extraordinarily 
effective; […] his readers become spectators, as Plutarch expressed it” (xvii; cf. Blass 
Beredsamkeit I. 234). As to the nexus of clarity, dispositio, Forster Smith logs the Thucydidean 
“way of leaving facts clearly stated and skilfully grouped”: “He dramatises history” (xviii). 
Briefly referring to the above passage, Kennedy notes the ‘enactment’ of argument in utramque 
partem via dialogs embedded in narrative: “Thucydides includes many speeches in his History, 
often arranging them into debates on two sides of a question. […] These speeches often sharply 
polarize the issue” (Comp. Rhet. 204; cf. Dionysius “Thucydides” 566–567, §36; 574–575, §37; 
spec. 578, §38: “τὸ δραματικὸν”). See Pearson’s comparatist remarks: “whereas Thucydides 
must have heard some of the […] speeches and reports of others, so that he could claim to 
reproduce the general sense of what had been said or at least work out ‘what they must have 
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The concept and practice of dispositio will per se signal that chronology does 
not tend to be the primary concern (even more so in other genres). In this 
respect, rhetorical economy is the téchne’s foremost task—especially with a view 
to employing it so effectually as to go unnoticed (‘celare artem’).264 Moreover, 
any historian will seek to vary his subject matter and its tractatio to avoid 
tedium, precisely by producing an intense and dynamic effect in the reader’s 
experience (enárgeia). To this end, he provides lifelike descriptions of certain 
settings (ékphrasis) and protagonists (charakterismós, effictio)—or puts 
(striking) words into the mouths of familiar, (supposedly) historical or 
mythological protagonists (dialogismós, sermocinatio, allocutio); brings the 
dead to life, in (and by) speech (eidolopoiía); drafts and disseminates distinctive 
(including verbalized) portrayals with a ‘characterizing’ function (ethopoiía, 
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said’, Timaeus’ speeches must be almost pure fiction, and those of Ephorus can hardly be 
different. Polybius complains not only that Timaeus’ speeches are fictitious, but that they are 
unrealistic, ill-suited to the speaker and the occasion” (Greek Historians 40; as to the latter, cf. 
147–148, 180–181). Similarly, Norden (speaking with Polybius): “bei jeder Gelegenheit legen sie 
Reden ein, ohne sich zu fragen, weder ob einer in jenem Falle habe reden können noch was er 
wirklich gesagt habe noch was er habe sagen müssen, sondern sie behandeln dieses […] 
notwendige Ingredienz der Geschichtsschreibung […] wie in der Schulstube” (Kunstprosa I. 83, 
I.i.iv). Generally: “seit […] Thukydides […] [‘waren’] die Historiker […] rhetorisch gebildet, und 
umgekehrt [‘behandelten’] die Rhetoren […] seit Isokrates gern historische Stoffe” (Kunstprosa 
I. 85–86, I.i.iv). “Eine […] unmittelbare Folge […] war die Sitte, in die Geschichtserzählung 
Reden einzulegen” (Kunstprosa I. 86, I.i.iv). As to the fact “[d]aß Thukydides durch seine Reden 
charakterisieren wollte”, Norden adduces “Markell”, using the phrase “δεινὸν ἠθογραφῆσαι” 
with respect to the historian (Kunstprosa I. 87n., I.i.iv). Yet said critic gives his value judgments 
free rein (passim): “Thukydides ließ sie reden [sc. ‘Perikles, Alkibiades’, here], […] jedes Word 
atmet den Geist der Männer und ihrer Zeit” (Kunstprosa I. 87n., I.i.iv). Burckhardt sees the 
Thucydidean “Fähigkeit […] alles, was man ihm berichtet hat, als Kundiger nachzudenken […] 
ohne aufdringliche Bemerkungen, mit den leisesten Mitteln […]. Die Gesinnungen, aus welchen 
das Tun hervorgeht, läßt Thukydides sich hauptsächlich in den Reden äußern, die er den 
[H]andelnden […] in den Mund legt. […] [‘Er’] bekennt […], daß er […] seine Personen das ihrer 
Lage Angemessenste (τὰ δέοντα μάλιστα) sprechen lasse” (413). “Einmal, bei der Verhandlung 
zwischen den Athenern und Meliern (V, 85ff.), charakterisiert er die Parteien auch durch einen 
Dialog” (413n.). “Während er aber die Leute völlig in ihrem Charakter reden und handeln läßt, 
begnügt er sich in der eigentlichen Charakteristik mit wenig Worten. Bei Perikles Tode gibt er 
(II, 65) […] nur das Politische […] und vermeidet […] auf das strengste alle weitern Personalien, 
und ähnlich sparsam ist er überall” (414). In general, such ‘ethopoietic’ frugality also functions 
as a delegative device with respect to (engaging) the recipient. As to the Renaissance afterlife of 
(inter alia) the Thucydidean guidelines for historiography, cf. Kohut (81). Cf. Lausberg on the 
use of “sermocinatio” in historiography: “die bei Historikern […] zahlreichen Reden [‘haben’] 
das verisimile zum Ziel. In der historia dient […] das verisimile dem verum“(Handbuch 166, §291). 
264 See subch. 5.1, above; as well as (the n. in) sections 4.1, 4.2; and the coda in part 6, herein. 
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notatio); personifies (and semioticizes) collectives or abstract entities 
(prosopopoiía, fictio personae, conformatio).265 
|| 
265 In their narratological “Glossary”, De Temmerman/Emde Boas define ‘characterization’ as 
“the ways in which traits and dispositions of any kind are ascribed by a narrator to a character, 
and the processes by which those […] are interpreted by narratees as pertaining to that 
character” (“Glossary” XII; cf. “Intro.” 2). While an accent on the reciprocities of projection and 
reception is to the point (cf. “Intro.” 2–3; 12; if warily handled: 15–19, spec. 18; cf. “Epilogue” 
650), a narrow, narratological take will hardly seem expedient (this multilateral device being a 
matter of poíesis sensu lato). They offer these variants, inter alia (thematically rearranged; see 
the outline at “Intro.” 23): ‘characterization by focalization’ (“Glossary” XIII; with “Intro.” 23); 
‘inter-’, or ‘intratextual characterization’ (“Glossary” XIV); ‘characterization by praxis’, resp. 
‘by appearance’ (“Glossary” XII; with “Intro.” 22–23); ‘by emotion’, ‘by group membership’ 
(“Glossary” XIII; with “Intro.” 22); ‘by setting’ (“Glossary” XVI); ‘by name (speaking names)’, 
by recourse to “the literal meaning or (folk) etymology” (“Glossary” XIV); ‘altero-’, resp. ‘auto-
characterization’ (“Glossary” XII); ‘(in)direct characterization’ (see “Glossary” XIII–XIV; with 
“Intro.” 20). The variant ‘by speech’ (“ēthopoiia”) is defined as ‘a form of indirect, metonymical 
characterization’: “traits and dispositions are inferred from a character’s speech (both style and 
content); a […] frequent method is the use of generalizations […] maxims (gnōmai)” (“Glossary” 
XVI; cf. “Intro.” 22–23). While in line with a neglect of ‘sermocinatio’ (in taxonomic, technical 
respects) throughout, the view that this may only be ‘indirect’ (to say nothing of ‘metonymical’) 
will seem problematic also de re; a narrowly narratological take appears to be unconducive (cf. 
“Intro.” 6; “Epilogue” 651). At variance with said limitation in De Temmerman’s/Emde Boas’ 
“Glossary”, their opening ch. does refer to the concept’s “broadest sense” as including “both 
direct and indirect characterization in all its forms” (“Intro.” 22). Equating ‘personification’ 
with ‘pathetic fallacy’ (“Glossary” XV) seems to insinuate twentieth century criticism—plus 
corresponding value judgments (cf. the express ‘disinterest’ in “Aesop’s fables”, “Intro.” 2n.)—
rather than a consideration of the rhetorical tradition on ‘prosopopoiía’. The relative absence 
(spec. at “Intro.” 19, as to “the schemas—both social and literary—that would likely have been 
available to Greek authors and readers”) of a comprehensive and detailed recourse to the art 
may seem problematic throughout (with mentions tending to be brief or extratextual: cf. e.g. 
“Intro.” 6–7; 9; 20n.; 22); and this especially so, since the eds. assert (in a brief conclusion) that 
“the underpinning in ancient rhetoric of techniques of characterization” is “central to this 
book” (“Epilogue” 650). De Temmerman’s/Emde Boas’ terminological choice of ‘metaphorical’, 
‘metonymical’ to modify ‘characterization’ (cf. “Glossary” XIV; “Intro.” 20) seems infelicitous, 
given the extent to which these terms are (all but incomparably) fraught with myriad (often not 
intercompatible) associations—hence will hardly conduce to scholarly descriptiveness. Equally 
problematic is the view of ‘bottom-up’ (sc. inductive) ‘characterization’ qua “the gradual 
accumulation of information about an individual’s character which cannot immediately be 
connected to pre-existing schemas, categories, or types” (“Glossary” XII). Yet human reception 
is always hypoleptic (apparently acknowledged at “Intro.” 16–19, spec. 17). The ‘top-down’ 
variant is said to “activate[…] a ‘package’ of corresponding expectations and knowledge” (qua 
“pre-existing types or categories”), based on a “piece of information about the character” 
(“Glossary” XVI); said formulation may lead to (or does not aim at preventing) essentialist 
misunderstandings, or even conduce to Platonizing construals (conforming to the deductive 
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 As to certain of these technico-taxonomic clusters mentioned, one might 
have recourse to the Ancient Greek historian again, seeing that one of the most 
significative (or notorious) collective ethopoiíai in world literature is put into the 
Thucydidean Cleon’s mouth—who invectively ‘characterizes’ the Athenians: 
It is your wont [‘εἰώθατε’] to be spectators [‘θεαταὶ’] of words [‘τῶν λόγων’] and hearers of 
deeds […]. You are adepts […] at being deceived […]. Each of you wishes above all to be an 
orator himself. You seek […] a world quite unlike that in which we live, but give too little 
heed to that which is at hand [‘περὶ τῶν παρόντων’]. […] you are in thrall to the pleasures 
of the ear and are more like men who sit as spectators [‘θεαταῖς’] at exhibitions of sophists 
than men who take counsel for the welfare of the state. (History III–IV. 62–63, 
III.xxxviii.4–7; with further details in the context)266 
|| 
approach). Such seems to be part of the agenda in the definition of what De Temmerman/Emde 
Boas call ‘transtextual character’ qua “appear[ing] in different texts (i.e. [a] character by the 
same name and referring to the same mythical or historical person)” (“Glossary” XVI; cf. the 
formulation “one instantiation of”; with “Intro.” 5; and despite general disclaimers at 7). 
266 See Blass (Beredsamkeit I. 233–234; 237; 240; 242–243); Gomperz (Griech. Denker I. 424); 
Bers (181); Kennedy (Comp. Rhet. 204, briefly); Croally (33–34); Bornscheuer (112–122, spec. 
116). Among other (political) speeches, Dionysius does “not approve of the debate between 
Cleon and Diodotus” (“Thucydides” 595, §43; 595n.)—on stylistic, propriety-related, and (likely 
also) ethopoetic grounds; cf. Bonner (Lit. Treatises 91). Carey refers to the above as “the 
(somewhat hypocritical) tirade which Thucydides puts into Kleon’s mouth” (“Intro.” 6n.; cf. 
also “Rhet. means” 34). Dionysius discusses several Thucydidean speeches at considerable 
length, and in detail (see “Thucydides” 566–615, §36–49); cf. Bonner (Lit. Treatises 90–92; 
spec. as to the assessment of the following dialog, 90–91). The Dionysian criticism centers on 
the ‘diplomatic’ exchange between Athenians and Melians (cf. “Thucydides” 574–593, §37–41; 
with Thucydides History V–VI. 154–177, V.lxxxiv–cxiv); at the outset, Dionysius employs the 
rhetorical term typically used for the ‘personifying’ of collectives: “Thucydides begins by 
stating in his own person [‘ἐκ τοῦ ἰδίου προσώπου’] what each side said, but after maintaining 
this form of reported speech for only one exchange of argument, he dramatises [‘δραματίζει’] 
the rest of the dialogue and makes the characters speak for themselves [‘προσωποποιεῖ τὸν 
μετὰ ταῦτα διάλογον’]” (“Thucydides” 574–575, §37; cf. History V–VI. 154–157, V.lxxxiv–lxxxv). 
In line therewith, Dionysius stresses the ‘craft’ involved in the sermocinationes: “Thucydides 
makes [‘ποιεῖ’] the Athenian representatives reply” (“Thucydides” 580–581, §39; cf. 578, §38; 
582, §39; 584, §40). The Ancient critic finds fault with the historian in terms of ethopoiía and 
decorum—meaning, it goes against his sense thereof (resp. of taste): “I do not know how these 
words can be considered appropriate in the mouths of Athenian generals” (“Thucydides” 585, 
§40; cf. 588–591, §41). Cf. “These would have been suitable words […] to use in a historical 
statement about Pericles, but they are not appropriate words to put in his mouth when he is 
defending himself before an incensed crowd” (“Thucydides” 597, §44)—i.e. taking the (quasi-
forensic) context into account; also: “He follows this with a statement which is true and 
strikingly expressed, but is certainly not applicable to the current situation” (“Thucydides” 
597, §44; cf. 599); generally: “The invention [‘εὕρεσις’] of the most potent arguments is not to 
be admired for its own sake, unless they be appropriate to the characters [‘προσώποις’], the 
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While a comprehensive (traditionally dependable) oratorico-dramatic nexus is 
set in relief incidentally, the protagonist’s ‘personifying’, ‘ethopoietic’, (highly) 
performative speech act for a particular collective (being a sermocinatio from a 
metapoetical perspective) might also be read in a ‘philosophóteron’ manner: that 
is, for its ‘kathólou’ insights concerning human culture, whose vector may seem 
|| 
situation [‘καιροῖς’], and all other relevant factors. […] the historian seems to have used these 
words, in which he is expressing his own opinion […], in the wrong context” (“Thucydides” 
600–601, §45). Accordingly (and again as to the Attico-Melian dialog), Dionysius puts the 
Thucydidean ventriloquisms ‘back into the writer’s mouth’ (so to speak): “he neither was 
present at this meeting nor took part personally in the discussion, nor received a report of it 
from any of the Athenian or Melian spokesmen, because he spent all the rest of the war, after 
his command at Amphipolis, in exile in Thrace” (“Thucydides” 589, §41; see Blass’ criticism 
thereof, Beredsamkeit I. 234, 234n.; 235; spec. 237). Personal reasons, as per Dionysius, are at 
the root of these particular sermocinationes and their tendency: “Perhaps it was because the 
historian bore his city a grudge for the sentence passed on him that he has deluged her with 
these reproaches, which were calculated to make her universally hated: for when the leaders of 
a state, entrusted by her with great power and appointed to represent her on missions to other 
states, seem to express certain views, those views are assumed by all to be those of the state 
which sent them out” (“Thucydides” 591–593, §41). More plausibly, Blass observes: “wenn […] 
die Athener nackt aussprechen, was sonst sich jeder wenigstens zu sagen scheut, so ist doch 
ihre […] thatsächliche Politik und folglich auch ihre Denkweise, auf die für den Historiker alles 
ankam, getreu gezeichnet” (Beredsamkeit I. 237). On the Thucydidean ‘characterization’ of 
“Attica and Athens” in general, cf. Foster (174–182). Regardless of what the Thucydidean intent 
might have been: Dionysius’ line of reasoning demonstrates the potential (generally plausible) 
functionalization of the devices of prosopopoiía (a group of delegates speaking for a collective), 
ethopoiía (the crafting and conveying of ethos in and by speech, including rhetorical color), 
and sermocinatio (the words being attributed to, put into the mouths of, the resp. personae). In 
general, Rood logs: “an important thematic role is played by the characterization of groups” in 
Thucydides (153)—implying a ‘notational’ poetics; said collective ethopoiíai might be placed in 
the mouths of protagonists (as above), hence amount to sermocinationes (given an extratextual 
author). Gomperz observes the dramatic aspects of Thucydidean historiography (“Figuren, die 
über die Bühne seines […] Geschichtswerkes schreiten”, Griech. Denker I. 423), and perceives a 
poetics said to effectually ‘avail itself’ of the historiae personae as ‘mouthpieces’ (Griech. 
Denker I. 422); cf. “in den Mund legt”; “sich […] des geeignetsten Sprachrohrs bediente” 
(Griech. Denker I. 422); “darauf […] läßt der Geschichtsschreiber […] verweisen”; “der durch den 
Mund jenes Feldherrn zu uns spricht”; “dieser Hinweis im Munde” (Griech. Denker I. 423); “sich 
[…] dieses […] Sprechers zu bedienen” (Griech. Denker I. 423–424); “die Überzeugung des 
Geschichtsschreibers […], die er durch keines andern Mund wirksamer kundgeben kann” 
(Griech. Denker I. 424). Focusing on Pericles, cf. Foster’s study, accentuating “the relation of 
speech and narrative”: the resp. “speakers […] illuminate Thucydides’ […] explanations by 
demonstrating the responses of characters imbedded in the action. […] we see human beings 
fully under the power of the passions their situation has produced. […] The reader is called 
upon to understand and assess their words in the context of the narrative of events” (4). 
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to be an immersion in consummate virtuality and pervasive experience by 
proxy—hence a life (increasingly or ultimately) based on vicariousness.267 
 In a chiefly narrative environment, likely ventriloquisms will often amount 
to individual sententiae only. Suetonius recounts Caesar’s arrival in Africa thus: 
No regard for religion ever turned him from any undertaking, or even delayed him. […] 
Even when he had a fall as he disembarked, he gave the omen a favorable turn by crying: 
‘I hold thee fast, Africa’ [‘Teneo te’, inquit, ‘Africa’]. (111–113, I.lix)268 
Given the context and its economy, the words put into Caesar’s mouth here also 
serve an ethopoetic purpose (to say nothing of their discursive potential).269 
 Tacitus deploys ventriloquistic techniques most efficaciously—typically for 
terse sentences, at climactic moments.270 Relating the mutinies stirring in the 
largely unsubdued area known as ‘Germania’ (from the imperium’s perspective), 
he presents them as worse than any “civil war” (“Annals I–III” 325, I.xlix) in the 
ensuing vivid description, which culminates in a distinctive sermocinatio: 
|| 
267 For the method of eliciting ‘more philosophical’, ‘universal’ aspects (quaestiones infinitae, 
relating to the status qualitatis, as per later taxonomies), see Aristotle (“Poetics” 58–59, 1451b, 
IX); Trimpi’s authoritative analysis (“Quality” passim; Muses 241–361; spec. 353–355). See 
Küpper: “events and performances with a mass appeal produce social cohesion […], or are […] 
intended to do so. […] Language-based performative practices that are presented in order to be 
consumed by a given public are […] apt to produce cohesion and then to steer […] the body 
social [resp. politic] into one specific direction” (“Hypotheses” 11; on Early Modern theater). 
268 “VENI∙VIDI∙VICI” (notorious words on Caesar’s part) are not put into the victor’s mouth in 
Suetonius, but “displayed among the show-pieces” of the triumph (“an inscription of but three 
words”): “not indicating the events of the war […], but the speed with which it was finished” 
(82–83, I.xxxvii.2). In said sense, they seem paradigmatically ethopoetic: comparable to the 
typical Laconian case (see the sample in this subch.), style (hence speech) is deemed indicative 
of ethos (cf. the onset of part 3) to such an extent that the words are received as actually uttered 
by the persona to whom they are attributed, or in whose vicinity they appear. Generally, cf. this 
(linguistically significant) appraisal: “In announcing the swiftness and fierceness of this battle 
[…], Caesar wrote three words. ‘Came, saw, conquered [‘Ἦλθον εἶδον, ἐνίκησα’]’. In Latin, […] 
the words have the same inflectional ending, […] a brevity […] most impressive” (Plutarch 
“Caesar” 562–563, §731, L.2; cf. 562n.). For affine samples, see Democritus (as qtd. in: Kranz 
Vorsokratiker II. 165, 68B115*84; cf. subch. 3.3); and spec. Aristotle, who—in a context of 
“delivery”, variation, “amplification”—has these asyndeta: “‘I came, I met, I entreated [‘ἦλθον, 
ἀπήντησα, ἐδεόμην’]’. […] here delivery is needed […] an asyndeton produces amplification: 
thus, in ‘I came, I conversed, I besought [‘ἦλθον, διελέχθην, ἱκέτευσα’]’, the hearer seems to be 
surveying many things” (Rhetoric 420–421, 1413b, III.xii.4; cf. 418–419, 1413b, III.xii.3; 418n.). 
269 For a refunctionalization in Calderón, see Küpper (Discursive Renovatio 342–343, with n.). 
270 Cf. Baldwin: “ethopœiæ” typically deal with what “some […] character of history or fiction 
[‘must have said’] on a critical occasion” (Ancient Rhet. 71–72; cf. 218)—emphatic of the latter. 
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The yells, the wounds, and the blood were plain enough; the cause, invisible [‘causa in 
occulto’]: chance ruled supreme [‘cuncta fors regit’]. […] No general or tribune was there to 
restrain: licence [‘licentia’] was granted to the mob [‘vulgo’], and it might glut its 
vengeance to the full [‘satietas’]. Before long, Germanicus marched into the camp. ‘This is 
not a cure, but a calamity’ [‘non medicinam (…) sed cladem’], he said, with a burst of 
tears, and ordered the bodies to be cremated. (“Annals I–III” 326–327, I.xlix)271 
The entire scene is disposed like the climax and (quasi-cathartic) dénouement of 
a tragedy; the ‘pathopoetic’ words put in Germanicus’ mouth (under extreme, 
extraordinary conditions) are patently functionalized with a view to movere.272 
 One noted case from Livy—being incomparably feckful also in generating 
myriad adaptations, reworkings, floating in (virtual) cultural networks—is the 
‘rape of Lucretia’, her consequent suicide, and the establishing of the Roman 
Republic by Lucius Junius Brutus: first, two short sentences are put into Sextus 
Tarquinius’ mouth—prior to his violation of the archetypal lady. They begin: 
“Tace, Lucretia” (History. I–II. 200–201, I.lviii.2).273 The female protagonist is 
later given a longer sequence of direct speech, reporting Tarquin’s physical 
|| 
271 The trans. stresses the sermocinatio’s centrality, effectuality by a proximate, alliterative 
paronomasia in the parallelism (adapted to the needs of a dominantly analytical language). 
272 The distance constitutive of a (poetico-)historical context may render spec. manifest what 
obtains in (any form of) ‘emotive’ oratory: “‘Die mächtigste Beredsamkeit ist die, welche eigene 
Leidenschaft in ihre Worte hineinwirft und doch die Leidenschaft mit kalter Berechnung als 
Mittel verwaltet’” (Justi, qtd. in: Norden Kunstprosa I. 121, I.i.iv). Valéry has: “La littérature est 
l’art de se jouer de l’âme des autres. […] Étant donnés une impression, un rêve, une pensée, il 
faut l’exprimer de telle manière, qu’on produise dans l’âme d’un auditeur le maximum d’effet 
— et un effet entièrement calculé” (“technique littéraire” 1786; see Dichtkunst 227). By way of 
contrast with an ethos of ‘sobriety’ (Sachlichkeit, Nüchternheit) characterizing historiographical 
works (and their authorial personae), the intercalated, ‘pathopoetic’ parts may accentuate (and 
so elucidate) said technique’s effectuality. Cf. Aristotle: “Appropriate style also makes the fact 
appear credible [‘pithanoi’]; for the mind of the hearer is imposed upon under the impression 
that the speaker is speaking the truth, because, in such circumstances, his feelings are the 
same, so that he thinks (even if it is not the case as the speaker puts it) that things are as he 
represents them; and the hearer always sympathizes [‘synomoiopathei’] with one who speaks 
emotionally, even though he really says nothing. This is why speakers often confound their 
hearers by mere noise” (Rhetoric 378–379, 1408a, III.vii.4–5). On the Greek term, cf. Oesterreich 
(Fundamentalrhet. 101); Niehues-Pröbsting: “Affekte […] gehorchen […] dem […] homoion 
homoio; sie wirken durch Ansteckung” (“Ethos” 347; cf. “Glauben” 27). See Blumenberg as to a 
“Zusteuern auf die wirkungssicheren ‘Reizwörter’” qua “im Typus ‘rhetorisch’”: “Wie schnell 
kann man […] Konsens erreichen, wenn man die kleinen Gefälligkeiten erweist, mit denen man 
bei jedermann Beifall findet, ohne etwas gesagt zu haben” (Sachen 39, v; cf. Begriffe 165). 
273 “‘Tace, Lucretia’, inquit; ‘Sex. Tarquinius sum; ferrum in manu est; moriere, si emiseris 
vocem’” (Livy History. I–II. 200, I.xviii.2). For intertexts, cf. Donaldson (passim); subch. 2.1. 
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transgression to her spouse (and others). The descriptive narrative transitions 
into a dialogic sequence of some plausibility: “to her husband’s question, ‘Is all 
well?’ she replied, ‘Far from it’”—the Latin being even more dynamic, with 
question and answer immediately succeeding one another in Livy’s textual 
economy (“‘Satin salvae?’ ‘Minime’”, History. I–II. 202–203, I.lviii.7). 
 Needless to say, said writer was not present, nor does it seem likely that he 
had at his disposal documents giving a verbatim account of Lucretia’s precise 
wording; yet such quasi ‘historicist’ notions are unlikely to occur (irrespective of 
their irrefutability), seeing that momentaneous evidentia—effected by descriptio 
and the verbal high point of the sermocinatio—is so effectual that the recipient’s 
ratio (whatever its valence otherwise) will here be suspended.274 
 Augustine treats said arch-familiar event by referring to some orator: 
A certain declaimer develops [‘declamans ait’] this theme admirably [‘Egregie’] and 
accurately [‘veraciterque’]: ‘A wonderful tale [‘Mirabile dictu’]! There were two and only 
one committed adultery [‘duo fuerunt, et adulterium unus admisit’]’. (de civ. Dei I–III. 84–
85, I.xix) 
Discursively, the Church Father requires this specific superstructure, his ‘moral 
of the tale’—not Lucretia’s direct speech (evoking her paganly inflected ethos, 
for which Augustine has no use). Since the declaimer is not known (see de civ. 
Dei I–III. 84n.)—while being all but tailored to the Christian orator’s purpose—
the latter might as well have thought up the former, using said sententiae as a 
pretext for the discursive needs in the economy of this precise context.275 When 
words are being put into the mouth of what is deemed a deity at a given point in 
time (as per the respectively prevalent language regime), cases like these have a 
tendency to turn especially problematic (qua ‘speaking in the name of’).276 For 
lack of competence in said field, one may leave such aside, here.277 
|| 
274 A text’s basis in an alleged ‘historical’ substratum includes (semi-)mythological personae. 
275 Nor would it be beyond that rhétor malgré soi to draw on his prior praxis—delegating his 
words to another; or discerning a (rhetorical) ‘self’ prior to, and after, the ‘tolle lege’ (cf. ch. 1). 
276 As to Measure for Measure’s hypólepsis of Rom 9:15 (and 18), itself an uptake of Ex 33:19, 
one critic believes that “St. Paul is quoting God” (Measure 33n.; with 32–33, TLN213–214, I.ii)—
which may well seem to be about as credible (sensible) as saying the same of ‘Shakespeare’. 
‘Ideology’ might be seen as putting words into the mouth of a ‘school’ or ‘movement’: “Es ist 
von vernichtender Ungemäßheit, daß aus […] Philosophie eine ‘Mode’ werden konnte, daß in 
ihrem Namen mehr zitiert worden ist als jemals sonst” (Blumenberg Literatur 103; infinitized). 
277 Cf. “Deum autem velle” (Blumenberg GKW II. 406). This piece of writing is attributed to 
“Menippus the Cynic”: “Epistles artificially composed as if by the gods [‘apò tou ton theon 
prosópou’]” (D. Laertius Lives II. 104–105, VI.101). Similarly, when a writer or rhétor is said to 
 Variants of Rhetorical Ventriloquism | 165 
  
 Being human, however, a scholar could seem qualified with respect to what 
is thought by some to be the other side, the Humanities—wherefore one might 
adduce these words, which Milton aptly places in the mouth of his protagonist: 
“Better to reign in Hell than serve in Heaven!” (Paradise Lost [2005] 10, I.263).278 
They are particularly pertinent here, since said assertion is a variation on a 
Homeric sermocinatio (with ethopoetic function), which had long been floating 
in various (virtual) cultural networks—the source context being the Odyssey’s 
hero meeting Achilles in Hades.279 The latter is made to say: 
|| 
speak for—to be the ‘mouthpiece’ of—another entity or phenomenon envisioned (vice versa, de 
re): “et Xenophontis voce Musas quasi locutas ferunt”, “and the Muses were said to speak with 
the voice of Xenophon” (Cicero “Orator” 350–351, xix.62). Cf. a sermocinatio for “God” in 
Seneca: “Puta itaque deum dicere”, “Think, then, of God as saying” (Essays I. 42–43, VI.3); at 
the outset: “the task is not difficult […] I shall be pleading the cause of the gods” (Essays I. 3, 
I.1); plus the (quasi theodicy-like) setup or (ventriloquist) pretext: “You have asked me, 
Lucilius, why, if a Providence rules the world, it still happens that many evils befall good men” 
(Essays I. 3, I.1). See Horace’s sermocinatio for the goddess Juno on Troy and Rome (“Odes” 
146–151, III.3) in the latter part of the noted ode containing the “si fractus illabatur orbis, / 
impavidum ferient ruinae” (“Odes” 146, III.3.7–8); after a more or less epideictico-deliberative 
onset, this insertion occurs: “Juno had made a speech that brought joy to the council of the 
gods”, “gratum elocuta consiliantibus” (“Odes” 146–147, III.3.17)—then follows her speech, 
actually to Rome, a caveat against greed and re-erecting Troy (cf. “Odes” 150–151, III.3.49–68). 
Horace interrupts or ends his sermocinatio for Juno with the words (externalizing and 
‘personifying’ the Muse by addressing her): “This will never do for a cheerful lyre. Where are 
you going, Muse? Don’t be so headstrong. Stop reporting the talk of the gods, and diminishing 
momentous matters with your trivial ditties”; “non hoc iocosae conveniet lyrae; / quo, Musa, 
tendis? desine pervicax / referre sermones deorum et / magna modis tenuare parvis” (“Odes” 
150–151, III.3.69–72). This simultaneously serves an ‘auto-ethopoetic’ purpose, as far as the 
speaker is concerned. Cf. Augustine’s prosopopoiía, treated in part 1, above. 
278 See Mansfield: “Precisely where Machiavelli makes a bold remark, […] he also makes a 
bolder insinuation, that is, he conceals a bolder remark. His boldness hides his boldness, for 
men are not ready to believe that a man who seems bold is bolder than he seems” (Modes 12). 
By ‘technical’ extension (and mutatis mutandis), the Florentine’s irreverent words in propria 
persona could be taken to camouflage (deflect attention from) the even more abysmal (not to 
say cynical) utterances conveyed via his manifold variants of ventriloquism (being legion): 
“Machiavelli proclaims openly and triumphantly a corrupting doctrine which ancient writers 
had taught covertly or with all signs of repugnance. He says in his own name shocking things 
which ancient writers had said through the mouths of their characters” (Strauss 10). 
279 For a figurative reapplication (and -functionalization with respect) to (actual) political life, 
cf. Cicero’s citing (or attributing) part of a letter by Atticus, (implicitly) equating ‘Odysseus’ 
with ‘Caesar’, and the ghosts with the latter’s followers (see the keyword “νέκυιαν”, Atticus III. 
60, §177.IX.10; cf. 60n.); Atticus (as per Cicero) inverts the process of prosopopoiía (eidolopoiía), 
in that he quasi de-personifies (or ‘ghostifies’) human beings along the lines of a paradigmatic 
segment of an arch-familiar text. Cf. Dio Chrysostom’s (moral philosophical, ‘diagnostic’) 
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Never try to reconcile me to death, glorious Odysseus. I should choose, so I might live on 
earth, to serve as the hireling of another, some landless man with hardly enough to live 
on, rather than to be lord over all the dead that have perished. (Odyssey 1–12. 435–437, 
XI.488–491)280 
While varied, the context remains similar, hence (formally or structurally) 
recognizable; but the Homeric eidolopoiía (Achilles being defunct at this point) 
has been transferred to an altogether different discursive setting in Milton.281 
|| 
ethopoiía of ‘Alexander the Great’ by way of contrast with the archaic warrior kat’ exochén: “His 
state of mind […] was the opposite of what Homer says was that of Achilles’ ghost. For that hero 
said that he preferred to live in bondage to / ‘Some man of mean estate, who makes scant 
cheer, / Rather than reign o’er all who have gone down to death’. / But Alexander, I doubt not 
[‘dokei moi’], would have chosen [‘helésthai’] to die and govern [‘árchein’] even a third part of 
the dead rather than become a god and live for ever—unless, of course, he became king over 
the other gods [‘basileùs (…) ton állon theon’]” (190–193, IV.50). Showing preference, hence 
(mental) habits, Homer’s ‘characterizing’ sermocinatio for ‘Achilles’ is used as a foil for (what 
seems to Dio) a plausible, putative choice on the part of ‘Alexander’—which indirectly ‘etho-
poeticizes’ the latter: speech being implicit, it might be crafted for said stance (e.g. as a 
progymnasmatic task). On another significative sermocinatio in Dio, see Trimpi (“Meaning” 22).  
280 Plato’s Socrates tells “the story of a brave man, Armenius’ son Er [‘Ἠρὸς’], by race from 
Pamphylia” at the Republic’s end—stating (hardly sans irony) that this is not “going to” be “an 
Alcinous’ tale” (Rep. 6–10. 462–465, 614b, X; cf. 464n.–465n.; the book closes with the story’s 
framework: 487–489, 621c–d, X). Having died, the warrior Er is said to have been a delegate of 
Hades—functioning qua “messenger to mankind [‘ángelon anthrópois’]” (Rep. 6–10. 464–465, 
614d, X; cf. 481, 419b, X), sent back alive to report of conditions post mortem: “Plato presents 
the idea of a ‘messenger’, […] like the angelos […] in Greek tragedy, whose function it was to 
inform the audience (and those onstage) about events which have taken place offstage” 
(Emlyn-Jones/Preddy xxiii–xxiv). In so doing, Plato ascribes to Socrates a tale in which the 
latter puts words into the mouth of a prósopon named Er—acting as the (writing, speaking) 
philosopher’s indirect spokesperson (another delegation): see the frequent formula “[h]e said 
[‘éphe’]” (Rep. 6–10. 464–465, 614c; 466–467, 615a; 468–469, 615c; 480–481, 619c; 482–483, 
620a, X). An eidolopoiía would be taking place within Er’s story only—i.e. when speaking of 
himself while being dead (Rep. 6–10. 464–487, 614c–621b, X). In Socrates’ setup, a revivified Er 
is said to be “describ[ing] what he had seen on the other side” (Rep. 6–10. 465, 614b, X, with 
487, 621b, X): i.e. an intratextual speaker’s sermocinatio for another persona (speaking in his 
stead, a delegative device for rhetorical effect); and Plato’s prosopopoiía plus allocutio—if Er is 
“a fictional character” (Rep. 6–10. 464n.–465n.)—with a discursive function. Generally, cf. 
Emlyn-Jones/Preddy—their value judgments (“philosophically disconcerting”) cum grano salis 
(xliii). On Macrobius and John of Salisbury’s hypólepseis of the myth, see Moos (406; 407n.; 
§88). As to the Homeric passage, cf. words put into the mouth of Shakespeare’s Claudio (not 
dead, but sentenced): “The weariest, and most loathed worldly life / That Age, Ache, pe[n]ury, 
and imprisonment / Can lay on nature, is a Paradise / To what we feare of death” (Measure 146, 
TLN1348–1351, III.i; with 146n. for “ri” qua “n”; cf. Hamlet 279–280, III.i.76–82). 
281 “‘Odysseus, do not gloss over death to me. I would rather be above ground still and 
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 As to affine recontextualizations of a particularly Machiavellian make, the 
ensuing will likely be among the most striking and significative ventriloquisms 
(the relevance of which greatly exceeds the limits of its immediate vicinity).282 
The Livian sermocinatio for one of his protagonists is cited and characteristically 
glossed by the Florentine in his setting and economy of discourse: 
[‘]Parva sunt haec; sed parva ista non contemnendo, maiores nostri maximam hanc 
rempublicam fecerunt’. Perchè in queste cose piccole è […] forza […]. Nonpertanto, 
conviene con queste cose sia accompagnata la virtù: altrimenti, le non vagliano. 
(Machiavelli Opere 246, III.xxxiii)283 
|| 
labouring for some poor portionless man, than be lord over all the lifeless dead[’]” (Odyssey 
[Oxford] 139, XI)—the ch. is there called ‘Odysseus Among the Ghosts’. For the reference, cf. 
Ellege’s note: “An ironic echo of Odyssey 11.489–91, where the shade of Achilles tells Odysseus 
that it is better to be a farmhand on earth than a king among the dead” (Milton “Paradise Lost 
[1674]” 1838n.)—whether or not there is ‘irony’ in play here would depend on the sense 
attached to that concept in this context. In Milton, the term eidolopoiía would likely no longer 
be applicable, since Satan is not dead and cannot die (dogmatically speaking). 
282 Pertinence, applicability beyond the (circumscribed) confines of an ‘individual’ passage 
or time is stressed by the Florentine’s textual economy: “speaking of the Livian mouthpieces in 
Discourses III 33, Machiavelli does not say, as he ordinarily does, that the characters […] ‘said’ 
what they said but that they ‘say’ it” (Strauss 152). Cf. “he says thus”; “who speaks thus” 
(Machiavelli Discourses 286, III.33); “Livy says these words” (Discourses 287, III.33). 
283 Livy: “parua sunt haec; sed parua ista non contemnendo maiores uestri maximam hanc 
rem fecerunt” (Ab Vrbe Condita VI. 80, VI.41.8). Cf. Kraus: “parua lead to maxima”, with 
“Appius’ maxima res” qua “new Rome” (324). Said scholar discusses the Livian ventriloquism 
for Appius Claudius (who himself puts words in the mouth of others)—at several points in her 
commentary. She logs the passage “capti et stupentes animi uocibus alienis” (Ab Vrbe Condita 
VI. 73, VI.36.8), wherein the latter (“‘in others’ words’”) is later “literalized” by “Appius’ 
sermocinatio” (Kraus 284); the first part of said section would also have attracted Machiavelli’s 
attention (cf. Il Principe 47, VII.28; 130, XIX.41; with Mayfield Artful 120n.; 149n.). In the 
segment at issue, “Appius relies on the rhetorical devices [of] sermocinatio […] and permissio 
[…], each of which allows him to caricature, and then to temporarily concede, the plebeian 
position in order to counter it. There is a danger […] in these […] devices that the conceded 
position will seem more valid than the speaker’s own […]. Appius is careful […] to make his 
opposition voices as unpleasant as possible […]. Within the story, his strategy results in a 
stalemate: the audience is not convinced, but the vote is postponed (42.1). On the level of 
discourse, […] Appius loses the battle for the patres. The uoces alienae […][,] in which he 
speaks[,] are all plebeian, […] they fragment his argument as strife fragments the city” (Kraus 
306; cf. 323). Intratextually, “[t]he effect this rhetorical tactic has on the audience is not 
specified. Narratively, […] it is counter-productive, as it gives the plebs a direct voice – indeed a 
multiplicity of voices – for the first time since 35.8, ending patrician monopoly […] and making 
Appius into his own heckler” (312). Kraus also notes that “Appius […] cannot stay out of his 
own sermocinatio” (314). The scholar defines “sermocinatio” as “a device which brings an 
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[‘]These are little things, but by not despising these little things, our ancestors made this 
republic the greatest’. For in these little things is […] force […]. Nevertheless, virtue must 
accompany these things; otherwise they have no value. (Discourses 286, III.33) 
Machiavelli’s context indicates the technique in question by initially framing 
the above quotes and ventriloquisms as follows: “Although this part is known in 
all the Roman histories, nonetheless it is proven more certainly by the words 
that Livy used in the mouth of Appius Claudius” (Discourses 286, III.33).284 This 
might seem to say that, while the general sense will always already be plausible 
to a reader conversant with the relevant (textualized) environment, it is not only 
the particular elocutio, but (more decisively) the dispositio of this sermocinatio 
that may yield the effect of momentaneous evidence: 
|| 
adversary or a supporter ‘to life’ by conjuring them up inside one’s own discourse” (312). She 
does not mention the (taxonomic) variants of rhetorical ventriloquism, which would probably 
have been expedient here (qua distinguishing the different devices, layers). 
284 “E benchè questa parte in tutte le istorie romane si conosca, nondimeno si pruova più 
certo per le parole che Livio usa nella bocca di Appio Claudio” (Machiavelli Opere 246, 
III.xxxiii). Cf. Strauss (150–152). See also: “lo istorico benissimo dice con queste parole, in 
bocca poste del” (Opere 246, III.xxxiii); “Livy demonstrates in the mouth of” (Discourses 156, 
II.14); “Machiavelli quotes some words said by Livy which the historian put into the mouth of” 
etc. (Strauss 151). In terms of dispositio, said scholar observes: “Nowhere in the First Book had 
Machiavelli even alluded to the problem posed by the difference between Livy and Livy’s 
characters. Only once therein did he make an explicit distinction between an author and a 
character of that author: he said that Sallustius ‘put’ a certain sentence ‘into the mouth of 
Caesar’. In the Second and Third Books, however, he refers 11 times to the difference between 
Livy and his characters by using expressions like ‘Livy makes someone say or do certain things’ 
or ‘Livy put these words into the mouth of someone’” (137–138; see “Livian characters […] are 
introduced […] as mouthpieces of Livy”, 151). In one place (and several), “Machiavelli ascribes 
to Livy an expression used by a Livian character” (303n.). Cf. “In the first two quotations from 
Dante and Virgil (I 11 and 21), Machiavelli ascribes to Dante what is said to Dante by Sordello[;] 
and he ascribes to Virgil what is said to Virgil by Anchises” (322n.; with Machiavelli Discourses 
36, I.11; 55, I.21). As to such particularization, (re)contextualizations in John of Salisbury, see 
Moos, stressing “die […] Bemühungen Johanns, infinite Zitate der Literatur in finite Aussagen 
historischer Persönlichkeiten umzuformulieren” (219, §59): “Eine stilistische Eigenart Johanns 
besteht darin, daß er Zitate häufig so wendet, daß sie als bestimmte Aussprüche autoritativer 
Gestalten in einer konkreten historischen Situation erscheinen (etwa ein Psalmvers als Aussage 
Davids), oder daß er […] literarische Figuren aus antiken Werken wie Autoren reden läßt […], 
ohne den […] Autor im philologischen Sinn […] zu zitieren” (174, §48; cf. 408, §88); “Laelius, 
nicht Cicero, erscheint als Verfasser von De amicitia. Plato wird […] als Autor eines Zitats 
vorgestellt, das […] aus Macrob stammt” (175, §48). “Dies kann so weit gehen, daß er […] 
Aussprüche oder Personen ganz erfindet” (175–176, §48). “Als vorbildliche ‘Autoren’ werden 
[…] die fingierten Gestalten, nicht […] die fingierenden Schriftsteller bezeichnet” (408, §88). 
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in attending to ‘little things’ we are taking a hint from Machiavelli […][, who] praises a 
Roman consul for not despising cose piccole […]; but he also praises Livy for putting these 
words in the mouth of the consul[.] (Mansfield Modes 10)285 
Where said scholar stresses a comprehensive (re)applicability, the Straussian 
contextualization specifies the various ventriloquistic layers involved: 
Among the words used by Appius Claudius there are some which he puts into the mouth 
of plebeians who mock religion. Those mockers regard the very foundations of religion […] 
as ‘little things’. We do not know this from the mouths of the mockers themselves. […] Livy 
uses characters of one of his characters in order to inform us about Roman criticism of the 
Roman religion. Appius […] adopts the words ‘little things’ as applied to religion […]; so 
does Livy[,] who puts these words into Appius[’] […] mouth; so does Machiavelli who uses 
these words in his own name when commenting on the Livian speech. The expression or 
the thought migrates from the minds of the mockers through the mouths of a Livian 
character and of Livy himself to Machiavelli. […] The mockers are mistaken, say Appius 
[…] Livy and Machiavelli in unison, for they are blind to the usefulness of religion[.] 
(151)286 
|| 
285 Cf. Mansfield’s (abysmal) remark: “I dwell on detail because the greatest discoveries are to 
be made in the details” (Modes 13)—since (to take said kairós for spelling out what will else or 
otherwise remain an enthymematic latency) that is where Old Nick is thought (or tends) to be. 
286 Strauss counsels wariness as to contexts, viewpoints: “Machiavelli […] presents Livy as 
revealing the truth about […] Roman religion by using as his mouthpieces Roman authorities 
addressing two different types of audience” (152); “they did not put their reliance in ‘little 
things’ but in other men’s reliance on ‘little things’, […] a big thing. […] little things […] are not 
the same” (151). Generally: “using a variety of characters as his mouthpieces, Livy was enabled 
[…] to expound the principles on which the Romans admittedly acted or in which they believed, 
and to criticize them” (141); said “republic […] rose to pre-eminence initially by fraud, […] he 
proves this by quoting from Livy a speech by an enemy of the Romans; Livy is presented as 
revealing the truth about Roman fraud by putting certain words into the mouth of an enemy of 
Rome. […] a respectable Roman [may] have been unable to say the truth about Rome except by 
making an enemy of Rome his mouthpiece” (42; with Machiavelli Discourses 156, II.13). As to a 
nexus of dispositio, sermocinatio, the latter’s vicarious functionality (in terms of delegation), cf. 
Strauss: “Livy […] laid bare the fraud through which Rome rose to greatness by using a victim 
of Roman fraud, an enemy of Rome as his mouthpiece. […] Livy speaks through the mouth of a 
foreigner about the fraud committed by his own rulers. […] Being ‘a good historian’, Livy was 
not so servile as to suppress truths which were unpalatable […] being wiser than the Romans, 
he outwitted them. He uses a noble deception to lay bare an ignoble deception. This is not the 
only case in which he reveals a harsh truth about the Romans through the mouth of an enemy 
of Rome” (139). The arch-hermeneutician contrasts two script-based sets in said respect: “Livy 
used not only Romans but also enemies of Rome as his mouthpieces. The Biblical authors do 
not use enemies of the Biblical religion as their mouthpieces” (144)—to say nothing of the 
Straussian utilization of Machiavelli. What he notes for Livy might apply to a veritable legion of 
ostensively ‘orthodox’ writers (interpreters): “being the mouthpiece of pagan theology, he was 
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In other words: the above anatomizes the discursive, intra- and intertextual 
stratification of rhetorico-ventriloquistic layers having accrued diachronically. 
 From a metapoetical perspective, dialogs consist of a (virtually synchronic) 
series of sermocinationes—while the latter tend to be embedded in (short) 
narratives or anecdotal exchanges (with a corresponding framework). Such 
typically feature two, or more, (allegedly) historical figures, during whose 
encounter celebrated or clever utterances are being put into the respective 
mouths for maximum effect (arranged with a view to an especially vivid 
immediacy, functioning as ‘momentaneous evidence’). Similar allocutiones may 
have already been floating in (virtual) cultural networks in certain variants (as 
‘infinite’ sententiae, for instance); whereas others are crafted for, and disposed 
to suit, the particular (discursive) purpose at hand. In a context concisely 
exemplifying Spartan “terseness” (‘laconism’)—and also with an ethopoetic 
agenda—Plutarch attributes words to the respective collective:  
when Philip wrote to them, ‘If I invade Laconia, I shall turn you out’, they wrote back, ‘If’. 
And when King Demetrius was annoyed and shouted, ‘Have the Spartans sent only one 
[‘ἕνα’] envoy to me?’ the envoy replied undismayed, ‘One to one [‘ἕν(α) (…) ποτὶ ἕνα’]’. 
(Moralia VI. 444–445, 511A)287 
|| 
perhaps also its critic” (137); he “revealed his judgment […] to some extent through judgments 
[…] put[…] into the mouths of his characters” (153). “Although Machiavelli refrains from saying 
so [in Discourses II.14], the words used by Annius are […] put by Livy into Annius’ mouth […]. 
Annius […] is a creation of Livy. By referring first to Livy and then to Annius, Machiavelli refers 
[…] to one and the same source. What this means appears if we remember that […] the Bible is 
of human origin […] must be read ‘judiciously’ […] these premises […] must raise the question 
‘Who has spoken to a prophet?’ if […]he […] says that God has spoken to him […]: the words of 
God are words which […] prophets ascribe to God or put into the mouth of God. It is not God 
who speaks through the mouth of […] inspired speakers […], but […] writers who speak through 
the mouth of God […]. God stands in the same relation to the Biblical writers as the characters 
of Livy stand to Livy. […] creativity […] is not limited to the speeches” (147; cf. 146–148; with 
Discourses 156, II.14)—to say nothing of ‘intentions’. Strauss is reading Machiavelli judiciously 
(to say the least): “Livy ‘made’ his characters […] ‘do’ what they did” (148). “Among the […] 
things […] our historian makes Camillus say and do, so as to show how an excellent man ought 
to be made, he puts these words in his mouth” (Machiavelli Discourses 281, III.81; cf. “words 
that Livy makes him say”, 296, III.38); the ‘poietic’ accent points to the (vicarious) crafting of 
‘ethos’. Strauss glosses the aforesaid: “This assertion regarding Livy’s intention is not borne out 
by the Livian speech to which he refers” (153). In other words: one might prudently place (or be 
putting) ‘intentions’ into someone’s head or text (to say nothing of the virtuoso thoughts 
thereon). On the ‘feedback effect’—hence layering of sermocinationes (“nameless characters of 
a Livian character”, 151)—typically seen to obtain once the technique has been discerned, cf. 
“Machiavelli makes Livy make his characters say what Livy himself says or thinks” (155). 
287 Cf. the common (ethopoetic) assumptions subtending the above sententiae: “the words of 
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In the second case, a delegate—functionally standing in, actually speaking for, 
a collective—shows that the device of prosopopoiía might be replaced (with a 
view to verisimilitude) by referring to (an otherwise abstract political institution 
typically represented by) specific agents (such as emissaries, ambassadors). 
 Comparable to the technique of advantageously embedding allocutiones in 
(dominantly) narrative writing, multilayered proliferations of various 
(dramatico-rhetorically) ventriloquistic devices might occur within a given 
work—an artful mise en abyme, structurally and metapoetically speaking.288 In 
the Lysian Oration “Against Diogeiton”, said (ghostwriting, extratextual) 
logographer vicariously composes a discourse on behalf of a client (whose 
persona is ‘etho-poetized’ in the process).289 Using direct speech, the latter 
|| 
a Laconian, sparse and clear, differ from those of a man of Attica, which are voluble” (Aelius 
Theon “Exercises” 48, §8.116); “the words of a Laconian will be ‘few and clear’, and those of a 
man of Attica garrulous” (John of Sardis/Sopatros 214, §11.196). At the metalevel, Kustas links 
the arch-rhetorical regard for circumstances to the given linguistic structure: “The influence of 
rhetoric is not limited to the literary arts. The Greek language has, built into it, a surprisingly 
large number of ways of saying ‘if’. […] It compels a consideration of all possibilities in a given 
instance. ἠθοποιΐα concerns itself with what so-and-so would have said if—” (64). 
288 Cf. subchs. 2.1, 3.1. Technico-conceptually, see Küpper on the device of “a mise en abyme 
du discours” (Discursive Renovatio 333; cf. 362; 364; 373; Diskurs-Renovatio 342; 370; 372; 381). 
289 Said oration is cited (preserved), treated by Dionysius (“Lysias” 62–85, §20–27). Cf. Carey: 
“This speech is not found in the direct tradition” (“Comment.” 207), “does not survive in its 
entirety” (Trials 102; cf. Lamb “XXXII. Intro.” 656). On the orator, see subchs. 2.1, 4.1, herein. As 
to logography generally, cf. Plato (“Phaedrus” 504–509, 257C–258D, §39–40; 570–571, 277B, 
§62; also on Lysias); Norden (Kunstprosa I. 35–38, I.i.i), cum grano salis; Kennedy (New History 
65); Conley (7). Cf. Bruns: “Es war erlaubt und […] üblich, sich die Rede schreiben zu lassen” 
(434); Devries: “‘Every man his own lawyer’ was the principle at Athens […] the interested party 
had to plead his own case, […] [but] could consult another and have his speech written for him 
[…] the clever speech writer […] place[d] those words […] in the mouth of his client, that would 
produce the effect of innocence […] worth, without any overt statement” (12). Bruss has: “to 
seem as unpracticed […] as possible […] would have been particularly useful in the ancient 
Greek courtroom, where, due to a strong anti-professional bias in the culture, litigants spoke 
for themselves. In such circumstances, maintaining the image of a ‘legal virgin’ worthy of a fair 
hearing was […] paramount” (46; 46n.; cf. “the illusion of amateurism so prized in democratic 
Athens”, 52); with Carey (Trials 12), accentuating a forensico-logographic need for consistency: 
“an[…] aspect to the use of character as a means of persuasion […] is dramatic characterisation. 
In any legal hearing the listener will be on the alert for signs of dissimulation. In the Athenian 
context the tradition that the litigant represent himself, together with the scope for the use of 
bought material or expertise (from commonplaces to whole speeches), made the ‘fit’ between 
speech and speaker a factor of some importance […] any obvious dissonance would jar” (“Rhet. 
means” 39). See Devries (13); M. Morgan: “The judges seemed to see and to hear the same man, 
instead of seeing one man and hearing the words of another” (“Intro.” xxx, §26); contrast Süss 
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ostensively reports (that is, represents and virtually stages) the (supposedly) 
very words of a third party unable to appear before the jury (“Diogeiton [1976]” 
|| 
(221–222). Cf. Carey, as to crafting “the plausibility which comes from internal consistency” 
(“Rhet. means” 32): “consistency and vividness […] through intrinsic plausibility invite belief, 
irrespective of the […] supporting evidence” (“Rhet. means” 43). Hellwig notes: “das πρέπον 
[‘liegt’][…] in der Übereinstimmung der […] Bilder: dessen, das der Redner von sich selbst 
entwirft, mit dem, das sich der Zuhörer vom Redner macht” (266). In said sense, consistency 
conduces to concealing the art (see part 6): “Lysias uses dramatic characterisation to secure 
two effects […] first […] a plausible ‘fit’ between the alleged or discernible circumstances of the 
speaker and what he says so that the intervention of the professional speechwriter is 
concealed. […] second[ly] […] to confirm the speaker’s version of his case by presenting an […] 
argument from probability; the implication, sometimes reinforced […] by explicit argument, is 
that the character before the jury is incapable of behaving in the manner alleged” (Carey “Rhet. 
means” 42). The oratorico-theatrical nexus is spec. relevant to logography: “appreciat[ing] the 
potential of dramatic characterisation, […] Lysias […] creates a vivid […] consistent portrayal of 
the speaker […] not […] a detailed character portrayal. Too much detail would obtrude […]. 
Lysias […] selects […] distinctive characteristics and by presenting these consistently creates 
the illusion of depth” (“Rhet. means” 40–41; cf. Bakker “Lysias” 411; 419; 421; 426–427; 426n.). 
Such ethopoiíai may be (and usually are) performed in utramque partem (so to speak): “the 
presentation of the opponent […] is […] used […] to create a consistent picture […] which 
increases the plausibility of the allegations against him” (Carey “Rhet. means” 43). As to “the 
potential of character in this theatrical sense” (“Rhet. means” 39)—“of ethos in the dramatic 
sense” (“Rhet. means” 40)—Carey notes: “Aristotle touches […] on this aspect […] in his 
discussion of […] to prepon […] at Rhetoric 1408a […] the use of language appropriate to […] 
external characteristics […] imparts ethos. Here and at Rhetoric 1417a, where he advocates the 
inclusion […] of details appropriate to ‘each ethos’ in order to make the narrative ethikos, he 
has in mind not just moral character but also plausibility” (“Rhet. means” 39–40; with Rhetoric 
378, 1408a, III.vii.6–7; 446–447, 1417a, III.xvi.8–9; contrast: Süss 219). While Carey refers to 
“chapter 15 of Poetics” (“characters must be fitting”), to “the requirement that character should 
be consistent (homalos)”, he maintains: “Aristotle has not thought through the implications for 
rhetorical theory of the notion of character as dramatic construct”; and “[p]ractitioners too 
were slow to grasp the potential of dramatic characterisation” (“Rhet. means” 40; see Aristotle 
“Poetics” 78–79, 1454a, XV). Apart from being unverifiable, the latter seems implausible, given 
the saturation with drama obtaining in Greek society, Hellenistico-Roman culture (see Sansone 
passim; spec. x–xi, 4–5, 20, 223). Carey’s other claim rests on a (strict) severance of the 
Stagirite’s Poetics from his Rhetoric—untenable not only de re (the more important factor, in an 
Aristotelian view); but also de dicto, given several express cross-references between these texts 
(the Nicomachean Ethics, the Politics, would also have to be adduced); cf. Aristotle (“Poetics” 
94–97, 1456a, XIX; with 29n., 95n., 97n., 100n., 105n., 111n., 115n.; Rhetoric 124–125, 1371b, 
I.xi.23; 350–355, 1404a–1405a, III.i.10). Blass associates “Rhetorik”, “Dialektik”, 
“Moralphilosophie”, “Staatskunst” (Beredsamkeit II. 61; cf. 62). With Aristotle (Rhetoric 344–
349, 1403b, III.i.3–7), Sansone logs: “Aristotle sees no fundamental difference between delivery 
as it relates to […] acting and […] oratory” (13; cf. 12). On the nexus of the Rhetoric, Poetics, cf. 
Hellwig (271n.); Elam (218–219); Eden (Fiction 13n.); Asmuth (“Drama” 185); subch. 4.1, herein. 
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666–669, §507–510, XXXII.12–18).290 Moreover, he also includes the reaction on 
the part of the initial context with a view to the present one.291 
|| 
290 Concerning the sermocinatio in Oration 32, see Lysias (“Diogeiton [2002]” 55–56, §12–18; 
with Dionysius “Lysias” 74–77, §25, for the mother’s complaint). See a brief discussion of her 
role in Blass (Beredsamkeit I. 415); Devries (47–48), cum grano salis. M. Morgan’s judgment 
seems problematic, in not accentuating the mother’s being virtually present only (wherefore, in 
a sense, his wording may hint that the act of ventriloquism has been effectual): “The figure of 
the woman is even better drawn […] the scene in which she appears […] the words she speaks 
are something unique in Greek prose” (“XXXII. Intro.” 156). Cf. Carey: “perhaps the finest touch 
[…] is the use of the widow […] the quotation of the woman’s speech to her father allows Lysias 
to circumvent […] one of the procedural limitations of the Athenian courts […] women could not 
appear in any capacity” (Trials 109). The speaker—described by Carey as projecting a 
“restrained persona” (“Comment.” 211)—first reports her having stated “that even though she 
had not before been accustomed to speak in the presence of men [‘eíthistai légein en andrási’], 
the magnitude of their misfortunes would force her to give us a full account of their hardships” 
(Dionysius “Lysias” 72–73, §25; cf. Devries 48n.). The functionally delegative dimension of the 
ensuing sermocinatio—“a harrowing invective presented in direct speech” (Bakker “Lysias” 
417), which “adds dramatic life to the scene” (Lamb “Intro. [Lysias]” 658)—is noted by Carey: 
“while sustaining for the speaker a restraint appropriate to one intervening against a kinsman 
[…], Lysias provides for the required emotional effect through the medium of the mother’s 
powerful denunciation of the treatment of the orphans […]. By including speeches ascribed to 
her[,] Lysias creates the illusion that we are actually hearing the mother speak. Since all […] 
she says is what one would expect under the circumstances, we may reasonably suppose that 
something along these lines was said, though the words will be those of Lysias. But even if the 
content of the speeches were fabricated, it would waste valuable time in court for Diogeiton to 
attempt to refute this portion of the narrative” (“Comment.” 211; cf. Trials 109). As to (Roman) 
declamation, Bonner notes: “In most controversiae the speaker would imagine himself in the 
position of the accuser or defendant and act the part, but there were certain circumstances in 
which it was the custom to ‘grant an advocate’ (patronum dare), and to defend or […] to accuse 
in the third person. If […] the person bringing the action should be a woman, she would not 
speak for herself in a declamation any more than she would, normally, […] as this would offend 
the Roman sense of decorum” (Declamation 52; cf. 52n. on “certain exceptions in practice”); “a 
citizen who had forfeited his right to speak […] would not declaim in propria persona, but 
would require to be represented by a ‘patronus’. These instances conform to legal practice. […] 
in certain circumstances, even a free citizen might prefer not to speak for himself, if, for 
instance, as a son, he should have to attack his own father and thereby offend the Roman 
conception of the dignity of the pater familias” (Declamation 52). “Even when the declaimer 
spoke as a patronus he was frequently able to enhance the vividness of his speech by direct 
quotation of alleged remarks of his client—a favourite device” (Declamation 53). 
291 Having (re)cited the mother’s (past) words spoken in the presence of family members and 
friends, the speaker addresses the “gentlemen of the jury [‘o ándres dikastaí’]” (Dionysius 
“Lysias” 76–77, §25; reiterated), producing a sort of mise en abyme of said past and the present 
situation before court—with a view to ‘syn-homoio-pathizing’ (so to say; cf. Aristotle Rhetoric 
378, 1408a, III.vii.4) these two audiences (domestico-familial, publico-forensic): “when we had 
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 In other genres, such as the Platonic or Lucianic dialog, one frequently 
encounters protagonists that ‘everyone knows’ from similar renderings: these 
are familiar personae (with corresponding éthe) floating in the vast virtual 
networks of a culture’s oral and written tradition, with characteristic sayings, 
dialogic anecdotes, or exemplary feats and sayings (at times rather loosely) 
attached to them (allocutiones, dialogismoí, ethopoiíai).292 In such cases, there is 
a need to maintain a certain recognizability (as per the aptum), but also a 
|| 
heard all these shocking accusations from the mother, we who were present were all so 
affected by this man’s conduct and by her account of it” (“Lysias” 77, §25)—i.e. precisely the 
sort of páthos to be induced in the jurymen, as well. With regard to Oration 3 (‘Against Simon’), 
Bakker comparably notes that “the narratio subtly encourages the jury to do the same” 
(“Lysias” 420)—meaning, to follow suit. As to intratextual ‘audience construction’ in Lucian, 
cf. Hodkinson (557). In the aforesaid respect, Lamb’s remark might not be doing justice to the 
passage: “Instead of amplifying her remarks, the speaker merely makes brief mention of their 
effect upon the company” (“XXXII. Intro.” 658). Contrast Carey’s functional analysis: “The use 
of direct speech creates the illusion that we are actually hearing the woman herself. It also 
allows the speaker to achieve pronounced emotional effects while maintaining for himself the 
restrain[t] […] appropriate […] [if] embroiled in a dispute with kin” (Trials 109). On the (virtual) 
vicariousness de re involved, see words Cicero puts into the mouth of ‘Antonius’: “compassion 
is awakened if the hearer can be brought to apply to his own adversities [‘ad suas res revocet’], 
whether endured or only apprehended, the lamentations uttered over someone else, or if, in 
his contemplation of another’s case, he many a time goes back to his own experience [‘ad se 
ipsum revertatur’]” (De Orat. I–II. 352–353, II.lii.211); this is to be “intenta ac vehemens” (spec. 
“ad commutandos animos atque omni ratione flectendos”)—in contrast to “that other kind of 
style, which[,] by bearing witness to the speaker’s integrity [‘probitatis’][,] is to preserve the 
semblance [‘speciem tueri’] of a man of worth [‘boni viri’]”, hence “should be mild and gentle 
[‘lenis’]” (De Orat. I–II. 352–355, II.lii.211). In the Lysian oration, a brief recapitulation of the 
case’s particulars (‘the treatment of the children’, ‘the unworthiness of their guardian’) is 
rounded off by a general statement, which the present (juridical) audience would likely be able 
to tie in with: “we […] reflected [‘enthymoúmenoi’] how difficult it is to find a person who can 
be trusted with one’s affairs” (Dionysius “Lysias” 76–77, §25). Structurally, content-related and 
formal instances of vicariousness tend to be found in close proximity: here, the practical (also 
moral philosophical) matter of steward-, guardianship; and a multi-layered sermocinatio (a 
logographer, writing words for a speaker to deliver, who, in so doing, ventriloquizes another’s). 
292 On a rhetorical use of the phrase ‘everyone knows’, see Aristotle (Rhetoric 378–381, 1408a, 
III.vii.7); and subch. 3.2. “Exemplum est alicuius facti aut dicti praeteriti cum certi auctoris 
nomine propositio” (Rhet. ad Her. 382, IV.xlix.62). Cf. “it is normal for Roman and Hellenistic 
writers to choose as their exempla for a given topic people who are well-known to their 
audience” (Gill “Personhood” 181). Stressing “[t]he powerful effect of prosopopoeia on 
Elizabethan readers” (Culture 287)—spec. as to The Mirror for Magistrates (wherein “the 
donning of a role is often signalled by a formula such as ‘I will take upon me the person of[’]”, 
Culture 286)—Plett notes: “The dramatic figures brought to life in this way were well known to 
the English public of the sixteenth century from the chronicles” (Culture 285). 
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considerable leeway in precisely said respect; hence a writer might flexibly 
produce the desired effects of both recognition (formally, an effect of repetition) 
and novelty (unfamiliarity) or variation in the recipients.293 
 This ties in with Aristotle’s Poetics, stating that a (well-known) mythological 
(‘historical’) character must be rendered as per the tradition—for the most part:  
Now, one cannot break up the transmitted stories (I mean, e.g., Clytemnestra’s death at 
Orestes’ hands, and Eriphyle’s at Alcmaeon’s), but the poet should be [rhetorically] 
inventive [‘heurískein’] as well as making good use of traditional stories. (“Poetics” 74–75, 
1453b, XIV)294 
To some degree of probability, a persona’s remodeling must proceed within 
certain limits set by custom, and be in keeping with what may be familiar to—
hence be deemed apposite by—a given audience as to a particular (mythologico-
historical) protagonist, respectively a (usual) set thereof.295 Aristotle habitually 
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293 On effectually using something ‘xenikòn’, see Aristotle (Rhetoric 352, III.ii.6, 1404b). As to 
the aptum in said respect, cf. Asmuth: “The ties between the poetics of drama and rhetoric are 
even closer with regard to the characters and their style of speaking. When Aristotle introduces 
appropriateness (πρέπον, […] ἁρμόττον […]) as a stylistic principle in his ‘Rhetoric’, he is 
thinking of diction as adequate to the situation and case at hand, but especially to the 
speaker’s social status. Accordingly, the conceptions of his ‘Poetics’ concerning […] ḗthē […] in 
drama entirely adhere to the principle of appropriateness: the character of a dramatic persona 
is to be in accord with its social role, with the historical tradition, and with itself” (“Drama” 
185; cf. “Angemessenheit” 581; 584). On variation with a view to the audience, see Cicero: “it is 
necessary to choose [‘est eligendum’] the style of oratory [‘Genus (…) dicendi’] best calculated 
to hold the attention of the audience [‘quod maxime teneat eos qui audiant’], and not merely to 
give them pleasure [‘delectet’][,] but also to do so without giving them too much of it [‘sine 
satietate’]” (“De Orat. III” 76–77, III.xxiv.97)—i.e. ‘variation sans satiety for maximum efficacy’; 
the context being the ornatus. Stressing that one “escape causing satiety [‘satietatem’]”, Cicero 
logs: “Thus in all things the greatest pleasures [‘voluptatibus maximis’] are only narrowly 
separated from disgust [‘fastidium’]” (“De Orat. III” 80–81, III.xxv.99–100); cf. “quae varietate 
taedium effugiant et mutationibus animum levent” (Quintilian Inst. Orat. 3–5. 276, 4.2.118). 
294 The fact that most of the (mythologico-historical) names given by Aristotle (e.g. ‘Eriphyle’, 
‘Alcmaeon’) will be known to specialists only—in contrast to (say) ‘Achilles’, ‘Helen’—may 
seem to prove the philosopher’s point (cf. the n. below). One might have infinitized the citation 
(de re), supplied familiar (‘modern’) names in a gloss; in the present context, it seems more 
apposite to signal the specific oscillation of alterity and familiarity. As to the above, see 
Horace: “Aut famam sequere aut sibi convenientia finge” (“Ars Poetica” 460, v.119; with 
context, v.119–127); also Vives (referring thereto): “si persona nova infertur, fingere eam licebit 
qualem collubuerit, sin vetus, qualem accepimus, juxta præceptum Horatii in arte poetica, qui 
enim finxit primus, velut jus in ea antecepit, et legem statuit sequentibus” (186, Aa.v, II.xvi). 
295 Temporal relations may come into question in said respect. Cf. Moos: “Macrob , Sat. I 1, 4–
5 sieht seine disputierenden Philosophen als Imitatio der Ciceronischen Dialogfiguren […] und 
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counsels to initially tie in with what ‘everyone knows or might know’—with 
what is likely to be literally ‘plausible’—as such evokes and effects a ‘universal’ 
common ground, on which to draw or build for utmost impact: “With character, 
precisely as in the structure of events, one should always seek necessity or 
probability [‘tò anankaion hè tò eikós’]” (“Poetics” 80–81, 1454a, XV).296 
 The Aristophanic Clouds—staging ‘Socrates’ in a manner somewhat at 
variance with other renderings—may be the most notorious case in this respect: 
when contrasted with Plato’s diversely nuanced versions, the play evinces both 
a certain set of overlapping characteristics being ascribed to said persona; and a 
considerable scope as regards (the tendency of) the overall, ethopoetic ‘image’ 
conveyed.297 In a dialogic exchange with the would-be student ‘Strepsiades’, the 
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entschuldigt seine Fiktionen damit, daß auch Platos Dialoge Par[…]menides, Timaios […] 
Sokrates […] wie Zeitgenossen miteinander reden lassen, […] Diachrones synchron behandeln” 
(407n.). The above relates to the rhetorical directive of ever reckoning with, adhering to, 
decorum—thematic suitability, plus being credibly in accord with common ken floating in, 
habitually extracted from, (virtual) cultural networks at any given time. Cf. Trimpi, connecting 
aequitas and the aptum: “Equity gains its freedom from (written) statutes[,] and poetry its 
freedom from (recorded) history[,] by concentrating on qualitative issues. Equity seeks the 
proper relation between the individual controversy to be judged and the body of statutes to be 
applied to it, while poetry seeks the proper relation of given particular events, historical or 
imaginary, to a principle by means of which they may gain significance” (“Reason” 104). 
296 Naturally, one might as well claim to be referring to a general consensus, common ground 
as does not obtain (or no longer); “for this is already common knowledge, and there is nobody 
who does not agree [‘homologei’], both from what he has been told [‘akoe mathèn’] and from 
personal experience [‘peíra’]” (Dionysius “Lysias” 36–37, §10; infinitized). Meta-technically, cf. 
Most: “I introduced this […] story with the words, ‘As everyone knows’. But presumably for 
most readers it was quite unfamiliar” (12; with 11). See Mayfield (Artful 80; 80n.–81n.; 115; 187). 
297 Quintilian stresses: “Plato excel[led, ‘eminuit’] in all the things […] a future orator should 
learn” (Inst. Orat. 1–2. 250–251, 1.12.15). Montaigne’s views on the ‘ventriloquizing’ philosopher 
(cf. Essais II. 263, II.xii) are unequivocal: “Lui-même [sc. ‘Platon’] est tout poétique” (Essais III. 
305, III.ix). “Et certes la philosophie n’est qu’une poésie sophistiquée. […] Platon n’est qu’un 
poète décousu. Timon l’appelle par injure grand forgeur de miracles” (Essais II. 300, II.xii; cf. 
435, II.xvi); Blumenberg (“Sturz” 37); Friedrich (34); Eden (“Montaigne on Style” 391). Niehues-
Pröbsting logs “[d]ass der platonische Sokrates eine im hohen Grade literarische Figur ist” (Die 
antike Phil. 66). Generally, a sermocinatio for a familiar persona implies that others (are likely 
to) have similar, variant sources, associations as to this (virtual, notional) ‘figure’, (hence) will 
gauge what is produced with reference to this name (including the ethos projected) by a given 
standard. There will be a significant difference between putting words into the mouth of an 
animal (a wolf, bear), or of ‘Dido’, ‘Brutus’—even if the words happen to be the same (floating 
sententiae). Moreover, the degree of familiarity with the ‘mouthpiece’ (so to speak) is decisive: 
words attributed to a turtle are likely to differ in effect from such as are put into the mouth of a 
platypus (depending on the receiving context). Traditional personae pertain to, are associated 
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latter asks: “Well, first of all tell me, please, what you’re up to”; and (the 
Aristophanic) ‘Socrates’ replies: “I tread the air and scrutinize the sun” (39, 
v.224–225).298 With regard to the dramatist’s poetics, these words represent a 
sermocinatio specially suited to the context and its economy. 
 Generally (and metapoetically) speaking, rhetorical ventriloquism may also 
serve as an (implicit) pretext for writing in the first place. With regard to Plato’s 
delegated prolixity, Blumenberg wryly remarks: “Of course, only someone who 
lets Socrates speak is permitted to write that much” (Selbstverständnis 84; trans. 
dsm)—while spiriting away his own philosophical persona in (and by) said 
process.299 Branham suggests that one discern “Plato’s comic technique” in 
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with, a copia of (aural, textual, notional) experiences on the part of the recipients—into which 
fund a rhétor or writer may tap when putting (other) words into their mouths. Above all, 
rhetoric encourages consideration of (utter attentiveness to) settings, nuances. Cf. Bakhtin’s 
accent: “All rhetorical forms, monologic in their compositional structure, are oriented toward 
the listener and his answer. This orientation […] is usually considered the basic constitutive 
feature of rhetorical discourse. […] this relationship toward the […] listener, taking him into 
account, […] enters into the very internal construction of rhetorical discourse” (Dialogic 280). 
298 On the Aristophanic play in a rhetorical view, see Bornscheuer (122–127, here spec. 122). 
299 Ostensible ‘logography’ sensu lato (“we wrote for a forlorn lover”) may serve as “vicarious 
self-depiction” (Wigham/Rebhorn, glossing Puttenham’s aforecited line, 291, with 291n., III.19). 
Cf. the motto (with n.) for subch. 5.1, above. In delegating a (philosophically desirable) ethos to 
the Socratic persona crafted and projected, the resp. writers (Plato et al.) ‘treat themselves’ to a 
vicarious image (sc. more faces). See Niehues-Pröbsting: “Platon [‘hat’] fast seine gesamte 
Philosophie dem Sokrates in den Mund gelegt […] er [‘schreibt’] in einer Form, die […] es ihm 
ermöglicht, mit der eigenen Person völlig hinter dem Geschriebenen zu verschwinden” (Die 
antike Phil. 67). Cf. Moos: “Der Begriff [‘Auctor’] steht […] in einem für Johann [of Salisbury] 
charakteristischen […] Sinn für Pseudonym, Maske, Rolle, Persona […]. Die Verwendung einer 
fictio auctoris oder ‘Autor-Ethopoeie’ ist nach einer […] Grosseteste zugeschriebenen Aussage 
ein eminentes Bescheidenheitszeugnis: ‘Plato war in seiner Lebensführung klug […]; daher hat 
er seine philosophischen Abhandlungen lieber anderen in den Mund gelegt [‘sub nomine potius 
alieno stilo mandasse’]” (408–409, 409n., §88). There seems to be a dependable nexus between 
delegative devices and legitimization as one of their (distinctive) functions; an associated use 
(with comparable primacy) will be wary prudence: “Der Policraticus-Prolog läßt sich […] als […] 
Rechtfertigung literarisch-rhetorischer Fiktion verstehen[:] […] im Sinne der sermocinatio 
(Ethopoeie), mit der ein Redner einer erfundenen Person, einem Autor oder […] Helden seine 
[…] Worte in den Mund legt[;] […] im narrativen Sinne des argumentum, der realitätsgerechten 
Erfindung einer passenden, charakteristischen Geschichte. Beide Male steht ein Name aus dem 
Literaturkanon stellvertretend, zeichenhaft für einen nicht im eigenen Namen aussprechbaren 
Gedanken” (412, §88). The elemental directive for all variants of rhetorical ventriloquism will 
be situative expediency (an arch-pragmatic grasp of the aptum—not one reducing it to elocutio, 
ornatus). Plato’s technical reticence may be seen as a form of ‘auto-etho-poíesis’ that virtually 
guarantees (self-)consistency with respect to (an authorial) ethos: while ever uniform itself, the 
signifieds of silence—being delegated to the resp. recipients—will tend to be myriad in effect. 
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(ethopoetically) “presenting thinkers as personified expressions of their 
theories, as comic instantiations of their own dominant ideas” (72).300 
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Blumenberg’s context: “Dialoge können nicht geschrieben, allenfalls nachgeschrieben werden, 
wie fiktiv auch immer. An der sokratischen Verweigerung des Schreibens rechtfertigt Plato den 
[…] Dialog: So viel darf eben nur schreiben, wer Sokrates reden läßt” (Selbstverständnis 84). 
The writer—ostensively keeping silent about ‘himself’—puts ‘Socrates’ (qua persona) into the 
notional (semantic) locus labeled ‘god’ in other (not only religious) contexts. As to such silence 
with another accent, see Bacon’s “De nobis ipsis silemus” (Neues Organon 32, Praefatio; being 
132 in Spedding/Ellis/Heath). Hypoleptically, Kant’s motto for the Kritik der reinen Vernunft 
opens with the former’s words: “De nobis ipsis silemus: De re autem” (Vernunft 1. 7)—in other 
words, still letting the resp. prevalent ‘god’ speak (be it called ‘res’, ‘Reason’, or else). Having 
situated said dictum as “a keyword of the epoch” (Schriften zur Technik 74; trans. dsm), 
Blumenberg restates it in a synchronic, self-inclusive form: “daß wir über uns schweigen” 
(Beschreibung 15; “that we be silent about ourselves”; trans. dsm). Ways of express, decided, 
incidental (transmission-related) silence may conduce to, downright yield, the inverse effect, 
catalyze attempts at ‘personifying’ an auctor from the text—a state of play offering considerable 
potentials for a resp. poetics. In this regard, Sappho may be spec. elucidating. On “the complex 
relation between face and voice in fragment 31”, “the mutual implication of speaking and not 
speaking in this poem”, see Prins (43; Sappho 78–81, §31; Longinus 198–199, §10.2), who (with 
de Man; cf. Harvey Voices 124; “Sappho” 88–89) asserts: “The anacoluthon […] opens a space 
for personification and depersonification, producing prosopopoeia as the figure that gives face 
by conferring speech upon a voiceless entity, yet in doing so also defaces it. […] fragment 31 
performs its own figuration as an act of disfiguration: the face is systematically disfigured, 
broken down into component parts” (Prins 43)—“a poem anatomizing […] prosopopoeia” (53). 
The ‘break’ or ‘opening’ refers to “[‘]the problem of the τό in line 5’” (Robbins in: Prins 42), that 
“pronoun […] introducing a relative clause” (41); one answer is “to give face to it—by projecting 
voice into the text […] assuming a speaking persona” (42). Prins logs “the primary critical 
strateg[ies]”: to see “fragment 31 […] as a monologue in which we may ‘refer to the persona 
loquens as Sappho’, […] a dramatized dialogue that creates Sappho as a dramatic speaker, […] 
an internal dialogue in which Sappho speaks as ‘the face behind the mask’” (Prins—partly 
citing Koniaris, Lidov, McEvilley, 42). She notes readings (here by Svenbro) as “animat[e] the 
writing itself, giving it face and voice”, “personif[ying] […] the written utterance as ‘you’”—with 
“[t]his prosopopoeia becom[ing] increasingly complex” (45; cf. 46). An Ancient move: via 
“personification Longinus […] conflate[s] poem and poet: Sappho is fragment 31” (49–50). Cf. 
Prins’ agenda: “Rather than reclaiming Sappho’s ‘original’ voice, I approach the […] fragments 
as […] cause and effect of translation. […] the performance [there]of […] ensures Sappho’s 
afterlife” (37). Even so, her conclusion seems to signal an interest in ‘seeking the source’ (“to 
recuperate Sapphic voice”): “in the long tradition of translating fragment 31, Sappho is defaced 
in the very attempt to give face and voice to this text” (67). At any rate, the reception decidedly 
partakes in this (and any) ethopoetic process: “in the Poetics […], as in the Rhetoric, character 
is represented as a factor constructed or inferred by the audience” (Elam 218); “ethos describes 
an audience’s projection of authority and trustworthiness onto the speaker, […] triggered or 
elicited by the speaker but […] supplied by the audience” (Baumlin/Baumlin 99; cf. 100). 
300 See Blumenberg’s felicitous dictum (infinitized): “der Inbegriff […] läßt sich figuralisieren” 
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 Dialogs—such as Plato’s Symposium, Lucian’s artful pieces—might be seen 
as virtually giving themselves to being put on stage (despite elaborate diegetic 
scaffolds). Branham—also noting Lucian’s use of prosopopoeia (see 5)—states: 
Where New Comic or classical tragic poets appear to have constructed their plays from the 
plot up, Lucian’s procedure is just the opposite: he begins by selecting a recognizable 
voice or set of voices and then projects them into a provocative situation, whether in 
Hades, on Olympus, or in ancient Athens. Here his rhetorical training in imitating the 
masters serves him well. In fact, Lucian’s protean ability for imitation and parody brings 
him into contact with every major genre from Homer through Theocritus. (4–5)301 
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(“Universalbibliothek” 33). Cf. Murphy: “Sometimes a single passage will give a striking insight 
into the whole rhetorical stance of an author” (“Authors” 33). The above phenomenon is 
transgeneric; for a personification of (oratorical) perspectives, see Fumaroli’s wording: “the 
point of view suggested by Tacitus in the Dialogue of the Orators through the voice of 
Maternus” (257); cf. subch. 2.1. As to “die auffällige Stilfigur der Gegner-Umbenennung” in 
John of Salisbury, see Moos: “Die Gegenthesen zu Johanns Ansichten […] werden personifiziert 
[…] mit Phantasienamen literarischer Provenienz versehen […] erhalten Pseudonyme, Deck- […] 
Spitznamen, Schimpfmetonymien” (289, §70). “Dies[…] erweist […] die […] ‘Kampfhandlungen’ 
als eine Art rhetorisch inszenierter ‘Charakterkomödien’ mit diatribischen Dialogelementen 
(wie dem einredenden fictus interlocutor). Sie lassen sich […] auch nach dem Modell […] 
fiktive[r] Probestreitgespräche mit einem imaginierten Gegner verstehen […][,] scheinen einem 
rhetorisch-dialektischen Doppelziel zu dienen: Als argumentative ‘Kriegsspiele’ schärfen sie 
das Denken in utramque partem, und durch den dramatisch gesteigerten Antagonismus […] 
zwingen sie den Leser in die Rolle des Richters” (289–291, §70; cf. spec. 290n.). 
301 For Lucian, Hodkinson notes: “Certain well-known figures appear as characters […], such 
as Homer and Odysseus, and here the narrator can rely on the reader’s knowledge in order not 
to have to describe them in any way. But he can then exploit this knowledge in order to 
characterize them in surprising ways which go against their conventional characterizations” 
(553). Moreover, “[t]he class of purely mimetic dialogues among Lucian’s works (Dialogues of 
Courtesans, Dialogues of the Gods, Dialogues of the Sea-gods, Dialogues of the Dead, The 
Judgement of the Goddesses) […] can be seen as literary exercises in characterization through 
ēthopoiia. […] The characters are ventriloquized by the author of the mimetic dialogues […], put 
in unusual or comic situations and then characterized mainly through their own speech, […] by 
what their interlocutors say about them, […] by their actions and reactions to one another” 
(556)—all of which are linguistically rendered, of course. As described by Branham, the above 
reverses Aristotle’s recommended procedure: “A plot is not unified, as some think, if built 
round an individual. Any entity has innumerable features, not all of which cohere into a unity; 
likewise, an individual performs many actions which yield no unitary action” (“Poetics” 57, 
1451a, VIII). Cf. Halliwell: “unity of ‘hero’ is not a sufficient (or even necessary) condition for 
unity of plot” (“Poetics” 57n.). This links to the accentuation of the ‘kathólou’ in ‘poíesis’ (sensu 
lato), as contrasted with an emphasis on “particulars” in “history” (“Poetics” 58–59, 1451b, IX): 
“In comedy […] the poets construct the plot on the basis of probability, and only then supply 
arbitrary names; they do not, like iambic poets, write about a particular person. But in tragedy 
they adhere to the actual names. The reason is that the possible seems plausible […]. Yet even 
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Plato and said (neo-)Sophist might be taken as expedient examples with a view 
to suggesting that the temporal distance to the ‘actual life’ of the historical 
human being is only of secondary import: once a recognizable persona is 
floating in the vast virtual networks of various (interwoven) cultures, it may 
take on—or relinquish en route—many different ‘masks’ or ‘public images’; the 
latter suggest what will be deemed appropriate for that persona (at a given point 
in time), and relatively regardless of genre (de re).302 Ventriloquistic techniques 
are of universal application, the same as the rhetorikè téchne on the whole—
whether applied in historiography, drama, (philosophical) dialog, or otherwise. 
 D. Laertius represents a copia in said regard: with rather few references to 
sources, and all but indiscriminately as to the emitting discourse or context, his 
Lives collect and assemble myriad instances as are likely to have been 
sermocinationes (stand-alone allocutiones, embedded in more complex 
ethopoiíai, part of dramatic works, etc.).303 Frequently (or even typically), the 
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in some tragedies there are only one or two familiar names, while the rest are invented; and in 
certain plays no name is familiar […] adherence to the traditional plots of tragedy should not be 
sought at all costs. Indeed, to seek this is absurd, since even the familiar subjects are familiar 
only to a minority, yet nonetheless please everyone” (“Poetics” 61, 1451b, IX). 
302 Speaking of “technically diverse characterization”, Hodkinson stresses: “Lucian’s works 
display great variation in their use of characterization techniques […]. As a sophistic author, he 
is well aware of ancient rhetoricians’ definitions of characterization techniques and sometimes 
refers to them in terms which display that knowledge, as well as employing the full range. The 
single most important character across his works is ‘Lucian’ himself or his alter-egos” (556). 
From among the “wide range of characterization techniques” in Lucian, Hodkinson’s noting 
the possibility of ethopoiía by proxy is of spec. import: “Anacharsis is characterized by others’ 
reactions to him” (550); this applies more generally: “very often in Lucian’s satire, the target is 
characterized by his own actions and the reactions they provoke in others” (552). Generally, 
Rusten notes that “Lucian […] shows a direct knowledge of the [Theophrastan] Characters” (18). 
303 With respect to the floating and refunctionalized (including cross-generic) uptake of 
sermocinationes, the ensuing case will be particularly significative, seeing that it also evinces 
the workings of hypólepsis in world literature more generally. Dante’s Divina Comedia abounds 
in allocutiones, some of which are put into the mouths of (apparently) historical human beings. 
In the following instance, the extratextual author’s words for the Medieval poet Guinizzelli 
offer a concise ethopoetic portrait (with laudatory purpose) of a renowned fellow writer: “‘he 
there whom I [sc. ‘Guinizzelli’] point out to you [‘Dante’, intratextually]’—and he pointed to a 
spirit ahead—‘was a better craftsman of the mother tongue [‘fu miglior fabbro del parlar 
materno’]: verses of love and tales of romance he surpassed them all—and let the fools talk” 
(Dante 286–287, v.115–119). In Eliot’s dedication to “The Waste Land”, said central 
characteristic—the poet qua linguistic ‘homo faber’—is tied in with as follows: “For Ezra Pound 
/ il miglior fabbro [‘the better craftsman’]” (3). See the gloss ad locum: “Eliot’s tribute to friend 
and fellow poet […] Pound […], whose poetic craftsmanship was invaluable in editing the 
Waste Land manuscript. The phrase echoes the tribute offered by Dante […] to twelfth-century 
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reader of anecdotes is probably facing rhetorico-enargic fabrications crafted 
with a view to effecting strikingly vivid scenes, specifically by putting 
(plausible, distinctive) words into the mouths of particular personae. The Lives 
may thus be seen as a rhetorical arsenal of effectual attributions and the 
crafting of ethos: a depot that might serve as a sort of ‘checklist’ as to what may 
be (thought to have been) aptly—always meaning, feckfully—attached to certain 
(supposedly) historical prósopa.304 Multiple ascriptions of similar sayings or 
anecdotes to different protagonists point to overlaps in the ‘personating’ 
(typifying, ‘characterizing’) process—this being one of the necessary results of 
any (ethopoetic) ‘image’ floating in a given (virtual) cultural network: once a 
(crafted and projected) rhetorical ‘self’ is found to ‘sell’, it will inevitably be 
recycled, leading to further sermocinationes (a dynamics remaining fairly stable 
to this day).305 The ensuing set of layered statements might serve as a sample: 
|| 
Provençal poet Arnaut Daniel in Canto 26 of Dante’s Purgatorio, a section from which Eliot also 
borrows l[ine] 427” (3n.; cf. 19, v.427; 19n.). In his capacity as dedicator, Eliot puts what, in 
Dante, had been a sermocinatio with an ethopoetic function into his own mouth (so to speak), 
thereby to ‘characterize’ a fellow craftsman also involved in the collaborative “Waste Land” 
project—hence implicitly (vicariously) also his own persona. Refunctionalizations will vary. 
304 Blumenberg hints that various ventriloquistic devices (sermocinatio, ethopoiía) may serve 
in heuristico-hermeneutic respects (cf. Beschreibung 152; Phänomenologische 94): “Klingt es 
glaubwürdig, wenn Leo Strauss […] schreibt: Husserl sagte mir einmal […]: [‘]Wenn es ein Datum 
Gott gibt, werden wir es beschreiben[’]? […]. Es ist aber wohl das, was Husserl hätte sagen 
müssen und daher auch gesagt hat” (Begriffe 30)—if the exchange took place; the bottom line: 
“Husserl […] konnte sehr wohl gesagt haben, was Leo Strauss von ihm berichtete” (Begriffe 31). 
305 For Plotinus’ hypólepsis and (discursive) refunctionalization of a dictum on the part of the 
Iliad’s Agamemnon by ‘putting it into the mouth of’ the Odyssey’s hero, cf. Blumenberg (“Plotin 
legt es dem Odysseus in den Mund”, Arbeit 87–88); in line with his overall thesis therein, the 
philosopher deems this “work on myth” (Arbeit 88; trans. dsm). Cf. Weinrich’s formulation: 
“Sokrates […], dem Plato die [äsopische] Fabel in den Mund legt” (436). The ensuing gives a 
sermocinatio’s distinctive recipient, in place of its (‘unknown’) emitter: “Hercules […] dem ein 
unbekannter Tragiker […] jene […] Worte geliehen hat” (Hirzel “Selbstmord” 284n.). Once one 
qualitative, or a sufficient number of ethopoiíai have conduced to the floatation of a (more or 
less) reliable ethos, the attributing party (or author) may tend to be of lesser import than what 
‘all (are said or thought to) know’. Conversely, if the source is considered to be authoritative to 
such an extent that the ‘that’ of their utterances trumps the (or any) ‘what’, the vicariousness 
constitutive of rhetorical ventriloquism might lead to such phenomena: “Goethe ist tot, und 
nun spricht Eckermann wie Goethe” (Blumenberg “Momente” 53); incidentally, this may be 
taken as another—elemental—ground for the rationality of Aristotle’s accent (or Plato’s praxis): 
‘one must make another speak in one’s place’ (cf. Rhetoric 460–461, 1418b, III.xvii.16; subch. 
5.1). The remaining ‘tell the story’ (see Blumenberg Sorge 25)—hence perform sermocinationes: 
“this 71-year-old woman, the survivor, has put the words in everyone’s mouth” (Davis 59). 
Samples may be infinitized, the (potentially) delegative functions of the device elicited. 
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Sotion […] says that he [sc. Anaxagoras] was indicted […] on a charge of impiety 
[‘asebeías’] […] and that sentence of death was passed on Anaxagoras by default. When 
news was brought him that he was condemned and his sons were dead, his comment on 
the sentence was, ‘Long ago nature condemned both my judges and myself to death’; and 
on his sons, ‘I knew that my children were born to die’. Some, however, tell this story of 
Solon, and others of Xenophon. (Lives I. 142–143, II.12–13)306  
Metapoetically, the reader is here facing the characteristic floating of sententiae 
qua sermocinationes—as Blumenberg notes, Goethe refunctionalized said 
aphorism, applying it to the (factual) demise of his own son: “Non ignoravi me 
mortalem genuisse” (Goethe 225).307 
|| 
306 Cf. Cicero on “the words Euripides has put into the mouth of Theseus [‘a Theseo dicta’] 
[…]: [‘]this lesson from wise lips I learnt, / Within my Heart I pondered ills to come: […] that […] 
/ No sudden care should rend me unprepared [‘Ne me imparatum cura laceraret repens’][’]. By 
the lesson which Theseus says he learnt form a wise man, Euripides means a lesson which he 
had learnt himself. For he had been a pupil of Anaxagoras, who, according to the story, said 
when he heard of his son’s death, ‘I knew that I had begotten a mortal [‘Sciebam me genuisse 
mortalem’]’. This saying shows that such events are cruel for those who have not reflected 
upon them” (Tusc. Disp. 260–263, III.xiv.29–30). See Seneca’s sermocinatio for ‘Demetrius’: “Do 
you [‘immortal gods’] wish to take my children?—it was for you that I fathered them” (Essays I. 
37, V.5). “Good men lose their sons; why not, since sometimes they even slay them?” (Essays I. 
43, VI.2); a gloss refers to “Lucius Junius Brutus […] Manlius Torquatus” (Essays I. 42n.). 
307 As related by Blumenberg: “auf die Nachricht, das einzige von ihm [sc. Goethe] bewirkte 
Leben sei erloschen, erwiderte er ohne Zweifel oder Verzweiflung, ausweichend in die 
lateinische Sprache, was zuerst von einem Griechen gesagt worden war, er habe gewußt, nur 
einen Sterblichen gezeugt zu haben: Non ignoravi me mortalem genuisse” (Goethe 225). 
Frequently, similar remarks ascribed or attributed to specific philosophers, or other personae, 
will actually derive from dramatic, dialogic, comparable renderings—at times even explicitly, 
e.g. in D. Laertius: “Menippus in his Sale of Diogenes tells how, when he was captured and put 
up for sale, he was asked what he could do. He replied, ‘Govern men [‘andron árchein’]’” (Lives 
II. 30–31, VI.29). Other cases do not feature direct speech (in the particular rendering given): 
“Through watching a mouse running about, says Theophrastus in the Megarian dialogue […], 
he [sc. ‘Diogenes’] discovered the means of adapting himself to circumstances [‘peristáseos’]” 
(Lives II. 24–25, VI.22). As of Early Modern times, the source will often be novels; since the 
twentieth century, they predictably derive from motion pictures—and from comparable forms 
of immediate, ‘enargic’ virtuality in the twenty-first. As to the ‘floating of sententiae’, see the 
following phrases on the part of D. Laertius: “Sotion, however, […] makes the Cynic address 
this remark to Plato himself” (Lives II. 29, VI:26); “Others give this retort to Theodorus” (Lives 
II. 45, VI.42); “But others attribute this remark to Diagoras of Melos” (Lives II. 61, VI.59). 
Ascribing an entire book to a particular authority might be described as an editorial 
sermocinatio, with (potentially) far-reaching consequences in terms of (the history of) 
reception; a notorious case would be the Rhet. ad Her. Caplan states the needful: “The fact that 
the treatise appeared, from Jerome’s time on, as a work by Cicero gave it a prestige which it 
enjoyed for over a thousand years” (“Intro.” vii–viii; Eloquence 2). As far as the ‘poetic’ 
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 From a pragmatic perspective, D. Laertius’ Lives demonstrate the degree to 
which the diverse forms of rhetorical ventriloquism are in fact effectual: crafting 
sayings (also in verbal exchanges) to be put into the mouths of various personae 
(allocutio, dialogismós), its assorted techniques conduce to producing vivid, 
‘characteristic’, probable ‘images’ (ethopoiía, with respect to eikós and a view to 
enárgeia).308 So as to effect plausibility, attention is paid to remaining in accord 
with their received ethos (meaning, as generally understood), while a certain 
flexibility obtains as to what will be deemed apposite in terms of redescriptions 
and attributions. Negotiating this tension in his textual economy—navigating 
with respect to the aptum—delineates the scope and leeway for the writer 
(dramatist, philosopher, orator, historian) as regards making his particular 
point (including where ‘universal’ by implication). The same as the overall 
téchne (see Küpper Discursive Renovatio 289), the ventriloquistic devices are 
transgeneric in terms of application.309 
|| 
perspective is concerned, see Carey (de re): “the tendency of artefacts to vary in value 
according to the identity of the creator offered an incentive to deceive” (“Intro.” 11). Cf. Moos, 
stressing the “Vorrang der mitzuteilenden Sache vor der mitteilenden Person” as among “den 
wichtigsten Legitimationsmotiven christlicher Pseudoepigraphie” (409, §88). 
308 See D. Laertius’ definition of ‘dialog’ (with recourse to the terms ‘ethopoiía’, ‘prósopon’): 
“A dialogue is a discourse consisting of question and answer on some philosophical or political 
subject, with due regard to the characters of the persons introduced [‘μετὰ τῆς πρεπούσης 
ἠθοποιίας τῶν παραλαμβανομένων προσώπων’] and the choice of diction” (Lives I. 318–319, 
III.48; cf. 292, III.18, “ἠθοποιῆσαι”; thereto, see K. Morgan 445–446). Apelt trans. the resp. 
phrase as “unter angemessener Charakteristik der auftretenden Personen” (Leben I. 159, III.48). 
309 In a genealogical argument, Sansone wishes to reverse dependences: “we are willing to 
believe, on the authority of Aristotle and others, that the earliest dramatists needed to learn 
from the earliest rhetoricians how to put persuasive words into the mouths of their characters. 
[…] on the contrary, it was the revolutionary innovation represented by the development of the 
drama that inspired the creation of rhetorical theory” (20). At any rate, the phenomenal plane 
yields an unequivocal finding: “Die Tragödie war hochrhetorisch” (Norden Kunstprosa II. 889, 
II.Anhang.I.viii). Cf. Mayfield (“Interplay” 10n.–12n.; with further references). Noting that 
“Lysias’ […] ability to delineate character (ethopoiia[…]) […] left scope for comic 
characterisation” (202), Harding focuses on the ensuing: “Perhaps Lysias’ most memorable 
creation in this [‘comic’] medium was the physically handicapped person of Speech 24, an 
alazon, if ever there was one, and one who […] personified the comic representation of rhetoric 
as the skill in ‘making the worse into the better argument’” (202). “Lysias decided to take the 
bull by the horns and use the technique of comic imposture (alazoneia) as his form of attack” 
(203). “In this brilliant speech Lysias has used many of the techniques of the comic dramatist – 
exaggeration, incongruity, parody, absurdity, the impossible and […], as he makes his own 
character admit, he has masterfully taken the comic hero off the stage and put him in court” 
(206). Cf. M. Morgan (“XXIV. Intro.” 119). With respect to Lysias in general, Blass notes “dass 
sich in mancher Rede ein […] Bild im Kleinen menschlicher Zustände findet, wie in der besten 
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 Whereas the specific, rhetorico-poetic disposition (selection and placement, 
hence function) in a work with historical claims will typically be a privileged 
point or climax (not least for reasons of variation in the textual economy), 
dialogic works (frequently featuring familiar personae) consist of sequential, 
contextualized sermocinationes (with narrative elements reduced in keeping 
with generic conventions).310 In an equally metapoetical perspective, the 
techniques in question prove especially expedient in plays, where words have 
actually been put in various mouths, speech is dynamically enacted on the 
stage, and performed with a high degree of vivid immediacy and intensity.311 
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Komödie” (Beredsamkeit I. 397). On the ethopoiía of the aforesaid persona from a linguistic 
perspective (including a close reading of the syntax and dispositio), see Forman (passim); his 
conclusion that one be dealing with an “individualize[d] […] character” (106) may seem 
problematic (contrast Bruss 54, who goes so far as to claim such as evidence of “contemporary 
scholars” being “equipped with more advanced conceptual categories”; cf. 54n.–55n.). Given 
the transpersonal qualities of language, as well as the fact that one seems to be dealing with a 
somewhat typified protagonist, “‘individuality’” (Bruss 54) cannot be pertinent (to say nothing 
of the term’s ‘utility’ in general). Even so, Kennedy’s contrasting view need not necessarily 
obtain: “Lysias does not attempt to vary the diction to suit the speaker; farmers, merchants, 
and aristocrats all speak the same simple, flawless Attic Greek” (New History 66). His ensuing 
assessment is equally problematic: “Lysias made two great contributions to Greek oratory. The 
first was a prose style of elegant simplicity […] [the] second […] was ethopoeia […] Lysias […] 
br[ought] out unique features of each client’s personality. Often, by showing some trivial 
weakness through a naturalistic touch, he succeeded in establishing a rapport with the 
audience that could convey the credibility of his client” (New History 66; cf. Persuasion 135–
136). The (hardly implicit) value judgments conveyed by the terms “unique” and “naturalistic” 
are inapplicable de re, and will (all but) inevitably give rise to misleading connotations. 
310 See Blass: “Offenbar sind die Reden des Thukydides Glanzpunkte des Werks” 
(Beredsamkeit I. 235)—from rhetorico-poetic, as well as hermeneutic points of view. 
311 Such accommodates the audience’s delight in, as well as gusto for, ‘special effects’—and 
is thus conducive to effecting an unreflected persuadedness (an only apparently ‘informed 
consent’); see Aristotle on “the weakness [‘asthéneian’] of audiences”: “the poets follow, and 
pander to the taste of, the spectators” (“Poetics” 72–73, 1453a, XIII; with 53–55, 1450b, VI). 
Quintilian accentuates: “etiam credit facilius quae audienti iucunda sunt, et voluptate ad 
fidem ducitur” (Inst. Orat. 3–5. 278, 4.2.119). Cf. Augustine’s “dilige et quod vis fac” (as qtd. in: 
Hammond “Timeline” lxii); in Green’s rendering: “Once your auditor thinks you love him, you 
can tell him anything” (7); he gives a mediated version as “Ama, & dic quod vis” (22n.; see 
Mayfield “Interplay” 18n.–19n.). The rhetorical theory of accommodatio will be apposite in this 
respect: “He, therefore, will be eloquent who can adapt his speech to fit all conceivable 
circumstances” (Cicero “Orator” 399, xxxvi.123). Cf. Paul’s version: “omnibus omnia factus 
sum” (1Cor 9:22; Vulgate); with Gracián (Oráculo manual 145, §77; 145n.); and Nietzsche’s 
cynical hypólepsis of the Pauline slant: “‘Dem Reinen ist Alles rein’ — so spricht das Volk. Ich 
aber sage euch: den Schweinen wird Alles Schwein!” (KSA 4. 256, III, “Von alten und neuen 
Tafeln”, §14); also Merleau-Ponty’s nonchalant remark (in a Montaignian context): “In public 
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 In (apparently) referential works, citations may take on a character akin to 
sermocinationes—specifically if the respective ‘authority’ is overtly or subtly 
recontextualized, overstated, misquoted, or fabricated altogether.312 As 
indicated above with reference to the textual yield, Machiavelli may well seem 
to have outperformed all in the art of rhetorical ventriloquism.313 The Tuscan 
|| 
life I become mad with the madmen” (204). Generally, see Eden: “rhetoric itself is first and 
foremost the art of accommodation” (Rhet. Tradition 14; cf. 2, 26, 42n.); cf. Mayfield 
(“Interplay” 18–19, 18n.–19n.; “Proceedings” 206, 224–225); as well as subch. 3.1, herein. 
312 For a pertinent nexus of hypólepsis and sermocinatio, see Blumenberg: “man [‘könnte’] 
Paulus in Abwandlung jenes dunklen Wortes des Thales […] sagen lassen: Es war alles voll von 
Gesetzen” (Arbeit 35); should the (author’s) hedging be omitted or forgotten in future citations, 
the turncoat Pharisee might be thought or said to have written or uttered these words indeed. 
Generally, see Blumenberg: “Thales is quoted verbatim by Seneca, although he left nothing 
written behind” (Schiffbruch 10n.; trans. dsm). Cf. Grube’s formulations (here as regards 
gleaning fragments to form a tentative notion of lost works): “Theophrastus is quoted as 
saying”; “Ammonius […] quotes Theophrastus as saying” (106); “a passage of Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus […] quotes Theophrastus as saying”; “attributes to Theophrastus a statement” 
(108). Grube also cites “Gellius[’] quot[ing] Varro as saying” (163); these might as well be 
sermocinationes. Cf. Kohut’s description of a Renaissance case: “der […] Humanist Pedro de 
Rhua […] [‘unterzieht 1549’] die Werke des damaligen Erfolgsautors Antonio de Guevara einer 
strengen Kritik […]. Guevara […] gebe ‘Fabeln für Geschichten’ (fábulas por historias), eigene 
Erfindungen für Erzählungen anderer [aus] und zitiere von anderen Autoren, was sie nicht oder 
anders gesagt haben” (90; brackets around “aus” in the source). With a view to metapoetical 
effects (including mise en abyme), Borges often uses such or similar devices (expressly)—e.g. in 
his “Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote” (passim). As to dispositio, Bakhtin stresses “the 
transmission and re-processing of another’s word”: “the speaker introduces into the other’s 
words his own intentions and highlights the context of those words in his own way” (Dialogic 
355). “Rhetorical genres possess the most varied forms for transmitting another’s speech, and 
for the most part these are intensely dialogized forms. Rhetoric relies heavily on the vivid re-
accentuating of the words it transmits (often to the point of distorting them completely) […]. 
Rhetorical genres provide rich material for studying a variety of forms for transmitting 
another’s speech, the most varied means for formulating and framing such speech” (Dialogic 
354); “in the makeup of almost every utterance spoken by a social person […] a significant 
number of words can be identified that are implicitly or explicitly admitted as someone else’s, 
and that are transmitted by a variety of different means. Within the arena of almost every 
utterance an intense interaction and struggle between one’s own and another’s word is being 
waged, a process in which they oppose or dialogically interanimate each other” (Dialogic 354). 
313 Cf. Strauss (35–36; 42; 106–107; 137–167); spec. “It would appear […] that Machiavelli 
stands in the same relation to Livy in which Livy stands to some of his characters: […] 
Machiavelli’s Livy is a character of Machiavelli” (141); “Tacitus is less Machiavelli’s model than 
his creation” (165); see Mansfield (Virtue 132; 320n.); Mayfield (Artful 83n.; 91n.). In such cases, 
the active participation in ‘etho-poíesis’ on the part of any process of reception will be spec. 
discernible. This also applies to other (including reciprocally delegative) forms of rhetorical 
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shows a general tendency to slightly modify (traditional) dicta by Livy or Tacitus 
(partly fictive, to begin with), as well as Scriptural passages.314 The manipulation 
of the source text or author will be effective both in terms of the resulting 
statement, and with a view to readers able to discern the difference—hence that 
Machiavelli has placed (altered or fabricated) words into the mouths of ‘Livy’, 
‘Tacitus’, or the Biblical ‘David’, while seemingly ‘just’ citing.315 
|| 
ventriloquism: “ich überlasse die Rückübersetzung der gesamten Prosopopöe dem Leser” 
(Küpper “Bemerkungen” 32). On Livy’s “us[ing] his doubting persona to engage the reader in 
the historiographical process”, cf. Kraus (158). On the refunctionalization of Scripture, Tacitus, 
see Machiavelli (Il Principe 93–96, XIII); with Strauss (329n.–330n.); Mayfield (Artful 180–182). 
314 The plane of phenomena or textual effects seems to render inevitable Strauss’ ensuing 
observation: “Machiavelli impresses his form on the Livian matter” (316n.). In particular, the 
scholar notes: “None of the six quotations from Livy in I 40 is completely literal” (318n.). Such 
a poetics renders close readings especially needful—as the following might demonstrate: “that 
Sallustian sentence, put in the mouth of Caesar, is very true: that ‘all bad examples have arisen 
from good beginnings’” (Machiavelli Discourses 95, I.46; with 95n.: “Sallust says that ‘all bad 
examples have arisen from good things’; see Strauss 137; 322n.). Cf. Aristotle (Politics 390, 
1303b, V.iii.2); with Ovid’s “Principiis obsta” (“Remedia” 184, v.91); Machiavelli (Il Principe 18, 
III.27; 18n.); Mayfield (Artful 171, 171n.–172n.; 222–223, 223n.). Generally, see these formulations 
in Trimpi (infinitized here—with a view to demonstrating a quasi-universal applicability): “In 
referring to” a text, he “makes certain important, though inconspicuous, changes. […] Each 
time” he “cites this passage […], he omits the qualifying phrase […]. The omission is probably 
not accidental”; with context: “Plotinus has changed Plato’s ‘to become like God (ὁμοίωσις 
θεῷ)’ […] into ‘to be god (θεὸν εἶναι)’” (Muses 170). See a comparable case elucidated by 
Kasprzyk: while Dio’s rendering of “Achilles […] contradicts the entire epic tradition”, he “goes 
further, using an episode from the Iliad to belittle the character […]. Not only is the invention of 
an episode attributed to the poet, but also the negative conclusion that Dio himself draws, in a 
particularly sophistic way, from sparse information. Rewriting Homer, commenting on the 
Homeric text and judging the character are inextricably linked” (527; with Dio Chrysostom 522–
525, XI.101–102, spec. the latter’s mention of “Homer [’s] […] eagerness to conceal the truth 
concerning that hero”, 523–525, XI.102). Expediently, Kasprzyk also notes the delegative 
technique of “attributing […] commentary to another character” (527). 
315 This will likewise apply to scenes dramatizing (spec. Il Principe 38–54, VII) the exploits of 
the (otherwise) historical protagonist Cesare Borgia, whom the factual author is known to have 
met; in such cases, an intratextual ‘Machiavelli’ (with the ethos of a counselor) puts words (or 
thoughts, intents) into the mouth (or head) of his (textual) persona ‘Cesare’ so effectively that 
the sermocinatio might go unnoticed, and be taken at face value (sc. ‘historically’). Cf. 
Quintilian: “Valet autem in consiliis auctoritas plurimum. Nam et prudentissimus esse 
haberique et optimus debet qui sententiae suae de utilibus atque honestis credere omnes velit. 
[…] consilia […] secundum mores dari” (Inst. Orat. 3–5. 122, 3.8.12–13; Russell’s trans. “very 
wise and very good” will be misleading: both in general, semantic regards, and in view of the 
decidedly pragmatic context; for the nexus with Aristotle, see Cope 109). “Multum refert etiam 
quae sit persona suadentis” (Quintilian Inst. Orat. 3–5. 138, 3.8.48); de re, see this collocation: 
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 In one instance, the Tuscan’s proclivity for—and notable virtuosity (not to 
say artfulness) in—all variants of rhetorical ventriloquism may be seen (or said) 
to come to the fore in a rather crafty manner.316 As per its context, the ensuing is 
functionalized with a view to setting up an argument in utramque partem—also 
signaled by its opening with Machiavelli’s characteristic ‘even so’—in the course 
of which a line ascribed to Tacitus reads: “‘In multitudine regenda plus poena 
quam obsequium valet’” (Opere 228, III.xix; “‘In ruling a multitude, punishment 
is worth more than compliance’”, Discourses 260, III.19).317 
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“auctoritate personarum” (Inst. Orat. 9–10. 304, 10.1.97). Cf. “Nichts ist dem rhetorischen 
Erfolg so abträglich wie ein negatives Image des Redners, nichts so förderlich wie Autorität 
und Ansehen beim Publikum” (Niehues-Pröbsting “Ethos” 342). Rhetorical ventriloquism is 
similarly utile in terms of this subtle device: “Hase de hablar a los presentes en los passados” 
(Gracián Oráculo manual 217, §210)—with the gloss: “referir la censura a un personaje de la 
historia” (Oráculo manual 217n.); “es […] el arbitrio empleado por los tacitistas […] que se sirven 
de personajes de la antigüedad para verter sus juicios en sus libros” (Oráculo manual 217n.); 
another statement is glossed: “que lo pone en boca de” etc. (Oráculo manual 133n.). As to the 
(Imperial) Roman practice of “declamation”, Kennedy notes (in general): “Contemporary 
subjects were avoided as potentially dangerous” (New History 168). On Shakespeare, see 
Maxwell (passim), spec. her central claims: “In scholarship, misquotation is vexing. In 
literature, it is an art” (56); “Misquotation occurs in two […] ways: […] verbal inexactness […] 
quoting out of context, in ways that are recognizably transgressive: irreverent, self-serving, 
devious […] ‘The devil can cite scripture for his purpose’ […] The Merchant of Venice (1.3.98)” 
(57–58; with Shakespeare Merchant 213, I.iii.94, cf. 213n.; Richard III. 169–170, I.iii.334–338; 
Marlowe 83, I.ii.111; cf. 83n.). Maxwell stresses: “Renaissance readers and writers […] were 
taught to misquote creatively. Renaissance England was a quoting culture” (58). “The New 
Testament is full of quotations from the Old, used mainly to justify arguments. So to quote or 
misquote the Bible, argumentatively, is to imitate its strategies” (63). “Shakespeare’s 
misquotations often economize” (67). “Misquoting is an art” (71). The value judgment inherent 
in the negative prefix will be anachronistic, as a matter of course: with respect to Early Modern 
(or comparably rhetorical) cultures, it would hardly have been considered ‘state-of-the-art’ or 
‘playing by the book’ to be taking up something without variation. 
316 See Christiansen—against her grain: “rhetoric can so easily become Machiavellian 
virtuosity” (300). From a descriptive (hence scholarly) perspective, the art kat’ exochén is a 
versatile, universal arsenal of expedients (see Aristotle Rhetoric 14–15, I.ii.1, 1355b; with Sloane 
“Education” 166; Bloemendal “Polish Pindar” 130; Mayfield “Interplay” 5–8; “Variants of 
hypólepsis” 249); any moralizing must seem misguided. 
317 Cf. “Nondimeno, Cornelio Tacito, al quale molti altri scrittori acconsentano, in una sua 
sentenza conchiude il contrario, quando ait: ‘In multitudine regenda plus poena quam 
obsequium valet’. E considerando come si possa salvare l’una e l’altra di queste opinioni, dico” 
etc. (Opere 228, III.xix); said ‘consensus’ insinuates the indirect presence of further 
ventriloquisms. Machiavelli continually refers to his allocutio (“ragiona Cornelio”, reiterated, 
Opere 228, III.xix), and then concludes: “la sentenza di Cornelio, dentro ai termini suoi […], 
merita d’essere approvata” (Opere 229, III.xix)—thereby legitimizing his own sermocinatio for 
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Naturally, the Latin text resembling Machiavelli’s partly hypoleptic 
sermocinatio tenders the precise opposite: “Obsequium inde in principem et 
aemulandi amor validior quam poena ex legibus et metus” (Tacitus “Annals I–
III” 610, III.lv).318 There appears to be a scholarly consensus that the 
Florentine—in his distinctive irreverence (not to say cynicism)—“invented” 
(Strauss 160; Mansfield Modes 373) the line he prudently places into Tacitus’ 
mouth.319 Even so, said word will have to be reaccentuated in rhetorical terms 
(with respect to heúresis); for the ‘consenting’ anonymous others—to whom 
Machiavelli alludes in this context (“al quale molti altri scrittori acconsentano”, 
Opere 228, III.xix)—will likely not only include the authorial persona itself. 
 In the Attico-Melian dialog, Thucydides puts the following words into the 
mouths of ‘his’ Athenian delegates: 
[‘]your hostility does not injure us so much as your friendship; for in the eyes of our 
subjects that would be a proof of our weakness, whereas your hatred is a proof of our 
power’. (History V–VI. 161, V.xcv) 
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Tacitus (spec. with its qualifications, see Mansfield Modes 374). Moreover, this state of textual 
affairs renders the (only virtual) movement from “ait” to “dico” an auto-arbitration (so to 
speak): Machiavelli crafts the counterweight for the balanced sentence. See the ch.’s title: 
“Whether to Rule A Multitude Compliance Is More Necessary Than Punishment” (Discourses 
260, III.19); with Mansfield’s comment: “We note that both indulgence and punishment are 
said to be necessary, but the discussion has to proceed from their contrariety” (Modes 372). 
318 Strauss’ argument seems consistent: “Machiavelli introduces the citation with the Latin 
ait: he draws our attention to the fact that he can write Latin; he thus prepares us for his 
writing some Tacitean Latin. The wording of the citation reminds us of a statement of Tacitus 
which expresses the opposite opinion to the apocryphal statement that Machiavelli put into 
Tacitus’ mouth. The genuine statement of Tacitus is immediately followed in his work (Annals 
III 55) by a remark which expresses doubt of the moral superiority of the olden times to the 
present […]: Machiavelli’s treatment of Tacitus as an authority is linked to a reminder of his 
own criticism of the root of the belief in authority” (325n.). 
319 Cf. “The passage quoted in Latin does not occur in Tacitus” (Machiavelli Discourses 
260n.). “As far as we know, the statement which he cites as a statement of Tacitus in order to 
‘save’ the opinion that it expresses was invented by Machiavelli: so far from bowing to an 
authority, Machiavelli treats himself as an authority” (Strauss 160; with 325n.). “The Tacitean 
quotation to which Machiavelli bows appears to have been invented by Machiavelli. Tacitus is 
quoted […] in invented Latin. Machiavelli’s means of invention is translation” (Mansfield 
Modes 373). It seems needful to place emphasis on the rhetorico-heuristic implications of said 
terms. On the Tuscan’s characteristic lack of respect, see Machiavelli: “non istima persona” 
(Mandragola 7, Prologo); “sanza alcuno respetto” (Il Principe 149, XXI.11; cf. Discourses 5, 
I.Preface); with Strauss (40); Mansfield (“Cuckold” 1); Mayfield (Artful 13–14; 88–89; 107n.; 
109; 120; 128; 186; 197, 197n.; 77–198 passim). 
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Spelling out the latencies in this “ἐνθύμημα”, Dionysius paraphrases (or puts 
notions into the minds of) the Thucydidean Athenians (along their lines): 
‘If you show us friendship you will make us seem weak in the eyes of others, but if you 
hate us we shall be thought strong; for we seek to rule our subjects not by the help of their 
good will but through their fear’. (“Thucydides” 582–583, §39) 
Like Dionysius (and without him), Machiavelli could (or rather, would) have 
arrived at the same notional conclusion from the Thucydidean text—inferring 
the suitable sententia cited, and using it in his sermocinatio for Tacitus.320 When 
Mansfield emphasizes that “Machiavelli’s means of invention is translation” 
(Modes 373), not only the first, but also the second (expressly) Latinate word 
will have to be read in rhetorical terms. 
 In line therewith, a note by the Florentine’s interpreters might indicate that 
the diverse techniques and phenomena of ventriloquism will (all but) inevitably 
also affect—or (as here) downright shape—the (various layers of) reception (to 
say nothing of their articles of faith): 
We believe that giving currency to Machiavelli requires us to convey as much as we can of 
his words, his terms, and his phrasing, because we wish to be sure that we are not putting 
our words in his mouth, thus putting our ideas in his head. (Mansfield/Tarkov xlix)321 
Whereas Machiavellian changes are typically tacit, a scholarly or translational 
ethos will render the opposite requisite.322 Yet another variant of the device 
might wish to make a point of the distortion (likely with no less an ethopoetic 
intent); this will be the case in the ensuing ‘twisting of words’ as is central to a 
highly ‘floatational’, frequently quoted (and recycled) Ancient example: 
when Aristotle observed that Isocrates succeeded in obtaining a distinguished set of 
pupils by means of […] devoting his discourses to empty elegance of style [‘ad inanem 
|| 
320 Machiavelli would thus not only be reading Tacitus’ text against the grain—but also be 
putting a notion into the latter’s mouth that might be inferred from the speeches attributed to 
the Thucydidean Athenians. Rhetoric is an art of latency and effect(uality). 
321 Mansfield notes the technique’s ‘virality’: “Machiavelli observes Livy putting words in the 
mouths of the men he writes about, making them his characters; and Machiavelli could be said 
with his Discourses to have appropriated Livy’s characters for himself and thus to have re-
formed the Livian matter” (Modes 7). Cf. Mayfield (Artful 78–79). 
322 Generally, see Bonner’s emphatically comparatist (and otherwise, or de re, Machiavellian) 
comment: “the method of recasting an author’s remark in order to bring home a criticism is 
among the most satisfactory methods of critical exposition” (Lit. Treatises 92–93)—express or 
tacit recontextualization (with concomitant refunctionalization) being another. 
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sermonis elegantiam’], he himself suddenly altered [‘mutavit repente’] almost the whole 
of his own system of training, and quoted a line from Philoctetes with a slight modification 
[‘paulo secus’]: the hero in the tragedy said that it was a disgrace for him to keep silent 
and suffer the barbarians to speak, but Aristotle put it ‘suffer Isocrates to speak’; and 
consequently he put the whole of his system of philosophy in a polished and brilliant 
form[.] (Cicero “De Orat. III” 110–111, III.xxxv.141; cf. 110n.)323 
Rhetoric is performed with a view to victory—what is effectual will be thought 
factual.324 As regards assessing the “cui bono” (Lausberg Handbuch 93, §158–
159), it will always be decisive, which words are being put into the mouth of 
whom, at what time, in which setting and whose presence, by which means, as 
well as on behalf of what or whom (potentially)—a matter of rhetorical 
dispositio; and ventriloquistically discrediting someone is not just a political, 
but also a literary and philosophical phenomenon.325 
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323 Cf. Webster (59). See Blass (Beredsamkeit II. 59–63, spec. 60, 60n.): “Jedenfalls ist die 
feindselige Haltung des Aristoteles gegen Isokrates nicht zu bezweifeln” (Beredsamkeit II. 60). 
While the scholar defends the rhétor passim, his passing remark is telling and (incidentally) 
pertinent: “er”—“Der Vergleich” or “Isokrates” (the reference being ambiguous, Blass will 
probably mean the former)—“hat seine Wahrheit, wenn man ihn nicht zu sehr ausdeutet” 
(Beredsamkeit II. 188). Sattler stresses: “Aristotle began instruction in rhetoric in competition 
with the well-established school of Isocrates” (63). Cf. Cicero: “Aristotle […] under the stimulus 
of the fame of the rhetorician Isocrates, began like him to teach the young to speak and 
combine wisdom with eloquence [‘prudentiam cum eloquentia iungere’]”—with “dicere 
docere” adjoined in the Latin (Tusc. Disp. 8–11, I.iv.7). Referring to “Isocrates, ‘that old man 
eloquent’”, the gloss reads: “With reference to his rivalry with Isocrates [,] Aristotle made, it 
was said, constant use of the line, αἰσχρὸν σιωπᾶν, Ἰσοκράτην δ᾿ ἐᾶν λέγειν” (Tusc. Disp. 8n.–
9n.). Cf. “Aristotle and Isocrates, each of whom, engrossed in his own profession, undervalued 
the other [‘contempsit alterum’]” (Cicero De Officiis 4–5, I.i.4). “Who was a more violent 
opponent of Isocrates [sc. than Aristotle]” (“Orator” 451, li.172). Quintilian gives this version: 
“Isocrates’ pupils distinguished themselves in every branch of study, and when he was an old 
man (and he lived to be 98), Aristotle began teaching rhetoric in afternoon lectures, often 
parodying (we are told [‘ut traditur’]) the well-known line [‘versu (…) frequenter usus’] in the 
Philoctetes: [‘]Shame to keep quiet, and let Isocrates speak [‘turpe esse tacere et Isocraten pati 
dicere’][’]” (Inst. Orat. 3–5. 14–15, 3.1.14; cf. 14n.). D. Laertius cites the same verse, but inserts 
“Xenocrates” instead (Lives I. 447, V.3; see the gloss at 446n.). Generally, Dionysius notes that 
“Aristotle […] is trying to besmirch Isocrates” (“Isocrates” 157, §18). 
324 See the n. in subch. 4.1; with Plato (Laws VII–XII. 470–471, 937E, XI; cf. 937E–938A); 
Hobbes (Man and Citizen 231, X.11); Bakhtin (Speech 152); Mayfield (“Interplay” 18n.–19n.).  
325 To say nothing of statements such as “The devil speaks in him” (Shakespeare Tempest 271, 
5.1.129). Even so, an epideictic functionalization (with a different tendency) is also conceivable; 
in this respect, see the assorted words put into Lichtenberg’s mouth by Blumenberg as an 
hommage (“Wie geht’s” 21–23). In certain cases, placing ostensibly unsuitable, prima facie 
inadvisable, otherwise self-evidently detrimental words into someone’s mouth—on whose 
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 One may here tie in with the focus of section 2.1, and note that the 
polyphony constitutive of dialogs allows much leeway in the textual economy of 
sermocinationes.326 It will be no accident that Plato perfected this particular art 
of discourse—seeing that dialogismós is also a delegative device, enabling the 
|| 
behalf one may be speaking (including one’s own)—may yield an ultimately utile effect, prove 
advantageous in the final analysis: “Que es arte ir contra el arte quando no se puede de otro 
modo conseguir la dicha del salir bien” (Gracián Oráculo manual 138, §66; cf. Mayfield Artful 
217). Pace Devries’ otherwise commonsensical remark—that “the object of comedy is to lay bare 
a man’s weaknesses and eccentricities, of rhetoric, to explain away his weaknesses and bring 
out his good points” (17)—one will therefore have to maintain that (not only forensic) 
expediency will sometimes dictate using someone’s (including the speaker’s) apparent or 
contrived limitations express- and purposively, spec. with a view to another (secondary, 
tertiary, etc.) interest. See Kennedy: “In general, character portrayal is effected by what the 
speaker is made to say, often by the seemingly unconscious revelation of some weakness of 
character” (New History 66). The Lysian corpus offers several such examples; cf. e.g. “[t]he 
defendant […] consistently claims to speak the ‘whole’ truth […], although it may reflect badly 
upon his character and position” (Bakker “Lysias” 419; with 419n.)—for “[o]penness, 
manifested explicitly in a readiness to reveal things which one might be expected to conceal, 
[…] helps to establish trust” (Carey “Rhet. means” 37). In another case: “The account at this 
point takes quietism almost to the point of cowardice […]. The advantage for characterization 
[…] was evidently felt to outweigh the disadvantage that some […] of the jurors might take 
exception to his lack of spirit” (Carey “Comment.” 99). Generally, cf. Niehues-Pröbsting: “Der 
spezifische Aspekt, unter dem die Rhetorik das Ethos thematisiert, ist ihr leitender 
Gesichtspunkt überhaupt, das Überzeugungspotenzial” (“Ethos” 341); he notes “rhetoric’s 
primary orientation toward impact [‘Wirkung’]” (“Ethos” 351; trans. dsm). As always in the art 
par excellence, the yardstick will be effectuality—above and before all else. 
326 Cf. Sloane: “humanist prose is […] always many voiced” (“Education” 175). For Galilei’s 
writings in this genre, several analyses on Blumenberg’s part demonstrate a functional process 
of dialogic distribution (rhetorical dispositio); in one case, the censor(s) had demanded that a 
certain formula be inserted—and the writer puts it into the mouth of the protagonist who does 
not prevail: “Anstoß sollte erregen, daß Galilei diese ärgerliche Formel dem Simplicio in den 
Mund legt, also der Figur des Dialoges, die am Ende Verlierer ist” (Legitimität 461). “Galileis 
raffinierte Dialektik besteht nun darin, daß er der konservativen Figur des Scholastikers in 
seinem Dialog, dem Simplicio, die Äußerung in den Mund legt, die der Argumentation ihre 
Wendung gibt” (Legitimität 459); cf. “daß er den so folgenreichen Einwand am Schluß dem 
Simplicio in den Mund legt” (“Fernrohr” 64). With regard to Valla’s “De vero bono”, Struever 
notes the (potentially) conative function of prosopopoiíai: “what, precisely, did he intend his 
readers to do with the personae, which he insists over and over again are the fictae personae, of 
Stoic and Epicurean? Within and without this dialogue, his reader is the recipient of subtle and 
not so subtle tactics of subversion: […] the Epicurean persona, in particular, seems 
inadequately undermined […]. His apologetic strategy […] may actually […] make easier […] the 
reader’s […] coming to terms with the radical doctrine he has the Epicurean espouse. Valla uses 
disjunction heuristically: […] ‘dum pro Epicureis loquor, Stoicum agere’. The counterfactual 
personae confront the reader’s expectations” (201–202). 
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distribution of otherwise (self-)contradictory statements, the (virtual) enactment 
of argument in utramque partem.327 Most importantly, it conduces to an effectual 
practice of parrhesía in permitting one’s saying anything one cannot—or does 
not wish to—say in one’s own name (or language) even so: “je fais dire aux 
autres ce que je ne puis si bien dire” (Montaigne Essais II. 119, II.x).328 
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327 As Montaigne notes, matters of tractatio are also relevant: “Platon me semble avoir aimé 
cette forme de philosopher par dialogues à escient pour loger plus décemment en diverses 
bouches la diversité et variation de ses propres fantaisies. Diversement traiter les matières est 
aussi bien les traiter que conformément, et mieux: à savoir plus copieusement et utilement” 
(Essais II. 263, II.xii; cf. Stierle “Gespräch” 313). For argument ‘also on the other sides’, see 
Mayfield (“Otherwise” passim); and subch. 5.1. Cf. this ventriloquistic variant in Emporius: 
“There is a third kind of ethopoeia [‘Tertium genus est ethopoeiae’], which is introduced only 
on account of the thing to be done [‘quod rei gerendae causa tantum inducitur’]; […] this 
approach is called the attorney’s [‘quae materies p r a g m a t i c a  nominatur’]”; the gloss 
adds: “Emporius means […] creating an imaginary agent for a desired action” (“Ethopoeia” 35; 
35n.; “de ethopoeia” 562). “It is brought in once in a great while so that a certain attitude will 
not appear at all or will appear very vaguely [‘Raro tamen ita ponitur, ut non vel leviter aliquis 
illic adfectus operetur’]” (“Ethopoeia” 35; “de ethopoeia” 562); his sample implies a mode of 
indirection (qua function of said device), whereby one artfully shifts accountability or deflects 
attention to another (hence away from the resp. speaker). As to the device of delegating the 
responsibility (or shifting the blame) for any, all rhetorical effects (impressions, convictions, 
having been influenced, etc.) to the recipient, see Nicolaus’ distinction (in Kennedy’s 
formulation): “[t]he goal of rhetoric is not to persuade, but to speak persuasively” (New History 
207); its “end is not to persuade in every case, but to speak persuasively in accord with what is 
available” (Nicolaus 132, §1.3). See Mayfield on delegation in an affine sense (“Talking 
Canines” 13n.; 22n.), spec. as to Nolting-Hauff’s remark concerning Cervantes (cf. 194). 
328 “I make others say what I cannot say so well” (Montaigne Essays 296, II.10); the context 
being his (decidedly polyglot) citational praxis, the economical intercalation of choice quotes—
qua indicative of prohaíresis (in an affine context: “Je l’ai fait à escient”, Essais III. 388, III.xii). 
Any immediate appearances notwithstanding, the aforesaid will not refer to elocutio only. Cf. 
the motto for subch. 5.1. On a (narrative) variant of delegative allocutio in Sidney, see Altman 
(91). Formulations such as the ensuing will seem to scent of sermocinatio to anyone versed in 
rhetorical ventriloquism—including (‘intentionally’, to be sure) the arch-hermeneutician: “A 
liberal theologian once said within my hearing that” (Strauss 50); especially since the ensuing 
is found in the immediate vicinity: “Some might say in defense of Machiavelli that” etc. (50). 
Formally speaking, the latter may yield the impression of functioning like Machiavelli’s “ait” 
(Opere 228, III.xix; with Strauss 325n.). As to reapplications of said vicarious procedure in terms 
of (diachronic) hypolépseis of sermocinationes, Montaigne’s case will be indicative. Regarding 
‘oratorical procedures’ associated with the genre of the “apology” in the Early Modern essayist, 
Teuber refers to “sermocinationes, which are put into the mouth of certain persons or […] 
personifications” (114; trans. dsm; see 114–126); in particular, he logs: “Montaigne legt ihm [sc. 
‘Socrates’] in enger Anlehnung an Platon eine entsprechende sermocinatio in den Mund” (124; 
with Montaigne Essais III. 385–387, III.xii; “fait […] parler Socrate”, 570n.)—and “identifiziert 
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 The metapoetically decisive tool is also employed intra-dramatically (a mise 
en scène ou abyme du dispositif).329 Like a Platonic Socrates (with both seeming 
to be in love with sermocinatio more than with the lógos itself), the Duke in 
Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure is (seen and heard in the act of) putting 
words into the mouth of his interlocutor: “Now (pious Sir) / You will demand of 
me, why I do this” (Measure 43, TLN306–307, I.iii); the theatrical audience is 
(evidently and audibly) being addressed, as well—and likely supposed to react 
with the (intradramatic) Friar’s “Gladly, my Lord” (Measure 43, TLN308, I.iii). 
 Even so, said Duke is not ‘safe’ from the device he delights in—which 
incidentally demonstrates the rhetorikè téchne’s generally supra-personal, 
instrumental, multipurpose status and use.330 In the last act, a flippant Lucio 
shiftily reattributes previous, defamatory remarks on his own part: “do you 
remember what you said of the Duke. […] And was the Duke a flesh-monger, a 
foole, and a coward, as you then reported him to be?” (Measure 259, TLN2711–
2712, 2714–2716, 5.1); to which the ruler replies: “You must (Sir) change persons 
with me, ere you / make that my report: you indeede spoke so of him, and much 
more, much worse” (Measure 259, 2717–2719, 5.1). By placing his own words into 
the Duke’s mouth, the slanderer Lucio replaces himself (so to say).331 
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sich mit der Rede des Socrates, als wäre es seine […] Socrates ist offensichtlich eine weitere 
persona des Essayisten” (Teuber 125; cf. Cave Cornucopian 308; with 302–312; McGowan 150–
162; Mack Reading 28; 30; 66). Teuber’s context is (highly) problematic—given his tendency 
toward substantialism, a (concomitant) relegation of rhetoric (incompatible with his own take). 
329 On the latter, see the above n. in this section; as well as subchs. 2.1 and 3.1, herein. 
330 Regarding the reasons for his (supposed) absence, the Duke uses a form of ventriloquistic 
relay (that is sure) to disseminate (any mis)information in a self-plausibilizing manner: “And 
he [sc. Angelo] supposes me trauaild to Poland, / (For so I haue strewd it in the common eare) / 
And so it is receiu’d” (Shakespeare Measure 43, TLN304–306, 1.3); in effect, the ruler 
(indirectly) delegates the vulgus to act in his stead and interest. His surrogate also has recourse 
to the conglomerate of techniques in question, particularly prosopopoiía; this intradramatic 
choice not only ‘characterizes’ him in ethopoetic terms, but is also rather apt from a 
metapoetical perspective—considering his vicariously enacting the ruler’s part and official 
role; in more than one sense, the Deputy’s ‘persona’ is ‘made’ by the Duke (so to say). See the 
following lines on Angelo’s part, all of which personify ‘Lex’—to various degrees and 
contextually differing functions (the latter often with a view to an ostensible legitimization, or 
the efficient delegation of responsibility): “We must not make a scar-crow of the Law” (Measure 
57, TLN451, 2.1). “It is the Law, not I, condemne your brother” (Measure 85, TLN833, 2.2). “The 
Law hath not bin dead, thogh it hath slept” (Measure 86, TLN845, 2.2). “You seem’d of late to 
make the Law a tirant” (Measure 116, TLN1123, 2.4). In the ensuing, Angelo expressly styles 
himself a mouthpiece: “I (now the voyce of the recorded Law)” (Measure 110, TLN1067, 2.4). 
331 Said intratextual hypólepsis (see Measure 168–171, TLN1604–1654; 172–173, TLN1666–
1673, 3.2) entails Lucio’s expressly asking the (cucullate) Duke to “say that I said so” (Measure 
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 Ultimately, the multilayered versatility and performative polytropism 
generally characteristic of rhetorical devices will probably all but inevitably 
lead to their being staged.332 Playfully and incisively performing its 
characteristically artful vicariousness in the meta-rhetorical play Words made 
viſible, Shaw’s personified Sermocination may therefore have the last word: 
Sermo. I am that Figure, Sir, by whom men recite the words of another in their diſcourſe. I 
am that Author of that ingenious Art of Quotation, whereby men may ſpeak as much 
Hereſie, Blaſphemy, Treaſon, as they will, and yet not be guilty of any theſe. The Author of 
that pleaſant Divertiſement of Tale-bearing, Detraƈtion, Miſpriſſion and Miſrepreſentation: 
the Author of that profitable Trade of revealing ſecrets and betraying Counſels. I have 
taught the Teachers themſelves to ſteal a whole Gooſe, feathers and all; and yet this is not 
felony but a large Quotation; and ſo that paſſes for Sermonizing, which is nothing but 
Sermocination. […] more men live and aƈt Sermocination than ſpeak it; ſeeing with other 
mens eyes, aƈting by other mens policy, and flaunting with other mens wit and money. 
(170)333 
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172–173, TLN1669–1670, 3.2); in other words: the slanderer himself delegates the fake friar to 
act as his mouthpiece. Lucio is generally depicted as a gossipmonger (ethopoetically): “They 
say”, “Some report […] Some” etc. (Measure 167, TLN1591 and 1596, 3.2). 
332 Neologisms may be conceived of as a way for putting words into a (personified) tradition’s 
mouth: “Puttenham’s Englishings invite the reader to imagine a persona actually uttering the 
figure to another in some sort of localized social context. Thus, ironia becomes ‘the Dry Mock’ 
and sarcasmus ‘the Bitter Taunt’ […]. Puttenham’s use of personified renamings […] connects 
language and behavior in the social world […] he transforms the vast majority of the tropes and 
schemes into characters […]. Sometimes the personifications seem to identify actual social 
types […]. If the Renaissance conceived of human beings as actors who perform not one but a 
host of different roles in the social world, Puttenham’s Englishings of the figures of speech 
transform them into all the varied ‘figures’—that is, all the varied masks or personas or selves—
that human beings might assume on the great stage of the world. Since the figures suggest that 
social interaction is always a matter of ‘counterfeiting’ one role or another, Puttenham’s 
personifications […] turn life into a continual allegory” (Wigham/Rebhorn 59). Such would 
conduce to, if not call for, dramatic enactments (such as Shaw’s ensuing piece). 
333 In this witty, parrhesiastic, and highly political school play on Shaw’s part, the persona of 
Sermocination is preceded by Apoſiopeſis (168–169; with reference to the Jesuits, 168); and 
followed by Proſopope (170–171), Sarcaſm (172–176). The former gives the ensuing exposition of 
itself—featuring another anti-Catholic invective, here by way of paronomastic punning on the 
Early Modern English spelling of prosopopoiía: “I am that Figure, Sir, whereby men aƈt ſome 
other perſon living or dead. I need not take much pains to diſcover to you, what ſucceſs my 
pains have had. The very laſt ſyllable in my name is greater than all the names of the Monarchs 
upon Earth; and I have given him the power to be ſo, by teaching him to aƈt the perſon of one 
that died ſixteen hundred years ago. I raiſe the dead as familiarly as any Conjurer: I make the 
vileſt Uſurper upon earth to paſs for a Reformer, the falſeſt Traytors to be eſteem’d as faithful 
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6 Concluding Synopsis (With a Brief Coda on 
Concealing the Art) 
More matter with less art. 
Shakespeare (Hamlet 241, II.ii.95) 
I perceive that even plainneſs it ſelf is Figurative. 
Shaw (139)334 
By effecting verisimilitude, plausibility, immediate evidence, the various 
ventriloquistic techniques detailed in part 5 at once accommodate and 
potentially manipulate texts, (historical) personae and éthe, as well as the 
respective recipients (readership, audience). The present conclusion provides a 
précis of parts 1 through 5, and offers a short coda on ‘entechnic’ artlessness. 
 In Augustine’s Confessions (section 1), several variants of rhetorical 
ventriloquism occur in a dense and decisive context: a Chastity personified and 
envisioned as speaking (prosopopoiía) is succeeded by (ethopoetic) words put 
into the mouth of the writer’s former self—which device prepares the crucial 
sermocinatio, the words attributed to children that everyone knows. 
 Also tendering a note on the method employed in the present study (2.2), 
the second heuristic part commences by outlining various ways in which 
rhetorical ventriloquism might obtain in dialogic genres (sensu lato). The 
Erasmian “Ciceronianus” features personified Humanist neologisms endowed 
with speech (prosopopoiía); regarding one of the protagonists (‘Nosoponus’), 
one might add that elements of notatio (his excessive Ciceronianism qua 
characteristic trait) seem to be playing a role, as well. Plato’s “Gorgias” presents 
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Counſellors, a meer Aſs to paſs for a Lion, and a Carrion Crow for a Peacock; and all this without 
any change of natures at all” (171); when asked whether its name not rather be “Hypocriſie”, 
Proſopope replies with an accentuation of pervasive representative action and life by proxy in 
human affairs that is similar to Sermocination’s aforesaid statement, thereby linking the two 
figures via the vicarious: “Men call me ſo ſometimes, Sir, but alaſs that name is too narrow for 
my nature. For in one word, all men aƈt over again the lives of other men, and whatever is done 
in the World is done by Proſopope” (171). For an analysis of this school play staging and 
enacting rhetorical figures as such, see Vickers (“Reflections” 92–98); on prosopopoiía in 
Shaw, cf. Vickers (“Reflections” 94); Christiansen (332). For an earlier, de re comparable play, 
see Burger on Reuchlin’s “Scenica Progymnasmata: Hoc est: Ludicra preexercitamenta”, “1497 
[…] von Heidelberger Studenten aufgeführt”, and trans. by “Hans Sachs” in “1530/31” as 
“Henno”: “Reuchlin will […] rhetorische Übungen auf szenische, […] schauspielmäßige Weise 
in einem Ludus durchführen” (Burger Renaissance 277; cf. 278–279). 
334 Cf. Christiansen (329). 
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two notorious personae (inter alia)—primarily by endowing them with likely 
speech acts (allocutiones) as per their familiar, hence likely bearing textually 
represented (drawing on previous, and conducing to further, ethopoiíai). From 
an equally metapoetical perspective, Cicero’s all but generic interlocutors “A.” 
and “M.” seem similarly disposed with a view to stressing the attributed words 
themselves (sermocinatio), while the Tacitean “Dialogus” might be seen to 
evince an especially dynamic ethopoietic agenda. Shakespeare’s “Lucrece” 
attributes (longer) speeches to (in)famous personae of Roman mytho- and 
historiography in a narrative framework—with the latter additionally 
accentuating that forms of ventriloquism are taking place. In the Cervantine 
“coloquio de los perros”, the extratextual reader faces a prosopopoiía—animals 
otherwise not deemed capable of (a distinctively) human (kind of) speech being 
(re)presented as talking—while the intratextual author claims to (simply) be 
recording all but verbatim the words actually spoken by dogs. 
 Subchapter 3.1 describes the concepts, and implications of, ‘effictio’ 
(‘charakterismós’), ‘notatio’ (‘ethopoiía’), ‘sermocinatio’ (‘dialogismós’), and 
‘conformatio’ (‘prosopopoiía’) in the anonymous Rhetorica ad Herennium; 
segment 3.2 indicates the use of the terms ‘prosopopoeia’ (seen to comprise 
‘sermocinatio’) and ‘imitatio’ (quasi ‘effictio’, here deviatingly called ‘ethopoeia’) 
in Quintilian (see the more detailed taxonomic synopsis in 3.4). Subchapter 3.3 
deals with the affine, rhetorico-dramatic concept of prósopa (personae) and the 
correlative notion of ethos—with due regard to the respective cultural contexts. 
 As to variants of rhetorical selfcraft (part 4 overall), subchapter 4.1 tenders a 
close reading of pertinent segments in the Dionysian treatise “Lysias”, which 
articulates the particular nexus between ‘enárgeia’ (‘evidentia’), ‘ethopoiía’, and 
‘tò prépon’ (the aptum)—thus taking up, applying, and elaborating on aspects 
entailed or prepared in part 3; crafting a concentrated description of the 
respective rhétor’s notable capacities, Dionysius at once elucidates, and 
textually performs, the very quality the tract attributes to its protagonist, the 
persona of ‘Lysias’ and its (received) ethos. Applying the concept of ‘personae’ 
as advanced in 3.3, segment 4.2 reads frontmatter in Shakespeare’s and 
Cervantes’ name with a view to an oratorico-dramatic approach to authorship. 
 Tying in with the heuristic method of parts 1, 2, and the conceptual 
groundwork laid in 3, the fifth offers additional, comparatist applications of the 
various forms of rhetorical ventriloquism. Via emphatically diachronic and 
transgeneric examples, said overall chapter focuses on the nexus of dispositio 
and sermocinatio—accentuating both the choice of words to be attributed, and 
their situative arrange- and placement in the mouth of particular personae (with 
selection and textual location pertaining to rhetorical economy). The conclusion 
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of part 5 highlights the particular artfulness required for—and articulating itself 
in—the various forms of ‘effectually putting plausible words into someone’s 
mouth’; said emphasis transitions to a brief coda on concealing the same.335 
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335 On ‘celare artem’ qua rhetorical premise and subtending value, see Heraclitus: ‘harmoníe 
aphanès phaneres kreítton’; “Unsichtbare Fügung ist stärker als sichtbare” (Kranz Vorsokratiker 
I. 162, 22B54). Blass has: “das scheinbar Gelöste ist in Wirklichkeit dennoch gebunden” 
(Beredsamkeit I. 419). Cf. Aristotle “Wherefore those who practise this artifice [sc. ‘giving their 
language a xénon (approx. unfamiliar, distinctive, verfremdet) air’] must conceal [‘lanthánein’] 
it and avoid the appearance of speaking artificially instead of naturally; for that which is 
natural persuades [‘pithanón’], but the artificial does not. For men become suspicious of one 
whom they think to be laying a trap for them […]. Art is cleverly concealed when the speaker 
chooses his words from ordinary language and puts them together like Euripides, who was the 
first to show the way” (Rhetoric 350–353, III.ii.3–5, 1404b); “if a speaker manages well, there 
will be something ‘foreign’ [‘xenikòn’] about his speech, while possibly the art may not be 
detected [‘lanthánein’], and his meaning will be clear [‘sapheniei’, sc. ‘have perspicuity’]. And 
this […] is the chief merit of rhetorical language [‘tou rhetorikou lógou areté’]” (Rhetoric 352–
355, III.ii.6, 1405a). Cf. “it is […] in speaking, that the orator’s skill conceals his art, so that it 
may not obtrude and be apparent to all [‘ne possit ars eminere et ab omnibus videri, facultate 
oratoris occultatur’]” (Rhet. ad Her. 250–251, IV.vii.10; with: “ne ars appareat”); for such would 
“instil[l][…] in the hearer the suspicion of premeditation and artifice, and this robs the speech 
of conviction [‘fidem’]” (Rhet. ad Her. 30–31, I.x.17). Caplan’s expedient and copious gloss ad 
locum (cf. Rhet. ad Her. 250n.–251n.) signals further textual locations of the ‘celare artem’ 
directive—inter alia in Aristotle, Dionysius, Longinus, Quintilian (as also cited herein). See the 
latter’s encomium of apparent effortlessness: “et perire artem putamus nisi appareat, cum 
desinat ars esse si apparet”; “and we think our art is wasted unless it can be seen, when the 
truth is that it ceases to be art once it is detected” (Inst. Orat. 3–5. 280–281, 4.2.127). The 
rhetorical gauge will always be ‘effectuality above all’. Cf. the orator’s applications: “The best 
[‘Optimae’] preparatory remarks will be those which go unnoticed [‘quae latuerint’]. […] Most 
effective of all is [‘plurimum tamen facit’] this clever pretence [‘callidissima (…) imitatio’] of 
simple candour [‘simplicitatis’] […]. The most eloquent of orators [‘vir eloquentissimus’] 
achieves his end [‘consecutus est’] […] by his common, everyday language and well concealed 
art [‘et arte occulta’]” (Inst. Orat. 3–5. 246–249, 4.2.57–58); “expressions […], in set 
commonplaces [‘in locis’], can be borne along with the tide and pass unnoticed [‘latent’] 
because of the richness [‘copia’] of their stylistic environment” (Inst. Orat. 3–5. 276–277, 
4.2.117); “compositio dissimulata” (Inst. Orat. 3–5. 276, 4.2.117). Quintilian spec. accentuates 
dispositio: “si quae sunt artes altiores, plerumque occultantur ut artes sint” (Inst. Orat. 6–8. 
340, 8.3.2; with Eden “Later Works” 93, 93n.; Rhet. Tradition 42n.). This pertains to latency 
literally: “Est emphasis […] cum ex aliquo dicto latens aliquid eruitur” (Quintilian Inst. Orat. 9–
10. 72, 9.2.64)—qualified as “aliud latens et auditori quasi inveniendum” (Inst. Orat. 9–10. 72, 
9.2.65), hence as engaging the audience in a notionally collaborative manner. Regarding the 
use of figures: “Sed ne si optimae quidem sint esse debent frequentes. Nam densitate ipsa 
figurae aperiuntur” (Inst. Orat. 9–10. 76, 9.2.72). Cf. Ovid: “Si latet, ars prodest” (“Art of Love” 
86, II.313). As a means functional qua remedy for any detrimental blatancy of the art, 
‘Longinus’ counsels fighting ‘fireworks’ with the same by adducing awe-inspiring ornateness 
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 The textual dynamics effected by various forms of rhetorical ventriloquism 
are specifically visible in cases where source texts (be they historiographical, 
literary, philosophical, or otherwise) are available for contrastive purposes. 
Often, such references will not (or no longer) be extant—and what may well 
have been a sermocinatio might not be discerned as such.336 With a view to 
manipulating an audience or readership, these contingencies achieve the most 
|| 
and the induction of striking emotions for purposes of overpowering the recipient’s ratio: 
“There is an inevitable suspicion attaching to the sophisticated use of figures [‘schemáton’]. It 
gives a suggestion of treachery, craft, fallacy […] So we find that a figure [‘schema’] is always 
most effective when it conceals the very fact of its being a figure. Sublimity [‘hýpsos’] and 
emotional intensity [‘páthos’] are a wonderfully helpful antidote against the suspicion that 
accompanies the use of figures. The artfulness of the trick is no longer obvious in its brilliant 
setting of beauty and grandeur, and thus avoids all suspicion. […] Much in the same way that 
dimmer lights vanish in the surrounding radiance of the sun, so an all-embracing atmosphere 
of grandeur obscures the rhetorical devices” (230–231, 17.1–2). This is directed against excess: 
“For art [‘téchne’] is only perfect when it looks like nature [‘phýsis’] and Nature succeeds only 
when she conceals latent art” (240–241, 22.1)—while “[t]o have bells hung all over you is the 
mark of a sophist” (247, 23.4). As to ‘celare artem’, see Trimpi on “Plotinus’” reaccentuation 
thereof with regard to “consciousness itself, which becomes more effective the less we are 
aware of it. ‘Conscious awareness, in fact, is likely to enfeeble the very activities of which there 
is consciousness […]’ (1.4.10)” (Muses 192n.). For Early Modern restatements, see Erasmus (here 
put into the mouth of Bulephorus): “docuit Cicero caput artis esse dissimulare artem” 
(“Ciceronianus” 86); as well as Castiglione (Courtier 32, I.26; Cortegiano 59, I.xxvi), as cited in 
subch. 4.2, above. On Montaigne’s concealing the art, see Sayce: “underneath” an “impression 
of spontaneity […] there is abundant evidence of rhetorical patterns and devices, of cunning 
echoes and modulated cadences” (312). “Supreme art consists in concealing art” (Knop 403; cf. 
412–414). In Shakespeare’s “Lucrece”, the following line provides a mise en abyme of the 
rhetorical device and directive: “In him [sc. Sinon] the painter laboured with his skill / To hide 
deceit” (“Lucrece” 357, v.1506–1507). See the gloss ad locum: “Sinon is the type of deceit, but 
the painter is also hiding his own art, as in the Latin tag ‘Ars est celare artem’ (‘It is art to hide 
art’)” (“Lucrece” 357n.). Gracián states: “Toda arte se ha de encubrir” (Oráculo manual 127, 
§45). Generally, see Oesterreich (“Person” 864; problematically, Fundamentalrhet. 138); 
Marschall (522); Asmuth (“Angemessenheit” 585); Mayfield (“Interplay” 6n.). The process and 
effect of celare artem has a pragmatic function: “Irrepimus tacite in rem, vel recta, quum altius 
repetitis principiis, prius quàm sentiat auditor quorsum evasurus sis, subruisti fundamenta rei 
contrariæ, et stabilivisti tuæ” (Vives 190, Aa3.v, II.xvi). 
336 Generally, see Strauss, referring to “Machiavelli[’s] indicat[ing] how easily the […] origin 
of utterances can be forgotten” (147). Bakhtin notes “[t]he process of gradual obliteration of 
authors as bearers of others’ words”; the latter “become anonymous and are assimilated (in 
reworked form, of course)”, hence “enter[…] into a new dialogue (with the […] voices of 
others)”, wherein “others’ words, […] voices that have become anonymous” are (again) 
“personifie[d]”; even so, “the authoritative word […] usually does not lose its bearer, does not 
become anonymous” (Speech 163; “Methodology” 67). 
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expedient forms of the respective technique, seeing that they ‘accidentally’ 
consummate the rhetorical desideratum par excellence—to be deploying a 
particular device (and the overall ars) so effectually that its use goes unnoticed: 
For this artlessness is itself the product of art [‘pepoíetai gàr auto touto tò apoíeton’]: […] it 
is in the very illusion of not having been composed with masterly skill that the mastery 
lies [‘en auto to mè dokein deinos kateskeuásthai tò deinòn échei’]. (Dionysius “Lysias” 
34–35, §8)337  
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337 See Dionysius’ artful (re)statement of the formula with respect to Lysias: the “χαρακτὴρ” 
of his “composition seems [‘dokei’] […] not to be contrived [‘apoíetós’] or formed by any 
conscious art [‘atechníteutos’]”, so that “every layman” and “many […] scholars [‘ton 
philológon’] […] not specialised in oratory” are likely to “receive the impression that this 
arrangement has not been deliberately and artistically devised [‘ou katà téchnen’], but is 
somehow spontaneous [‘automátos’] and fortuitous [‘étyche’]. Yet it is more carefully 
composed than any work of art [‘érgou technikou’]. For this artlessness is itself the product of 
art: […] it is in the very illusion of not having been composed with masterly skill that the 
mastery lies” (“Lysias” 34–35, §8; see the priming sequence: 26–27, §3). Cf. Bruss (50–51), 
stating: “Lysias is a master of the art of artlessness” (51; with 56). Usher: “his apparent 
artlessness conceals art” (“Lysias. Intro.” 17). Roberts: “the best art is that which best conceals 
itself” (47)—precisely because, as “Dionysius more than once reminds us […] the excellence of 
the ancient authors was the result of […] elaborate art”; he notes “the infinite pains bestowed”, 
that “the labour is severe” (46); and Roberts says as much of the Ancient critic himself (47–48). 
This pertains spec. to rhetorical dispositio (cf. subch. 5.1). Ultimately, the process and 
technique of celare artem also implies that art is discerned by the same, hence by those 
practicing it; see Quintilian’s reference to “the speaker’s plan and hidden artifice [‘occulta 
calliditas’]”—stressing that “in this business the only art is that which can only be seen by an 
artist [‘namque ea sola in hoc ars est, quae intellegi nisi ab artifice non possit’]” (Inst. Orat. 1–2. 
302–303, 2.5.7–8; with 302n.). Cf. “Nam si qua in his [sc. delivery, facial expressions, gestures, 
here] ars est dicentium, ea prima est ne ars esse videatur” (Inst. Orat. 1–2. 238, 1.11.3). Likewise 
Blumenberg, on the overall téchne: “Rhetoric teaches to discern rhetoric” (“Annäherung” 423; 
trans. dsm). “Gegen Rhetorik hilft nur Rhetorik” (Niehues-Pröbsting “Ethos” 345). 
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